The term "nothing" is defined as "that which has no properties". Insofar that pre-existence is not nothing, then it has some properties. Or another way to look at it, if a term is not meaningless, then it has an essence, that is, some essential properties.How can pre-existence have a property? — Yohan
Sure, you are correct. "Non-x" is the absence of x. So pre-existence is similar to non-existence in that they both lack the property of existence.How can non-existence BE a property? Do not only things have properties? Non-existence isn't a thing. It refers to an absence of thing. Or rather, it tells you that not anything is being referred to. Like a finger that isn't pointing at anything. — Yohan
As mentioned above, the essence of a term is found by listing its essential properties. The essence of "empty" can be "absence of being filled". The essence of "pre-filled" is "absence of being filled" + "potential of being filled that will be actualized eventually".Explain to me how an empty bowl is any way different than a pre-filled bowl. — Yohan
This disagrees with common sense. In real life, neither a unicorn nor a phoenix exist, and yet the definition of a unicorn is different than the definition of a phoenix. The only property (or lack there of) they share is the absence of existence. To use yet another example: A bowl is empty; a bottle is empty; yet a bowl is not identical to a bottle despite both being empty.A unicorn and a phoenix are exactly the same while NOT existing. — Yohan
So you are saying if you exist again, then you didn't really cease existing prior. — Yohan
If my status could change from pre-existence to existence, then necessarily my status could also change from post-existence to existence — Yohan
Tautologies are only worthless if they are obvious. — Yohan
If everyone was saying some bachelor's are married, and I pointed out that actually nobody who is unmarried is married...it would be a tautology — Yohan
So a seed implies the possibility for a tree. In a sense though the tree already exists in the seed...it's just undeveloped. — Yohan
All proofs involve some form of axiomatic circularity — Yohan
You said if all possibilities exist, they are not mere possibilities.
What is a mere possibility? Is a mere possibility something that could be but isn't? — Yohan
The one does not necessarily follow from the other. While true you didn’t exist at one time, and did at another, doesn’t mean you came from nothing. — Mww
How is switching from non-existence to existence any different from switching between nothing and something? — Yohan
And then how far back can we go? If we go back in time far enough can we get to a place where I didn't exist? — Yohan
Seems nobody is getting my points. Oh well, sorry if it's a waste of time. — Yohan
If I may. This is a nice illustration, but how does it demonstrate that the second snowball is not identical to the first one? Let's call your scenario scenario 1. Let's compare with scenario 2, in which the initial snowball was never thrown at the wall, thereby never got destroyed. What is different, property-wise, between the final snowball from scenario 1, and the snowball from scenario 2?If I make a snowball, heave it at the barn wall and it explodes, it has immediately ceased to exist as a snowball. If I gather up all the snow from the former snowball, make another snowball from that, there is then a snowball containing the constituency of the former, but not the identity of it. A snowball exists again; the snowball really does cease to exist. The arrow of time does not allow snowballs in general to exist, cease to exist and exist again as the same thing. — Mww
If I make a snowball, heave it at the barn wall and it explodes, it has immediately ceased to exist as a snowball. If I gather up all the snow from the former snowball, make another snowball from that, there is then a snowball containing the constituency of the former, but not the identity of it. A snowball exists again; the snowball really does cease to exist. — Mww
It's not just about genetic coding anymore. — Mapping the Medium
Again, human reason always seeks the unconditioned, that which is the irrefutable, absolutely fundamental ground for all thought. Problem is, that involves infinite regress, for any answer promotes the possibility of an underlaying query as to why such should be the case. — Mww
Thus, the question how far back in time can you go before getting to a place (in time) where you don’t exist is easily answered by the certainty of regular human reproductive mechanics: no childbirth, no you. — Mww
Imagine your consciousness disassociating with your body, so that you can observe your body from a distance. From this point of view, "your" body is entirely not self.
The question is, why is this body associated at all with my self?
Why didn't this body become born without my consciousness. Why didn't I remain as nothing when this body came into being.
It would seem I was associated in some way with this body before it came into existence. Or else it would have been born without me. — Yohan
That's exactly my position: origin,continuity defines things and people.Where did an apple come from? It didn't come out of nowhere. It grew from the tree. It is a part of tree. It is a tree. A person came from his/her parents. The person is his/her parents. His/her parents are their parents. That shows in nature - in biology books it's written that animals care about two things: their survival and the preservation of their genes(their children). And like that we can go back in generations. And the scientists tell us about the evolution and the big bang. That at the beginning there was a big bang. So we all came from the big bang. So we all are the big bang. So every person is everyone.Imagine you are an extension of the combination of your mom and dad's DNA. Imagine no soul, or spirit. — Per Chance
I'm thinking the example of snowball is not adequate — Samuel Lacrampe
If my status could change from pre-existence to existence, then necessarily my status could also change from post-existence to existence — Yohan
by "identical", I mean not that they are similar, but that they have the same identity, that is, they are one-and-the-same. — Samuel Lacrampe
I understood that your answer would be no. — Samuel Lacrampe
I don't understand why you are bringing knowledge and perception in a metaphysical topic. — Samuel Lacrampe
A thing is real/not real independent of our knowledge of it. — Samuel Lacrampe
Two" things are identical or one-and-the-same if they have all the same properties that make their identity. — Samuel Lacrampe
what is your definition of "identical"? — Samuel Lacrampe
If by that you mean the original data must come from empirical observations, then I agree. If you mean that the concluding metaphysical claim must be empirically verifiable, then I disagree. What is metaphysical is not directly observable; it can only be deduced.[...] no metaphysical proposition can be shown to be valid without empirical justification. — Mww
Of course I can't do that; but I can tell you about a real thing that existed before I knew about it: dinosaurs. My point is that the existence of a thing is not caused by our knowledge of it. So in the stool example, it doesn't matter if a subject does not know if the stool was previously assembled or not.Then you should be able to tell me about a real thing unknown to you. — Mww
No; the opposite: our identities are distinct precisely because you and I have different properties. Matter, for one thing: my body is not yours. Then a few other properties I'm sure, like height, weight, etc.Then why are you and I not identical? Are our respective identities really from the properties we have in common? — Mww
I agree with the perception part (assuming true perception), because this informs about a property of the object perceived. But I disagree with the thought part, which I believe you categorized as subjective. Subjectivity by definition refers to the subject of thought, not the object of thought.It follows that if either class has even one incongruent thought (properly conception) or perception (properly intuition), the things cannot be identical, for the simplest of reasons that they cannot have the same identity. Assuming correct judgement, naturally. — Mww
How could that be? As per P1 from this post, "identical" means they have the same identity, which is the list of their properties. It follows that the identity must be known in order to determine if the two things are identical. Could you give an example where we perceive two things which seem identical without knowing what those things are?Furthermore, whether we grant two things are identical or not, we are given nothing from that, that we can use to establish the identity of just one of them. I can perceive two things which seem identical without knowing what those things are. — Mww
”Two" things are identical or one-and-the-same if they have all the same properties that make their identity. — Samuel Lacrampe
our identities are distinct precisely because you and I have different properties. Matter, for one thing: my body is not yours. Then a few other properties I'm sure, like height, weight, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe
[...] no metaphysical proposition can be shown to be valid without empirical justification.
— Mww
If by that you mean the original data must come from empirical observations, then I agree. If you mean that the concluding metaphysical claim must be empirically verifiable, then I disagree. What is metaphysical is not directly observable; it can only be deduced. — Samuel Lacrampe
A thing is real/not real independent of our knowledge of it.
— Samuel Lacrampe
......Then you should be able to tell me about a real thing unknown to you.
— Mww
Of course I can't do that; but I can tell you about a real thing that existed before I knew about it — Mww
So in the stool example, it doesn't matter if a subject does not know if the stool was previously assembled or not. — Samuel Lacrampe
Subjectivity by definition refers to the subject of thought, not the object of thought. — Samuel Lacrampe
Could you give an example where we perceive two things which seem identical without knowing what those things are? — Samuel Lacrampe
I could try to explain my point of view ... But I don't want to argue it.Direct experience does not reveal an external physical world.
— Yohan
Why wouldn’t it?
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You actually have to assume metaphysical physicalism in order to have the illusion of experiencing an external physical world.
— Yohan
What if I don’t want my experience illusory? — Mww
No; in the sense that I give, "two" things would be identical if they are numerically one. E.g. you say you saw a brown dog at such time and such place, and I say I saw also saw a brown dog at the same time and place, then we conclude that your dog and my dog are identical, that is, we speak of the same dog. In the case of identical twins, "identical" just means that all or most of the properties are similar, yet the twins are numerically two. I'm okay using the term identical in either sense, so long as we are on the same page.[...] are identical twins one-and-the-same? Even if their parents couldn’t tell them apart by their properties, is it permissible thereby to say they have the same identity? — Mww
Correct. While I believe that things must have the same identity to be identical, the reverse is not necessarily true. I retain my identity even if I have a few different properties from 2 years ago. The answer, as per Aristotle, lies in the distinction between essential properties and non-essential (or accidental) properties; where if you change non-essential properties, like weight, you retain your identity, but if you change essential properties, like dying, then you lose your identity.I doubt you think of yourself as “Samuel LaCrampe” just because you are a certain height, because “Samuel LaCrampe“ has been many heights. — Mww
As per Aristotle again, when it comes to things other than persons, the cause of particulars is the matter. E.g. two triangles are numerically two because they are composed of separate atoms. When it comes to persons, I add the soul in addition to matter as the cause of particulars or individuality (but we can leave that can of worms alone).Therefore, some other condition must determine why we are separately identifiable as particulars in the set of all general instances. — Mww
Ah. So subjectivity means abstract, rational, non-empirical ideas, and objectivity means empirical things, is that more or less correct?What do you mean by subject of thought? [...] I offer subjectivity to be the conscious rational activity of a thinking subject. The object of thought is a cognition, an empirical cognition grounded in phenomena is an experience, a rational cognition grounded in abstractions is a judgement, all of which requires a thinking subject, that to which those cognitions, without exception, all belong. — Mww
It sound to me you equate the identity of a thing with its name. In your example, you can describe the things by listing their properties, but then the only thing missing is what they are called, am I correct? A name is only a symbol or sign that points to the identity, but is not it. E.g. say I just learned to speak english, and don't know what the word "bird" means, ie, I don't know what identity it points to. You describe it by saying it is the type of animal that has two legs, a beak, feathers, and can fly. I say "Ah! I get it. We call it 'oiseau' in french." You have described its identity by listing its properties, and now I know it.How about perceiving two things that each have 4 legs, wings, and speaks. It is entirely possible for such things to exist, because there is nothing contradictory about them, which makes explicit the possibility of perceiving them. Damned if I would know what they are [...] — Mww
Well, physicalists claim ...correct me if I'm wrong...atoms of light reflect off of atoms in a "world" and those atoms hit our eyes. And the atoms of our eyes trigger atoms that make up "our" brain...and then what? many triggered atoms collectively have a particular atomic activity that corresponds to an "experience of an external physical world"Explain away if you’re so inclined; no argument from me.......promise.
Yes, I favor idealism of a certain sort, along other disciplines. But that doesn’t matter here, cuz I’m not arguing anything. Just listening, even though I might ask a question or two. — Mww
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