I merely pointed out she isn’t an Antinatalist which makes your argument that there is a kantian Antinatalist argument extremely implausible. — Mark Dennis
is entails a goal of preventing, if only by argument, and convincing others, all future human life, or perhaps any life that can experience suffering. These prevented lives are prevented without the consent of the potential life forms. — Coben
though actually I don't believe in objective morals, I prefer a universe with life, even life that can suffer,and I would guess that most life can suffer. IOW I do not accept consent violation as the value that overrides all other values. — Coben
Third, I think life carries with it its own consent. Life forms want to live, it is inherent in their nature. A person may change their inherent drive to live and thrive once they have been faced with experiences X and Y. — Coben
Fourth, we are constantly doing things that potentially violate the consent of others. — Coben
ntinatalism is asking us to override the desires involved. Heterosexual penetrative sex is pretty much ruled out, since pregnancy can result in a foetus. — Coben
I somehow did not see this reply so am replying now, rather late in the day. — Bartricks
No I didn't. Why might a surgeon sometimes be justified in performing surgery on someone who cannot consent? When not doing so would result in a great harm to the patient. — Bartricks
Now, compare that to a procreation case. Does not creating someone result in a great harm to them? No. — Bartricks
So, sometimes - sometimes - we are justified in doing something that significantly affects another person without their prior consent when failing to do so would result in a great harm befalling them. — Bartricks
I somehow did not see this reply so am replying now, rather late in the day. — Bartricks
I'm not convinced of this statement, but that of course does not make it untrue. — boethius
You don't seem to have bothered to have read the argument. — boethius
Are you reverting back to your original argument that it's the lack of consent that's the problem? Or are you changing your argument to the extreme consequential argument that living entails lot's of suffering? — boethius
What do you mean 'reverting'? I have said repeatedly that my case for antinatalism is 'cumulative'. That means I think there are numerous arguments - no one by itself decisive - that imply procreation is wrong. — Bartricks
Being unable to defend many arguments does not a stronger argument make. — boethius
If you believe a bunch of arguments together justify antinatalism, I suggest you make a new thread with this "cumulative" argument and referencing the arguments that accumulate; either debates such as this one, which, though insufficient to justify antinatalism on its own, play some part in the cumulative argument scheme or then new debates that will to occur in the context of your cumulative structure. — boethius
And no good arguing that we cannot affect people by bringing them into existence, for that falsely assumes that to be affected by something you need to exist prior to being affected. — Bartricks
Can something/someone nonexistent be affected by something/someone else? — Emind
So it seems that although you need to exist to be affected by an act, you do not need to exist prior to the affecting act.
It seems to me, then, that you are conflating the 'existence condition' (which says you need to exist in order to be affected) with what we might call the 'prior existence condition' (which says you need to exist prior to an act in order to be affected by it). The 'existence condition' is true (I think), but the 'prior existence condition' is not. — Bartricks
Whereas it seems that you would conceive that Trudy is affecting her child, I would construe it as Trudy doing something that will affect her child in the future.
It's a somewhat subtle distinction, but one nonetheless. — Emind
Exactly, "will" be affected, not is being affected. — Emind
No, that's an absurd suggestion. To make a cumulative case one would need to show that each argument had some probative force, and that would require making each argument. And so the opening post would then have to be thousands of words long. — Bartricks
This is correct. It is amazing that many people dont understand this concept that you dont have to exist prior to a certain point to be harmed ONCE you are actually brought into the world. — schopenhauer1
I guess Im not necessarily ready to forego the "prior existence" condition.
On the following basis:
It seems to me that there needs to be a certain sort of temporal symmetry when you affect someone.
The two agents need to exist simultaneously, in the same temporal reality before we can talk about any party affecting the other one. — Emind
It's in no way absurd. Plenty of people have written thousands of words to make an argument. — boethius
There's nothing wrong with using thousands of words to make a case. But there is something wrong - or at least unwise - in making one's OP thousands of words long. — Bartricks
I like the way you don't actually address the point I was making. — Bartricks
We agreed this consent issue is insufficient to justify antinatalism. — boethius
Now that you've changed your position I'll restate again my criticism. — boethius
I am so far not satisfied that you fairly apply your principle of consent to all ethical issues where it would seem relevant to do so. — boethius
You say, "well, consent doesn't matter if it prevents harm", b — boethius
er, where? No, the fact procreative acts are ones that those who are created by then have not consented to is a fact that makes them 'prima facie' wrong - 'default' wrong. That is, they will be wrong unless there is some other feature they possess that either annuls or overcomes the wrong-making power of the feature I have identified. — Bartricks
You seem to have difficulties with subtleties like this. If I say that in some contexts the fact an act will prevent some great harm eclipses the importance of getting a person's consent, then you take that to mean that if an act will prevent some harm then consent doesn't matter, or will always be eclipsed by the significance of the harm it prevents (that is, that preventing harm is lexically more important than respecting consent). I do not believe such things. — Bartricks
It will be inconvenient for your objections, but my view is that lack of consent is a prima-facie wrong-making feature. That does not mean it is always a wrong-making feature. Sometimes it doesn't matter. And sometimes it matters but other things matter more. Note the 'sometimes'. — Bartricks
The point, however, is that it 'default' matters and so if an act is an act of such a kind, then it is reasonable to suppose it is wrong until or unless we have evidence that some other feature also present is either annulling the prima facie wrongness of the lack of consent involved, or eclipsing it. — Bartricks
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