Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the sway of the scheme concept; even monotheists have religion.
A table of terms that are associated with both organize and fit — Moliere
Any tertiary sources? — Banno
We saw that any conceptual scheme worthy of the title must be true. — Banno
I see the argument here as a rejection of defining truth in terms of fit. Davidson takes truth as fundamental. — Banno
T-sentences — Banno
T-sentences — Banno
... any conceptual scheme worthy of consideration will be true. — Banno
...we literally make it true (now in the Ramseyan sense...) — Isaac
Something can be 'true' if the scheme's predictions match the phenomenal experience, but the phenomenal experience is mediated by the scheme - we see what we want/expect to see, we literally make it true — Isaac
Something can be believed if the predictions it implies match the phenomenal experience, but the phenomenal experience is mediated by the predictions - we see what we want/expect to see... — Isaac
As the triviality of the case decreases the background of common beliefs decreases.
Accepting that some degree of translation is possible, the background of common beliefs will never decrease to 0%. In cases of increasing nontriviality, though the background of common beliefs may dwindle, it will never decrease to 0%. The limit-case-percentage is unknown.
In the example of Chinese and Western medicine, as Banno describes it, the background of common beliefs may be as limited as a belief in tumors and the will to rid the body of them.
Within the two conceptual schemes there may exist two distinct conceptions of the body, two distinct conceptions of the mind-body relationship and of the magical potencies of matter and of metaphysics in general. This is exemplary of a nontrivial case. But there is agreement within the framework of both schemes that tumors are bad and should go away and agreement that they sometimes do go away. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Does he mock the faithful? — bongo fury
, I should like to read Davidson as just saying to the extremists, the incommensurabilists: look, accept that if two links in 'separate' referential webs are in some undeniable way equivalent, then the webs can't be as separate as you thought. — bongo fury
But that's not a bad summation. — Banno
Honey, vinegar and flies. — Banno
We saw that any conceptual scheme worthy of the title must be true.
— Banno
Rereading Davidson and the thread.
Can you connect this statement to a quote in Davidson? Where does Davidson measure the titular "worthiness" of conceptual schemes? — ZzzoneiroCosm
Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes in terms of the notion of fitting some entity has come down, then, to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory if it is true.
Davidson argues that to fit is to be true.
— Banno
I see the argument here as a rejection of defining truth in terms of fit.
— Banno
A contradiction here vis-a-vis truth in connection to fit. Can you parse this or connect it to some quotes? — ZzzoneiroCosm
your improved understanding of the article might be better facilitated by your attempting to answer these questions yourself. — Banno
The first is not a definition of truth, so much as of fit in terms of truth. The second says there can be no definition of truth. Hence, no contradiction. — Banno
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