I just did.

Read me.

Here:

1. If it is Tuesday, then it is raining (false)
2 It is not raining (false)
3. Therefore it is not Tuesday (true) — Bartricks

Read.

False premises can and do lead to true conclusions, as was shown in the argument. The real question is about justification.

Confidentlywrong: we both know that pigs are dogs, don't we?

Bartricks: pigs aren't dogs. What are you on about?

Confidentlywrong: well, we disagree about then, yes? Can you show me an example of a pig that is not a dog?

Bartricks: Take any pig - it's not a dog.

Confidentlywrong: but dogs are horses. We all know that.

Bartricks: No, dogs are not horses. And pigs are not dogs.

Confidentlywrong: Well, can you show me a pig that is not a dog

Bartricks: I just did.

Confidentlywrong: But I do not read what you say. So, without writing anything, can you show me a pig that is not a dog

Bartricks: no.

Confidentlywrong: there you go - you see! Pigs are dogs, which are horses.

1. If it is Tuesday, then it is raining (false)
2 It is not raining (false)
3. Therefore it is not Tuesday (true) — Bartricks

Denying the antecedent...

Not valid.

Denying the antecedent...

Not valid. — creativesoul

No, denying the consequent. Valid.

Look, confidentlywrong, you're confidentlywrong. Get on that.

Humble pie. Shovel. Your mouth. Come along, eat up.

Ah, your such a childish dick!

I consent. That is modus tollens.

Ah, your such a dick! — creativesoul

Classy. Is you upset because the nasty man did some clever on you?

Oh, and it is 'you are' or 'you're' not 'your'.

Do you also agree that you're completely wrong about Gettier cases? If I remember rightly, in our last spat you seemed to think it is crucially important that one is called Smith and the other Jones. That's right, isn't it?

Do you also agree that you're completely wrong about Gettier cases? — Bartricks

No. I have both cases right.

Gettier confuses the truth conditions of the general proposition "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", with the truth conditions of Smith's belief that "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". In the former(a general proposition), anyone and everyone that has ten coins in their pocket and gets the job counts as "the person with ten coins in their pocket". But in Smith's belief only Jones counts, for it is not just a proposition, but Smith's belief about Jones.

No. I have both cases right. — creativesoul

Yes, but you're confidently wrong about that, Confidentlywrong. The relevant belief is about the person who will occupy the post, not Jones specifically.

And even if it was about Jones specifically - which is isn't - we could construct a case in which the belief is about Jones yet does not qualify as knowledge. I did that, but you didn't read it.

I consent. That is modus tollens. — creativesoul

Yes - 'denying the consequent'.

Ah, perhaps my replies don't sound Latin enough. So, here goes: Yourvium understandium est Gettier cases hoc confused rubbishium.

You never directly addressed that by the way... or the following questions...

Who did Smith believe had ten coins in their pocket?

Who did Smith believe would get the job?

There's only one correct answer here my friend(s), and refutes Gettier because it show us all that Smith's belief is false, and therefore... not a problem for JTB.

Addressediumed I didium. Youvium est confusedium. De ja vu. (sorry, that's French).

In order to maintain your position here, you're forced to claim that Smith's belief is about someone other than Jones...

That's false on it's face.

Who did Smith believe had ten coins in their pocket?

Who did Smith believe would get the job? — creativesoul

:brow:

Now you're just making yourself look bad. I consented the earlier point about false premisses, because that's what reasonable people do when they realize that they're wrong... and I was.

However, you are wrong about Smith's belief... and so is everyone and anyone else who thinks that Smith believed anyone other than Jones would get the job. Since we know that Smith knew Jones had ten coins in his pocket, and was justified in believing that Jones would get the job, we also know that when Smith deduced "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" from that that Smith was picking out Jones to the exclusion of all other people, including himself.

It's a novel approach, but dead on the mark.

Proposition is not equal to belief, which a careful assessment of Gettier's paper clearly shows, assuming the right approach. We can see this for ourselves...

As a general proposition(divorced from belief) "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" is true whenever anyone with ten coins in their pocket gets the job, including Smith himself.

...and that is the sleight of hand, because...

...as a deduction of Smith's belief, "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" is all about Jones... and no one else. So, it is irrefutable to say that in Smith's own mind, according to his own belief, the person being picked out to the exclusion of all others by the deduction is Jones, because Smith's belief is clearly about none other than... Jones.



Perhaps a substitution exercise will help drive the point home...

Smith's belief is that Jones will get the job, and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Hence, by entailment he arrives at the following...

"The person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job."

The only correct substitution for "the person with ten coins in his pocket" is Jones. Anything else, and both the truth conditions and the meaning of Smith's deductive belief changes. That would render the deduction something other than Smith's belief. Anything other than Smith's belief is unacceptable, for it is Smith's belief that is being taken account of here. Thus, anything other than Jones would be an unacceptable substitution...

Salva Veritate.

Jones did not get the job. Therefore, Smith's belief was false. False belief is not a problem for JTB. Gettier's Case I is a case of false belief.

QED

But people use the term, "know", to refer things that aren't so. They don't know that they don't know. They think they do, which is why they use the word. — Harry Hindu

If Alice looks out the window before claiming that she knows that it is raining, then her use of the term "know" is justifiable. If her claim is false, then she will not actually know what she thinks she knows. That is, she has used an achievement verb, but has not actually acquired knowledge. Nonetheless, it is a perfectly ordinary and acceptable use, and does not indicate that she doesn't know what it means.

We used to know that the Earth was flat until we learned that it wasn't. — Harry Hindu

Compare with "It used to be true that the Earth was flat" (which is an unconventional use). Since knowledge entails truth, people used to think the Earth was flat (as you say below), but they could not have known it was flat.

We used to think the Earth was flat based on observations. It took a more objective observation to show that we were wrong (looking at the Earth from space). How do we know when we have reached the most objective observation to say that we then possess knowledge? — Harry Hindu

The issue is that in many scenarios, it's possible that the state-of-affairs is such that you could be mistaken no matter how carefully you investigated it.

Short of deductive proof, there is not going to be a guarantee of truth, only criteria that justifies the belief or claim (such as looking out the window when checking for rain). The same goes for finding mistakes. It's not an infallible process but it is a self-correcting process.

Like I said, if people say that they know that it is raining, when it isn't, then how are they using the word that is meaningful? How is how people use the term evidence that they know how to use it? — Harry Hindu

Consider the parallel with people saying that it is true that it is raining, when it isn't. Or simply that it is raining, when it isn't.

People know perfectly well what rain is (and how to use the term "rain"), but can nonetheless be mistaken in a given instance.

That's the case with the term "know". When Alice looked out the window and saw what looked like rain, her belief that it was raining was justifiable. If she later discovers that it wasn't actually raining then she would presumably agree that she didn't know it was raining after all - she was mistaken. So that demonstrates a consistent understanding of the meaning and proper use of the term "know".

Salva Veritate. — creativesoul

Yes, veritable saliva.

No, Smith's belief is about the person who will occupy the role.

But even if it rigidly designates Jones - and it doesn't - we could easily construct another Gettier case in which Smith's belief about Jones's coin situation is justified, true, and not knowledge.

I described such a case. You either didn't read it, or didn't understand it

No, Smith's belief is about the person who will occupy the role.

But even if it rigidly designates Jones - and it doesn't — Bartricks

No? As if Smith's belief was not specifically about a particular person named Jones? As if Gettier did not say who in particular Smith's beliefs were about???

:brow:

I'll forward Gettier's own words here. I mean, there is no stronger ground for determining who Smith's belief is about in particular.

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the fol1owing conjunctive proposition:

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket.

There it is, in Gettier's own words...

Jones is THE man who(Smith believes) will get the job!

QED

But even if it rigidly designates Jones - and it doesn't - we could easily construct another Gettier case in which Smith's belief about Jones's coin situation is justified, true, and not knowledge.

I described such a case. You either didn't read it, or didn't understand it — Bartricks

Or I did both and already responded.

Sigh...

Brother you're welcome to follow Gettier's formula all you like, and we'll examine it accordingly. As I said earlier, I love these mind puzzles. Shows that some logic is anything other than infallible when used as a means to take proper account of belief.

Can we agree that knowledge is information? Defining information is a lot easier.

Bartricks,

Let me respond to you first. I do want to address some of the other comments, too, though, but perhaps in subsequent posts.

Hmm, I do not think you're right, but it doesn't really affect my point, which I'll elaborate on shortly.

What a curious response. I showed why there was no need to invoke the notion of luck in your treatment of the two knowledge claim scenarios. Your only coherent response is to argue why my objection is somehow mistaken or insufficient. Instead, you want to move on to some other point without admitting your error. Okay, go ahead, but I didn't address that point, whatever it is. I addressed your characterization of the two knowledge claim scenarios, and those objections stand.

Several things: first, intuitively the agent 'is' justified.

No, intuitively he's not justified. Come one now, that just is the lesson to draw from our intuitions about knowledge. Yes, he is justified on the JTB definition, but the scenarios are meant to highlight how JTB fails as a definition. (I think Sam26 wants to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition, but that seems wrong -- unless we want to accept that knowledge is defeasible, which nobody wants to accept.) So, in both scenarios, there is something amiss with the justification. In other words, he's not justified. This is why people have moved from JTB to WTB (warranted true belief, where the "warrant" guarantees us that neither of the knowledge claims you described count as knowledge).

They could not reasonably have been expected to know that the clock was not working. So, they were justified in believing it was working, and so subsequently justified in believing it was the time that it represented it to be.

Hmm...maybe you didn't understand my post. I explain why you're conflating two separate ideas and, thus, equivocating on the term "justified." Yes, he can be pardoned for not knowing that the clock wasn't working. So, it's perfectly understandable that he believes it is a working clock and, of course, that working clocks keep the correct time. But broken clocks do not lend epistemic justification for beliefs about the time. That just is the intuition which informs our conclusion that he doesn't actually have knowledge. He used a broken clock to form his belief about the time; hence, he doesn't actually know it's 3 PM despite having a true belief that it's 3 PM. You seem to think, quite counter-intuitively, that a broken clock can provide the requisite justification for a belief about the time. Again, you need an argument or example to make it more palatable. You've yet to provide such an example, although you apparently think you have.

Second, for the sake of argument let's test your analysis.

Not "for the sake of argument" -- for the sake of avoiding admitting that you are wrong.

If it is correct, then any belief about the time based on a broken clock's report should fail to qualify as knowledge.

Correct.

But I can imagine a case in which a person bases a belief about the time on a broken clock and their belief 'does' qualify as knowledge.

No, you cannot.

For example, imagine the clock has broken, but it has literally just broken - that is, it has broken at the point at which its hands reach 3 o clock. It was working fine up to that point. The agent then looks at the clock. Now, the agent is looking at a broken clock and, on the basis of its report, he forms the belief that it is 3 o clock (which it is). This time it seems clear enough that the agent does have knowledge, yes?

No, he doesn't have knowledge. He still lacks justification, the right kind. This example is in no meaningful way different from the original example, so I don't know what you think you've added to the discussion. Why would it matter whether it stopped working a moment ago, 24 hours ago, or 24 years ago?

But anyway, I am not married to the 'luck' analysis either, for my point is not that this or that analysis is always and everywhere correct, but rather that whatever diagnosis we give of why the agent lacks knowledge in the relevant case, we will be able to construct another case in which that 'key' ingredient is present and the agent lacks knowledge (or absent, and the agent possesses knowledge)

To be fair, the luck analysis hasn't been correct once. Anyway, are you saying there's no indefeasible definition of knowledge? That seems like a rather strong position to take. I don't quite see the motivation for it, but I'm not saying you're wrong. I simply haven't put any serious thought to the matter.

That's not to say that the diagnosis of the original case was wrong.

I'm pretty sure I already proved it wrong.

It is just to note that there is no stability to what is, and is not doing the work of making it the case that the agent has knowledge (apart from possessing a true belief).

Why is that the conclusion? If there are clear intuitive cases of knowledge -- which there are -- then there would seem to be coherent criteria for knowledge. That's just the take-away, right? Are you saying that because nobody has been able to spell out this criteria, it can't exist? Or, more likely, are you saying that nobody can spell out criteria for knowledge that isn't susceptible to counter-examples? Again, I don't see why that conclusion would follow.

I get that you're entertaining the question of what makes 'knowledge' impossible to define in an indefeasible way. That is, why are all the criteria for knowledge susceptible, according to you, to counter-examples in which the criteria are satisfied but in which our intuition tells us the person doesn't have knowledge. I don't think you're right about this, but I leave you to theorize. I've only objected to the two knowledge scenarios you mis-characterized.

Thus it is reasonable to conclude that 'knowledge' is an attitude that a person is adopting towards true beliefs. Not, I emphasis, an attitude one of us is adopting towards true beliefs, but an attitude Reason is adopting towards them.

I disagree. I don't think you can have knowledge that it's 3 PM based on a belief you formed by looking at a broken clock. You've yet to provide such an example. Without giving us reason to doubt our intuitions about knowledge, then your argument never gets off the ground.

Can we agree that knowledge is information? — ovdtogt

No.

No, intuitively he's not justified. Come one now, that just is the lesson to draw from our intuitions about knowledge. Yes, he is justified on the JTB definition, but the scenarios are meant to highlight how JTB fails as a definition. (I think Sam26 wants to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition, but that seems wrong -- unless we want to accept that knowledge is defeasible, which nobody wants to accept.) So, in both scenarios, there is something amiss with the justification. In other words, he's not justified. This is why people have moved from JTB to WTB (warranted true belief, where the "warrant" guarantees us that neither of the knowledge claims you described count as knowledge). — fiveredapples

You're right I do want to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition. I want to separate the definition from it's actual application, i.e., the definition works, but it's application is fallible. The application of the definition, due to a number of human fallibility factors, is never infallible. We are always updating and changing what we think we know. So, built into the application of the definition (we could in a sense call it a kind of formula) is the understanding that for various reasons/causes it could turn out that my justification wasn't correct, thereby nullifying my reasons for thinking I was justified. If we later find out that the clock was broke, then we weren't justified - period. Just because you thought you were justified, doesn't mean you are or were justified. This is why often our justifications need testing, because we are often wrong. Fallibility always includes the possibility of being wrong, even if it's a very low probability.

If Alice looks out the window before claiming that she knows that it is raining, then her use of the term "know" is justifiable. If her claim is false, then she will not actually know what she thinks she knows. That is, she has used an achievement verb, but has not actually acquired knowledge. Nonetheless, it is a perfectly ordinary and acceptable use, and does not indicate that she doesn't know what it means. — Andrew M

If Alice knowing wasn't true, then she misused the word. You misuse a word when it is irrelevant to use. You misuse words when you don't know what they mean.

Compare with "It used to be true that the Earth was flat" (which is an unconventional use). Since knowledge entails truth, people used to think the Earth was flat (as you say below), but they could not have known it was flat. — Andrew M

So they confused knowing with thinking? If knowing and thinking are indistinguishable so that you don't know whether you're doing one or the other, then how do you know that everything that you know is what you know and not what you think, including what knowledge is? If you can't ever attain knowledge as you've defined it, then what's the point in using the term?

As you have defined it, you'd have to know that you know it is raining in order to say that you really know that it is raining. How do you know that you know if knowing and thinking are indistinguishable? You've engineered a nice infinite regress of homunculi of knowing that you know that you know that you know, etc.

I want to separate the definition from it's actual application, i.e., the definition works, but it's application is fallible. — Sam26

I don't think anybody would disagree that we sometimes make mistakes. So, yes, sometimes when we think we've satisfied the definition of JTB, we actually haven't. So far, however, you haven't addressed the objection we are making against JTB.

The application of the definition, due to a number of human fallibility factors, is never infallible.

.
Now you're introducing the idea of infallibility, which no human is, but that doesn't mitigate against the objection that JTB fails as a definition. Your defense of the definition can't simply be that every time it fails, it's because of human error. That's way too strong a defense, which should be a red flag to you.

We are always updating and changing what we think we know.

Okay, but not always about everything. We are advancing and making new discoveries, creating new methods, improving old methods, etc., but that doesn't imply that everything we've known in the past gets revised in the future in light of the "updating and changing" that we do. No, many things remain forever the same, maintain the same status as always, and do not change in light of human advancement. You're taking a common phenomenon and making sweeping generalizations so that it applies to the one case you want it to apply to.

So, built into the application of the definition (we could in a sense call it a kind of formula) is the understanding that for various reasons/causes it could turn out that my justification wasn't correct, thereby nullifying my reasons for thinking I was justified.

Yes, but this simply says what you've already said: namely, that we're not infallible, so we might, on occasion, be mistaken about having attained proper justification. Infallibility, however, isn't a defense against the objection that JTB fails as a definition. After all, the objections come from hypothetical situations in which we simply stipulate the conditions. So, we can't be wrong about those conditions, as they are stipulations. In other words, the objections to JTB are theoretical objections, so your defense that we are infallible is actually a non-sequitur.

In the Russell example Bartricks gives, the man has justification under the JTB conception of knowledge. If he didn't, it would pose no problem for the JTB conception of knowledge. The problem is that our intuitions about knowledge tell us that something is awry. We don't think he has knowledge, pace JTB, and we pinpoint the problem to the source of his belief: namely, the broken clock. There is no human fallibility at play here. To think fallibility is at work here -- to respond that the man made a mistake in thinking the broken clock was a working clock -- is to not realize that the justification criterion, per JTB, has actually been satisfied in the example.

I suspect that you're using our intuitive definition of knowledge, not JTB, to defend JTB. In essence, you're saying that had he looked at a working clock, he would have had the right type of justification. Again, though, he already has the right type of justification -- he hasn't made any mistake -- according to JTB. That's why JTB fails -- because it doesn't square with our intuitions of knowledge, and human fallibility cannot save JTB from the objections we're making against it.

If we later find out that the clock was broke, then we weren't justified - period.

But as I explained, we were and remain justified under JTB.

I don't want to rehash my same objection about your fallibility defense. I think I've made myself clear. I do want to add that you seem to be turning the fallibility defense into a certainty requirement. Something like, "We can never be certain that we've satisfied the JTB requirements because we are fallible." That is not an adequate defense of JTB.

I think you are feeling frustrated and we need to agree to disagree. Maybe someday you will realize there is a difference between animals communicating and language but obviously will not be this day.

Bartricks,

Before we spend more sweat and tears on responses to each other, I want to highlight a very important disagreement we have, which might be the source of most of our disagreements. You believe that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. I believe that a broken clock cannot lend such justification. Unless we address this disagreement, we're going to be talking past each other quite a bit. We might simply have different intuitions about knowledge.

The best we might hope for, then, is to let others say what their intuitions are on the matter. So, the question to others is, can a broken clock lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time? Or, in simpler English, if you come to believe that it's 3 PM based on your looking at a broken clock, do you have the right kind of justification for your true belief -- by sheer coincidence, the time actually is 3 PM ---- to count as knowledge?

Sam,

You seem to think that fallibility helps you defend JTB from the objection that it fails as a definition of knowledge. I've tried to explain why fallibility cannot help you defend JTB from the objections we're making against it. The one point of disagreement which we have to settle is that you think that the man doesn't have epistemic justification in the Russell example, but I think (as does Bartricks) that he does have justification. Although I believe Bartricks thinks he does because he thinks the broken clock lends epistemic justification. Nevertheless, the man in the Russell example satisfied the JTB definition. If you disagree with that point, then we too are going to talk past each other.

Thank for share. Its best answer on this question.

But people use the term, "know", to refer things that aren't so. They don't know that they don't know. They think they do, which is why they use the word. We used to know that the Earth was flat until we learned that it wasn't. We can only know that we didn't know after the fact of saying that we did. So how people use the word isn't always about what is so. Knowing is only the belief that you have the proper information to form a conclusion, when you might not. — Harry Hindu

I think we need to take a look at how our brains work. We are slow thinkers and fast thinkers. I have argued that animals don't have language and that goes with understanding fast and slow thinking. We share fast thinking with all animals but other animals do not share slow with us. An animal is not going to argue "They don't know that they don't know." An animal is not going to argue A can not be B. I hope people will watch this video about fast and slow thinking and reflect on what "knowing" means.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqXVAo7dVRU