Well the obvious question has to be, if there are no true propositions, then how does this forum exist?

I would worry about equivocating between “true” and “the truth”. One is a description; the other is the nominalization of that description. One describes things (propositions), and the other is a thing. — NOS4A2

Yes, I too worry about that and so made avoiding such equivocation a priority.

However, it seems to me that such equivocation is what proponents of other views engage in - especially those who defend correspondence theories.

Well the obvious question has to be, if there are no true propositions, then how does this forum exist? — 3017amen

I did not say there are no true propositions. Clearly there are. I said I think it is possible for there to be no true propositions. There's a world of difference between the claim that it is possible for there to be no true propositions and the claim that it is true that there are no true propositions.

Reason is thinking about thought and belief. It's not an entity in and of itself capable of doing stuff. So, it would be helpful if you stopped personifying reason. — creativesoul

Why would that be helpful? If my view about truth is true - that is, if truth is constituted by Reason's asssertions - then Reason must be a person, for only persons can assert things.

It seems to me that you've decided in advance - in advance of listening to what Reason has to say about the matter - that Reason is not a person.

Again, Reason must be a person if truth is constituted by Reason's assertions, for only persons can assert things.

Something is true for someone when all he deems relevant sources agree it is true — khaled

But first you're talking about when someone believes a proposition is true, rather than about what the property of truth itself consists of. Second, to believe something is to believe it is true - so now we have truth, the concept we want elucidated, turning up in the analysis - that makes it circular and thus unhelpful. For an analogy, let's say the question is "what is water?' (as in, what does water consist of, rather than 'please identify some water for me'). Well, no good saying "people believe they have water when they believe that every source verifies it is water", for first that's not an answer to the question (which is about water itself, not about beliefs) and second it is circular as you've said "people believe they have water when they believe they have water" (true, but unhelpful).

I don't think it makes sense to ask what is truth in some ultimate sense without referring to the individual. — khaled

Why? The question has been asked - not just by Pontius Pilate, but by many others including many contemporary philosophers, so the question is a prima facie coherent one. That doesn't mean it is coherent, but it does mean a case is owed for thinking it is not.

Plus I've addressed the question and proposed an answer - if the question makes no sense then you'd need to show that my answer to it makes no sense.

I did not say there are no true propositions — Bartricks

Ok got it. Are you saying then if there exists at least one true proposition, then, they must be logically necessary/ logical necessity?

Ok got it. Are you saying then if there exists at least one true proposition, then, they must be logically necessary/ logical necessity? — 3017amen

Not sure I understand the question.

My analysis of truth, if correct, permits there to be no true propositions, for it is possible for Reason not to assert anything.

Clearly there are true propositions, which just shows that Reason does assert some things.

As it seems clear enough to my reason that whatever a person asserts, they are able not to assert - and as Reason must be a person in order to be able to assert anything - then I do not think any of Reason's assertions are asserted of necessity. That is, I do not believe any proposition has its truth of necessity. All true propositions are true contingently, not of necessity (including, of course, that one).

A lot to be said for this, if not looked at too closely.We might ask, "How does reason know?" - Or is that irrelevant? Or, we may allow reason to ground a claim that this or that proposition is true, but that doesn't reach truth itself. — tim wood

I do not yet see how inspecting it more closely throws any doubt on it. If truth is a performative of Reason, as I have argued, then it is easy to answer the question "how does Reason know", for knowledge involves having a true belief that has been acquired in a manner that Reason approves of - and so Reason knows what she knows because truth is in her gift as is justification. So, "how does Reason know" is akin to asking how I think what I think (answer: I think what I think by thinking it).

Prove, please.
— tim wood

What would constitute being proof of that?
— creativesoul
A proof would constitute proof of that. Your claim, you prove. It looks like you don't have one. — tim wood

You're the one invoking proof. What does "prove, please" politely demand if not proof of something or other?

What are you asking me to prove and what does your criterion for proof demand of me? What standard must I meet?

What do you mean? — Bartricks

"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untrue because..." or "... would be the case if not for..." etc.

Such contexts are potential predators, and must be fought off and dominated.

So... you're compelled to hold that propositions do not depend upon language for their very existence. I'm compelled to hold that they are.

What's the argument and/or reasoning in support of your objection here?

I've one for how/why they are.

...

All propositions are proposed.
All propositions are existentially dependent upon language.
Language is existentially dependent upon belief.
Propositions are existentially dependent upon belief.
True propositions are kinds of propositions.
True propositions are existentially dependent upon belief.

If the statement is true, then it is false; and if it is false, then it is true. — 3017amen

Is the above a true statement? It seems like more of a meaningless contradiction, and is therefore false.

This search for 'truth' as an abstract concept is illogical. Truth is only logical in relation to a question/problem. Truth is whatever 'solves' this problem or 'answers' that question. — ovdtogt

I can know facts without having asked a question or trying to solve problems.

A fact that is not able to answer/solve a question/problem can never be a fact.

Sorry to answer with another question, but why do we want the truth, what do we want from it, what are we expecting?
— Brett
Usefulness. The truth is useful. Falsehoods aren't. — Harry Hindu

Of course the truth is useful. But the truth being sought here seems to be eternally elusive, as if it’s not so much a search for truth as some sort of psychological drama that we indulge in. Having found this “truth” what then? Is it to decide if we’re right in what we think, or to know “all”, or to build the perfect world. What do we want from this “truth”?

A fact that is not able to answer/solve a question/problem can never be a fact. — ovdtogt

How is this any different than saying that the universe is filled with information/facts that is the answer to some question?

Some bit of information in the universe is only relevant in specific contexts or to specific questions, but that doesnt mean that the information only exists when we ask those questions. We have to find the answers, not make them up.

So, "how does Reason know" is akin to asking how I think what I think (answer: I think what I think by thinking it). — Bartricks

Nope. Not what does reason think when it's thinking, but how if ever it "knows" that anything that it thinks is true. You can define true as you like. As a "performative of reason" is pretty good and better then most, but it just doesn't get there, except as a definition. "What is 'true'"? "True is what my reason says is true." "How does it know?" "By definition: if (my) reason is thinking it, then it's true." "Is reason always correct with respect to knowing that what it thinks is true?" Answer: of course not. And what do you do with that?

I can know facts without having asked a question or trying to solve problems. — Harry Hindu

Are you quite sure of that? All facts are historical facts; i.e., historical in nature. That's one problem, and then there's the problem of your perception. And then there's the problem of figuring you what "knowing" means. I do not doubt that in your brain are all kinds of thoughts you're not immediately thinking of at all. Do you know them? How would you know unless you ask in some sense?

Casually and informally, no doubt you're correct. Are you being casual and informal?

Folks want to get a leg up on the topic of truth, here's a place to start:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/

or search this site.

A statement that does not answer a question or solve a problem is not a fact. It is just a string of words that has no meaning or value. It does not contain a scintilla of 'truth'.

For I provided an argument in support of the view that a proposition is true when Reason asserts its content to be the case. — Bartricks

On the basis of what would reason assert anything to be the case? Is it not possible that the bases could differ in different contexts?

For I provided an argument in support of the view that a proposition is true when Reason asserts its content to be the case. — Bartricks

A proposition is true when it is able to solve a problem or answer a question.

1.3 Pragmatist theories
A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:

Truth is the end of inquiry.

I would worry about equivocating between “true” and “the truth”. One is a description; the other is the nominalization of that description. One describes things (propositions), and the other is a thing. — NOS4A2

Yes, 'true' is an adjective, attribute or property; while 'truth' is a noun. But is there a salient difference between what is true and truth, or the truth?

"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untrue because..." or "... would be the case if not for..." etc. — bongo fury

I still do not follow or see on what basis you are rejecting my analysis. I have argued for the truth of a view that seems quite different to yours, and as such my arguments - if they go through - refute your position. Truth is not the name for some practice of ours - our practice of calling some sentences 'true', for clearly we could have that practice and some of the sentences we call true could be false. Truth is, as I have argued, the assertive activity of Reason: a proposition is true when Reason asserts it.

What's the argument and/or reasoning in support of your objection here? — creativesoul

I am not sure what you're talking about - this thread is about truth and I have offered an argument in support of a distinctive analysis. But you're talking about propositions. And I do not see how anything you have said about propositions casts any doubt on what I have said about truth.

So... you're compelled to hold that propositions do not depend upon language for their very existence. I'm compelled to hold that they are. — creativesoul

I'm not 'compelled' at all. I did not express a position on propositions, I simply showed how nothing you had said about them (dubious though I think it was) casts doubt on my view about truth.

To believe something is to think it true. Now it is that property - the property of truth - that I am trying to understand. So what beliefs do or do not depend on seems entirely beside the point.

So... I've misunderstood then.

What is truth a property of?

I did not express a position on propositions, — Bartricks

You did doubt a claim about the existential dependency of propositions. If it doesn't matter, so be it. I'm good with hearing the answer to the last question and taking it from there.

I can know facts without having asked a question or trying to solve problems. — Harry Hindu

Are you quite sure of that? All facts are historical facts; i.e., historical in nature. — tim wood

I didnt ask a question about whether or not all facts are historical, yet you still provided that "fact". So is this evidence that facts exist independent of questions? Questions are a result of ignorance. If we weren't ignorant we wouldnt ask questions because we'd already have all the facts.

Nope. Not what does reason think when it's thinking, but how if ever it "knows" that anything that it thinks is true. You can define true as you like. As a "performative of reason" is pretty good and better then most, but it just doesn't get there, except as a definition. "What is 'true'"? "True is what my reason says is true." "How does it know?" "By definition: if (my) reason is thinking it, then it's true." "Is reason always correct with respect to knowing that what it thinks is true?" Answer: of course not. And what do you do with that? — tim wood

I haven't defined truth, rather I've provided an analysis of it. That is, I am trying to understand what truth is, in and of itself. Literally, what is it made of?

I have also argued for my view, not simply announced it. So yes, one can say what one wants about truth - one can say truth is the number 10, or truth is a giraffe. That is easy. But I have not done that, rather I have presented a case - a reasoned argument - for thinking that truth is a performative of Reason.

My view changes in your quote - my view is that truth is a performative of Reason, but in your quote it suddenly becomes a performative of 'my' reason. But 'my' reason (and 'your' reason) are faculties, not Reason itself. Just as there is what is seen and sight and the two are not the same.

You ask "how does it [Reason] know?" - but if this presents you with a puzzle it is only because you have rejected the analysis. There is no puzzle if the analysis is correct, for to know something is to have a justified true belief. What does that involve? Well, we know from the analysis - and note, you'd be begging the question if you reject it without argument - that truth is a performative of Reason. And we know too that to be justified in a belief is to have acquired it in a manner Reason approves of (for that is just what a justification is). Thus, again, there is no puzzle understanding how Reason knows this. Perhaps you could explain why you think there's a puzzle here, for I do not see one.

Again, I stress again that in your quote above you conflate my view with a quite different one. My view is that truth is a performative of Reason - so, when Reason says something is true, her saying it makes it so, for 'being true' just is to be asserted by Reason - not 'our faculties of reason'. When I talk about our reason I am referring not to Reason, but the faculty by means of which we are aware of Reason.