"The conditions of harm" are not the harm itself. And there is no "aggression" against an embryo that gestates through foetal and prenatal stages to live birth. Harm and aggression only apply to a sentient human being which a human foetus only becomes once her thalamocortical system is fully connected (enabling pain circuitry and sensorimotor coordination (i.e. functional sentience)) in CNS around 26th week, that is, the last trimester of pregnancy, and then thereafter. Prenatal sentients are always indistinguishably "already born" persons (e.g. premature births); therefore, negating any increase in harm simultaneously reduces hindrances to positive growth and well-being. — 180 Proof
Of course, abstinence, contraception or sterilization only prevent conditions of fertilization and pregnancy but do actual harm to the "already born", who desire to procreate, by depriving them - whether by State Coercion (e.g. Nuremberg Race Laws, Margaret Sanger's "Negro Project" (& other U.S. eugenics sterilization policies)) or Ideological Conformity (e.g. millenarian, malthusian, eco-catastrophist, antinatalist, etc) - of procreating. Is this 'desire to procreate' morally wrong? No. That would be accusing them of "thought crime", which like "blasphemy", harms the integrity of persons. There simply aren't any grounds to judge any desires "morally wrong" absent harmful conduct or without aggravating factors in attempts to exercise or fulfil them. — 180 Proof
Your 'metaethical' argument, schop 1, just doesn't hold up under scrutiny which exposes again that it's a false dichotomy; 'negative ethics & positive ethics' entail each other in practice; the choice isn't ever 'either dystopia or utopia' (i.e. mammon or Eden, hell or heaven), but rather to struggle - alone and collectively - with the choice: to do or not to do to anyone what you find hateful, or harmful. The more reasonable interpretation is, I think, (mine) to avoid mitigate or relieve NET harm rather than (yours) to, much less reasonably, (attempt to) prevent / eliminate ALL harm. — 180 Proof
I don't think so. This just means that (your? Cabrera's?) conception of ethics is (too) ideologically, or rigidly, one-sided to be widely applicable in the "messy" real world. Thus I differ in my metaethical interpretation previously (above). — 180 Proof
Only "no conditions" (i.e. no exceptions, no edge cases, no reflexivity) which your ruleset doesn't account for ... à la Kant's "CI" mistake redux. :roll: — 180 Proof
Well, the discussion was not about that, but if you really want to criticize my position, please do it without assuming that ethics should be based on the individual and not society as that is just begging the question. Why is "overlooking individuals for 'third-parties'" bad?A lot, because you keep advocating for a greater good principle and I'm saying this is overlooking individuals for third-parties. — schopenhauer1
Violating the principle by forcing everyone not to procreate is not bad as one is preventing harm from the violation of non-aggression by doing so.In the case of one's non-harm principle being violated from someone else:
Non-aggression followed | Non-aggression violated
Following = good | Following = not bad as one is preventing harm from the
violation of non-aggression — schopenhauer1
I think it comes into play most when it comes to procreation. There are several first principles that must be agreed upon- — schopenhauer1
I can make any number of choices based on preferences that are not constrained by the negative ethics. — schopenhauer1
In the intra-wordly mess of the real world, someone will ALWAYS be harmed by your decisions, and you by there's. — schopenhauer1
Not even a quack, let alone a qualified doctor, would prescribe beheading as a cure for a headache. The aim is to treat the malady - suffering - AND make life enjoyable or at least livable. I guess I'm saying, in a very important way, antinatalists are unable to distinguish the patient (life) from the disease (suffering) and this leads them to the mistaken conclusion that life (patient) = disease (suffering). — TheMadFool
"The conditions of harm" are not the harm itself. And there is no "aggression" against an embryo that gestates through foetal and prenatal stages to live birth. Harm and aggression only apply to a sentient human being which a human foetus only becomes once her thalamocortical system is fully connected — 180 Proof
if the doctor first caused conditions known to make the patient suffer — schopenhauer1
Otherwise the analogy is not apt to the antinatalism argument whereby the parent is creating a life that will suffer, de novo, in the hopes that it won't be that bad or they will find some coping techniques such that the good will outweigh the bad. — schopenhauer1
The antinatalist/pessimist position is as follows:
1. Life is suffering or suffering outweighs happiness — TheMadFool
2. If life is suffering or suffering outweighs happiness then nonexistence is better than life
So, — TheMadFool
No. Antinatalism doesn't require this to be the case. It just requires that life includes SOME suffering — khaled
The antinatalist can't see the distinction between life and suffering. — TheMadFool
You say even "some" suffering is good enough to decide. — TheMadFool
Doesn't that mean no suffering or perhaps ecstatic joy would make the antinatalist decide otherwise. — TheMadFool
If 1 were true then antinatalists have no argument. Right? — TheMadFool
The antinatalist/pessimist thinks 3 is the truth. — TheMadFool
I'm saying the situation is actually 2 — TheMadFool
and then the following basic arithmetic is possible. — TheMadFool
Can you kindly present your version of antinatalism? — TheMadFool
2. A life of joy is desirable. — TheMadFool
Now imagine a person being given choices as follows:
1. Hell
2. Earth
3. Heaven
4. Nonexistence — TheMadFool
The foundation under antinatalism is suffering. There is no suffering in heaven. So, no, antinatalism can never provide a good reason to opt for nonexistence over heaven. — TheMadFool
Doesn't this mean that life/existence is NOT the problem here and that existence is sufficiently distinct from suffering? — TheMadFool
In short I think it's possible to make earth a heaven. No suffering, no antinatalism. — TheMadFool
If earth was a heaven I wouldn't be an antinatalist — khaled
Well, thank you for trying to show me positiveness in life. You seem like a kind-hearted spirit based on your post. In a way I agree with your "mission". That is to say, I see compassion and helping others as a great way to cope with life. I see antinatalism and philosophical pessimism as actually therapeutic, but starting from a different place. Once life is seen in this way, we can be more tolerant, more compassionate, etc. We can see ourselves as in this together, rebelling against it, and communally seeing the problem. So antinatalism can bring people together in a way through the rebellion :D. — schopenhauer1
Well, since i agree that negative ethics entails procreation being immoral unless Earth is devoid of any suffering whatsoever, i will ask a question: How do you justify negative ethics? — HereToDisscuss
I don't. It's my personal choice. I just looked at how I act when it comes to any other situation where one can choose to use another's resources in any way. Most people (including myself) are risk averse in those scenarios. For example if I saw a house I think you like going on sale, I wouldn't just steal your credit card and buy it without your consent simply because there is a chance you don't like it or don't want to spend the money right now. I doubt you would either. So I just extended that to procreation out of a desire for consistency. — khaled
Well, the discussion was not about that, but if you really want to criticize my position, please do it without assuming that ethics should be based on the individual and not society as that is just begging the question. Why is "overlooking individuals for 'third-parties'" bad? — HereToDisscuss
Violating the principle by forcing everyone not to procreate is not bad as one is preventing harm from the violation of non-aggression by doing so.
I believe that just entails my conclusion above, which is what i was trying to say the whole time. It is a case of one's non-harm principle and non-aggression principle being violated from something else. — HereToDisscuss
Julio Cabrera has some interesting arguments, and I agree with many of them when considered from his point of view, as I do yours. Cabrera is reacting to what he calls ‘affirmative moralities’ - which is not the same as ‘positive ethics’, by the way. Affirmative moralities lack a negative perspective - they seem to be ignorant or in denial of the necessity of pain, loss, lack and humility, not just to experiencing life, but to existence. By ‘Affirmative morality’ Cabrera refers to a positive ethics that fails to acknowledge its own limitations. But Cabrera’s (and your) ‘objective’ and universal evaluation of these necessities as ‘harm’ is an equally limited perspective. — Possibility
But a non-judgemental view of pain from all possible perspectives of existence (not just of life) shows it to be simply an awareness that energy, effort or attention is necessary to adjust to change. That we accept and even invite pain in our life as evidence of effort or resilience in an ever-changing world is not to suggest that pain is ‘good’ instead of ‘bad’, but that it is both - and ultimately neither. In a universe where change is ubiquitous, it’s understandable that pain is a fundamental experience, so it seems ridiculous in this light to call it ‘harm’ - as if existence without instances of pain were possible - or to include all possible instances of pain in a single moral perspective. The negativity of pain stems from its significance to our experience of life, not from its meaning. By understanding the meaning of pain as both positive and negative, we can make more effective use of it as an informative experience. — Possibility
Cabrera is correct in arguing that most moralities reject the negative in favour of the positive, but even his own morality exists within a limited perspective of life. When we recognise the limitations of this perspective, we can then begin to understand that what is both ‘bad’ and necessary in this perspective could relate to the broader universe in a more meaningful way than we think. — Possibility
Procreation, regardless of whether we consider it good or bad from whatever perspective, is objectively not necessary. I think that’s the important thing that everyone needs to understand. But the ignorant will continue to believe it is what they are supposed to do, for whatever reason. Most of those reasons are directly related to their value systems, their moral perspective. So you can argue from a moral perspective if you want to, but you’re spending all your time arguing for your moral perspective, which is far more difficult and complex. If that’s your agenda (and I suspect it is), then go for it, and I’ll leave you to it.
But if your agenda is antinatalism, then I would suggest that it’s certainly possible (and more flexible) to argue its merits from an amoral, objective position. — Possibility
I'm also of the view that we are all part of a single being (us and all life), that giving birth doesn't create a new being out of nothing but that it shows us another part of that being, so in that view we suffer because the whole being also suffers, and then it doesn't create new suffering to give birth, what creates new suffering is how we treat others and ourselves. In order for the whole being to get better we have to care for one another, if we simply all stop procreating then other forms of life will take our place, and if somehow all life in the universe disappears then the whole being would simply create another universe and start again. Maybe the way to reduce suffering is neither suicide nor antinatalism, but love. There are so many things we could do to make the world a much better place, so let's keep working in that direction, let's try everything before giving up, the way I see it we have barely begun. — leo
If some people want to give up that's okay, and if they want to share their views on antinatalism that's okay too, but it would be a sad thing if somehow antinatalists came to rule the world and force everyone to stop procreating against their will no matter the suffering they cause. If existence doesn't end with death in this universe (which I firmly believe) then that would cause more suffering than it would prevent. But the way I see it you don't force your beliefs onto others, so if it's therapeutic for you that's good.
Indeed we're all in this together, but while you see the problem in life itself, I see the problem in what we do with life :flower: — leo
I'd probably agree there positive not quite the same as affirmative ethics as he uses the term, but there are parallels. One of these being that one is overlooked for the other, or rather violated for the other. — schopenhauer1
I am not sure, but I believe we've had this conversation before. If so, I probably brought up that this is very close to Nietzsche's idea of "beyond good and evil". In other words, there is no good or evil, suffering isn't actually "bad". Rather, suffering provides meaning and we should bask in its radiant glow of significance-making. I think this is just subversion of pain in order to justify it. If the conundrum is that life has pain, if we make pain "good" then we can justify its existence. I just don't buy it being "good" or providing "significance". In a world without pain or suffering (if we want to split the concepts in whatever self-styled manner), even the pain of not having a bit of pain to make life more significant would be there. So I guess this goes down to the metaphysics of pain. But even if we were to say that reality MUST have pain for X, we can simply say that we simply don't need reality then. In other words, no one has to experience it in the first place. And precisely the antinatalist notion that NO ONE actually misses out by not experience anything in the first place, there really is not much of a counterargument to it except the notion that people must be born to experience X, Y, Z experiences (perhaps you collaboration, etc.). But that then begs the question why? And then we are back to square one. — schopenhauer1
This is a bit murky and pseudo-spiritual. You'd have to explain. My response to this particular sentiment is that you think the universe has some plan or perspective of its own outside of the human perspective. I'd need proof of that. Even if there was a "higher" perspective... how does it affect humans? Think of this idea.. What if a big giant god-like being was watching us and had a completely different view of morality.. to him, our suffering matters not.. How does that affect us, the sufferers? Of course, this is a terrible view to start.. I really don't want to bring religious hodgepodge into this.. It leads to all sorts of non-real/non-relevant rabbit-holes (in my opinion). We mine as well talk about what we know at hand- the human perspective and what we can agree to be the case. — schopenhauer1
Ok, now I'm interested. What would the "objective position" entail? — schopenhauer1
It's simple. The main premise is: It is wrong to commit any act that may harm someone else unless the benefits of it massively outweigh the losses to said someone. — khaled
Can it harm someone? Definitely. — khaled
A life of joy is desirable TO THOSE WHO ALREADY LIVE. There are no magical ghost babies desiring joy or avoiding pain. In other words, NOT procreating doesn't mean you're "denying" someone something desirable (an argument I see often, not that you made it) — khaled
When did I imply otherwise? I never said life is inherently problematic — khaled
If earth was a heaven I wouldn't be an antinatalist. — khaled
andA life of joy is desirable TO THOSE WHO ALREADY LIVE — khaled
Again. Imagaine a PERSON being given these choices. There is no such person. — khaled
1. If you look at how medicine and technology has changed our lives you must agree that suffering is decreasing compared with the past where disease and the simple act of living were much more difficult
2. From the above we see a downward trend to suffering in general which bolsters our hopes that in the not so far future, suffering, harm as you put it, will become zero — TheMadFool
life would be preferable to nonexistence. — TheMadFool
The above statement encapsulates the problem with antinatalism that the "solution" to life's problems is nonexistence. — TheMadFool
it becomes evidently clear that no one, choice/not, would object to a life/existence in heaven. It's like an offer you can't refuse. — TheMadFool
However when we're certain of what the choice will be, life in heaven in this case. we don't have to ask for consent do we? — TheMadFool
Yes, as of the moment it is unavoidable but given how much progress we've made over the ages in the happiness department you can surely see that suffering is not a necessary but a contingent truth about the world — TheMadFool
I don't. It's my personal choice. I just looked at how I act when it comes to any other situation where one can choose to use another's resources in any way. Most people (including myself) are risk averse in those scenarios. For example if I saw a house I think you like going on sale, I wouldn't just steal your credit card and buy it without your consent simply because there is a chance you don't like it or don't want to spend the money right now. I doubt you would either. So I just extended that to procreation out of a desire for consistency. — khaled
Both of these are debatable. What's not debatable is that PAIN has decreased. IE the actualy physical sensation that comes with disease for example. However there is surprisingly little evidence to suggest that SUFFERING (the subjective experience itself, or the mental part of pain) has changed much over time and much evidence to suggest that people experience similar amounts of suffering despite the pain. Good evidence would be the fact that poorer populations are generally happier (with exceptions at the extremes of course). That's an example of people enduring more pain, yet experiencing less suffering. I think if suffering was directly proportional to pain, we would have gone extinct loooooong ago.
But ok let's say suffering decreased — khaled
Because "society" doesn't actually experience suffering or happiness or anything, individuals do. It can be many individuals, but once individuals get reified into an abstract concept "the greatest good" "pursuit of happiness", it goes out of the bounds of the locus of the experience. — schopenhauer1
Ok, is this a debating point? You'd have to explain. — schopenhauer1
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