He believes that it's 3 PM. And he came to believe that it's 3 PM by looking at a particular clock, a particular broken clock. — fiveredapples

Yes.

The content of his belief included a particular broken clock. He believed that that particular broken clock was working, and hence used it to form the subsequent belief that it was 3PM.

The content of his belief included a particular broken clock. He believed that that particular broken clock was working, and hence used it to form the subsequent belief that it was 3PM. — creativesoul

No, the content of his belief didn't include the concept 'the broken clock.' The content of his belief is captured by what he thought, not what was true or can be inferred from what he thought.

For the sake of getting clear on this point, I'll just pretend he actually had this thought, but I don't concede that he actually thought this: "This clock is working." How you can you object to this analysis? He looked at the clock and thought, "This clock is working." The clock's not working is a fact about the clock. You can't include this fact as part of his belief, because he never thought that the clock wasn't working. So, you can't say that his thought was "This broken clock is working."

The following comments are an aside. You should really get clear on the above first.

As someone has already pointed out, doesn't the fact that you're attributing to him a self-contradictory belief give you pause? Furthermore, the fact that it's obviously self-contradictory should suggest to you that he can't believe it.

The content of his belief included a particular broken clock. He believed that that particular broken clock was working, and hence used it to form the subsequent belief that it was 3PM.
— creativesoul

No, the content of his belief didn't include a broken clock. The content of his belief is capture by what he thought... — fiveredapples

This serves to further drive the point home that I made earlier about the significant difference between our notions of belief. Given that the topic is all about belief... what counts as JTB... it seems that getting belief right is crucial to getting JTB right...

The first thing that needs to happen though is to clarify what I'm saying, as compared/contrasted to what you're attributing to me as if I'm saying, or as if it follows from what I'm saying. This may be a tough road. I hope not.

For the sake of getting clear on this point, I'll just pretend he actually had this thought, but I don't concede that he actually thought this: "This clock is working." How you can you object to this analysis? He looked at the clock and thought, "This clock is working." The clock's not working is a fact about the clock. You can't include this fact as part of his belief, because he never thought that the clock wasn't working. So, you can't say that his thought was "This broken clock is working." — fiveredapples

I did not say that though, nor would I.

What I said was that he believed a broken clock was working, and he clearly did. His belief was about that particular clock, and that particular clock was a broken one. The content of his belief most certainly included that particular broken clock.

He did not know it was broken. He did not believe it was broken. He believed it was working. He believed a broken clock was working.

I note, and earlier mentioned, that the belief that approach is underwriting your position on this. While that is a perfectly acceptable method for examining belief statements, which treats belief the same as propositions/statements, it fails miserably to take proper account of operative unspoken belief such as the ones we're dealing with here.

I'm not saying that he believed that "a broken clock is working" is a true statement. I'm not saying that those words went through his head. I'm not saying that that statement is a belief of his. The content of his belief regarding the clock is not equivalent to a statement.

That's where we are at odds...

What counts as the content of belief.

I mean, someone already point it out, but doesn't the fact that you're attributing to him a self-contradictory belief give you pause? — fiveredapples

It would if I were. I'm not.

Right. Heidegger, indeed. But (and I hope you'll agree) not on his authority but rather on his successful unconcealment of the phenomenon. Since I've been exposed to Heidegger, I find myself discovering his insights in less explicit form in Hegel and Feuerbach. How does language exist? The basic insight seems to be that we are social on a deeper level than we are individual. So analyses that start from an isolated subject gazing at pure meanings, while possibly illuminating, are also trapped within a tradition obsessed with an epistemological problem while neglecting an ontological one.

What say you? — softwhere

I would agree that there are deep-seated issues with JTB particularly regarding the belief aspect... and it's an ontological problem.

I find that Heiddy's notions of being in the world, ready at hand, and others all seem to make a valiant attempt at further discriminating between kinds of thought and belief, particularly those which are informed and/or mediated by language use.

I also find his method far too complicated.

Bob looks at the clock and forms the belief that it is 3pm. That's a basic or rudimentary belief with no implication that he needed another belief prior to forming that belief, which would just result in an infinite regress. — Andrew M

We're working from different notions of what counts as a basic or rudimentary belief. Our exchange led us into the notion of whether or not a language less creature's belief could possible count as being well grounded. If it requires being based upon other beliefs, then we arrive at the notion of infinite regress... Somewhere along the line, some belief or other is not based upon prior belief.

Can those be identified and/or isolated, and can they count as being well grounded true ones?

It also seems clear to me that there are a plethora of pre-existing belief underwriting the very ability to participate in time telling practices such as looking at clocks, so... To say that there is no implication that he needed another belief prior to forming that belief is most certainly wrong.

However we can nonetheless investigate the premises of Bob's belief. Those premises emerge as part of our analysis, not something we need to suppose were Bob's beliefs at that time.

But... when we're offering an account of Bob's belief, they must be Bob's beliefs... right?

Right. So how do you know that you or someone else is using the term, "knowledge" correctly, so say things like, "I/You are using the term, "knowledge" correctly."? — Harry Hindu

I have a model for what knowledge is. For example, my model says that knowledge is always true. So if Alice says that she knows it is raining, but it's not raining, then Alice's claim doesn't satisfy that model. So she didn't use the term correctly (in the veridical sense - her claim may still have been justifiable).

Whereas her claim may be satisfied on your model (that doesn't include a truth condition for knowledge).

Fiveredapples has given an eloquent defense of his position, but my position is much simpler. I'm sticking to JTB as the definition of knowledge. I don't see any good reason to give it up. The clock was broke, therefore the person wasn't justified in their belief that the time was X. If they weren't justified, then they failed to meet the definition of knowledge under JTB. Gettier fails for similar reasons. — Sam26

I'm curious whether you think there can ever be justified but false beliefs. If not, then the T condition in JTB would be redundant since the J would already entail truth. Thus knowledge, on your view, would be justified belief (where justified entails the truth of the belief and its premises).

Can we ever confidently label something knowledge, by this definition? We can certainly evaluate justifications, but how do we evaluate 'true' if not via justification? — Coben

It's only definitional and contextual; we never know truth or have any knowledge in any absolute sense. Actually, I prefer to think of "knowing that" as a specialized form of "knowing how" and "knowing how" as a specialized form of what I like to call "knowing with". So knowing is most generally a matter of being able to do various different kinds of things.

But I agree with @Sam26 that the idea of JTB best presents what we mean by knowing that and that the clock example and Gettier cases are impotent in that they do not work against it because they rely upon an ineluctably subjective idea of what constitutes justification. It's not that we can ever know with certainty that we are justified, just as we can never know with certainty what is true, and hence whether we have indefeasible knowledge.

The point, as I see it, is a definitional one that if we had justification for a belief and the belief was true (which I would say are actually the same thing) then we would have knowledge. So we may indeed have knowledge, it's just that we can never be sure, except in some exclusively contextual sense or other, that we have knowledge; but we do know according to JTB what the idea of having knowledge means.

I don't think indefeasible and infallible are synonymous, but I get your objection.

Well, of course I have discovered many times that what I thought I knew was not in fact knowledge. That's just to say I didn't really know back then, so of course it wasn't knowledge that got defeated. — fiveredapples

(Just saw that @Janus addressed something of the same. Notwithstanding, I’m still interested in your answers)

From a theoretical view of what knowledge is, I say of course. From the stance of practice (praxis), however, I’m very curious to better understand:

What is your contention against the following position: All of our claims of knowledge are to be treated as instantiations of knowledge until they become falsified by evidence, if such falsification were to ever occur.

Importantly, the underlined portion, to me, is what makes all our claims of knowledge less than indefeasible in practice. This being the stance you previously mentioned you’re not OK with.

For clarity, according to Wiktionary, “indefeasible” is given one definition: “not liable to being annulled or declared void”.

Or are you suggesting that unlike some past experiences, everything you currently (claim to) know can never be "annulled or declared void" as knowledge regardless of what evidence might be discovered?

Again, I'm trying to better understand you're affirmations.

We're working from different notions of what counts as a basic or rudimentary belief. Our exchange led us into the notion of whether or not a language less creature's belief could possible count as being well grounded. If it requires being based upon other beliefs, then we arrive at the notion of infinite regress... Somewhere along the line, some belief or other is not based upon prior belief.

Can those be identified and/or isolated, and can they count as being well grounded true ones? — creativesoul

I think so, at least in principle.

It also seems clear to me that there are a plethora of pre-existing belief underwriting the very ability to participate in time telling practices such as looking at clocks, so... To say that there is no implication that he needed another belief prior to forming that belief is most certainly wrong. — creativesoul

What I was referring to here is the idea that Bob first needed to think about whether the clock was working before he believed it was 3pm. And before that he needed to think about whether the clock was real or a hologram. And before that ...

He didn't do any of that. He just glanced at the clock, saw that it showed 3pm, and then got on with the rest of his day.

I otherwise agree that we can infer that he has other related beliefs (such as that clocks are generally reliable, that clocks are usually real and not holograms, and so on).

But... when we're offering an account of Bob's belief, they must be Bob's beliefs... right? — creativesoul

We're asking whether Bob's belief that it is 3pm counts as knowledge (and why or why not). It doesn't really matter if Bob simply believes that space aliens implanted his mind with the correct time. We only care that Bob believed the time that the clock showed and that the clock was working correctly. If he did and the clock was working correctly, then we say that Bob knew it was 3pm, regardless of his personal theories of things.

We're working from different notions of what counts as a basic or rudimentary belief. Our exchange led us into the notion of whether or not a language less creature's belief could possible count as being well grounded. If it requires being based upon other beliefs, then we arrive at the notion of infinite regress... Somewhere along the line, some belief or other is not based upon prior belief.

Can those be identified and/or isolated, and can they count as being well grounded true ones?
— creativesoul

I think so, at least in principle. — Andrew M

Ok. My aim is to do it in practice.

But... when we're offering an account of Bob's belief, they must be Bob's beliefs... right?
— creativesoul

We're asking whether Bob's belief that it is 3pm counts as knowledge (and why or why not). It doesn't really matter if Bob simply believes that space aliens implanted his mind with the correct time. We only care that Bob believed the time that the clock showed and that the clock was working correctly. — Andrew M

I think that I overlooked the importance that "at that time" had in what you were saying and misunderstood you as a result. It seems we agree that our report of Bob's belief must include what Bob's beliefs are/were. If you're aiming to hone the focus upon the immediately relevant beliefs... then I'm pretty sure that we're in agreement, with the important one being about the broken clock.

The only thing still sticking in my side between our respective views is the notion that all beliefs are premiss based, which I do not agree with. However, when we're talking about candidates for knowledge claims per JTB, that seems to hold good.

In my view there are two senses of justification. First, there's what we mean by justification, viz., having good reasons or good evidence, etc. Second, there's the application of what we mean by being justified. For example, think of it this way, in mathematics we have the formula, and then, we have the application of the formula. The formula is a guide, but we can often or sometimes get it wrong, i.e., we can make an error in the application of the formula. So, I can believe, think, or surmise that I'm correct, but later find out that I was wrong. This is why I say that you have to distinguish between thinking you're justified, as opposed to actually being justified in reality.

I've already mentioned this, but it bears repeating. Built into the application of JTB (not the definition, the application) is the idea of probability. So, when I look at a clock there is a low probability that I'm going to arrive at an incorrect time. This is built into the application of JTB, just as it's built into the application of a mathematical formula, that sometimes we're just incorrect. Knowing this, explains the conflict in the clock example, at least to my satisfaction. The man (again) isn't justified, he merely thinks he is.

Andrew asked me if we could be justified, and yet have a false belief. Yes, in the application we can think we're justified and yet have a false belief. However, in terms of the definition of JTB, if we're really justified, then it necessarily leads to a true belief. This doesn't mean that what we're really saying is that JTB simply amounts to JB, because we're not talking about any belief, we're talking about true beliefs. Again, being justified leads to the truth under the definition of JTB (justification and truth are different concepts), but not necessarily in its application.

We seem to be in essential agreement.

My main point about prior beliefs is that Bob would presumably just glance at the clock and automatically form a belief about the time. He's not consciously reflecting on it, weighing up evidence, or making inferences from one belief to another. How he forms his belief happens "under the hood", so to speak, as part of the brain's internal processing.

However we can infer his beliefs and construct a chain of inferences as a representation of what's going on in Bob's subconscious.

I have a model for what knowledge is. For example, my model says that knowledge is always true. So if Alice says that she knows it is raining, but it's not raining, then Alice's claim doesn't satisfy that model. So she didn't use the term correctly (in the veridical sense - her claim may still have been justifiable).

Whereas her claim may be satisfied on your model (that doesn't include a truth condition for knowledge). — Andrew M

This isn't anything different than what you've already said. Your model is useless if you can never know when it's appropriate to use. Knowledge would be this state-of-affairs that we'd never know about because we can never know that knowledge is true because we only have justifications and justifications are not truths. They might be, but we'd never know.

This isn't anything different than what you've already said. Your model is useless if you can never know when it's appropriate to use. Knowledge would be this state-of-affairs that we'd never know about because we can never know that knowledge is true because we only have justifications and justifications are not truths. They might be, but we'd never know. — Harry Hindu

There is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true. So there's no point criticizing the model on those grounds.

It happens to be the model that people ordinarily use, including yourself, except that you also allow justifiable, but false, claims to be knowledge. Your model is no more (or less) useful, it's simply a different choice of language to represent the same reality.

There is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true — Andrew M

Bingo! You finally got it! So if this is common knowledge - that there is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, then that means people use the term, "knowledge" in the way I have described it, not you. People understand that their knowledge is fallible and so don't use the term in a way that implies truth - only justification.

Not only does your version of "knowledge" not fit how people use it, it relegates truth into meaninglessness as well. If there is no infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, what does it mean to be "true"?

We seem to be in essential agreement. — Andrew M

I'm thinking much the same thing...

My main point about prior beliefs is that Bob would presumably just glance at the clock and automatically form a belief about the time. He's not consciously reflecting on it, weighing up evidence, or making inferences from one belief to another. How he forms his belief happens "under the hood", so to speak, as part of the brain's internal processing. — Andrew M

That's one way of putting it. Although I agree with the description as a commonly understood one, I'm very hesitant to employ the terminology as an explanation of his belief. I think we can do better, with less verbiage.

there is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true... — Harry Hindu

This is false. It all depends upon the claim under consideration.

Depends on the claim, yes, which we may say depends on the domain of discourse. Empirical knowledge is always contingent, so there is no infallible guarantee that some claim is true; pure rational knowledge is always apodeictic, which is its own infallible guarantee that some claim is true.

This is false. It all depends upon the claim under consideration. — creativesoul

Sure. Like I said before: we can make our own truths like who is the current President of the United States, or what the capital of France is, but when it comes to the things we didnt design ourselves, like nature, we can't be sure that our knowledge is infallible because the truth is some state-of-affairs that we had no role in making.

Depends on the claim, yes, which we may say depends on the domain of discourse. Empirical knowledge is always contingent, so there is no infallible guarantee that some claim is true; pure rational knowledge is always apodeictic, which is its own infallible guarantee that some claim is true. — Mww

That's a traditional way of thinking about it. I reject nearly every dichotomy underwriting such discourse.

the truth is some state-of-affairs — Harry Hindu

I reject this notion of truth...

That's one way of putting it. Although I agree with the description as a commonly understood one, I'm very hesitant to employ the terminology as an explanation of his belief. I think we can do better, with less verbiage. — creativesoul

Fair enough. How would you explain it?

Bingo! You finally got it! — Harry Hindu

I've been saying it from the beginning of our exchange, but I'm glad you've finally caught up! ;-)

So if this is common knowledge - that there is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, then that means people use the term, "knowledge" in the way I have described it, not you. People understand that their knowledge is fallible and so don't use the term in a way that implies truth - only justification. — Harry Hindu

That people are fallible means that they sometimes misuse the term "knowledge" or "know". They sometimes claim to know things that they don't.

Here's the definition of use from Lexico: "Take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something; employ." In the context of our discussion what are being deployed are words and sentences.

Now what has Alice accomplished or achieved when she claims to know it is raining when it isn't (as she may later discover)? She hasn't accomplished what she intended, because she has a mistaken belief.

As I mentioned earlier, this issue is not just confined to knowledge terms. That people are fallible means that they can mistakenly misuse any word (according to their own definition). They can point out the window and say "rain" when it's not rain (for example, it's water from a hose).

Not only does your version of "knowledge" not fit how people use it, it relegates truth into meaninglessness as well. If there is no infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, what does it mean to be "true"? — Harry Hindu

It means that a claim describes a state of affairs as it has been defined. For example, we understand what the phrase "it is raining" means. So if Alice claims it is raining when it is raining then her claim is true. That is a correct use. Whereas if she claims it is raining when it is not raining, then her claim is false. That is an incorrect use (or misuse).

I reject this notion of truth... — creativesoul

That's nice. I reject your rejection. Now what?

That people are fallible means that they sometimes misuse the term "knowledge" or "know". They sometimes claim to know things that they don't. — Andrew M

Why do they claim to know things that they don't? If they claim to understand what knowledge and knowing is, then how can they misuse the terms?

Here's the definition of use from Lexico: "Take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something; employ." In the context of our discussion what are being deployed are words and sentences. — Andrew M

What is it that we are trying to accomplish or achieve in deploying words and sentences? What caused words and sentences to appear on this screen for me to read?

Not only does your version of "knowledge" not fit how people use it, it relegates truth into meaninglessness as well. If there is no infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, what does it mean to be "true"?
— Harry Hindu

It means that a claim describes a state of affairs as it has been defined. For example, we understand what the phrase "it is raining" means. So if Alice claims it is raining when it is raining then her claim is true. That is a correct use. Whereas if she claims it is raining when it is not raining, then her claim is false. That is an incorrect use (or misuse). — Andrew M

This means that a claim is accurate or inaccurate.

Accurate: Free from error, or conforming exactly to truth.
Truth is the actual state-of-affairs.

It can be true that you make a claim, but the claim itself might not be accurate. Claims can have a range of accuracy. Some of it can conform to the truth while some of it might not. Truth is what is the case regardless of whether claims are made about it or not.

The way that I have been seems adequate enough, and without all the subconscious stuff.

Well, it seems to me that you've no way of talking about what sorts of things can be true - such as knowledge claims - and what makes them so. Given that the thread is about JTB, where truth is held to be a property of true propositions/statements, it seems to me that your using the term "truth" as states-of-affairs and then arguing about it is akin to using an american football in a world cup match and arguing about which football to use.

That's what.

:smirk:

The OP assumes that knowledge must always be correct or 'true' knowledge. This isn't necessarily the case. The best definition that I can think of off hand is that knowledge is any part of a worldview.