You seem to think that fallibility helps you defend JTB from the objection that it fails as a definition of knowledge. I've tried to explain why fallibility cannot help you defend JTB from the objections we're making against it. The one point of disagreement which we have to settle is that you think that the man doesn't have epistemic justification in the Russell example, but I think (as does Bartricks) that he does have justification. Although I believe Bartricks thinks he does because he thinks the broken clock lends epistemic justification. Nevertheless, the man in the Russell example satisfied the JTB definition. If you disagree with that point, then we too are going to talk past each other. — fiveredapples

What god or part of nature made the clock in the first place? Without a clock, how can anyone justify the argument that it is 3 o'clock? Time is intangible and we are treating it as tangible when we agree it is 3 o'clock without realizing it is only our agreement that is 3 o'clock that makes it 3 o'clock. If we are on daylight savings time it is not 3 o'clock at 3 o'clock because everyone agrees it is 2 o'clock.

Or how about this, if we were primitive people without the counting system we have, making it possible to have an agreement that a day is 24 hours and that a day is divided between day and night, there would not be clock time to argue about. Is it a bit insane to treat time as a tangible reality? How about arguing socialism is good or bad? Is that a tangible reality or intangible? We can not agree on many things we argue about because of our arguments about intangible beliefs and we are not practicing awareness of what is tangible and what is intangible. Knowing socialism is bad, is like knowing God is good. This "knowing" can not lead to rational thinking.

It doesn't matter if the believer doesn't realize the clock is not working. It's not working. They believe that it is working. That is false belief. False belief does not make good ground for knowledge. Luck? Sure. So, that case is not a case of well grounded true belief even if it is a case of being lucky. — creativesoul

I've read a little of what you say on the topic prior to the post where this quote comes from, but I cannot claim to have read everything you say in the thread. So, I might have an incomplete understanding of what you're claiming. That said, I have some comments.

You are making more work for yourself than necessary. You claim that false premises cannot lead to a true conclusion. Frankly, I don't know what to make of this claim, but I see that Bartricks has beaten you over the head with an obvious counter-example. Again, I'm not sure how your claim pertains to the Gettier examples, but I don't think you need to make this argument. You have, I believe, the correct intuition that broken clocks cannot lend the proper justification for knowledge claims. This is actually the main point of contention between you and Bartricks.

He believes the contrary, that broken clocks can lend the proper justification for knowledge claims. I think he's wrong, but we might have to chalk this up to contending intuitions. You don't seem satisfied with that and want, instead, to make a stronger argument against him. It's in this stronger argument -- this argument about 'false beliefs not supporting a true conclusion' -- where you are faltering.

He's right to say that the man (in the Russell example) in justified in believing that the clock is working and keeping the correct time. He thinks that's enough to get him the epistemic justification he needs for knowledge claims. After all, he says, if the man is justified in believing the clock is working (which he is), then that's all the justification needed. Here, I think he's wrong. Once we hash out how clocks lend epistemic justification -- namely, by working and keeping the correct time -- we see that this particular clock cannot lend such justification. He believes that because there is justification for this presumption -- that clocks work and keep the correct time -- he doesn't need to concern himself with whether that particular clock works or not. That's why he thinks, or is consistent with why he thinks, that a broken clock can sometimes provide the proper justification for knowledge claims. He is, in my opinion, simply not digging deep enough.

Again, I'm not sure how your claim pertains to the Gettier examples, — fiveredapples

That one doesn't. It was about Russell's clock, and it's both wrong and unnecessary.

:wink:

Broken clocks are not good ground to base knowledge of time on. Simpler is better.

Gettier's cases have different issues, which I've explained at length beginning on page six, and again on the last couple pages. I've only touched on Case I, but II suffers the exact same flaw... conflation of proposition(conjunction that time) and belief.

In the Russell example Bartricks gives, the man has justification under the JTB conception of knowledge. If he didn't, it would pose no problem for the JTB conception of knowledge. The problem is that our intuitions about knowledge tell us that something is awry. We don't think he has knowledge, pace JTB, and we pinpoint the problem to the source of his belief: namely, the broken clock. There is no human fallibility at play here. To think fallibility is at work here -- to respond that the man made a mistake in thinking the broken clock was a working clock -- is to not realize that the justification criterion, per JTB, has actually been satisfied in the example. — fiveredapples

(Nice posts, btw).

Why, or how, does the man know that it’s 3 o’clock? Only because he looked at the clock which, to his mind, was working properly. The obtainment of truth that it is 3 o’clock is thus here directly determined solely by the reality of there being a working clock.

As uncomfortable as this might be, remove the god’s eye view from the scenario. If the man goes about life from here on out without ever observing anything which contradicts with his conviction that it was 3 o’clock on account of a working clock so showing, to the man this belief will be a known. Hence, to him and all others that he interacts with, there will be no evidence that he did not obtain a true state of the world (the correct time) from observing a working clock (a reality to which his beliefs accurately conform). If enquiry was made into how he knows this, his justification (of a fact, rather than ethical justification for the acceptability of so believing – the two forms of justification sometimes get conflated) will be that a working clock informed him of it so being. Here, a working clock showing that its 3 o’clock is, again, the reality to which his true proposition of it being 3 o’clock conforms. And again, because nothing he encounters will contradict his justified true belief, that it was 3 o’clock will to him be knowledge.

Now, where he to any point in the future to discover things that contradict with what is to him a known, he at this point will know (as per the LNC) that some or all of the data involved are in fact mistaken. At this point what is and isn’t known becomes doubted to varying degrees. Say he then discovers that this same clock was not working properly via enquiry. Now, he gains awareness that his then held truth of it being 3 o’clock (on account of a working clock so showing) was in fact a belief-that (a belief of what is true) that did not conform to what was real – was in fact a false belief. He can now ethically justify his stance that it was 3 o’clock but can no longer factually justify it – for the reality on which it was dependent turn out to be bogus.

The person now knows that he was wrong in what he presumed to be knowledge.

None of us have a god’s eye view of the world. Factual justification of our beliefs of what is true in fact being true is all we have to go by. Most of the time, we don’t spend a lot of time in justifying our knows. They simply cohere into other knowns without contradiction and this, typically, serves as sufficient justification for them. But when there is a contradiction between what we take to be knowns, then we know that some of the givens we’ve taken to be knowns are not.

Placing the god’s eye view of the scenario back in, the terminology gets confused: the man only thinks he knows that its 3 o’clock – something we know on account of knowing that the reality of it being a working clock is bogus. But, because the person is unware of this, to the person his known is, at least for the time being, fully secure, and he has no reason to doubt his knowledge.

My take away from this is that declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. In practice, we never spend an entire lifetime factually justifying one single belief-that, so our justifications are never perfect but always approximate. Regardless, we assume that anything we consider a known could be so justified ad infinitum without and problems manifesting in the process. The shortened version of all this is then, imo, JTB.

Why, or how, does the man know that it’s 3 o’clock? Only because he looked at the clock which, to his mind, was working properly. The obtainment of truth that it is 3 o’clock is thus here directly determined solely by the reality of there being a working clock. — javra

Hi Javra,

May I ask which scenario you are referring to: the Russell example or the counter-example? In the Russell example the clock is not working, which leads me to think you're talking about the counter-example, as that's the one in which the clock is working, but you also say things which suggest the clock isn't working.

What you describe after your initial comment is Coherentism. I don't find much appealing about this counter-intuitive theory, so I'm not sure I need to take it seriously. If you're a Coherentist, it doesn't matter whether the clock is working or not, so I don't understand the emphasis on the working clock.

And I appreciate the head nod about my posts.

Gettier's cases have different issues, which I've explained at length beginning on page six, and again on the last couple pages. I've only touched on Case I, but II suffers the exact same flaw... conflation of proposition(conjunction that time) and belief. — creativesoul

Would it be too much to have it all in one post? Reading someone's theory piecemeal is way too taxing for a sluggard like me.

May I ask which scenario you are referring to: the Russell example or the counter-example? — fiveredapples

Via the Russel example, I was addressing the understanding that the man can only know its 3 o'clock if his beliefs conform to reality. His primary belief is that he is observing the reality of a working clock, from which is derived the second belief of what time it is. In Russell's scenario, the second belief (is assumed to) conform to reality only via the first belief's (assumed) conformity to reality. Differently stated, in the stipulated case, it is only the (assumed) truth of a working clock that justifies the man's (assumed) truth of what time it is - which, in this example, luckily happens to be correct.

But the first belief is untrue.

Still, it is - or would be - the reality of a working clock that leads - or would lead - to knowledge of what time it is.

Because the man has no justification by which to deem that the clock to not be working, to him he holds knowledge of what time it is.

To those who are aware that the clock is not working, the man does not hold knowledge of what time it is - this because the primary belief upon which his second belief is founded is untrue, thereby making the second belief factually unjustified, despite if happening to be correct by mere luck.

I suppose the pivotal part of my previous post was this:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

From my perspective, since the man would not be capable of so justifying his conviction of what time it is, he does not hold what he and everyone else deems to be knowledge.

Via the Russel example, I was addressing the understanding that the man can only know its 3 o'clock if his beliefs conform to reality. — javra

No, that's not enough. If that were enough, then he could simply guess the correct time and he'd have knowledge, according to your definition. This is an even weaker conception of knowledge than JTB.

At least JTB attempts to tie the belief to reality by way of a reliable source of truth.

To those who are aware that the clock is not working, the man does not hold knowledge of what time it is - this because the primary belief upon which his second belief is founded is untrue, thereby making the second belief factually unjustified, despite if happening to be correct by mere luck. — javra

People are not the ultimate determiners of whether someone has knowledge. I feel like you're speaking as Coherentist, but I reject Coherentism, so I accept none of your premises. I pretty much know what Coherentism entails. If you want to argue for Coherentism, I'm all ears.

If you'll accept my premise that I'm omniscient, then know that you're wrong. See, it's not very compelling.

No, that's not enough. If that were enough, then he could simply guess the correct time and he'd have knowledge, according to your definition. This is an even weaker conception of knowledge than JTB.

At least JTB attempts to tie the belief to reality by way of a reliable source of truth. — fiveredapples

I will not repeat what I said in my previous posts, but this clearly did not take what I said in context.

I will not repeat what I said in my previous posts, but this clearly did not take what I said in context. — javra

Am I wrong that you're a Coherentist? Aren't you saying that as long as all his beliefs cohere -- don't contradict any other beliefs he has -- then he has knowledge that it's 3 PM?

Am I wrong that you're a Coherentist? — fiveredapples

In its pure traditional form, quite.

Coherency of beliefs applies, in part, to justifications - not to truth. Do you find that justifications for beliefs can be incoherent and yet valid?

Coherency of beliefs applies, in part, to justifications - not to truth. Do you find that justifications for beliefs can be incoherent and yet valid? — javra

Do you mean...Can I reasonably hold two beliefs which don't cohere? I think maybe I'm not understanding what you're asking.

Do you mean...Can I reasonably hold two beliefs which don't cohere? — fiveredapples

No, that anybody can.

Can you validly justify a belief-that via use of givens that do not cohere?

As you have defined it, you'd have to know that you know it is raining in order to say that you really know that it is raining. — Harry Hindu

In order to justifiably believe that it is raining, Alice needs to look out the window. If her belief that it is raining is true then she knows that it is raining.

In its simplest form, that is all there is to knowledge and that example captures how people ordinarily use the term.

There is no need to "know that you know". Your concern, it seems, is that Alice only has a justifiable belief but is no closer to (really) knowing that her belief is true. But that is to misunderstand the conditions of knowledge. Since she has a justifiable belief, she knows that it is raining just on the condition that her belief is true. There's nothing further she needs to do, or can do, in order to know it. And the same conditions apply when reflecting on her belief - if she knows that it is raining then she can further know that she knows it.

How do you know that you know if knowing and thinking are indistinguishable? — Harry Hindu

What distinguishes them logically is that knowledge has a truth condition, thinking does not. (Or, in Gilbert Ryle's terminology, knowing is an achievement word, thinking is a task word.) Alice can think it was raining at 3pm and later discover that it was not. But she cannot know that it was raining at 3pm and later discover that it was not.

So the two terms have different uses. To say that people used to know that the Earth is flat, for example, would be a misuse of the term "know" given that it has a truth condition and that that belief is unjustifiable today.

What a curious response. I showed why there was no need to invoke the notion of luck in your treatment of the two knowledge claim scenarios. Your only coherent response is to argue why my objection is somehow mistaken or insufficient. Instead, you want to move on to some other point without admitting your error. — fiveredapples

How is that curious? First, I showed why your alternative to my 'luck' analysis is false. Note, the only evidence you provided that I was mistaken was the putative truth of your analysis. So I refuted your analysis.

Before we spend more sweat and tears on responses to each other, I want to highlight a very important disagreement we have, which might be the source of most of our disagreements. You believe that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time. I believe that a broken clock cannot lend such justification. Unless we address this disagreement, we're going to be talking past each other quite a bit. We might simply have different intuitions about knowledge. — fiveredapples

No, we're not talking past each other. I refuted your view. How? I outlined a case in which a person forms a belief about the time based on a broken clock's report - and it was clear that the person's belief qualified as knowledge. Your analysis would insist it would not qualify as knowledge. It does - clearly it does - therefore your analysis is false.

There are other cases - fake barn cases - that also imply your analysis is false.

So, the question to others is, can a broken clock lend epistemic justification to beliefs about the time? Or, in simpler English, if you come to believe that it's 3 PM based on your looking at a broken clock, do you have the right kind of justification for your true belief -- by sheer coincidence, the time actually is 3 PM ---- to count as knowledge? — fiveredapples

No, there are cases and cases. Individual cases need to be described. Our intuitions are about particular cases, not about principles.

So, if you present someone with the original clock case then they may well agree that the reason why the agent's belief fails to qualify as knowledge is that it is based on the report of a broken clock.

Note, I do not deny that this is true of that case.

But if you then present them with 'my' broken clock case, they are likely to agree that the agent's belief does qualify as knowledge.

Likewise with Potemkin barn cases.

Hi Javra,

Sorry, I cannot wrap my head around this question. It's probably not complicated, but it doesn't make full sense to me, so I don't want to commit to an answer yet. Let me refresh my understanding later and possibly get back to you tomorrow. For now, it's off to work for me. Thanks for the responses.

Although I believe Bartricks thinks he does because he thinks the broken clock lends epistemic justification. — fiveredapples

I do not think this - I think they 'can' lend justification. I'm a holist about knowledge. That is, I think what transforms a true belief into knowledge in one context, may not in another.

So, sometimes an agent has a true belief about the time, but it fails to qualify as knowledge due to the fact it was based on the report of a broken clock.

But sometimes an agent has a true belief about the time and it 'does' qualify as knowledge even though it was based on the report of a broken clock.

That's going to be the case whatever condition you specify. It'll provide you with the correct explanation of why an agent lacks knowledge in some cases, but a false one in others.

To return to my analogy with deliciousness: sometimes I find something I am eating delicious due to the presence of chocolate in it. But sometimes I find something I am eating foul due to the presence of chocolate in it.

No worries.

My take away from this is that declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. In practice, we never spend an entire lifetime factually justifying one single belief-that, so our justifications are never perfect but always approximate. Regardless, we assume that anything we consider a known could be so justified ad infinitum without and problems manifesting in the process. The shortened version of all this is then, imo, JTB. — javra

But aren't you answering a different question, namely "when is someone justified in believing they have knowledge"? The person in the Russell clock case - and other Gettier style cases - may well be justified in believing they have knowledge. But it still seems true (and would seem true to them too, were they aware of the nature of their situation) that they do not, in fact, possess knowledge.

Just in case an example would be of help:

Suppose I affirm knowledge that it will rain today. You ask me why. I then reply by justifying this belief to true with the following: there’s a satellite up in the sky and my cat is next to a plant out in the backyard – with this being the full scope of my justification. The two givens, even if true, do not cohere in any intelligible manner to my belief.

Here, I’d consider that my justification was invalid.

Now suppose that I explain things in a coherent manner as such: the satellite up in the sky has given a weather forecast of 80% chance of rain and my cat has always had a weird habit of sitting next to a plant in my backyard a few hours before it rains, next to which he is now sitting. The same basic truths are presented, but now the explanation provided makes them cohere with my belief that it will rain today.

Here, I’d consider that my justifications were valid – even if less than perfect.

In case it does rain – thereby evidencing my belief-that to be true – I can then maintain my claim of having had JTB in the latter case, but I can't claim JTB in the former case.

(edited the last sentence for better semantics)

But it still seems true (and would seem true to them too, were they aware of the nature of their situation) that they do not, in fact, possess knowledge. — Bartricks

As I believe I've addressed in my posts, I agree with this.

To me the conceptual problems only emerge when we presume (or else intend to gain) an omniscient perspective of reality and, thereby, possession of an infallible knowledge. We never hold such.

Still:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

True propositions that can be thereby justified ad infinitum without problems - where it to be feasible to so justify - occur. When they occur will always remain to some measure fallible for all of us non-omniscient beings.

To me the conceptual problems only emerge when we presume (or else intend to gain) an omniscient perspective of reality and, thereby, possession of an infallible knowledge. We never hold such. — javra

I am not sure I am following you. What are these conceptual problems and how do they arise for my position?

So, my position - as described in the OP - is that knowledge consists of a feeling Reason is adopting towards true beliefs.

This explains why there will be nothing, beyond simply being a 'true belief' that all clear cases of knowledge have in common.

Gettier-style cases and other similar thought experiments show us that sometimes a true belief qualifies as knowledge due to the fact it was justified, sometimes not. Sometimes a true belief can be knowledge without there being any justification for holding it; sometimes a true belief fails to be knowledge precisely because there is no justification for holding it; sometimes a true belief fails to be knowledge despite there being a justification for holding it.

How can we make sense of that?

Well, consider the property of 'delicious-to-me'. Only something I am eating can be delicious to me. But sometimes something I am eating to me is delicious because it has flavour P; yet sometimes something I am eating it is not delicious to me because it has flavour P; and sometimes something is delicious to me and flavour P, despite being present, played no role at all.

There is nothing problematic in that. I am not contradicting myself if I like foodstuff A due to its having flavour P, yet dislike foodstuff B due to its having flavour P.

Likewise, then, if knowledge is a feeling. There is nothing problematic - nothing incoherent - in Reason finding that she has the knowledge feeling about one true belief due to it being justified, yet does not have the knowledge feeling about another true belief despite its being justified.

Would it be too much to have it all in one post? Reading someone's theory piecemeal is way too taxing for a sluggard like me. — fiveredapples

Notta problem... Gotta say five... your manners are impeccable nowadays! Not that we've ever been at rhetorical odds.

:wink:

Cheers!

Good to have someone like you here... I must say... and I know that I'm not alone regarding the sentiment!

So, my position - as described in the OP - is that knowledge consists of a feeling Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. — Bartricks

As we once concluded a few days back, I’m not profound enough to understand the subtleties of your position regard Her: Reason. To which I again say, so be it! Off to the shallow tides with me.

But to give a reply given the best of my understanding regarding the position you affirm:

I have yet to encounter this person you refer to as Reason. But if I did, I’d do my best to explain to Her that truth is a conformity to what is real, that only if something is true can it be justified without error regardless of degree, and that there can be no knowledge in the absence of truth. I think I’d try to tell Her this even if Reason’s feelings might get hurt by me so saying. (I don’t like unnecessarily hurting persons, even if they are strangers to me.)

This may or may not be in accord to your position. But again, I’m not of that depth.

No, we're not talking past each other. I refuted your view. How? I outlined a case in which a person forms a belief about the time based on a broken clock's report - and it was clear that the person's belief qualified as knowledge. Your analysis would insist it would not qualify as knowledge. It does - clearly it does - therefore your analysis is false. — Bartricks

What nonsense. You're just insisting that your scenario shows what you say it does. Everyone is perfectly in his own right to say whether it strikes him as a case of knowledge or not. You proved nothing. It's absurd to think your scenario is anything other than a study case for everyone to decide for himself whether the man in the scenario has knowledge. I weighed in that he doesn't, and I explained why he doesn't. You've done nothing more than say otherwise. You haven't even bothered to explain -- because you don't know how -- why this new example is in any meaningful way different from the Russell example. You think "the clock just stopped working moments prior" is doing philosophical work for you. It's not. Yet somehow, magically, inclusion of this provides a case of someone having knowledge about the time based on looking at a broken clock? That's laughably bad.

Smith believed Jones would get the job, and no one else. Gettier needs Smith to believe otherwise, but he quite simply does not. — creativesoul

That's my refutation of Gettier's Case I in a nutshell.




We're talking about Smith's belief.

That needs kept in the forefront of consideration. Gettier only begins by talking about Smith's belief. Gettier then conflates propositions and belief and loses sight of Smith's belief in the process.

The truth conditions of "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", when examined by us as a general proposition(which is what Gettier wants and needs us to do), and the truth conditions of "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" when examined by us as Smith's belief(which Gettier neglects entirely) are drastically different from one another. And remember, we're talking about Smith's belief.

So, the aforementioned distinction needs drawn and maintained.


The truth conditions of the general proposition "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", amount to any man that has ten coins in their pocket and gets the job. In other words, any man with ten coins in his pocket who gets the job counts as "the man". That's all it takes to satisfy the truth conditions of (e) when we examine it as general proposition. It doesn't matter who it is. However...

Remember that we are talking about Smith's belief, and the same just cannot be said about it...


Smith's belief (e) was based upon Smith's prior belief(s) that Jones is the man with ten coins in his pocket that will get the job. That much is undeniably clear. I mean, Getter himself writes... and I quote...

Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket

So, we can clearly see Smith's belief is Jones is the man who will get the job. The problem is that Gettier loses sight of the fact that that's Smith's belief, and he does so immediately afterwards. This is shown by Gettier's examination of Smith's belief as though it were equivalent to a general proposition.

That's just not the case.

Smith does not believe that just any man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. Smith's belief is only true if Jones gets the job and had ten coins in his pocket. No one else matters. Smith believes that Jones will get the job. Gettier's own words stand in clear support of this. Let's look again for ourselves...

Gettier wrote:

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket.

Here we can see - yet again - where Gettier offers Smith's own belief that Jones is the man who will get the job and has ten coins in his pocket. Gettier then claims those beliefs count as Smith's ground for believing the following...

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

That's a fair enough account, as long as we keep in mind that it is still Smith's belief. Gettier doesn't. When examining (e) - as Smith's belief - we know that that's about Jones and only Jones. I mean, with just a moments thought, there is no question whatsoever regarding who Smith's belief is about. Gettier said it clearly. The president of the company picked Jones out to the exclusion of all others when he told Smith that in the end Jones would get the job. Jones was the man that allowed Smith to count the coins in his pocket. Smith picked Jones out to the exclusion of all others when talking about the man that allowed him to count the coins in his pocket.

Clearly Smith is picking out one particular Jones to the exclusion of all other men when he deduces (e). So, there is no question who Smith's belief is about. Smith believes Jones is the man who will get the job as well as believing Jones is the man with ten coins in his pocket. Thus, it can only be the case - when interpreting Smith's belief (e) that the referent of "the man" is the exact same Jones that the president was talking about; the exact same Jones that allowed Smith to count the coins that were in his pocket; the exact same Jones that Smith believed would get the job; and the exact same Jones that was there with Smith throughout the very thought process Gettier describes.

Gettier neglects all of this, and conflates proposition and belief as a result.

Smith believes Jones is the man with ten coins in his pocket who will get the job. Jones is not the man with ten coins in his pocket who got the job. Thus, Smith's belief is false.

False belief is not a problem for JTB.

QED


In summary, Gettier confuses propositions and belief by conflating the truth conditions of the general proposition "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", with the truth conditions of Smith's belief that "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". In the former(a general proposition), any man that has ten coins in their pocket and gets the job counts as "the person with ten coins in their pocket". Whereas in Smith's belief only Jones counts...

Smith's belief was about none other than Jones, and it was false. This also is more than adequate explanation for the intuitive dissonance that everyone who reads Gettier's paper has upon first contemplation. The logic is impeccable. Unfortunately, it's a bait and switch, going from truth conditions of a particular belief had by a particular person about another particular person to the truth conditions of a general proposition that is not about anyone in particular. Thus, it's nothing more than an accounting malpractice. Every Gettier example following that formula has the same flaw... the rules of entailment permit a change in both the truth conditions and meaning of P. That's unacceptable. Salva Veritate.

We're just repeating ourselves, so either we're talking past each other, or one is simply failing to see what the other saying, or how they are using their words.

You keep referring to how people use the term and I keep pointing out that people don't use the term correctly if their belief didnt have a truth condition. We agreed on this so I dont see how it makes sense for you to keep referring to how people use the term when it is impossible to know when they used the term correctly (ie. problem of induction) when truth doesnt follow from justifications. It follows from the relationship between some belief and some state-of-affairs. It would be possible to have a true belief without any justification.

My argument is that they think they know what it means, but don't know what it means. If they really knew, then they'd know that knowledge, as they (and you) are using it, is an illusion.

In order to justifiably believe that it is raining, Alice needs to look out the window. If her belief that it is raining is true then she knows that it is raining. — Andrew M

This doesnt follow. If her belief is true then it qualifies as knowledge. Her belief can be justified, but not true. So she can't have knowledge unless she knows her belief is true. How will she know if her belief is true when she only has justifications from which truths don't necessarily follow?

My argument is that a truth condition is not a qualification for knowledge. Justifications are the only qualifications for knowledge.

Truth is some state-of-affairs. Knowledge can be true or false, which fits how we use the term in an objective sense - outside of our awareness of whether our knowledge is true or not.

Suppose I affirm knowledge that it will rain today. You ask me why. I then reply by justifying this belief to true with the following: there’s a satellite up in the sky and my cat is next to a plant out in the backyard – with this being the full scope of my justification. The two givens, even if true, do not cohere in any intelligible manner to my belief. — javra

Thank you. My brain is no longer capable of abstraction, so examples almost always help.

Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. Of course I would dismiss the cat basis as superstition, probably, but there might be some science behind it: maybe cats are especially prescient of upcoming rain storms. Either way, without knowing what type of information the satellite is providing, without knowing the reliability of satellites in forecasting rain on Earth, or rain in your town (more specifically), it wouldn't strike me as a case of knowledge for two reasons: (1) I don't think you can have knowledge of the future. Well, that pretty much ends the discussion for me, but (2), in case knowledge of the future is something others subscribe to, I don't know of the reliability of your methods for acquiring your belief to say whether you have knowledge. But your reasons cohere with your belief.

As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. If we allow beliefs about the future to count as knowledge claims, then we must allow that knowledge is defeasible. My intuitions about knowledge say otherwise. This, btw, is why the Gettier Case I scenario doesn't strike me as helpful in any way. But, back to your post.

Here, I’d consider that my justification was invalid.

Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification.

Now suppose that I explain things in a coherent manner as such: the satellite up in the sky has given a weather forecast of 80% chance of rain and my cat has always had a weird habit of sitting next to a plant in my backyard a few hours before it rains, next to which he is now sitting. The same basic truths are presented, but now the explanation provided makes them cohere with my belief that it will rain today.

Like I said, they already cohered, in my opinion, but now I might be swayed into thinking you have enough for epistemic justification for knowledge. I don't, of course, as 80% reliability, even coupled with your prescient cat, is not enough, in my opinion. And, again, it's a claim about the future, so I wouldn't care if satellite reports were 100% reliable to date. To me, you wouldn't have knowledge even then.

Here, I’d consider that my justifications were valid – even if less than perfect.

Yes, I'd say that you have perfectly good reason to believe that it's going to rain later today.

In case it does rain – thereby evidencing my belief-that to be true – I can then maintain my claim of having had JTB in the latter case, but I can't claim JTB in the former case.

I don't subscribe to this formula of saying someone had knowledge after all because their belief about the future turned out to be correct or true. So, to me, in neither case you had knowledge, and in neither case you had JTB either.

What nonsense. You're just insisting that your scenario shows what you say it does. Everyone is perfectly in his own right to say whether it strikes him as a case of knowledge or not. — fiveredapples

No, not nonsense. Your reply is as inept as insisting that in Russell or Gettier's original they were just 'insisting' that the agent lacks knowledge.

Then you've just said "everyone's entitled to their opinion". Er, yes. That's not in dispute. That's what someone says when they've lost the argument.

In the original clock case it is clear to the reason of virtually everyone that the agent lacks knowledge despite also clearly possessing a justified true belief.

Now, you - you - have insisted that any true belief based on the report of a broken clock does not count as knowledge.

I provided a clear counterexample. I'll describe it again in case you just didn't bother reading it.

There's a clock that's been working fine until 3pm, when it breaks. Tom looks at that clock at 3pm - the moment it breaks - and forms the belief that it is 3pm. Now, does he know that it is 3pm?

Yes. Doesn't your reason tell you the same? Seriously, what does your reason say about the case?

Note, if you just reject such intuitions on the grounds that respecting them would require abandoning your thesis, then you're the dogmatist. You've now got an unfalsifiable thesis.

...you're the dogmatist. You've now got an unfalsifiable thesis. — Bartricks

As if the position put forth in the OP is anything other than an unfalsifiable thesis.

The irony of pots and kettles...