Feyerabend, Kuhn... Janus, although they might not admit it; this is where their story ends. — Banno
How would you eliminate doubt that there is some aspect of their language that is untranslatable? — frank
And how would I eliminate the doubt - should I have it - that there is some aspect of your use of English that is untranslatable? — Banno
Indeed, wouldn't a part of your language that was untranslatable into any shared language be a private language in Wittgenstein's sense? — Banno
...neither Chinese nor Western medicine are translatable into the terms of the other, — Janus
But that's just not true. If the tumour goes away, the tumour goes away, regardless of what you call the tumour. — Banno
If we say that there is a strict demarcation between science and pseudoscience, then we are committed to saying that all worldviews prior to our current scientific worldview are false and meaningless. To say that would look like a prime example of cultural chauvinism and the modernist myth of progress. — Janus
Here we have all the required elements: language as the organizing force, not to be distinguished clearly from science; what is organized, referred to variously as "experience," "the stream of sensory experience," and "physical evidence"; and finally, the failure of intertranslatability ("calibration").
The idea is then that something is a language, and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can translate it or not, if it stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, facing or fitting) to experience (nature, reality, sensory promptings).
The general position is that sensory experience provides all the evidence for the acceptance of sentences (where sentences may include whole theories)
The trouble is that the notion of fitting the totality of experience, like the notions of fitting the facts, or being true to the facts, adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. To
speak of sensory experience rather than the evidence, or just the facts, expresses a view about the source or nature of evidence, but it does not add a new entity to the universe against which to test
conceptual schemes
Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes
in terms of the notion of fitting some entity has come down, then,
to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual
scheme or theory if it is true. Perhaps we better say largely true in
order to allow sharers of a scheme to differ on details. And the
criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own now becomes: largely true but not translatable
But there is clear progress, at least in terms of science and technology. — Marchesk
But that's just not true. If the tumour goes away, the tumour goes away, regardless of what you call the tumour. — Banno
This notion of one paradigm not being translatable into the other fails, because overwhelmingly we share the same beliefs. — Banno
But that's just not true. If the tumour goes away, the tumour goes away, regardless of what you call the tumour.
— Banno
I don't find this response to be adequate or even relevant, so I won't respond to it further. — Janus
Claiming that Chinese medicine cannot be understood in western terms is intellectual smog. — Banno
If the tumour goes away, the tumour goes away, regardless of what you call the tumour. — Banno
I'm assuming you understand that I am not talking about the outcomes of Chinese medicine, but about its conceptual underpinnings. Negative outcomes, as well as positive, are a feature of both Chinese and Western medicine, of course; but that is irrelevant. — Janus
A familiar example would be that the beliefs associated with Christianity are not translatable into the terms of the physical sciences or even into general empirical terms. — Janus
The stuff in the cup is wine. Those who say it is blood are doing no more than playing word games. — Banno
A nontrivial case - in the sense that a foundational belief - the ascendency of matter over the imagination - is thrown into question. To the zealous, the imagination-centered scheme ("blood") is a deeper reflection of reality than the matter-centered scheme ("wine"). So things are topsy-turvy. But there is still a background of common beliefs - for example a belief in the existence of the red liquid. — ZzzoneiroCosm
I'm not certain that a conceptual scheme can be true or false, for the purposes of the article — fdrake
Yes, we have translated the objects of one to the objects of another. Have we translated their relations? — Isaac
We have translated proper names? And nothing else? — Banno
That there are beliefs which function in one which would not function in another. — Isaac
"Function"? What is it for a belief to function, as against it's being true? — Banno
But that's just not true. If the tumour goes away, the tumour goes away, regardless of what you call the tumour. — Banno
This notion of one paradigm not being translatable into the other fails, because overwhelmingly we share the same beliefs. — Banno
Davidson says "...something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory if it is true" I thought it a simplification to allow a wider view, but since it is one the author uses too, that seems a reasonable endorsement to use it, no? — Isaac
Without an idea of conceptual schemes, models, predictions, expectations... We simply would have to discard the last two decades of cognitive science. — Isaac
My reaction is that perhaps the conceptual schemes Davidson is dealing with differ in some important way from the models that you are discussing here. — Banno
This is very much the conclusion I'm coming to as well. The only exception to that is Kuhn. The article specifically 'attacks' Kuhn and yet it feels like Kuhn is talking about the sorts of models I'm discussing (or there's some overlap, might be more accurate). — Isaac
That's it. — Banno
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