Objective Idealism as represented by Hegel and Peirce I take to be the position that says that objects are always in conceptual shape, so to speak, even when they are not being looked at. — John
And now the argument is shifting from realism vs idealism to materialism vs idealism. — John
So it is certainly not uncontroversial, even among Buddhist scholars, that 'mind only' must be interpreted as an assertion of the kind of idealism which is understood as a claim that reality is, at bottom, only mind. — John
Yogācāra doctrine is summarized in the term vijñapti-mātra, "nothing-but-cognition" (often rendered "consciousness-only" or "mind-only") which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating a type of metaphysical idealism, i.e., the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created by mind. However, the Yogācārin writings themselves argue something very different. Consciousness (vijñāna) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end.
Yogācāra tends to be misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as epistemological warnings about karmic problems. The Yogācāra focus on cognition and consciousness grew out of its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation. Two things should be clarified in order to explain why Yogācāra is not metaphysical idealism: 1. The meaning of the word "idealism"; and 2. an important difference between the way Indian and Western philosophers do philosophy.
But a person who is an ontological materialist could still consistently believe that it is better to be motivated by ethical or even spiritual ideals. — John
Objective Idealism as represented by Hegel and Peirce I take to be the position that says that objects are always in conceptual shape, so to speak, even when they are not being looked at. This is very clearly not to say that objects are dependent on minds, whether human or otherwise, but that being in conceptual shape or form is altogether independent of minds, just as being visible is altogether independent of actually being seen. I think the same can be said for Plato's Forms. — John
For an object to be in conceptual shape would be for it to have an intelligible form. All objects have intelligible forms otherwise they would not be objects. — John
The reason why "God" is necessary, is that we have to assume an act whereby the conceptual shape is given to matter, to produce the object. (Matter itself being the principle of unintelligibility.) This is the act of creation, because as you say, without conceptual shape, there is no object. So this is the act whereby the object gets its existence. Prior to this, it is only a conceptual shape, but not yet a material object, it is the conceptual shape of what will come into existence. But this "will come into existence" is contingent rather than inherently necessary, due to the unintelligible nature of matter itself, time and possibility. It is better stated as what could come into existence at that time, depending on this act. So we appeal to a free will act of God to account for the existence of objects..A person who is an ontological realist and yet thinks that one should follow ethical ideals, could be a Christian who believes this world was created by God as a world material through and through, which He has made intelligible to the human soul by giving it a conceptual shape. — John
A person who is an ontological realist and yet thinks that one should follow ethical ideals, could be a Christian who believes this world was created by God as a world material through and through, which He has made intelligible to the human soul by giving it a conceptual shape. — John
But no Christian believes the soul is material
The point that is getting lost here is that it is the modern conception of 'scientific materialism' that is monistic, i.e. there is only one kind of substance, that is 'matter-energy', and everything science knows (what else is there?) is the product of that, via the processes described by physics and evolutionary biology — Wayfarer
Does anyone believe that anything is immaterial? I mean material in its broadest sense, so the soul, while not constituted of physical matter, is constituted, has a constitution, of some kind of subtle material, or ethereal substance. Even God must surely have a constitution of some kind. By constitution I mean structure, body, matrices. How can a mind operate in a void? An absolute void? — Punshhh
Do you understand the logic which leads to the conclusion that the conceptual shape must be prior to the material object itself? — Metaphysician Undercover
But obviously, if the soul, and God, are not material, then that understanding can't co-exist with a philosophy which sees the world as 'material through and through'. — Wayfarer
All of the intricacies of philosophical theology, idealism, and the rest, were worked out over periods of centuries after the Bible was written. The early Greek-speaking theologians, Clement of Alexandria and the like, incorporated Platonist ideas into theology. Then of course Aquinas incorporated many aspects of Aristotelean philosophy, and the whole history of philosophy, up until Hegel, comprised of exploring the fundamental ideas of substance, idea, nature, matter, mind and the rest. Cartesian dualism was created from a modernisation of the previous tradition.
The point that is getting lost here is that it is the modern conception of 'scientific materialism' that is monistic, i.e. there is only one kind of substance, that is 'matter-energy', and everything science knows (what else is there?) is the product of that, via the processes described by physics and evolutionary biology. Mind has come along as a very recent evolutionary development, by way of the output of the h. sapiens forebrain. God, spirits, souls, and the rest, are all anachronistic supersitions of an ignorant age. That is what materialism says.
Do you mean logically prior or temporally prior? — John
Considered abstractly they are general, considered concretely they are particular. Particular forms are instantiations of a general evolution of forms. Is it reasonable to posit the prior existence of the general form of the rhinoceros, prior to the advent of actual rhinoceri? Would it be reasonable to posit the pre-existence of the the particualr form of a particualr rhino prioir to its birth? — John
I am taking issue with the philosophical debates that are based on the presumption that the purported reality of spirit is a purportedly objective reality. — John
It is the holding of metaphysical views in general that is the problem because they are based on a kind of thinking that objectifies. — John
In any case, would such a postulated prior temporal existence be an objective existence in our spatio-temporal world or would it be an existence in some other spatio-temporal order? — John
If it were in a separate spatio-temporal order then on what grounds would you say it could be temporally related to our spatio-temporal world such as to justify the claim that it would be temporally prior? — John
Being non-material, these forms are understood to be non-spatial. — Metaphysician Undercover
One of the principle difficulties of philosophy is arriving at an understanding of the nature of spirit. It is not 'nothing', that is simply an indication of the inadequacy of the mind for the nature of the question. It is also not something. My approach is, it can't be understood through the exercise of thought and reason, so my approach is negative, 'not this, not that'. It is something that has to be realised on a deeper level. (I'm sure you of all people on this board would undersatnd that ;) ).
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.