Reason is not a concept, but a faculty, which allows for the development of concepts.

Well, it's also a concept. We have a concept of what reason is, and it's tucked into that words and what it elicits for each of us.

Let the free-for-all begin!!!!

The established standard on reason, understood as the primary activity of the conscious mind, gives no origin or identity to it. Nowhere in any critique, even while giving the fullest account of what it does, its authoritative role in human morality and knowledge, is there a single solitary comment on what it is.

After 50 years of writings, and the development of a very specific philosophy dedicated exclusively to it, containing not one inkling of a definitive formulation for its origin or constitution, I’d be mighty suspicious to see one show up anytime soon.
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Sorry...I got carried away. You asked about the “origin of the concept “reason””, which is easy enough to answer: understanding. Understanding is the source of all concepts, but the question remains as to whether reason is a concept. The argument has been made that a definition is sufficient to justify the possibility of a concept, but we find so many definitions for reason that conceptual veracity for it diminishes accordingly.

Etymologically, "reason" comes from a root that means "to put in order", or "to fit together", which suggests that "reason" is fundamentally about understanding the relationships between things.

Well, it's also a concept. We have a concept of what reason is, and it's tucked into that words and what it elicits for each of us. — Coben

You might have a 'concept of language' but I don't see how that advances understanding of language. It's too multifaceted to reduce to a concept.

Etymologically, "reason" comes from a root that means "to put in order", or "to fit together", which suggests that "reason" is fundamentally about understanding the relationships between things. — Pfhorrest

Perfectly correct. Historically, I think the conscious use of the faculty of reason can be traced to Pythagoras, with his/their work on 'ratio' as exemplified in number, music and geometry. Later this became characteristic of the Greek tradition as a whole, for example in the genius of Archimedes.

It must have been intoxicating for those who realised 'the power of reason' in those ancient times. Mankind had emerged from the long neolithic into early civilizations, and began to realise the power that came from understanding things like leverage, displacement, geometry, and other such discoveries. (Actually I remember one such discovery was the ability to measure the height of remote objects by movement of the sun and the comparison of ratios. I think that was Thales?) This was seen as a kind of semi-divine power, the ability to discern the real causes of things, which provided the ability to perform hitherto inconceivable acts. That was the early origin of what was to become science.

The established standard on reason, understood as the primary activity of the conscious mind, gives no origin or identity to it. — Mww

Maybe it's because reason can't be explained, rather, it is what explains. I think one of the follies of our age is to believe that reason can be explained in terms of evolutionary adaptation or by some other means, so I'm highly dubious of attempts to 'explain reason'.

I'm highly dubious of attempts to 'explain reason'. — Wayfarer

Absolutely. I’ve harped on this forever.......reason cannot explain itself without being used to explain itself. No one is going to take seriously anything to patently circular. It matters not what name is given a particular methodology for the explanation, it still must be derived by reason. At least, as long as it’s a human doing it.

The term 'reason' is multiply ambiguous.

For it is sometimes used as a synonym for 'explanation' (for instance "what's the reason this is happening?").

Sometimes it is used to mean 'normative reason', where a 'normative reason' is some kind of preference of Reason.

Sometimes - as in the sentence above - it is used to refer to the source of the preferences just mentioned (a capital 'R' is typically used in such cases).

And sometimes it is used to refer to the faculty by my means of which we are made aware of normative reasons.

There may be more meanings to the term than this, but those are some commonly recognised ones.

Absolutely. I’ve harped on this forever.......reason cannot explain itself without being used to explain itself. No one is going to take seriously anything to patently circular. — Mww

Circularity is not always a problem. For instance, I - Bartricks - exist, and I am a person. Are you now justified in believing that there is a person, Bartricks, who exists? Yes. Yet the basis upon which you are justified in believing this is that a person, Bartricks, told you.

The fact, then, that we cannot learn anything about Reason apart from by listening to her does not, in and of itself, indicate a problem.

You might have a 'concept of language' but I don't see how that advances understanding of language. It's too multifaceted to reduce to a concept. — Wayfarer

I am not quite sure what you are saying.

He refers to the concept of reason. You say it isn't a concept but rather a process. But these are not mutually exclusive. When we refer to reason, yes, we are referring to a certain kind of thinking and justifying ideas, drawing conclusions. Could be privately engaged in, could be interpersonal or even collaborative. Those processes.

But what I just did was throw out, very quickly, my sense of the concept of reason. What we think the word 'reason' is distinguishing and describing in generall. What we mean. We can compare this idea we have, the concept of reason we have, with some specific process of thinking or arguing, etc.

What concepts are not also things or processes?

There's the concept of reason. Then there is ALSO those processes the word refers to out there in specific cases.

The 'processes' you talk about are referred to not as 'reason' but as 'reasoning'.

We use our 'reason' - and in this context the word refers to a faculty - to engage in reasoning. That is, 'reasoning' is the activity of consulting one's reason. One's reason is the faculty, 'reasoning' is the act of using it.

OK.

Fair enough. But we still have a concept of reason - what the idea of reason distinguishes, describes
and then
we have the faculty.

It's a concept and it refers to a faculty. An idea that refers to a very complicated function of minds and must, as an idea, distinguish this function from other functions.

I could argue that to call it a function is to reify it, but really that is a side issue. I still think that whether referring to processes or a function, there is still a concept and what the word refers to.

Sorry...I got carried away. You asked about the “origin of the concept “reason””, which is easy enough to answer: understanding. Understanding is the source of all concepts, but the question remains as to whether reason is a concept. The argument has been made that a definition is sufficient to justify the possibility of a concept, but we find so many definitions for reason that conceptual veracity for it diminishes accordingly. — Mww

I disagree that understanding is the origin of all concepts. I think it is misunderstanding that is the origin of concepts. Concepts are generated in an attempt to resolve misunderstanding. Misunderstanding leads to the creation of concepts, which leads to greater and greater misunderstanding

What is the origin of the concept "reason", how did its applications develop, and what does the term mean in relationship to current knowledge? — Enrique

Reasoning is the procedural act of verifying the justification for a knowledge claim. It is an entirely mechanical activity, in the sense that a machine can do it too.

On the other hand, discovering the justification for a knowledge claim -- as opposed to merely verifying it -- is not reasonable. There cannot exist a mechanical procedure that is capable of discovering new knowledge. That is probably the most far-reaching conclusion of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.

Creativity is not mechanical, but it is also not rational.

Given the strong and growing competition from computers, you will no longer get particularly far if you all you can do, is to reason. The ability is not entirely worthless, but it also no longer that valuable.

What is the origin of the concept "reason", how did its applications develop, and what does the term mean in relationship to current knowledge?

There are plenty of online dictionaries of etymology that might suffice to answer your questions.

https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=reason

A concept always refers to a five dimensional subjective experience, so to distinguish between ‘reason’ as a concept and ‘reason’ as process is simply to reduce the concept to four dimensional information - to the form of temporal event - in an attempt to reify or define it. Reason as a process precludes our ability to use it in predicting or anticipating other events, relating to our experience outside time. Some people also personify Reason in a respectful effort to relate to it as an ‘other’ - a fellow experiencing subject.

The way I see it, reason is the structure in our understanding of the world, how we relate information beyond the spatial and temporal aspects of reality. It may be seen as purely logical, in which case it can be reduced to one dimensional, mechanical information. But there is much more to reason than rationality and logic.

Not all value structures are quantifiable, and to confine our understanding of the world only to these quantifiable or even mathematically reducible value structures is to limit our understanding of the world. The so-called verification of knowledge claims by such reductionism is evidence of our fears. The diversity of our language use, including written and verbal, imagery, music, movement and symbolism, points to the versatility of reason and the scope of information it is capable of acquiring about the world.

Incidentally, there is more to understanding the world than even the concept of ‘reason’ suggests. We also have a capacity to relate to the world beyond reason, beyond our diverse value structures that attribute significance to what matters.

Reason(n): human faculty which creates and/or develops an argument.
As such, it is:
1) An inherent mental function.
2) A type of controlled (conscious) problem-solving.

Reasoning(v): creation and/or development of an argument.
As such, it is:
1) A human event (temporal extension).

I think it is misunderstanding that is the origin of concepts. Concepts are generated in an attempt to resolve misunderstanding. — Yohan

Sometimes, perhaps. Dark matter was conceived pending a possible misunderstanding of observation or mathematical prediction. Nevertheless, it is pretty hard to de-legitimize the concept of “incline plane” when you see a ball merrily rolling from a higher to lower elevation.

Reason(n): human faculty which creates and/or develops an argument. — Galuchat

Reason cannot create or develop knowledge statements nor their justification. Reason can only verify them.

For example, it took 350 years to discover the proof for Fermat's Last Theorem, while the process was clearly not reasonable. On the contrary, the process cannot even be documented.

What is the origin of the concept "reason", how did its applications develop, and what does the term mean in relationship to current knowledge? — Enrique

This sounds like a homework question.

Reason(n): human faculty which creates and/or develops an argument. — Galuchat

Reason cannot create or develop knowledge statements nor their justification. Reason can only verify them. — alcontali

Why would you confuse "an argument" with "knowledge statements"?

Why would you confuse "an argument" with "knowledge statements"? — Galuchat

Well, neither the knowledge statement (Fermat's last theorem) nor its justification (Wiles' proof) can be discovered through reason.

Why Pierre de Fermat discovered his last theorem cannot be documented. Why Andrew Wiles finally discovered its proof 350 years later, is also a mystery. The only thing that is reasonable are the verification steps that confirm that Wiles' argument proves Fermat's theorem.

So you’re saying Fermat didn’t reason to his theorem and Wiles didn’t reason to his proof? How would you account for either the theorem or the proof, if the cognitive faculties of each of their respective originators were not in play?

So you’re saying Fermat didn’t reason to his theorem and Wiles didn’t reason to his proof? How would you account for either the theorem or the proof, if the cognitive faculties of each of their respective originators were not in play? — Mww

There is no justification for why they discovered it.

That is in fact the case for any discovery. If it were possible to discover new knowledge by reasoning, i.e. by using a documented procedure, we would have discovered all knowledge already. Such procedure cannot possibly exist. If such procedure existed, we could use it to solve, for example, Turing's halting problem, while it is provably unsolvable.

There is no procedure for knowledge discovery.

By the way, reasoning, i.e. verifying justification, is a mechanical faculty. Computers can do it too.

There is no justification for why they discovered it. — alcontali

We’re not asking about justifications; we asking about the facts. There is a theorem, there is a proof, so the justifications for the why of their reality is completely irrelevant. Actually, the justification for the why of them could very well be sheer accident, although we both should logically recognize it isn’t.

Both were the products of pure reason, within the context of the paradigm sufficient to facilitate it. Fermat reasoned his theorem from Pythagoras’ triples, and the justification for the why of the proof was nothing more than the mere existence of the theorem.
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If it were possible to discover new knowledge by reasoning, i.e. by using a documented procedure, we would have discovered all knowledge already. — alcontali

The fact that we haven’t, and the fact that we understand knowledge is always tentative, makes explicit either knowledge isn’t that which is discovered, or reasoning isn’t the means for it. Reason is a fundamental human condition, so whatever else is the case, it must have to do with reason; anything else is contradictory and therefore absurd. So it follows necessarily that knowledge as a discovery is a false representation.

I’ll leave it there.

There is no justification for why they discovered it. — alcontali

Hence, the knowledge-discovery process is not rational. The output product, knowledge, clearly is, but the process clearly is not.

Both were the products of pure reason — Mww

They are not the output product of pure reason. Creativity is not reasonable.

The justification for the why of the proof was nothing more than the mere existence of the theorem — Mww

It took 350 years to produce the proof, the discovery process of which was not reasonable. There is no way anybody could find the proof merely by "reasoning". Thousands of people tried and failed. Once the proof had been discovered, it was indeed possible to verify that it really was the proof by mere reasoning.

The fact that we haven’t, and the fact that we understand knowledge is always tentative, makes explicit either knowledge isn’t that which is discovered, or reasoning isn’t the means for it. — Mww

Agreed. Knowledge discovery is not guided by reason at all. The third millenium prize goes to the core the problem. They offer $1 million if you can clarify the following:

P vs NP Problem

If it is easy to check that a solution to a problem is correct, is it also easy to solve the problem? This is the essence of the P vs NP question. — Third millenium prize

In the case of Fermat's Last Theorem, it is obvious that it does not take 350 years to verify that Andrew Wiles' proof is correct, even though it took 350 years to discover it. The discovery process is not rational while the verification process definitely is.

Pure reason does not explain why knowledge gets discovered. It is only able to verify the justification for knowledge. Hence, reason cannot possibly be the most important ingredient in the progress of human knowledge.

So be it.

But we still have a concept of reason - what the idea of reason distinguishes, describes
and then
we have the faculty. — Coben

A 'concept' is just another word for 'idea'.

Concepts (ideas) are always 'about' things (their 'objects').

So, the concept of cheese is about cheese. That is, it is the idea of cheese.

A common mistake - made, it seems, by virtually everyone here - is to confuse concepts with their objects. That is, to confuse the idea - concept - of cheese with cheese itself.

Apart from the concept of a concept, concepts are not identical with their objects. So, the concept of cheese is not itself cheese. It is idea - it is just the idea 'of' cheese.

Likewise, the concept of Reason is not itself Reason. It is 'of' Reason - the idea of Reason.

So, there's Reason. Then there's our idea of Reason - the concept of Reason. Then there's the faculty by means of which we are aware of Reason's prescriptions - a faculty that we also (confusingly) call 'our reason'.

So, the concept of cheese is not itself cheese. It is idea - it is just the idea 'of' cheese. — Bartricks

The map is not the territory. — December 28, 1931, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Alfred Korzybski, New Orleans