Positive ethics is intra-worldly, i.e. how to live.

Negative ethics is prior to the world, i.e. whether or not one should live.

Once a person exists, they have interests which include having positive experiences.

Before a person exists, they have no interest in having positive experiences.

Metaphor: once noodles are boiled, the noodles cannot become rigid again. They also taste better with spice. — darthbarracuda

Good points. Your implication is that prior to birth, negative ethics always takes precedence. That is create no harm, force no harm. However, I would argue, even after existence we have negative principles such as non-aggression and non-harm. It is the fact that it is unavoidable to completely bypass these in the mirky intra-wordly affairs that is the point. For example, in almost all realms, non-aggression and non-harm are at least seen as ideals towards others. By aggression, I don't mean like the aggression of playing a game or sports (though that does bring actual harm sometimes), but aggression as in physically forcing someone into a viewpoint that the aggressor decides is good for them. It cannot be avoided but it is usual a typical standard, that ironically does not get applied to procreation, the exact time when all harm and force can be prevented.

So the species work properly and betterment of society are the two positive ethics I see here (an example of X that I proposed for whatever positive ethics one proposes).Why do we need people born to better society and the species to work properly? I guess, a) Why prima facie does this matter? b) Why would forcing existence on someone who will definitely suffer be justified for this? In other words, why would the two negative ethical principles of non-aggression (non-forcing) and non-harming be violated on behalf of this grand agenda of species and society? — schopenhauer1

Not really, as my only two claims were that 1) Suffering and happiness work for those things and 2) Because the nature of these are similar, there is no real reason to treat them very differently like you suggest. I could've followed up what i said with that (since our thoughts about morality came from that and are still based on the very idea, i would say it is reasonable to suggest morality is basically that and also that the "oughts" we suppose come from that too, not really leaving any other candidate for the basis for normative claims) but i did not so that i could hear your justification for treating them that way.

Also, i do not agree with your assumption that these principles should be upheld at all costs, so...

Nah, I couple the prevent harm principle almost always with non-aggression principle. You should not force anyone into your perspective. In fact that is one of the main reasons for antinatalism in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Well, should that principle really be upheld if billions of people, not to mention any other living beings capable of experiencing pain, suffer everyday and will continue to suffer untill they eventually die? I can not see a reason not to violate it. The idea that we should uphold some principle that only exists to avoid suffering (If it does not, why even have it? It can not be a morally good principle then.) when all it does is allowing for more suffering sounds counter-intuitive to me.

The idea that we should uphold some principle that only exists to avoid suffering (If it does not, why even have it? It can not be a morally good principle then.) when all it does is allowing for more suffering sounds counter-intuitive to me. — HereToDisscuss

Once born, the principle of forcing the end of others to prevent suffering, does not hold up for reasons @darthbarracuda was getting at. That is to say, once born, the rules of the intra-worldly affairs hold sway. That is, there are people with their own wills and goals. Prior to birth, there was an asymmetry of preventing pain (which is absolutely good even if no one to realize no suffering), and relative good (preventing good only matters if an actual person is around). Now, preventing someone's desires, wills, and negating that DOES come into play once born. Thus not only the prevention of harm, but the principle of respecting that a person exists with desires, etc. comes into play. Notice it is STILL a negative ethic.. Prevent suffering when you can, but prevent aggression as well. Prior to birth, no force at all takes place upon someone else (unlike the procreation scenario), AND no suffering will be caused (unlike the procreation scenario). Indeed, preventing suffering is always good. Once existing, ending lives, even to prevent harm to them later on, is like making humans who will suffer so they can benefit from it later on.. The non-aggression principle is being violated in both scenarios, and it is using people as an agenda in both scenarios.

If I may ... :chin:

Imagine a bucket with a hole. Yes the hole (suffering) must be adequately sealed (negative ethics) but the goal actually is to fill the bucket (positive ethics). — TheMadFool

Yet since "the hole" can never be filled once and for all (without discarding (i.e. euthanizing, suiciding) "the bucket"), the infinite task (à la Sisyphus' stone) of re/filling "the hole" becomes "the goal".

With ethical theories, you can have positive ethics and negative ethics. Roughly speaking, [ ... ] You can have a mixture of the two, but I am proposing that it is only negative ethics that matters ... — schopenhauer1

False dichotomy. "Positive and negative" entail each other. Like coin faces. Like mass-gravity. Like yin-yang. Etc ...

Besides, double negation yields positivity: 'negation of suffering' is caring for 'well-being' of a sufferer. So I reject the premise of the OP. To wit: claiming, or assuming, that there are two types of ethics, practiced separately or "mixed", begs for Occam's Razor; rather, in effect, ethics has (at least) two aspects (i.e. foci): indirect self-care (1. positive - 'actualizes' (i.e. optimizes) self - which is also a sufferer - as a moral agent) via direct care of sufferers (2. negative - helps eliminate hindrances to well being).

Perhaps this 'dual-aspect' concept is more apparent with
agent-based systems (e.g. here's mine (sketched)) than with (mere) rule-based, act-based or preference-base systems.

Approximately a year ago, I collaborated with several people of various nationalities in an effort to document the work of the Argentinian philosopher Julio Cabrera. His work focuses on what he calls "negative ethics". I have copy-pasted the section on negative ethics from Wikipedia. I think it has direct relevance to the topic at hand. Perhaps you will find it interesting:

"In his book A Critique of Affirmative Morality (A reflection on Death, Birth and the Value of Life),[4] Julio Cabrera presents his theory about the value of human existence. Human life, for Cabrera, is "structurally negative" insofar as there are negative components of life that are inevitable, constitutive and adverse: as prominent among them Cabrera cites loss, scarcity, pain, conflicts, fragility, illness, aging, discouragement and death. According to Cabrera they form the basic structure to human life, which he analyzes through what he calls naturalistic phenomenology, drawing freely from thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. Cabrera has called his work an attempt to put together Schopenhauer and Heidegger, introducing a determinant judgement of the value of being into the analysis of Dasein, and putting morality above life, against Nietzsche.

Cabrera develops an ethical theory, negative ethics, that is informed by this phenomenological analysis. He argues that there has been an unwarranted prejudice in ethics against non-being, a view he calls "affirmativity". Because affirmative views take being as good, they always view things that threaten this hegemony as bad; particularly things like abstention from procreation or suicide. Cabrera criticizes affirmative ethics for asking how people should live without asking the radical question of whether people should live tout court. He argues that, because of the structural negativity of being, there is a fundamental "moral disqualification" of human beings due to the impossibility of nonharming and nonmanipulating others. Nonharming and nonmanipulating others is called by him the "Minimal Ethical Articulation" ("MEA"; previously translated into English as "Fundamental Ethical Articulation" and "FEA"). The MEA is violated by our structural "moral impediment", by the worldly discomforts – notably pain and discouragement – imposed on us that prevent us from acting ethically. Cabrera argues that an affirmative morality is a self-contradiction because it accepts the MEA and conceives a human existence that precludes the possibility of not-harming or not-manipulating others. Thus he believes that affirmative societies, through their politics, require the common suspension of the MEA to even function.

Cabrera's negative ethics is supposed to be a response to the negative structure of being, acutely aware of the morally disqualifying nature of being. Cabrera believes children are usually considered as mere aesthetic objects, are not created for their own sake but for the sake of their parents, and are thrown into a structurally negative life by the act of procreation. Procreation is, as Cabrera argues, a supreme act of manipulation, a harm and a violation of autonomy. He argues that the consistent application of normal moral concepts – like duty, virtue or respect – present in most affirmative moralities entails antinatalism. Cabrera also believes that a human being adopting negative ethics should not only abstain from procreation, but also should have a complete willingness for an ethical death, by immediate suspension of all personal projects in benefit of a political fight[5] or an altruistic suicide, when it becomes the least immoral course of action.

Cabrera's Critique is one of his most systematic defenses of negative ethics, but he has also explored the same ideas in other works, such as Projeto de Ética Negativa,[6] Ética Negativa: problemas e discussões,[7] Porque te amo, não nascerás! Nascituri te salutant[8] and Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation."

Yet since "the hole" can never be filled once and for all (without discarding (i.e. euthanizing, suiciding) "the bucket"), the infinite task (à la Sisyphus' stone) of re/filling "the hole" becomes "the goal". — 180 Proof

Fantastic point but I don't think this is a complete and accurate description of the human condition. It all depends on what you think is the hole in the bucket of life. If you consider sickness and death, obvious inevitabilities, as constituting the problem then true, the task is a pointless Sisyphean task. I question this attitude, at least insofar as death is concerned. Why? Simply because, in a weird way, complaining about what can't be avoided, like death, is equally, if not more, absurd. It appears therefore that we're left with two choices - Sisyphus or a sad Sisyphus. Where this ties in with what I have to say is that we may need to rethink what the hole in the bucket of life is. Also, if scientists are to be believed there's a lot of research going on in disease and longevity. Perfect health and immortality may eventually banish the antinatalist into quaint mythology.

If we both agree that more refined suffering exists at higher levels (along with the "fulfillment"), why would the fulfillment matter in the face of at least some negative experience? In other words, what about "fulfillment" overrides the two principles of non-aggression and non-harm? Why should this grand agenda be enough justification to override the negative ethics? Certainly no one needs fulfillment prior to birth. You must violate the principles of non-harm, non-aggression to another person, in order to create these chances for fulfillment. Why does thinking something is good for someone else count as being a reason to violate these negative ethical principles? — schopenhauer1

In the spirit of pragmatism and wisdom it behooves us to tackle any problem, yours/this included, in the best way possible. For that we must give some weightage to positive ethics. After all we're, hopefully, not in hell, tormented in such manner that makes the desire for pain relief so urgent that it makes positive ethics moot. I don't mean to make light of the real and horrible suffering some have undergone but to consider this as a problem for all is a hasty generalization.

False dichotomy. "Positive and negative" entail each other. Like coin faces. Like mass-gravity. Like yin-yang. Etc ...

Besides, double negation yields positivity: 'negation of suffering' is caring for 'well-being' of a sufferer. So I reject the premise of the OP. To wit: claiming, or assuming, that there are two types of ethics, practiced separately or "mixed", begs for Occam's Razor; rather, in effect, ethics has (at least) two aspects (i.e. foci): indirect self-care (1. positive - 'actualizes' (i.e. optimizes) self - which is also suffers - as a moral agent) via direct care of sufferers (2. negative - helps eliminate hindrances to well being).

Perhaps this 'dual-aspect' concept is more apparent with
agent-based systems (e.g. here's mine (sketched)) than with (mere) rule-based, act-based or preference-base systems. — 180 Proof

I think we are actually somewhat near the same page on this. There is an aspect of being used in procreation. People are born for an X reason (that is third-party that is not the agent that is actually being affected by the decision). Preventing birth is respecting the dignity of preventing any future suffering and not forcing a situation onto someone. At the procreational decision, we uniquely have the ability to not force agendas and to prevent all suffering. Once born, agendas and suffering ensue. We can cope for sure with whatever flavor you want, buy into whatever rhetoric, but the basic agenda of life, and the more refined agenda of society, and the agenda of pursuing this or that ensues along with unknown quantities of undue harm and collateral damage. Why, we don't ask, we just assume and foist, assume and foist. What's good for the goose (me) is good for the gander (other people), right? Blah, that's not respecting shit for anybody. It's the ultimate hubris of "I know what's best for everyone". Yet, I get accused of it most. The gumption :).

In the spirit of pragmatism and wisdom it behooves us to tackle any problem, yours/this included, in the best way possible. For that we must give some weightage to positive ethics. After all we're, hopefully, not in hell, tormented in such manner that makes the desire for pain relief so urgent that it makes positive ethics moot. I don't mean to make light of the real and horrible suffering some have undergone but to consider this as a problem for all is a hasty generalization. — TheMadFool

I refer you to my last post as it is basically the response to this notion that positive ethics is required as default for other people to follow.

Once born, the principle of forcing the end of others to prevent suffering, does not hold up for reasons darthbarracuda was getting at. That is to say, once born, the rules of the intra-worldly affairs hold sway. That is, there are people with their own wills and goals. Prior to birth, there was an asymmetry of preventing pain (which is absolutely good even if no one to realize no suffering), and relative good (preventing good only matters if an actual person is around). Now, preventing someone's desires, wills, and negating that DOES come into play once born. Thus not only the prevention of harm, but the principle of respecting that a person exists with desires, etc. comes into play. Notice it is STILL a negative ethic.. Prevent suffering when you can, but prevent aggression as well. — schopenhauer1

Well, is preventing desires and wills really a bad thing compared to letting suffering go on? The problem is, these desires and wills lead to more suffering (almost every single one of them, i would say) and, more importantly, they also lead to new individuals that will definitely suffer being born. If you end the human race, you will also prevent the suffering of these new people who will be "forced into existence" and it is justified as a result-and i am ignoring the fact other living beings, aside from humans, can experience pain and suffer too. I would argue that this means that if you have the power to destroy all life on planet Earth and you choose to not do it, you are indirectly responsible for the suffering of those individuals and other living beings who will be born. In that case, is not preventing desires and wills of living individuals really better when not doing that means more people (and other living beings who will experience pain) will suffer? That does not seem to be the case for me, especially when one considers how many animals also get forced into existence in a more cruel way-it is countless. (especially the ones we use as food, like chickens)


Also, that was supposed to be a side comment-i am curious as to why you only quoted and replied to that and nothing else. Isn't the main topic something else-that is whetever intrinsic positives exist or not?

Well, is preventing desires and wills really a bad thing compared to letting suffering go on? The problem is, these desires and wills lead to more suffering (almost every single one of them, i would say) and, more importantly, they also lead to new individuals that will definitely suffer being born. If you end the human race, you will also prevent the suffering of these new people who will be "forced into existence" and it is justified as a result-and i am ignoring the fact other living beings, aside from humans, can experience pain and suffer too. I would argue that this means that if you have the power to destroy all life on planet Earth and you choose to not do it, you are indirectly responsible for the suffering of those individuals and other living beings who will be born. In that case, is not preventing desires and wills of living individuals really better when not doing that means more people (and other living beings who will experience pain) will suffer? That does not seem to be the case for me, especially when one considers how many animals also get forced into existence in a more cruel way-it is countless. (especially the ones we use as food, like chickens) — HereToDisscuss

So, if you pay attention to my arguments, I put a lot of weight on non-aggression. Once born, people have their own autonomous identity as individuals and should be respected. Thus the principle of non-harm is contradicted here with the principle of non-aggression. Thus, this ethic would not be one of some Lex Luther villain, purely contemplating calculations of loss and harm. People as individuals are taken into account. Thus, as I have always advocated, the only means by which an antinatalist can further their cause is through argumentation and convincing of the individual. That is it.

So, if you pay attention to my arguments, I put a lot of weight on non-aggression. Once born, people have their own autonomous identity as individuals and should be respected. Thus the principle of non-harm is contradicted here with the principle of non-aggression. Thus, this ethic would not be one of some Lex Luther villain, purely contemplating calculations of loss and harm. People as individuals are taken into account. Thus, as I have always advocated, the only means by which an antinatalist can further their cause is through argumentation and convincing of the individual. That is it. — schopenhauer1

Well, i was just trying to show that this has unwanted results (both negative ethics and the non-aggression principle). It just leads to more suffering. So, why exactly should we accept this principle by default? Just because?

Also, how can principles contradict each other? I do not think that is deontological ethics anymore, so i am curious to see your explanation.

Last of all, when confronted with two contradictory principles when assessing whetever one ought to make a certain decision or not, on what basis should one pick one over the other?

I refer you to my last post as it is basically the response to this notion that positive ethics is required as default for other people to follow. — schopenhauer1

I don't know whether I'm agreeing/disagreeing with you here. "Basic necessities" seems self-explanatory right? Perhaps people will argue over what counts as basic but the words "basic necessities" has a ring of compelling urgency right?

Well, i was just trying to show that this has unwanted results (both negative ethics and the non-aggression principle). It just leads to more suffering. So, why exactly should we accept this principle by default? Just because? — HereToDisscuss

So again, you are ignoring the autonomous human part. Autonomous individuals have to be accounted for. If you are paying attention, these ethical theories are grounded in individuals NOT third-party agendas (like some amorphous utilitarian calculation of harm that you proposed in your life-ending scenario). In fact, one of the main reasons for not having people is that it is not using people in order for them to follow third-party agendas, however starry-eyed the reasons (like pursuing happiness, character-building games, finding their way in the current society, making society better, tending the farm, advancing the tribe, following religious principles, etc. etc.). Individuals are where ethics resides because individuals bear the brunt of existence. Society and outside entities may help form individuals, but it is at the individual level that life is experienced, decisions are made, suffering occurs etc. Thus, third-party reasons that affect individuals who can otherwise have a say, would be using those individuals.

Also, how can principles contradict each other? I do not think that is deontological ethics anymore, so i am curious to see your explanation. — HereToDisscuss

Why wouldn't they at times? Non-harm is important, but the principle cannot be forced on others. Non-harm is perfectly legitimate a consideration prior to birth. Harm will be prevented from preventing birth. By having someone, you are causing conditions for harm. Not only that, you are forcing someone to deal with this. By preventing birth, both principles are followed- non-harm and non-aggression. Once born, the intra-wordly rules apply because now there is or will be an autonomous individual, where considerations of non-aggression must be had. It isn't that hard to fathom that both principles can be in effect at the same time, one mitigating the other. Thus it is not purely consequential nor deontological, etc.

Last of all, when confronted with two contradictory principles when assessing whetever one ought to make a certain decision or not, on what basis should one pick one over the other? — HereToDisscuss

I think I explained at the beginning as to how the decisions prior to birth would be different than after birth. Prior to birth, all instances of harm can be prevented without any force whatsoever. After birth, considerations of force and non-aggression must be employed as well. If people are not to be used in agendas (as is the case of birth), then to be consistent here, people once born, cannot be used in agendas (like ceasing all harm and suffering). However, there is an instance where all suffering can be prevented without using individuals as agendas, and that is birth.

I don't know whether I'm agreeing/disagreeing with you here. "Basic necessities" seems self-explanatory right? Perhaps people will argue over what counts as basic but the words "basic necessities" has a ring of compelling urgency right? — TheMadFool

I don't follow. Is this a new idea or something pertaining to a previous post?

I don't follow. Is this a new idea or something pertaining to a previous post? — schopenhauer1

I mean basic necessities kinda screams out at you that it should be a priority doesn't it?

So again, you are ignoring the autonomous human part. Autonomous individuals have to be accounted for. If you are paying attention, these ethical theories are grounded in individuals NOT third-party agendas (like some amorphous utilitarian calculation of harm that you proposed in your life-ending scenario). — schopenhauer1

Well, what about the will-be automomous individuals that won't be born yet? Are those "autonomous individuals" so important that the suffering that they cause are okay? Or, in other words, if the individual brings about a huge amount of suffering, aren't we entitled to prevent their desires and wills so that they do not do it anymore? Isn't this the reasoning we use for punishing criminals?
You do not account those other individuals.

In fact, one of the main reasons for not having people is that it is not using people in order for them to follow third-party agendas, however starry-eyed the reasons (like pursuing happiness, character-building games, finding their way in the current society, making society better, tending the farm, advancing the tribe, following religious principles, etc. etc.) — schopenhauer1

I have showed why it was not merely an agenda though. You just choose to ignore it and are now pretending nobody has tried to justify it-at least in this thread.

Individuals are where ethics resides because individuals bear the brunt of existence. Society and outside entities may help form individuals, but it is at the individual level that life is experienced, decisions are made, suffering occurs etc. Thus, third-party reasons that affect individuals who can otherwise have a say, would be using those individuals. — schopenhauer1

And "using individuals", in some cases, is okay, right? For example, we punish criminals. We punish children. We sometimes make decisions on behalf of people who are not informed enough to make a good decision even if they do not want it.
I am not going to quote the other paragraph as it is essentially the same point. I am just going to ask a question:

If people are not to be used in agendas (as is the case of birth), then to be consistent here, people once born, cannot be used in agendas (like ceasing all harm and suffering). — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by an "agenda" then? How can it be an agenda when it is the only thing that actually matters when making moral decisions?
Please define that word.

I mean basic necessities kinda screams out at you that it should be a priority doesn't it? — TheMadFool

But in what context?

Well, what about the will-be automomous individuals that won't be born yet? Are those "autonomous individuals" so important that the suffering that they cause are okay? Or, in other words, if the individual brings about a huge amount of suffering, aren't we entitled to prevent their desires and wills so that they do not do it anymore? Isn't this the reasoning we use for punishing criminals?
You do not account those other individuals. — HereToDisscuss

You'd have to explain this a bit more. I'm not quite getting the scenario. If we prevent birth, and that person who was prevented from birth might have caused suffering to others in large quantities.. is it that sort of thing? I'm not quite getting it.

I have showed why it was not merely an agenda though. You just choose to ignore it and are now pretending nobody has tried to justify it-at least in this thread. — HereToDisscuss

Shown WHAT was merely not an agenda?

And "using individuals", in some cases, is okay, right? For example, we punish criminals. We punish children. We sometimes make decisions on behalf of people who are not informed enough to make a good decision even if they do not want it. — HereToDisscuss

As I've said elsewhere: Except for cases which I acknowledged- children needing guidance from parents, self-defense, or the threat-of-force, there are no excuses other than people have an agenda, and they want someone else to follow that agenda and that agenda is more important than the non-aggression principle. Why should it be in this case and not others? Because the will of the parent is strong? Because social pressures can bypass principles of non-aggression?

As for the child needing guidance, I said that this "force" is only temporary time/place, the birth decision reaches all the way into autonomous adulthood. If you need a reminder for the reasoning there.

What do you mean by an "agenda" then? How can it be an agenda when it is the only thing that actually matters when making moral decisions?
Please define that word. — HereToDisscuss

What is the only thing that actually matters? I said non-aggression and non-harm both matter. At the birth decision, we can prevent complete harm onto someone else, and we completely not force a decision onto someone- both principles are perfectly followed. Once you have violated the non-aggression principle and procreated another person- forcing a view, so to say LITERALLY onto another (for a whole lifetime nonetheless!), then the intra-wordly affairs of mitigating non-harm and non-aggression RECOGNIZING the autonomy of the individual who has choices, decisions, wills, desires, ensues. As for punishing criminals, if the justice system is "just", it is probably revolving around the idea of non-aggression, exactly the principle I explained. That is, the person violated this principle to some extent (theft of property, physical violence, threats of violence, threats to property, etc. etc.). Now there may be unjust or unnecessary laws, or misapplied laws, but that's a totally different issue and not necessarily in the realm of ethics proper though tangential.

But in what context? — schopenhauer1

In the context which requires us not to ignore negative ethics.

In the context which requires us not to ignore negative ethics. — TheMadFool

It may be, but can you make a few sentences or paragraph actually framing what you are saying about basic necessities and negative ethics.

Preventing birth is respecting the dignity of preventing any future suffering and not forcing a situation onto someone. At the procreational decision, we uniquely have the ability to not force agendas and to prevent all suffering. Once born, agendas and suffering ensue. — schopenhauer1

This reasoning discounts the suffering that would result from frustrating primordial biological drives to procreate - whether self-abstemious or state prohibitionary it's the same deprivation - which trades-off increased suffering of current childless persons for the price of "preventing" "future suffering" of offspring while indifferent to the fact that being regretfully / involuntarily childless persons increases the suffering of their future selves.

Misery breeds company. As you point out, schopenhauer 1, at the "the procreational decision" it's always already (2.5 million years!) too late for the "already born" to excise, or en masse talk themselves out of, our species-hardwired, libidinally-facile, procreative drives ... Ethics more profitably focuses on how sufferers Can/Must avoid minimize or relieve increasing suffering (I prefer harm) to sufferers - ourselves and others - rather than, in effect, assuming counterfactually that in some possible world sufferers do not exist, suffering does not exist, and that we ought to strive to actualize, so to speak, that (utopian? extinction?) possibility. 'Destroy the village in order to save the village' - irrational ad absurdum as well as immoral.

I am antinatalist in the same sense I am pro-suicide, pro-euthanasia, & pro-abortion: philosophically, that is, as a hypothetical prospect, or option, - pro or con - for each thinking person to choose for him or herself without coercion by any manifest authority or violence (i.e. non-aggression principle). The reasoning is clear: sufferers ought not increase their own or any other sufferer's suffering, because this abject condition - existence - cannot be prevented ex post facto. The reductio (above) exposes an interpretation of antinatalism that (by neglect) increases suffering (of the "already born") more than it speculatively prevents.

It may be, but can you make a few sentences or paragraph actually framing what you are saying about basic necessities and negative ethics. — schopenhauer1

If you don't mind I'd like to continue with my bucket with a hole analogy of life. The hole represents the basic necessities and, by any rationale they need to be tackled first. Otherwise, as @180 Proof said we're going to be in an Sisyphean situation. The word "basic" and "necessities" emphasize this point as they have a sense of urgency in them.

Then there's the issue of what constitutes the hole in the bucket. Do we include in it things that are clearly unavoidable like some forms of suffering like sickness and death?

To some the answer would be a resounding "yes"but if you consider the inevitability of death and sickness it looks like making them part of the problem would be like Sispyhus exchanging his already heavy stone for another heavier one. In other words we would be compounding our own problems. This suggests that for the sake of practicality, we exclude the insurmountable from the list of our problems.

On the other hand ignoring sickness, death, etc which are real sources of misery and focusing on the "easy" problems like, e.g., adequate recreational time, would be like trying to correct the grammatical errors in the speech of someone waving a gun in your face - misprioritization with fatal consequences. What bears mentioning here is that people are interested in solving the problem of sickness and death. Many leading minds have predicted that immortality and perfect health could be achieved in the next 30 years (an optimistic estimate). This means that a lot of the problems which form the basis of an antinatalist outlook are being or will be solved.

As you mentioned, every stage of this ascent into higher planes of existence, each being better than what preceded it, will have its own set of problems. These will then be classified as basic necessities and will require solutions if we are to enter the next stage. I guess the phrase basic necessities is like a slider along the journey to eudaimonia, the ultimate goal. The concept of basic necessities exists only as an urgent reminder of problems that need to be solved (holes that need to be fixed) before we enter the next stage on our path to personal fulfillment.

Another way of tackling the problems that make life so undesirable from an antinatalist point of view would be to increase the flow of joy into the bucket of life. Considering that the real problems of sickness and death are as yet unsolved we can, as many people are wont to say, make the best of what life has to offer. I've heard people tell others to fill every moment with joy or carpe diem, etc. This attitude comes from acceptance that life isn't a bed of roses. There will be problems but that would mean that we should enjoy the smooth trouble-free stretches of the journey.

This reasoning discounts the suffering that would result from frustrating primordial biological drives to procreate - whether self-abstemious or state prohibitionary it's the same deprivation - which trades-off increased suffering of current childless persons for the price of "preventing" "future suffering" of offspring while indifferent to the fact that being regretfully / involuntarily childless persons increases the suffering of their future selves. — 180 Proof

But the "harm" to the parent for not procreating doesn't measure up to the harm done to the future child, especially because it is creating conditions of suffering on behalf of someone else and thus "forcing" their hand. It would be like someone who would really like to force another into X game, and is sad not to force them. Should we allow it, simply because they are sad they can't force someone's hand in something? A more extreme example is someone who gets glee from doing something that would cause harm to others, but thinks what they are doing is good, and is "harmed" by not being allowed to do it.

Misery breeds company. As you point out, schopenhauer 1, at the "the procreational decision" it's always already (2.5 million years!) too late for the "once born" to excise, or talk themelves en masse out of, our species-hardwired, libidinally-facile, procreative drives .... Ethics more profitably focuses on how sufferers Can/Must avoid minimize or relieve increasing suffering (I prefer harm) to sufferers - ourselves and others - rather than, in effect, assuming counterfactually that in some possible world sufferers do not exist, suffering does not exist, and that we ought to strive to actualize, so to speak, that (utopian? extinction?) possibility. 'Destroy the village in order to save the village' - irrational ad absurdum as well as immoral. — 180 Proof

I'm not sure how it is "immoral" to not have any more children. However, the libidinal part can be easily remedied if sex is "necessary" or "common" with modern contraceptives.

I am antinatalist in the same sense I am pro-suicide, pro-euthanasia, & pro-abortion: philosophically, that is, as a hypothetical prospect, or option, - pro or con - for each thinking person to choose for him or herself without coercion by any manifest authority or violence (i.e. non-aggression principle). The reasoning is clear: sufferers ought not increase their own or any other sufferer's suffering, because this abject condition - existence - cannot be prevented ex post facto. The reductio (above) exposes an interpretation of antinatalism that (by neglect) increases suffering (of the "once born") more than it speculatively prevents. — 180 Proof

And of course I am not for coercion either. Thus I only think antinatalism is appropriate to argue and convince others of but never force.

Edit: I added a couple things here @180 Proof. As for not ignoring the post-facto reality of the "once born", I am also in the ballpark of what you are advocating, as a hypothetical option pro or con. However, the overall consequence and utopianism you present I believe to be a bit uncharitable interpretation of antinatalism. It isn't about the end goal, simply about preventing at the margins. Also, I think in an odd way, the pessimism of understanding our situation can somehow be therapeutic for the post-facto reality of the "already born". It can teach patience, compassion, understanding, tolerance, and the idea of not taking things too seriously (when possible and one is not in some physical or mental harm that doesn't even allow this mental trick).

This means that a lot of the problems which form the basis of an antinatalist outlook are being or will be solved. — TheMadFool

I think @180 Proof had in mind more than mere worries about mortality and sickness, though these are certainly problems. By the way, if we include all the mental health problems and even everyday anxieties in the "sickness", then what encompasses sickness would be much larger a category and perhaps even more harmful than what you at first might be thinking. For those who have severe types of mental illness, it can probably never be completely conveyed their perspective to those who don't understand and never experienced it. And sickness itself has too many factors to be done with in 30 years. That is indeed a way too optimistic estimate. There are also misfortunes, accidents, and such contingencies that you may also not be adding to that list of physical harms.

Anyways, what 180 Proof was most likely getting at was a Schopenhaurean form of suffering. This is similar to the Buddhist one. I now label it as "deprivationalism". It is the constant state of needing and wanting. We are deprived of something, whether it be entertainment, survival, or comfort related. This never ends. We can never be said to be completely satisfied. This is the background for which our contingent, utilitarian lives are always operating. As @Inyenzi put it to describe this (what I call) "structural suffering" of human existence:

On my view, there is no higher state of 'happiness' anyway, than the way in which the antinatalist conceives of the unborn. To be unbound from all causes and conditions, where "exists", and "does not exist" doesn't even apply. How could any temporary experience of happiness or pleasure in this world even compare to this? All positive experiences in this world are filtered through the lens of our temporal embodiment as a deprivational human animal - subject to stress, pain, need. suffering, aging and inevitable death. If impregnating a woman somehow thrusts conditions on what was previously unbound by causes and conditions, then it is the ultimate crime. Compared to the timeless peace of the unborn/unconditioned - the experiences of this world are nothing but stress and suffering. — Inyenzi

Why would the prevention of suffering take a back seat to the promotion of "well-being"? — schopenhauer1

Why would it be the other way? I think this is purely up to subjective judgement, though it is a common fact that most people are much more loss averse than gain seeking and I'm one of them

Consider this:

I believe that there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure. Both the greatest happiness principle of the Utilitarians and Kant's principle, "Promote other people's happiness...", seem to me (at least in their formulations) fundamentally wrong in this point, which is, however, not one for rational argument....In my opinion...human suffering makes a direct moral appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway. — Karl Popper

Besides, while what makes people happy varies from person to person and from day to day for each of us, what makes people miserable, or suffer, is the same for everyone (i.e. not "subjective" in the least): deprivation, physical dysfunction (i.e. illness), harm of any kind, helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, fear-terror), betrayal, bereavement, etc - in effect, involuntary decrease or loss of agency. It's self-evident what is harmful to our kind (and living things like, or nearly like, us such as mammals) and what we need when harmed; thus, we (can) know what to do or not to do to and for other persons and living creatures vulnerable to being harmed or in need of help when they're suffering; therefore, we (can) reasonably judge whether or not, by action or inaction, conduct decreases (i e. avoids mitigates or relieves) someone's - some creature's - suffering. Hardly a (merely) "subjective" consideration.

Notice how the quote begins with the key words I BELIEVE. I could find you a similar quote that advocates the exact opposite and also begins with I Believe. Would that change your mind? Not very likely, so don’t expect this quote to change anyone’s mind either.

Besides, while what makes people happy varies from person to person and from day to day for each of us, what makes people miserable, or suffer, is the same for everyone (i.e. not "subjective" in the least) — 180 Proof

Uhhhhh No?

deprivation, physical dysfunction (i.e. illness), harm of any kind, helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, fear-terror), betrayal, bereavement, etc - in effect, involuntary decrease or loss of agency — 180 Proof

There is a group of people called masochists so that ends that.

therefore, we (can) reasonably judge whether or not, by action or inaction, conduct decreases (i e. avoids mitigates or relieves) someone's - some creature's - suffering. Hardly a (merely) "subjective" consideration. — 180 Proof

When did I say we couldn’t? I never said we couldn’t REASONABLY (key word) judge how our conduct affects the suffering of others, what I said was that even if we are in agreement that an act will increase said suffering, some will find it ok as long as it creates a certain level of happiness (positive ethics) and some won’t (negative ethics)

Ok.

The path to hell is paved with 'positive ethics'.