My answer is, "what forest?"

As in, if there's nobody around then there's not even a forest.

However, the forest in this case is an assumption or axiom of an imagined scenario in someone's mind. "Given that I am imagining a forest with a falling tree in the absence of a human, would this falling tree make a sound." And so you'd answer in terms of the imagined scenario. You can answer how you want, because the forest is just an imagined scenario here.

But in ontological terms, there exists no forest in the absence of mind. At least that's my opinion.

Here's an outline of some of the other options:

Naive/direct realism: the tree 'looks' green, and produces the actual qualia of "TIMBER!" even in the absence of humans. All the ears and brain do really, is allow one to perceive the externally existing 'qualia'. Sounds, colours, smells, etc, are in the world which exists independent of mind.

Indirect realism: A bunch of atoms which make up what we call a tree, falls down according to physical forces (such as gravity) obeying physical laws, producing physical sound waves in the external world. As in, no actual noise or sound qualia is produced, but a physical sound wave is created by the falling tree and travels through the physical forest interacting with the environment. If somebody was around, the persons ear would convert the sound waves into neuronal impulses which would be processed by the brain into an internally generated experiential representation of the sound wave - the actual perception of noise, the sound of the falling tree.

Objective idealism: the tree and forest is dependent on minds, but even in the absence of human minds an all seeing mind 'holds' the forest and falling tree in existence, so that the qualia of the falling tree noise still exists even when no human is around.

What other options are there?

The question at hand here is what the ontological status of the sound by the fallen tree is with the absence of an observer (mind) -- so whether there is an ontological difference between the observable and unobservable.

A good analogy to this problem is the peripheral vision and the para central vision. The para central vision is what we actually see while our brains fill in the peripheral vision with images we remember, as we scan our environment with our eyes. As our para central vision moves, it causes no ontological change on the objects we observe. I claim this as the simplest explanation, because the alternatives require extra axioms if we include the idea of multiple minds, with its differences and its imperfections.

I am willing to defend scientific realism in this regard, because I believe in multiple independent minds along the time spectrum.

Unless you are a stinky solipsist. That is a Sisyphean task that I am not willing to take.

Objective idealism: the tree and forest is dependent on minds, but even in the absence of human minds an all seeing mind 'holds' the forest and falling tree in existence, so that the qualia of the falling tree noise still exists even when no human is around. — Dukkha

I don't think that is objective idealism; it is more like Berkeley's view that the Universe continues to exist in God's perception, in the absence of other perceivers. That is the subject of the famous limerick:

There was a young man who said, "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."

REPLY
Dear Sir:
Your astonishment's odd:
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by
Yours faithfully,
GOD.

Realists take the stance that the tree falls whether or not anyone is present. The meta-philosophical point that I would make is that even to posit an empty forest or uninhabited universe, still implicitly assumes a perspective. What is time, location, or scale, absent any perspective whatever? You could be considering 'the tree' from the perspective of a cell within it, or from the perspective of the planet that it is on, but you can't consider it from no perspective. So imagining an empty forest, with no observer to hear the tree fall, still amounts to a perspective. What would any scene or object be like, from no perspective?

If a tree falls in the forest, and nobody is around, does it still make a sound? — dukkha

It still makes compressive waves in the air. Without a mind, though, no sound is made. In the same way your alarm clock beeps for a while before you wake up. You only register a beep when you are conscious.

What would any scene or object be like, from no perspective? — Wayfarer

This brings to mind the phrase "God's eye view" which is said to be the 'view from nowhere'. I always found that a very silly notion; and in light of that incoherency I have preferred to think of the God's eye view in terms of a far more intelligible notion: the 'view from everywhere'.

What kind of tree?

This brings to mind the phrase "God's eye view" which is said to be the 'view from nowhere'. I always found that a very silly notion; and in light of that incoherency I have preferred to think of the God's eye view in terms of a far more intelligible notion: the 'view from everywhere'. — John

Actually, 'The View from Nowhere' was a 1986 book by Thomas Nagel (although whether the saying has other meanings, I don't know.) Nagel's book is about reconciling the impersonal, quantified perspective that is arrived at via scientific analysis - that being 'the view from nowhere' - with the particular perspectives of individual lives; the book explores that question from a number of angles (and is on my 'must read' list.)

The 'God's eye view' is another matter - it is taken to mean that one purports to speak from a position of omniscience (interestingly, the very brief Wikipedia entry notes as an example 'In science, when a scientist ignores the way a subject-object problem affects statistics or an observer effect affects experiment.')

But what I was commenting on, is that if you imagine the primeval forest, millions of years before people existed - and I'm sure there was one, that is where coal comes from! - that act of imagination still smuggles in the human perspective. You're seeing it, in the mind's eye, perhaps even with expert knowledge of carboniferous flora. 'Of course', you will say 'billions of trees fell in those forests, and nobody ever heard any of them'.

While that is true, it doesn't really come to terms with the point of the question, which is more about the phenomenology of sound than about the empirical facts. So really that argument amounts to the same kind of objection as Samuel Johnson's to Berkeley's lecture, when he kicked a large rock, declaring 'I refute it thus'.

But long experience on internet forums tells me that this particular argument usually ends up like:

I'm looking to start a thread on theories of perception. — dukkha

Start one? Sometimes it seems like all we're capable of talking about, in every friggin thread no matter what it was ostensibly about at the start, are (a) phil of perception, (b) the mind/body problem, and (c) idealism versus realism. It's like turning on a classic rock station and hearing "Stairway to Heaven", "Smoke on the Water" and "Iron Man". Yeah, let's do more of that!

Anyway, my view on the cliched question/koan in the subject line is that (I) it makes a sound, (II) the idea that there's anything "tricky" about the question is ridiculous, and (III) it has nothing to do with philosophy of perception.

But in ontological terms, there exists no forest in the absence of mind. At least that's my opinion. — dukkha

And from this idealist statement it can only follow to be skeptical of the existence of other minds. What would keep you from taking that last step into solipsism? If you are skeptical of the existence of the forest without experiencing it, then you must also be skeptical of some other mind in the forest (essentially being part of this forest), for a sound to occur.

Idealists who haven't taken that last step into solipsism are inconsistent in that they claim to believe in the existence of things they have never experienced (other minds) while not believing in things that they have experienced before but aren't experiencing right now (trees).

When you begin to question the your mind being an effect of other causes, then you throw out the aboutness of the experience. You are no longer informed of anything because information is the relationship between cause and effect. You'd no longer be able to categorize sounds and visuals together because there would be no correlation between the sound of a friend and the visual of a friend because they can often occur without each other (you can hear your friend on a the phone but not see them) and they are different kinds of experience altogether (there is a brute distinction between a sound and a visual).

Theoretically a photon could leave the Big Bang and travel all the way to a Big Crunch without ever doing a damned thing only to repeat the journey all over again, but energy that goes in endless circles for one eternity after another and never accomplishes a damned thing is a contradiction in terms. You can put forth all the causal arguments you want for why it must exist, but the proposition remains entirely hypothetical and about as useful as debating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. On the other hand, a context without significant content is a demonstrable contradiction meaning a tree falling in the forest when no one is around must make a noise if it is to obey the same physical laws as everything else and be worth even talking about.

Einstein was bothered by the idea that, according to quantum mechanics, the moon is not necessarily in the sky when nobody is looking. To me, that's no more disturbing than saying there are monsters in my closet when nobody is looking.

It isn't necessary to got to the extreme of solipsism though if by 'there is no forest' we mean rather that something is there that only becomes a forest when observed by a forest-perceiver. This rightly puts the emphasis on the namer as the source of a thing's 'name' (by which of course I mean every aspect of identity) rather than any inherent quality of the thing itself.

If the old chestnut had been rephrased as 'if a tree falls and only a profoundly deaf person is there to hear it' then it is perhaps clearer that there is no sound though the observer experiences the event in other ways.

I don't think that is objective idealism; it is more like Berkeley's view that the Universe continues to exist in God's perception, in the absence of other perceivers. — Wayfarer

Woops, that's what I meant!

And from this idealist statement it can only follow to be skeptical of the existence of other minds. What would keep you from taking that last step into solipsism? If you are skeptical of the existence of the forest without experiencing it, then you must also be skeptical of some other mind in the forest (essentially being part of this forest), for a sound to occur. — Harry Hindu

Does my mind need to be perceived by another in order for it to exist? No, so why would it be any different for other minds?

Idealists who haven't taken that last step into solipsism are inconsistent in that they claim to believe in the existence of things they have never experienced (other minds) while not believing in things that they have experienced before but aren't experiencing right now (trees). —

But this argument only works if you conceive of the world you inhabit as being completely private to your perceptions, which would beg the question of solipsism. I think that when for example you 'meet someones gaze', it's a direct encounter of minds. And not say a private to myself perception of a person which may or may not be a representation of the actions of another person which exists in an independently existing 'mind-bubble', depending on whether you're a solipsist or not.

(there is a brute distinction between a sound and a visual). — Harry Hindu

What about when you 'see someone talking to you'? Your experience was a cohesive whole, and the two senses only become separate afterward when you separate them intellectually.

The blue on the top face of the cube on the left, is the same colour as the yellow on the top face of the cube on the right.

And on both cubes the middle square of the top face is the same colour as the middle square of the front.

This is a problem for direct realists.

This is a problem for direct realists. — dukkha

I'm pretty close to simply starting to say either "Hey moron" or "Hey liar" to you, because you seem completely incapable of learning, OR completely uninterested in doing anything other than promoting straw men for some reason.

Direct realists (and *sigh* about turning this into yet another discussion on phil of perception, by the way)--anyway, direct realists do not deny that there are illusions.

my view on the cliched question/koan in the subject line is that (I) it makes a sound, (II) the idea that there's anything "tricky" about the question is ridiculous, and (III) it has nothing to do with philosophy of perception. — Terrapin Station

So, it's a non-issue, or a silly question, why would it be asked on a philosophy forum? What is it a reference to?

In Scotland I once came across a tree (silver birch) that had fallen thee times. each time it had turned its growth upwards again from where it lay. I didn't ask it if it had heard its own fall, but had definitely responded to to it.

If a tree in the forest sang 'I get knocked down, but I get up again' would you believe it?

So, it's a non-issue, or a silly question, why would it be asked on a philosophy forum? — Wayfarer

Haha--I literally laughed out loud at that.

So, does that constitute an answer? We are supposed to be informed of what, by the fact that you find it amusing?

Haha that you have no idea why your question would be funny.

Oh, I get it. Now concentrate: you know that this is a 'philosophical question', right? And this is a 'philosophy forum', where people type in 'philosophical questions', and others get to type in 'philosophical responses'. Is that also funny?

Oh, I get it. — Wayfarer

I sure don't believe that.

OK, then - what's funny? Please explain the joke.

OK then, I will take a shot - the question about 'if a tree falls in the forest...' is a joke, right? How can anyone ask that? Surely everyone knows that when trees fall they make a huge racket, whether or not anyone's around. It's a trick question, surely.

And from this idealist statement it can only follow to be skeptical of the existence of other minds. What would keep you from taking that last step into solipsism? If you are skeptical of the existence of the forest without experiencing it, then you must also be skeptical of some other mind in the forest (essentially being part of this forest), for a sound to occur. — Harry Hindu
— dukkha

Does my mind need to be perceived by another in order for it to exist? No, so why would it be any different for other minds? — dukkha

This doesn't address my point that you have never experienced another mind. You only infer that other minds exist through the behavior of bodies. Why can't you infer that trees continue to exist without you experiencing them. When you look at a tree, then close your eyes, then open them again and see the tree again, you don't infer that the tree continued to exist despite not appearing in your experience for a brief moment?

Idealists who haven't taken that last step into solipsism are inconsistent in that they claim to believe in the existence of things they have never experienced (other minds) while not believing in things that they have experienced before but aren't experiencing right now (trees). — Harry Hindu

But this argument only works if you conceive of the world you inhabit as being completely private to your perceptions, which would beg the question of solipsism. I think that when for example you 'meet someones gaze', it's a direct encounter of minds. And not say a private to myself perception of a person which may or may not be a representation of the actions of another person which exists in an independently existing 'mind-bubble', depending on whether you're a solipsist or not. — dukkha

This isn't consistent with what you said in the "See-Through" thread. You argued in that thread that your experience is always indirect. So how can you have a direct encounter with minds? When you look into someone's eyes, you are having a direct encounter with a representation of their body. You never experience someone's mind. You can experience it indirectly via their body's behavior, just as you infer the existence of atoms from the behavior of matter on the macro scale.

(there is a brute distinction between a sound and a visual). — Harry Hindu

What about when you 'see someone talking to you'? Your experience was a cohesive whole, and the two senses only become separate afterward when you separate them intellectually. — dukkha

You missed the example of talking to them on the phone. You don't separate them intellectually then. You do link the two sensations together intellectually because you've established a pattern of seeing them speak before. But my point was that if solipsism/idealism is the case and sounds and visuals aren't representations of other things, then they aren't representations but real things themselves. Are you the same dukkha that I was conversing with in the "See-through" thread because you are basically contradicting everything you said in that thread.

It isn't necessary to got to the extreme of solipsism though if by 'there is no forest' we mean rather that something is there that only becomes a forest when observed by a forest-perceiver. This rightly puts the emphasis on the namer as the source of a thing's 'name' (by which of course I mean every aspect of identity) rather than any inherent quality of the thing itself. — Barry Etheridge

If there is anything out there that exists independently of the mind's experience of it, then that is realism, not idealism/solipsism. It doesn't matter if the experience is different than what the thing is (this would be indirect realism). If the thing continues to exist when I'm dead, then realism is the case, not idealism/solipsism.

OK then, I will take a shot — Wayfarer

No, that's not at all what I found funny about your comment. What was hilarious about your comment was that it was at least phrased as if being presented on a philosophy forum would be sufficient for something to not be silly, stupid/moronic, etc.

But in ontological terms, there exists no forest in the absence of mind. At least that's my opinion. — dukkha

How do you account for minds inferring that forests existed before minds to think about them as forests? If the world only exists for minds, then why does it seem like the world existed prior to minds? Why is it that minds find themselves to be dependent on the world?

If there is anything out there that exists independently of the mind's experience of it, then that is realism, not idealism/solipsism. It doesn't matter if the experience is different than what the thing is (this would be indirect realism). If the thing continues to exist when I'm dead, then realism is the case, not idealism/solipsism. — Harry Hindu

You can't equate idealism with solipsism. As we've gone over many times before, they're not the same thing. The idealist's position is that all things are mental in nature; it's not simply the position that all things are a product of one's own mind. There can be other minds, each with their own thoughts and experiences, that continue to exist even when you're dead.

You can't equate idealism with solipsism. As we've gone over many times before, they're not the same thing. The idealist's position is that all things are mental in nature; it's not simply the position that all things are a product of one's own mind. There can be other minds, each with their own thoughts and experiences, that continue to exist even when you're dead — Michael

This is true, and it has been defended many times. But I can't get over the fact that the idealist is making an exception for other minds, epistemologically speaking. The idealist is hand-waving the issue away by asserting that of course other minds exists. Don't be silly.

The solipsist is more consistent. We only know about other minds the same way we know about objects, which is via perception. And if to be is to be perceived ...

This is true, and it has been defended many times. But I can't get over the fact that the idealist is making an exception for other minds, epistemologically speaking. The idealist is hand-waving the issue away by asserting that of course other minds exists. Don't be silly. — Marchesk

How is it making an exception? The idealist presumably uses the same inference that the materialist uses to confirm the existence of other minds. They just don't think that this inference can be used to confirm the existence of some non-mental substance from which minds sometimes (but not always) emerge.

How is it making an exception? The idealist presumably uses the same inference that the materialist uses to confirm the existence of other minds. They just don't think that this inference can be used to confirm the existence of some non-mental substance from which minds sometimes (but not always) emerge. — Michael

To be is to be perceived. I perceive a rock, so it exists. But it doesn't exist outside being perceive. I perceive you so you exist, at least while I'm perceiving you.

Now I can imagine that you continue to perceive the world as a good idealist once I'm no longer perceiving you, but then I'm just pulling a realist stunt by making an exception for other minds. You can say it's different, because it's other minds. Fine, but I only know about them via perception, so it's an epistemological problem for the idealist.