Functionalism in philosophy of mind is kin to behaviorism except it identifies psychological states as mediators of a pattern of causes and effects. The cause of the joy at hearing Beethoven is auditory stimulation (at least in part). The effect is smiling or clapping. It could be that the main thing all experiences of joy have in common is that they might inspire a person to say "I feel joy."

In some ways MR is compatible with functionalism, but Putman used MR against functionalism. Exploring that would take me further down the path of functionalism than I really wanted to go. Any comments welcome, though.

Behaviourist after torrid love-making session with professional colleague:

'That was wonderful for you, dear. How was it for me?'

Behaviourist after torrid love-making session with professional colleague:

'That was wonderful for you, dear. How was it for me?' — Wayfarer

Functionalism isn't like that. It emphasizes outer causes and ramifications over internal neural states.

It does make sense to think about social norms when we think about psychological states, plus individual psychology. A person who experiences a lot of pain everyday will rank a pain as minor when the same physical condition could be experienced as horrific to someone else.

An aspect of pain for humans is the so-called "pain of the pain." This is distress arising from the expectation or memory of pain.

Considering that kind of thing, functionalism makes sense.

、他のあらゆ

The meaning of the proposal is reduced by the transducer, but, if it argues that the information remains constant, in an ideal sense, always, without interference, then the formal objectifications could be the ones that give meaning to the meaning. Like to tell that it is not the transducer that means the idea, but rather that it can happen the other way around; that formal objectification means the transducer. — armonie

"A transducer is a device that converts energy from one form to another. Usually a transducer converts a signal in one form of energy to a signal in another."

I'm not addressing the conversion of energy. I'm arguing that because the meaning of a proposition can be represented in different symbolic forms and even in different media, then the meaning or the intelligible content of the proposition, is separable from the physical representation. It's suggestive of a form of dualism. As far as I'm aware, it's a novel argument.

る可能性

. The information, isn't it, energy? — armonie

No - that's the point. Information is not reducible to energy. There's a famous aphorism to that effect by the creator of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener - '“Information is information, not matter or energy.'

And this doesn't necessarily imply Cartesian dualism. I'm not arguing for information as a substance. I think it's nature is very elusive. But it can be shown that it can't be explained in terms of 'arrangements of objects', whether they are particles or whatever.

(And, who or what is Caminante??)

を諦めて、

Well - I can communicate with you. Whether you understand what I'm trying to say is another matter, but I'm trying to convey an idea. And, I'm saying, an idea can be represented by many different symbolic systems, yet still remain identifiable, and I think that says something.

Explored at greater length in this post.

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Music requires a listener. The sounds exist irrespective of whether there is a listener but they’re only music to a listener.

This is an interesting argument against reductionism:

From Pylyshyn (1984):

Jim sees an auto accident. He goes to a phone and dials 91. What will he do next? Most likely he'll dial another 1.

The explanation for this is a systemic generalization between

A. What he recognized
B. His background knowledge
C. His resulting intentions, and
D. That action

A reductionist's explanation will be too weak because the specific neural events and muscular contractions involved here will only be associated with one way of learning, coming to know, and the action of dialing (he could dial with a pencil, a toe, voice recognition, etc).

Because of multiple realizability, a reductionist can't capture all capturable generalizations, a tenet of scientific methodology.

You can communicate with me because we belong to a specific linguistic community, that is where the symbolic operates, in the specific, true, but it still has a physical support. — armonie

I agree. As I understand Derrida, one of the deep fantasies of philosophy is meaning without 'physical support,' meaning without a vessel that is directly present 'in' or 'for' some mind. Can I talk to myself without an historically generated language? Can I talk to myself at all in the sense of learning anything from this monologue? I think that we do learn from talking to ourselves. The symbols don't refer to timeless entities but are caught up in time and recontextualization.

たひ

I wonder if I have ever been able to think, or If I was just repeat someone else's words? — armonie

Clearly we think as individuals. Wouldn't you agree? But we think in the words of the tribe.

Because of multiple realizability, a reductionist can't capture all capturable generalizations, a tenet of scientific methodology. — frank

That's because language-using beings orient themselves to the world via meaning.

because the specific neural events and muscular contractions involved here will only be associated with one way of learning, — frank

Like I said before, and no-one seems to notice this, it's nuts to think that 'brain states' represent anything whatever. That's the hangover of Locke's representative realism, but it's completely untenable, because it mistakes neurology for semiotics, whereas neurology works at completely different level to semiotics, representation, language, and the like.

Clearly we think as individuals. — softwhere

The individual - 'me' - exists like the foam on a wave on an ocean. The most recently-arrived and most ephemeral of beings.

The individual - 'me' - exists like the foam on a wave on an ocean. The most recently-arrived and most ephemeral of beings. — Wayfarer

Indeed. The human being is a radically historical and social being. What I am pre-philosophically inclined to call 'my' reason is the work of centuries. More locally, the human being without a tribe is unthinkable. We are born helpless with necks too weak for our heavy heads. A human brain that doesn't learn a language is largely wasted.

Our quickly senescent bodies would be pathetic indeed were they not the vessels of a time-binding software or 'philosophical subject.' If philosophy is the religion of self-consciousness, then the self that is known is not primarily the helplessly mortal self (we have magazine quizzes for that) but the human in its/our unfolding potential. The materiality of the signifier and material in general are crucial for time-binding, for the human being to lift itself up from superstition and poverty (its immersion in nature, one might say).

That's because language-using beings orient themselves to the world via meaning. — Wayfarer

We might say that this orientation is meaning. The mind/matter distinction is a historical contingency. The beetle in the box is problematic.

Wittgenstein invites readers to imagine a community in which the individuals each have a box containing a "beetle". "No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle."[16]

If the "beetle" had a use in the language of these people, it could not be as the name of something – because it is entirely possible that each person had something completely different in their box, or even that the thing in the box constantly changed, or that each box was in fact empty. The content of the box is irrelevant to whatever language game it is used in.

By analogy, it does not matter that one cannot experience another's subjective sensations. Unless talk of such subjective experience is learned through public experience the actual content is irrelevant; all we can discuss is what is available in our public language.

By offering the "beetle" as an analogy to pains, Wittgenstein suggests that the case of pains is not really amenable to the uses philosophers would make of it. "That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation', the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." — Wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_language_argument

If the notion of pure mind is threatened, then so is the notion of pure matter. Indeed, 'mind' and 'matter' are troubled in the same way by the argument above. Private meaning is problematic. And yet I depend on the same system of signs that I use to unveil the strangeness of this system.

I'm arguing that because the meaning of a proposition can be represented in different symbolic forms and even in different media, then the meaning or the intelligible content of the proposition, is separable from the physical representation. It's suggestive of a form of dualism. As far as I'm aware, it's a novel argument. — Wayfarer

With formal languages perfect translation (between media) is not only possible but common. And I agree that this is fascinating indeed. But non-formal languages are famously only imperfectly translated. The act of reading is also creative. Moreover the writings of the past are changed (recontextualized) by the writings that come after. What is 'the ideality of the literary object'? It's a 'spiritual realm,' as I see it. But this spiritual realm also seems to be dynamic, caught up in time, and subject to dissemination.

The dualism is still there, but isn't this culture versus nature?

(its immersion in nature, one might say). — softwhere

More like it's clinging to and grasping of the sensory domain (which ends up being the meaning of 'empiricism'.)

I heard that Schrodinger's cat had eaten Wittgenstein's beetle, although others heard differently.

It's a 'spiritual realm,' as I see it. — softwhere

It’s the ‘formal realm’, I think - the domain of laws, conventions, number, logic and the like. We ‘see’ it through the ‘eye of reason’. Whereas the spiritual realm is seen through ‘the eye of the heart’ according to mystic lore.

I don’t know if I have mentioned the intriguingly-named philosopher Afrikan Spir, but do look him up on Wikipedia, specifically the paragraph on ‘ontology’.

Then, in light of that, consider that the only perfect application of the word ‘is’ is the equals sign. Other usages of the word ‘is’ are only ever approximations.

More like it's clinging to and grasping of the sensory domain (which ends up being the meaning of 'empiricism'.) — Wayfarer

We need the sensory domain, though. Since we are fundamentally social beings, it's our sense organs and our flesh generally that make language and thought possible.

I heard that Schrodinger's cat had eaten Wittgenstein's beetle, although others heard differently. — Wayfarer

That looks like a dodge.

It’s the ‘formal realm’, I think - the domain of laws, conventions, number, logic and the like. We ‘see’ it through the ‘eye of reason’. Whereas the spiritual realm is seen through ‘the eye of the heart’ according to mystic lore. — Wayfarer

Note the necessary appeal to metaphor. I understand the metaphor and agree with it. This metaphoricity is one of the ways that natural language exceeds formal language.

I also like 'eye of the heart.' This metaphor emphasizes the passion involved in the 'spiritual.' I realize that some might understand metaphor to be a reductive concept, but as Derrida noted: if metaphysics is metaphorical, then metaphor functions metaphysically within such an assertion. To compare God to a literary object is as much a promotion of literature as it is a demotion of God. Alternative approaches (justifying God as a scientifically defensible entity) seem the wrong way to go (I think you agree here.)

Fine thoughts. However, I really feel as though we've derailed Frank's thread (mea culpa), so let's try a recap. From the OP:

'Multiple realisability' is a response to the flaw in brain-state reductionism: it doesn't appear to be possible to correlate a particular brain state to a psychological state (like pain). This flaw is particularly noticeable when we think about the broad range of creatures who can feel pain: their varying anatomy makes it seem impossible to make this correlation. — frank

The SEP entry on multiple realisibility' says something similar:

The multiple realizability thesis about the mental is that a given psychological kind (like pain) can be realized by many distinct physical kinds: brain states in the case of earthly mammals, electronic states in the case of properly programmed digital computers, green slime states in the case of extraterrestrials, and so on.

I chipped in to say that

I've always felt that there's a much stronger argument for MR than just pain, in that neuroscience can't find any objective correlation between 'brain states' and all manner of mental phenomena, including language. — Wayfarer

I will add, I think the talk about 'electronic states' and 'slime states' is really typical of the kind of nonsense that passes for philosophy nowadays even though I might be sympathetically inclined to the basic argument.

Frank then introduced a refinement to the OP, to wit:

Jim sees an auto accident. He goes to a phone and dials 91. What will he do next? Most likely he'll dial another 1.

The explanation for this is a systemic generalization between

A. What he recognized
B. His background knowledge
C. His resulting intentions, and
D. That action

A reductionist's explanation will be too weak because the specific neural events and muscular contractions involved here will only be associated with one way of learning, coming to know, and the action of dialing (he could dial with a pencil, a toe, voice recognition, etc).

Because of multiple realizability, a reductionist can't capture all capturable generalizations, a tenet of scientific methodology. — frank

So I will bow out at this point as plainly the kind of argument I have in mind is completely different to anything intended by the OP.

compositional fallacy — 180 Proof

I've never come across a panpsychist saying a whole must be conscious because some of the parts are (although no doubt there will be such people, I may even be one of them, although I don't recall making an argument of that form). If you are fallacy hunting, wouldn't the fallacy of division be more apt? Namely that the parts must be conscious because the whole is?

I could understand you crying foul in terms of a divisional fallacy. Are you sure that's not what you mean?

Frank then introduced a refinement to the OP, to wit: — Wayfarer

I'm actually just plowing through the SEP article you posted. It's kind of like homework so I can understand various angles on the concept of emergence.

Your contributions have been welcome.

Another related avenue: psychological generalization vs situated cognition

I'm actually just plowing through the SEP article you posted. It's kind of like homework so I can understand various angles on the concept of emergence. — frank

Multiple Realizability is consistent with current Natural Science (inductive evidence).

Corporeal and mental events are mutually dependent, but incommensurable because:
1) While correlation can be demonstrated, causation cannot.
2) Corporeal and mental data are accessed at different levels of abstraction (i.e., Neurology and Psychology).

Also, neuroplasticity is a fact (ruling out the possibility of epiphenomenalism, which is consistent with psychoneural identity theories).

It is obvious that body and mind are open sub-systems of (at least certain) organisms (e.g., those having a central nervous system). Body is open to mind and environment, and mind is open to body. But mind cannot be a sub-system of body if neuroplasticity is a fact.

Multiple Realizability is consistent with current Natural Science (inductive evidence).

Corporeal and mental events are mutually dependent, but incommensurable because:
1) While correlation can be demonstrated, causation cannot.
2) Corporeal and mental data are accessed at different levels of abstraction (i.e., Neurology and Psychology). — Galuchat

Right. This is the conclusion of the Pylyshin argument I discussed above. So the stance that best meshes with scientific methodology is non-reductive.

Also, neuroplasticity is a fact (ruling out the possibility of epiphenomenalism, which is consistent with psychoneural identity theories). — Galuchat

Yep. I mentioned neural plasticity, just didn't delve into it.

Which brings us to emergence.

Which brings us to emergence. — Galuchat

Yep. I'd like to start a thread discussing emergence, I'm not quite there, though. Been busy.