Which is better parallel then for the biological system producing actual qualia out of the electro-chemical sensory signals? — Zelebg
as the signals that they process are not being interpreted by a conscious agent. — Wayfarer
mathematician's played around with numbers as an abstract exercise long before they applied it to the real world (?) — 3017amen
It is a fallacy to believe only the (human) brain is conscious. — ovdtogt
An eye that can see is conscious of light. — ovdtogt
Science relies on the assumption that we live in an ordered Universe that is subject to precise mathematical laws. Thus the laws of physics, the most fundamental of the sciences, are all expressed as mathematical equations. — ovdtogt
I'm beginning to see a part of our communication glitch. You seem to think that a "virtual electron" --- as represented by illuminated pixels on a computer screen --- is still an electron in a different physical form. Yet, those screen pixels have none of the physical properties of an actual electron. Instead, they only have the potential to cause the metaphysical idea of an electron to be generated in the mind of the observer. The graphic symbol is merely an illusion or appearance, due to its conventional association with a real object. I'm sure you know this, but your terminology is misleading."You equate "physical" and "actual", and I agree. But if a simulated electron is not physical & actual, what is it?" --Gnomon
It's virtual. It means it is represented as information by some other physical form rather than its actual form. — Zelebg
Eyes are [a] be(ing) conscious of light. — ovdtogt
Consciousness is holistic, it manifests as the interaction of all manner of cells and organs as an orchestrated whole which is what 'being' refers to. — Wayfarer
That attitude is a direct historical consequence of the Christianity.
— Wayfarer — ovdtogt
Virtual : not physically existing as such but made by software to appear to do so.
Hence, a virtual electron is not, as you suggested, an electron in an alternative "physical form" in space-time, but merely a pointer to a meta-physical form in consciousness.
Why argue so convoluted. Our sensory organs transmit the signal by means of a biochemical electrical charge and our brains are able to interpret that signal in such a fashion that it provides us with knowledge about our environment. Don't have to make it more complicated than that.
An eye that can see is conscious of light.
So if a scientist takes up the challenge of addressing the "hard problem", you'd see that as misguided? — frank
an eye that can see is conscious of light.
That is crazy in so many ways, beautiful! — Zelebg
will reformulate such a speculative chimera into explanatory conjecture that can be modeled computationally and, at least in principle, tested (e.g. IIT). — 180 Proof
We will now address the deepest and most interesting variant of the NBP, the phenomenal unity of perception. There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole. This is closely related to the problem known as the illusion of a stable visual world (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). ....
Traditionally, the NBP concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades. But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.
There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.
But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.
You might have missed the scientific paper I mentioned above, which mentions the 'hard problem' in particular connection to what is called the 'neural binding problem'. The paper is here, from which I quote: — Wayfarer
I want to understand how the way the eye works and how that corresponds to the sound of a breeze through the leaves of a tree. — ovdtogt
Evidence? — 180 Proof
any competent scientist will reformulate such a speculative chimera into explanatory conjecture — 180 Proof
There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function.
What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene
Scientists, like most of us on these forums, traffic from time to time in pseudo-philosophical speculation. — 180 Proof
And this very scientist says that, and again I quote [ ... ] There genuinely, really is 'a hard problem of consciousness', ... — Wayfarer
... but it's almost beyond doubt that you don't actually comprehend what it is. — Wayfarer
Yes. A symbol points to something else. But it is not the actual something else. And the something else is not necessarily concrete or real. It may be an idea or concept. In that latter case, the physical symbol points to a meta-physical concept. The pointer points FROM something symbolic or virtual, TO something semantic, which is an abstraction pointing BACK TO something real or physical. The "difference" is between Mind & Matter, Substance & Attribute, Potentiality & Actuality. "Vive la difference!"Pointer points FROM something to something. Do you understand the difference when that pointer of yours points from, say an actual chair in a room, and virtual chair on a computer screen? — Zelebg
Note : a Virtual Electron is a potential particle, not an actual particle.
Virtual : not physically existing as such but made by software to appear to do so.
If you don't like the Google definition of "Virtual", which alternative definition would better suit your personal preference, and preconceptions?but you are failing to make any sense as you are unable to google properly because you do not understand words. — Zelebg
That was my own personal definition.you even gave correct definition: — Zelebg
So, you believe that "virtual" and "potential" existence are equivalent to "real" and "actual or physical" existence? Hence, nothing in the world is "unreal" or "ideal" or "metaphysical", yes?To suddenly confuse the two like that is not simply senseless, it requires total cognitive blindness. — Zelebg
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