While I understand where you are coming from, I also think the evolving idea of g/G has been and remains important. Why this monotheism? Why this God apart from nature? If Feuerbach was right, then God served a purpose as a stage of free and rational humanity becoming conscious of itself as such, a perhaps necessary error.

Not to invent, but to discover, “to unveil existence,” has been my sole object; to see correctly, my sole endeavour. It is not I, but religion that worships man, although religion, or rather theology, denies this; it is not I, an insignificant individual, but religion itself that says: God is man, man is God; it is not I, but religion that denies the God who is not man, but only an ens rationis, – since it makes God become man, and then constitutes this God, not distinguished from man, having a human form, human feelings, and human thoughts, the object of its worship and veneration. I have only found the key to the cipher of the Christian religion, only extricated its true meaning from the web of contradictions and delusions called theology; – but in doing so I have certainly committed a sacrilege. If therefore my work is negative, irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered that atheism – at least in the sense of this work – is the secret of religion itself; that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but fundamentally, not in intention or according to its own supposition, but in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature. — Feuerbach

God has the qualities of 'infinite' human reason-feeling-imagination distributed in fact over many mortal bodies--but concentrated and projected symbolically away from this plurality of local mortality. As human culture accumulates within language, a kind of super-mind is created that individuals can plug into by reading, thinking, living. God's omniscience functions as a point at infinity. The philosopher wants to know like God, from first principles. In short, God is an important 'fantasy' worth talking about.

Those “marks of all things that exist” are also all equally marks of all beings, and everything real — Pfhorrest

It is unarguable that all manifest entities are temporal and compound. It ought to be an easy thing to refute it it isn’t the case.

:chin:

Yeah sure. All manifest things, all existing things, all real things, all beings. Everything. So if God by definition is not like that, then he’s none of the above, or else he’s some weird kind of thing that’s unlike all of the other things we’re familiar with. But if that means he doesn’t exist, like all the things we’re familiar with do, then he’s also not real, manifest, a being, etc, like all of those other things either. You’re applying an argument against existence that applies equally well against reality, being, etc, but for no apparent reason declining to actually apply it to those.

I saw another thread discussing what time is not, and now I am curious about what you guys might think about this one.

In my case, I think God is not me.

So, what is it that God is not, in your opinion? — Daniel

God --- All good --- All knowing --- All powerful
1*.------------Yes------------Yes-----------------Yes
2.--------------Yes------------Yes-----------------No
3.--------------Yes------------No------------------Yes
4.--------------Yes------------No------------------No
5.--------------No-------------Yes-----------------Yes
6.--------------No-------------Yes-----------------No
7.--------------No-------------No------------------Yes
8.--------------No-------------No------------------No

1* is the god we all know and debate about. In accordance with the OP's question let's play around with the three omni-attributes of god and hopefully get to God's essence and discover what god is not.

Which of the three qualities of god is indispensable or, put otherwise, which quality is of prime importance in the definition of God?

When it all began, there were a multitude of gods and the general belief was that they, like us, had emotions, weaknesses, moral shortcomings, etc. but what made them divine was power. The power of Thor, Zeus and Indra made them gods and no or little significance was given to their moral character. It's worth mentioning that godly power in the early history of humanity had a lot to do with the natural phenomena - weather, earthquakes, disease, pestilence, all factors that affect our wellbeing. This was a time of polytheism where many gods had to be worshipped and doing so kept in a happy state to either prevent calamities or ensure positive outcomes. God was all powerful

Then came the realization that godly power was in a large parts nothing more than ignorance. The weapon of Thor, Indra and Zeus was simply an electrical discharge from clouds. Ergo, the power of the gods, that which made them divine, was our own ignorance, thus necessitating a revision of the definition of god. God had to be all knowing.

As time passed humans soon realized that an all powerful, all knowing doesn't quite do the job of allaying our fears and sustain our hopes for there was no requirement that an all powerful, all knowing god care about, let alone help, us. To remedy this situation we had to add the last, but not the least, attribute to god. God had to be all loving.

It's quite clear from the above that omnipotence was by itself inadequate and we were forced to add omniscience to the definition of god. This too failed as an acceptable definition of god - we had to make god omnibenevolent too.

Though simplified the above account touches upon the crucial stages in the evolution of the notion of god and the most important takeaway is that a definition of god that was acceptable to us was only possible with the attribute of omnibenevolence. Neither omnipotence nor omniscience and not even these two together gave us a satisfactory definition of god. In other words it's necessary that god be good. God can never be be evil or, to answer your question, God is not evil.

God can never be be evil or, to answer your question, God is not evil. — TheMadFool

Good answer. And that's because the divine predicates are familiar human virtues. Who made who? We created God in our own image, unconsciously, automatically. But what are concepts? They too are 'non-material' ghosts, like the concepts of the non-material and the material for that matter (which by the way threatens our conception of concepts.)

At the same time, God also works as a symbol for world entire in its mysterious presence. this whole vast circus is God, or entertainment for the gods. Lots of uses of 'God' and 'gods.' But the God of Christians only makes sense with human virtues, as a non-evil loving God. And yet, of course, what's with the hellfire? And that's how speculative philosophy is born, as an attempt to make theology rational.

If God also exists, then God would be just another fact of the universe, relative to other existents and included in that fundamental dependency of relation. — Bishop Pierre Whalon

I think I understand this, and I think that's why various philosophers have more or less identified God with all of reality. To ensure that God remains good, reality has to be understood as either already good or on the way to becoming good, justified as a result. 'No finite thing has genuine being.' There is only God. Human consciousness is God knowing himself, etc.

There cannot be any empirical evidence of the existence of God, for God does not exist. — Bishop Pierre Whalon

Out of context, this looks suspicious. If God is not all of reality or a kind of shareable subjectivity, then in what way is s/he at all? To me it seems like the burden of a rational-philosophical theist to articulate how God is supposed to be or not be...basically what is intended. To be sure, a mystic need not reply to skeptics or offer explanations.

But if that means he doesn’t exist, like all the things we’re familiar with do, then he’s also not real, manifest, a being, etc, like all of those other things either. You’re applying an argument against existence that applies equally well against reality, being, etc, but for no apparent reason declining to actually apply it to those. — Pfhorrest

Whalon is paraphrasing an idea which has been central to philosophical theology but which modern culture has generally lost sight of.

If God is not all of reality or a kind of shareable subjectivity, then in what way is s/he at all? To me it seems like the burden of a rational-philosophical theist to articulate how God is supposed to be or not be...basically what is intended. — softwhere

Well, think about what 'empirical' means. Basically it means that you can bring the subject of the debate into the ambit of what our culture agrees can be validated in the third person; what is measurable or detectable by scientific instruments, and mathematical analysis of the implications of same. But the objects (using the term loosely) of religion and spirituality are not at all of that nature, because they're not a 'that' to us. And if the subject is not something that can be understood as an object of experience, then we don't understand the kind of reality we're talking about. But suffice to say, in religious parlance, what is being indicated is a relationship, an 'I-thou' relationship, rather than a subject-object relationship.



Here's another couple of snippets:

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value – and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is value which is of value, it must lie outside of all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world.

In other words, all worldly actions and events are contingent (‘accidental’), but matters of value are necessarily so, for they are ‘higher’ or too important to be accidental, and so must be outside the world of empirical propositions:

6.42 Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental.

A statement from Ray Monk, who wrote a well-regarded biography of Wittgenstein:

Wittgenstein's work is opposed, as he once put it, to “the spirit which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in which all of us stand.” Nearly 50 years after his death, we can see, more clearly than ever, that the feeling that he was swimming against the tide was justified. If we wanted a label to describe this tide, we might call it “scientism,” the view that every intelligible question has either a scientific solution or no solution at all. It is against this view that Wittgenstein set his face. 1

I think he's misread by a lot of people.

:up: I'm quite familiar with Feuerbach: we make The Maker (in our own image reflected back at us as it alienates us) which spurs us on to the infinite / sisyphusean task of remaking ourselves into imago dei (i.e. "The Maker"). Dionysus vs the Crucified. :victory:

"God is so much above all that one can say nothing. You worship him better therefore through silence." ~ Angelus Silesius

I heard that Wittgenstein was quite a religious guy, actually. — Wayfarer

In the sense that Spinoza was "religious": amor dei intellectualis - yeah: definitely more mystical than "religious", maybe even more ecstatic than mystical: the difference being the latter seeks union - theois - with the divine (i.e. Mysteries), whereas the former seeks the impersonal depth, or aspect, of oneself (à la Iris Murdoch's (neo/platonic) unselfing or
mushin no shin). Transcendence and immanence, respectively.

The thrust of ‘that of which we cannot speak’ was not that speech was idle, but that it falls short. So he points to the ineffable beyond speech, but, unlike what the positivists said, this was not because metaphysics was ‘nonsense’ but that it too fell short. — Wayfarer

Agreed. I invoke Witty on this point about theism 'falling short' for which silence - about the g/G to which it purports to refer (but cannot) - is demanded by intellectual(?) moral(?) aesthetic(?) ... religious integrity.

There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.
— Wittgenstein

Traitor to the cause, perhaps? — Wayfarer

Not at all. Witty's "cause" up close looks very different from any creedal or totemic "cause" insofar as "the religious" make graven images & idolatrize, that is, put g/G into words e.g. scriptures, theisms, theologies, theodicies, etc. and "the mystical", let alone (most) ecstatics, exorcise them.

In the beginning was the Ladder ...

:flower:

:death:

"Die Rose ist ohne warum; sie blühet, weil sie blühet ..."

"God is so much above all that one can say nothing. You worship him better therefore through silence." ~ Angelus Silesius — 180 Proof

That's actually quite compatible with the thrust of Whalon's essay.

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

[Comparing his teaching to a raft hastily constructed from leaves and branches]. And what should the man do in order to be doing what should be done with the raft? There is the case where the man, having crossed over [the river of saṃsāra), would think, 'How useful this raft has been to me! For it was in dependence on this raft that, making an effort with my hands & feet, I have crossed over to safety on the further shore. Why don't I, having dragged it on dry land or sinking it in the water, go wherever I like?' In doing this, he would be doing what should be done with the raft. — The Buddha

"the religious" make graven images & idolatrize. — 180 Proof

People idolize all kinds of things.

People idolize all kinds of things. — Wayfarer

Yeah but the idolatry-prohibiting [Abrahamic] religious believers are hypocrites lacking integrity when they do it.

the eternal 'IS' — PoeticUniverse

The solution apparent is that what 'IS' is every particular, every path, and every event all at once and ever, that presentation then necessarily having to range through all the particulars, according to basic laws.

Since what 'IS' is All, not anything is apart from it, and so we are in/of its particulars flashing by, as those are what it is composed of.

Whalon is paraphrasing an idea which has been central to philosophical theology but which modern culture has generally lost sight of. — Wayfarer

Yeah you explained that already, a difference between "existence" and "being" or "reality". But I'm saying that the same argument given against "existence" works equally well against "being" or "reality": we have this big body of real existing beings that we're familiar with, and if you point at it and say "all of that is composite and temporal, God isn't, so God doesn't exist" you'd have to equally say he's not real and not a being. Showing that God doesn't exist but is a real being is supposed to be the demonstration that existence is different from reality or being, but this argument to show that God doesn't exist also shows that he's not real or a being, so that difference has not been demonstrated. Everything we're ordinarily familiar with exists, is real, is a being, and so on, so if something that's supposed to be unlike all of that stuff is thereby shown to not fit in one of those categories, it's also shown to not fit in the others.

God is so much above all that one can say nothing. You worship him better therefore through silence." ~ Angelus Silesius — 180 Proof

:fire: :halo: :fire:

Yeah you explained that already, a difference between "existence" and "being" or "reality". But I'm saying that the same argument given against "existence" works equally well against "being" or "reality": we have this big body of real existing beings that we're familiar with, and if you point at it and say "all of that is composite and temporal, God isn't, so God doesn't exist" you'd have to equally say he's not real and not a being. — Pfhorrest

I will have another brief shot at it. In ancient philosophy until about the 17th century there was the understanding of the 'degrees of reality'.

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is. 1

Put another way, ontological simplicity was a determinant of its degree of reality. Atoms were supposed to be ontologically simple, as being indivisible and eternal (according to the materialists) but 'the ideas' were so understood in the Platonic tradition.

'The source of all being' is which we now would conventionally identify as God, because Christian theologians incorporated those ideas from Greek philosophy into their dogma; but not all of their originators would have agreed with that at all, had they been given the choice. (Recall the Platonic Academy was closed by Christians.) But in the philosophy of late antiquity, the neoplatonic ‘One’ alone was truly real; everything then cascaded ‘down’ through levels or planes or hypostases with the sensory domain being most remote from the source. (Scholars have commented on the similarity with the contemporaneous Indian philosophy of Brahman.)

That is sense in which 'the One', however conceived, is 'beyond existence'; it doesn't come into, or go out of, existence, however any particular existent is ontologically dependent on the reality. (I think that notion of ontological dependence is barely represented in post-17th c philosophy, although I might be mistaken.)

This is why, in the metaphysics of the Republic, there were lower and higher forms of knowledge, beginning with pistis and doxa (belief and opinion) and ascending through dianoia (knowledge of mathematical and geometric truths) to noesis (knowledge of the Forms - see this table). And the Platonic notion of what constitutes knowledge is very different to our own, in that veridical knowledge of the visible world - the domain we instinctively assume is the sole reality - is impossible, because the visible domain is not truly intelligible (which I think is validated by many of the vast confusions in modern physics and cosmology). In the famous analogy immediately preceding the divided line, we do not see the reality, but are trapped in the cave of ignorance, mistaking shadows on the cave wall for reality.

As I said, a lot of Platonic philosophy was incorporated into or amalgamated with Christian theology by the Greek-speaking theologians such as Origen and Clement of Alexandria, among many others. That was the beginning of the grand synthesis that actually forms the core of Western philosophy. Of course, much water under the bridge, moderns have discovered many things which we completely unforeseen to the ancients. But be that as it may, there are some fundamental insights in that tradition which haven’t been superseded, so much as simply forgotten. We literally have forgotten an entire way of understanding, not just this or that detail.

Now to answer my own rhetorical question regarding what, if anything, is not made, compounded, or temporal, there is actually an answer to that question, which is: the natural numbers. Numbers are the same for all who can think, and they don't come into, or go out of, existence. And knowledge of arithmetical proofs and the like, is direct and apodictic. This is the sense in which the Platonic tradition understood dianoia as being of a higher order than sensory knowledge. That was preserved in Galileo ('the book of nature is written in mathematics' but for complex historical reasons, other crucial elements of the philosophy became lost.)

So that is like a pointer to the understanding of 'intelligible reality' - ideas that can only be grasped by the eye of reason alone. But those 'higher ideas' are real in the way that logical proofs are real, i.e. by necessity; it is the domain of the self-existent and apodictic. And beyond that, another realm again. (I think the most thorough contemporary book is Jacques Maritain's Degrees of Knowledge.)

The solution apparent is that what 'IS' is every particular, every path, and every event all at once and ever, that presentation then necessarily having to range through all the particulars, according to basic laws. — PoeticUniverse

The whole Aristotelian notion of essence and substance is an attempt to define what a being or particular truly IS. Essence is derived from esse, is, so essence = isness. And particulars, whether objects or beings (horses, tables, Socrates) are a mixture of essence and accident, which enables them to be at once both intelligible whilst allowing for their mutability and imperfection.

The whole visible universe is an admixture of essence and accident. It is not real in its own right, but it's not simply an illusion either. Understanding that grand scheme was seen as the aim of philosophy (before it became regarded as a separate discipline to science.)

Think of something that exists, that is not composed of parts, and does not begin and end in time. — Wayfarer

I'm having trouble thinking of some X "that is not composed of parts." I assume you consider yourself capable of such a thought. Describe this thought to us.

Think of something that exists, that is not composed of parts, and does not begin and end in time. — Wayfarer

So, if God is not composed of parts (being simple) and does not begin and end in time (being eternal), then God does not exist. — Wayfarer

You asked me to think of "something that exists." Then you say that it doesn't exist.

As a mystic myself, I'm comfortable - and at times delighted - with paradoxical language. But a contradiction is a contradiction.

Wiser to call god an abyss or a nothingness or an idealized omni-recession than to say bluntly "god does not exist." Again: A contradiction is a contradiction.

Wiser still not to talk about god at all. It only evokes hostility, bafflement and hecklings by folks who have never conjured or suffered the voidlike touch of -------------- YWH.

This is a beautiful post. Thank you. — softwhere

Thanks. I bumped into Eckhart by way of Derrida. I forget the name of the book.

I figured you'd know Feuerbach. 'All must pass through the fiery brook.'

An interesting position. But what of great music, great art, great poetry? While I like the idea of silent monasteries... — softwhere

When god is apprehended or grokked in a paradoxical light - language fails us. One wants to deploy a paradoxical phraseology. With so many logicians skulking in cybershadows it's a mistake to resort to paradox. You won't be welcome and you won't be understood.

The great poets - I think of Rimbaud's "Genie" - come closest to describing god. But they fail. Great music can convey the moment of ecstatic union. But it's a dayfly shadow set beside the psych-ekstatic prowess of a devout and weathered mystic.

I'm having trouble thinking of some X "that is not composed of parts." I assume you consider yourself capable of such a thought. Describe this thought to us. — ZzzoneiroCosm

7

Not a description, but an example.

Have a read of this passage concerning Augustine and Intelligible Objects. (Start at (1)).

7 — Wayfarer

I suppose that's arguable. It wouldn't be so difficult to argue that seven is composed of exactly seven parts.

Of course. But it's a prime number, therefore, only divisible by itself and by one.

I get the "degrees of reality" thing. I have a similar concept in my own philosophy, though I don't call either direction of the spectrum more or less real, but more abstract or more concrete. It sounds like you're calling "reality" (in the adjectival sense of "real-ness") what I'd call "abstractness", and that's fine for our purposes here. What's still not clear is how "reality" or "being" (in the adjectival sense of "is-ness") are different from "existence" in that regard. Concrete things like, for example, trees, exist, are real, and are beings, right? And your conception of God is of something that is on the far opposite end of what I'm calling the concrete-abstract spectrum, out there with numbers and such, and those are "more real" in your view, no? So how are they not also "more existent"? Or if "real" = abstract and "existent" = concrete on your account, are trees not real on your account? (And not beings either? Or is it God that's not a being, because to be is to exist which is the opposite of to be real?)

With so many logicians skulking in cybershadows it's a mistake to resort to paradox. You won't be welcome and you won't be understood. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I tend to agree, I guess. I think theology should be rational or just confess itself as poetry.

The great poets - I think of Rimbaud's "genie" - come closest to describing god. But they fail. Great music can convey the moment of ecstatic union. But it's a dayfly shadow set beside the psych-ekstatic prowess of a devout and weathered mystic. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I enjoy this input. I know the ecstasy of music and rationalized theology, but I can't claim access to a mysticism that escaped a return to everyday life. I'm not familiar w/ the 'genie,' but I'll look into it.

Wiser to call god an abyss or a nothingness or an idealized omni-recession than to say bluntly "god does not exist." Again: A contradiction is a contradiction. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But there's a real point at issue. We have developed these fantastic instruments that can measure the entire universe and see into the sub-atomic domain. For us, that is all there is. Whenever we speak of 'what exists', then we think of what is 'out there somewhere'. It is the 'phenomenal realm', the domain of appearances. Modern naturalism insists that this is all that is real - 'the cosmos is all that exists', per Carl Sagan. Our orientation towards that subject-object perspective is instinctive and culturally ingrained. So this kind of argument is directed - as it says! - against those who say that the absence or non-discoverability of 'the divine' anywhere within this picture, is an argument against it.

So, I am giving examples of intelligible objects, as entities that are real, but not phenomenally existent. Whenever we count or reason, we're actually negotiating a meaning-realm; but because we do that instinctively, we take it for granted. But that meaning-realm, likewise, is real but not existent, in that you can only point it out to another being with similar reasoning capacities. You can't point it out to a horse or a cow; it's not something you can see through scientific instruments. It's the implicit domain in which all of judgement is embedded.

There's another well-known contemporary theologian who was (in)famous for asserting that 'God does not exist', that being Paul Tillich. There's a fragment floating around cyberspace to wit:

"Existence - Existence refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite'. Therefore existence is estrangement."

"Although this looks like Tillich was an atheist such misunderstanding only arises due to a simplistic understanding of his use of the word 'existence'. What Tillich is seeking to lead us to is an understanding of the 'God above God'. We have already seen earlier that the Ground of Being (God) must be separate from the finite realm (which is a mixture of being and non-being) and that God cannot be a being. God must be beyond the finite realm. Anything brought from essence into existence is always going to be corrupted by ambiguity and ...finitude. Thus statements about God must always be symbolic (except the statement 'God is the Ground of Being'). Although we may claim to know God (the Infinite) we cannot. The moment God is brought from essence into existence God is corrupted by finitude and our limited understanding. In this realm we can never fully grasp (or speak about) who God really is. The infinite cannot remain infinite in the finite realm. That this rings true can be seen when we realize there are a multitude of different understandings of God within the Christian faith alone. They cannot all be completely true so there must exist a 'pure' understanding of God (essence) that each of these are speaking about (or glimpsing aspects of)...."

"... However in many cases his theology has been misunderstood and misapplied and this most notably with his statement that God is beyond existence (mistakenly taken to mean that God does not exist). Tillich presents a radically transcendent view of God which in fairness he attempts to balance with an immanent understanding of God as the Ground of Being (and the Ground of Meaning) but fails to do so. In the end, as we cannot speak of the God above God we cannot know if any of our religious language has any meaning and whether ultimately the God above God really exists. Certainly, according to his 'system', we cannot test Tillich's 'God hypothesis'. However an interesting dialogue may be had between Christian humanists who posit that God is bound within language and does not exist beyond it (e.g. Don Cupitt) and Tillich who posits that our understanding of God is bound within language yet presumes (but cannot verify) that God exists beyond it.beyond it.

I think, in other domains of discourse, this distinction between 'what exists' and 'what is real', is not problematic, as it's very much a product of modernity.

Concrete things like, for example, trees, exist, are real, and are beings, right? — Pfhorrest

They're admixtures of real and unreal. They're real insofar as they're forms. 'Formless matter' is inchoate disorder. Forms (morphe) are what enable matter (hyle) to be intelligible at all. So they're real in a sense, but not in the same sense as intelligible realities. And, I'm saying, what we've lost is that ability to perceive different senses of what it means to say that something is. But, hey, we're actually starting to find some common ground, and that's great.

7 — Wayfarer

And "7" - suppose I accept that it has no parts - doesn't exist?

not phenomenally existent — Wayfarer

real but not existent — Wayfarer

You're fudging your words. The first is qualified by "phenomenally." The second isn't.

Paul Tillich — Wayfarer

I'm a huge fan. :blush:

Well, when you gesture towards '7', what you're gesturing towards is a symbol - but the reality of 7 can be represented by any number of symbols - seven, 7, VII. So what is the reality? It is a noetic object, something grasped by the rational intelligence. So, it's not a phenomenal existent, but a noetic or noumenal existent.

But, as I say, our thought is so thoroughly shot through with these realities that we fail to notice them, or take them for granted. We assume that it's something that can be understood as an adaptation.