I highly recommend reading C.S Peirce's 'The Fixation of Belief'. True, it's not just limited to the US, but it was at a peak frenzy at the time the US was founded. It is the mindset that the US was conceived in and steeped in.

If we were able to rationally go back to the time of Scotus and examine the differences between what became ontological individualism and Islamic thought, perhaps there could be fodder for potential discussions between the two. Wishful thinking, I know.

The problem with Peirce's metaphysics is that he allows that pure, absolute continuity, which can only be expressed by us human beings through the terms of infinity, to be polluted by the concept of "infinitesimal". — Metaphysician Undercover

How much of Peirce's metaphysics (and mathematics, and phenomenology, and logic/semeiotic) have you actually studied carefully? What fundamental distinction are you positing here between the concepts of "infinity" and "infinitesimal"?

A succession of infinitesimal points does not provide the necessary conditions to fulfil the criteria of "continuity". — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce would agree with this, although "infinitesimal point" is a contradiction in terms. There are infinitesimals, and there are points; they are two very different concepts, since infinitesimals have extension (though smaller than any assignable/measurable value), while points do not. His parallel terms when discussing time are moments, which have duration (though shorter than any assignable/measurable value), and instants, which do not.

Positing a degree of difference as existing between the infinitesimal points, no matter how large or small that degree of difference is, necessitates the conclusion that there is something "change", which occurs between such points, rendering the supposed continuity as non-continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce would agree with this, as well. Infinitesimals (and moments) are indefinite, and thus cannot be individually distinguished; we can only discern differences once we have marked off specific points (or instants). In fact, one of Peirce's own definitions of a moment is "a time in which no change which can in any way be made sensible can take place." A finite lapse of time between two marked instants is required for any difference to become discernible. In his own words, "between any two instantaneous states there must be a lapse of time during which the change is continuous, not merely in that false [Cantorian] continuity which the calculus recognizes but in a much stricter sense."

Because Peirce proposes a polluted, and impure form of continuity, rather than starting with a pure and true continuity as his first principle, his approach to agapasm is demonstrably a materialist approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce would vehemently deny both charges here--he does start with a pure and true continuity as his first principle, or at least consistently strives to do so; and he explicitly rejects materialism, calling it "quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense," instead affirming objective idealism as "the one intelligible theory of the universe." It treats "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," such that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." Accordingly, Peirce's cosmology understands the very constitution of being as true continuity underlying indefinite possibilities, some of which are actualized by the ongoing process of determination.

So sorry, I didn't answer your direct question. I'm juggling stuff here.

It is ontological because at its root it is based on an understanding of 'being' and how that relates to free will and individual rights.

If you can't explain something, there is still the possibility of an explanation. We just don't have it. — god must be atheist

‘Miracles are not against nature, only what we know about nature’ ~ St. Augustine.

How much of Peirce's metaphysics (and mathematics, and phenomenology, and logic/semeiotic) have you actually studied carefully? What fundamental distinction are you positing here between the concepts of "infinity" and "infinitesimal"? — aletheist

Are you not aware of the difference between infinitesimal and infinite?

Peirce would agree with this, although "infinitesimal point" is a contradiction in terms. There are infinitesimals, and there are points; they are two very different concepts, since infinitesimals have extension (though smaller than any assignable/measurable value), while points do not. His parallel terms when discussing time are moments, which have duration (though shorter than any assignable/measurable value), and instants, which do not. — aletheist

Let me rephrase that then, Peirce replaces the "point" with the "infinitesimal", as the point might be designated as unreal, and incapable of producing a continuity. The duration of time cannot consist of "instants", or points, which have zero duration, but it may consist of "infinitesimals", which I might have carelessly referred to as points with extension.

Peirce would agree with this, as well. Infinitesimals (and moments) are indefinite, and thus cannot be individually distinguished; we can only discern differences once we have marked off specific points (or instants). — aletheist

This is why such infinitesimals cannot be taken as real. Each infinitesimal requires a point of division, a boundary, to separate it from another infinitesimal. Without such a boundary the infinitesimal has no existence. But these boundaries are said to be vague because such dimensionless points cannot have any real existence in an extended medium. So Peirce proposes nothing to substantiate any boundaries and therefore nothing substantiates any infinitesimals. The infinitesimals are imaginary, simply a proposal, as that which constitutes the continuity. But the reality of the continuity is only supported by the infinitesimals. So the position is in fact, circular.

Let me explain better. For various reasons we are inclined to assume the reality of continuity. However, the existence of change and difference makes it very difficult to validate logically any supposed continuity. If infinitesimals are real, this provides the logical foundation for the reality of continuity. But the only thing which supports the reality of the infinitesimals is the "need" to support the continuity. Of course it's a pragmatism, the infinitesimals are assumed for the purpose of making continuity real, but there is nothing real to support this "need".

In his own words, "between any two instantaneous states there must be a lapse of time during which the change is continuous, not merely in that false [Cantorian] continuity which the calculus recognizes but in a much stricter sense." — aletheist

See, the problem here is that the "two instantaneous states " are not real. There is nothing to validate the still "instant" in the continuous passage of time. And if such instants were real, they would break the continuity. They are only posited to allow that the infinitesimals which exist as continuous change between the instants, are real. But if divisions in time are created artificially by positing such points, then there is no principle to deny dividing time infinitely. So the infinitesimals are posited solely for the purpose of denying infinite division, without any real substance.

Peirce would vehemently deny both charges here--he does start with a pure and true continuity as his first principle, or at least consistently strives to do so; and he explicitly rejects materialism, calling it "quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense," instead affirming objective idealism as "the one intelligible theory of the universe." It treats "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," such that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." Accordingly, Peirce's cosmology understands the very constitution of being as true continuity underlying indefinite possibilities, some of which are actualized by the ongoing process of determination. — aletheist

It's very clear that Peirce abandons true continuity by denying infinite divisibility, and replacing it with infinitesimals . And, it is also clear that this procedure is logically incoherent. In order to have real existence, the infinitesimals require real boundaries. So if the infinitesimals are real, then the continuity is not, due to the existence of the boundaries. If the infinitesimals are produced from arbitrary divisions created by us, then there is no principle by which infinite divisibility is denied.

Let me rephrase that then, Peirce replaces the "point" with the "infinitesimal", as the point might be designated as unreal, and incapable of producing a continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce does not "replace" points with infinitesimals; they are two different concepts, and there is still a role for points--not as the parts of a line, but as the discrete boundaries between its continuous parts. He helpfully clarifies this in one manuscript (R 144, c. 1900) by referring to points (or instants) as limits and the line segments (or lapses of time) between them as portions. In later writings he reverts to "parts" for the latter, but suggests "connections" for the former.

The duration of time cannot consist of "instants", or points, which have zero duration, but it may consist of "infinitesimals", which I might have carelessly referred to as points with extension. — Metaphysician Undercover

The duration of time does not consist of infinitesimal moments, either. As with anything truly continuous, the whole is ontologically prior to any of its parts.

... I conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no definite parts, although to endow it with definite parts of no matter what multitude, and even parts of lesser dimensionality down to absolute simplicity, it is only necessary that these should be marked off, and although even the operation of thought suffices to impart an approach to definiteness of parts of any multitude we please.*
*This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is not a real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or another does not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. — Peirce, RS 30, 1906

The parts are indefinite (infinitesimals/moments) unless and until we arbitrarily mark them off (with points/instants).

Each infinitesimal requires a point of division, a boundary, to separate it from another infinitesimal. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the very nature of infinitesimals/moments is that they are not distinct from one another at all.

Another plain deliverance of the percipuum is that moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same. Obviously, this would be so according to our interpretation. But if time consists of instants, each instant is exactly what it is and is absolutely not any other. In particular, any two real quantities differ by a finite amount. — Peirce, CP 7.656, 1903

We can only introduce points/instants as the boundaries between adjacent segments/lapses that have finite length/duration.

If infinitesimals are real, this provides the logical foundation for the reality of continuity. But the only thing which supports the reality of the infinitesimals is the "need" to support the continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we have good reason from our phenomenal experience to posit that continuity is real, and the hypothesis of infinitesimals "provides the logical foundation for the reality of continuity," then we have good reason to conclude that infinitesimals are likewise real.

Now a fact that goes to show that time is continuous is that our consciousness seems to flow in time. If we suppose that we are immediately sensible of time, the origin of the idea is explained; but if not, then we must cast about for some other way of accounting for our having the idea. Now there are great difficulties in the way of supposing that we are immediately conscious of time, and therefore of the past and future, unless we suppose it to possess the third property of continuity [infinitesimals], so that we can be immediately conscious of all that is within an infinitesimal interval from any instant of which we are immediately conscious, without its thereby following that we are immediately conscious of all instants. — Peirce, R 257, c. 1894

What is the argument for denying the reality of infinitesimals?

See, the problem here is that the "two instantaneous states" are not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not a problem at all, it is precisely Peirce's view.

... it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion ... — Peirce, R 295, 1906

Instantaneous states are creations of thought for describing real events in time. We arbitrarily mark them at finite intervals, but the reality is continuous motion/change.

But if divisions in time are created artificially by positing such points, then there is no principle to deny dividing time infinitely. So the infinitesimals are posited solely for the purpose of denying infinite division, without any real substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense, Peirce consistently affirms that time is (potentially, not actually) infinitely divisible, and that this is always necessary (but insufficient) for true continuity. In fact, he asserts repeatedly that instants of any multitude, or even exceeding all multitude, may be inserted within any lapse of time--even an infinitesimal moment.

In order to have real existence, the infinitesimals require real boundaries. So if the infinitesimals are real, then the continuity is not, due to the existence of the boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a confusion of reality and existence. Indefinite infinitesimals/moments are real, but do not exist; distinct points/instants exist, but only by virtue of being marked off by an act of someone's will.

Scotus supported "ontological individualism" against certain Islamic thought that said we had a world soul. Scotus sided with Aquinas on this. Aquinas and Scotus believed in free will. But all sin for Aquinas is infinite, but for Scotus even mortal sin is finite (but deserving of eternal punishment still). I learned this from the Old Catholic Encyclopedia (new advent dot com)

Duns = Dunce

‘Miracles are not against nature, only what we know about nature’ ~ St. Augustine. — Wayfarer

St. Augustine also believed that having slaves was a good thing, and having those who refused to convert to Christianity spiked on a stake or burnt alive underwater was a good thing.

Your appeal to authority may appeal to you, but it has no philosophical weight. And this is a philosophy website, not a site to promote religion (other than on rational, philosophical grounds).

In my opinion, and in yours, miracles are signs of god, so if they are not supernatural, and they have no signs of impossibility about them, then by definition they are not miracles. For instance, raising from the dead by nothing other but sheer will, or healing the blind by nothing other than placing a hand, are miracles. Their only explanation is intervention by a supernatural being, god namely. I hardly would believe that you would argue against that.

So are miracles compatible with natural forces, like St. Augustine said, or are they the acts of a supernatural, of god? Clearly, they are acts of god, so St. Augustine was clearly wrong with his false beliefs.

Which means, in effect, that nothing happens that science cannot explain in principle. That's how it works out. — Wayfarer

With the exception of miracles. Miracles are the direct effect of god circumventing the laws of the universe.

Miracles can't be explained by science.

But scientists and atheists are on the opinion that miracles don't ever happen.

I haven't been paying a ton of attention, but has mapping the medium oscilated between Aquinas and scotus on here? And if she thinks we are all God, why read them instead of Hegel

St. Augustine also believed that having slaves was a good thing, and having those who refused to convert to Christianity spiked on a stake or burnt alive underwater was a good thing. — god must be atheist

Burned alive underwater! Must have taken some powerful magic. However it’s false, the burning of heretics didn’t start until many centuries later, medieval period. Augustine never dreamed of punishing heresy on pain of death. Rather he was one of history’s great rhetoricians. Of course it’s true that the ancients tolerated slavery. Swap you for chemical warfare.

But scientists and atheists are on the opinion that miracles don't ever happen. — god must be atheist

They might, though. To say ‘miracles can’t happen’ as matter of principle verges on superstition of another kind, as it put scientific orthodoxy in a role previously assigned to religious authority. But there are many basic facts about life and mind which science has no grasp of. Science deals with what can be objectified.

Besides the Catholic Church has procedures for canonisation which require two bona fide accounts of miracle cures. And this has had the consequence of building up a very large data set -about which, see this account (written by a self-described atheist although apparently one with no ideological ax to grind.)

You never heard of Greek fire? As for miracles, strange things happen in ALL religions. Catholics just pay attention to the ones they want to..

They might, though. To say ‘miracles can’t happen’ as matter of principle verges on superstition of another kind, as it put scientific orthodoxy in a role previously assigned to religious authority. — Wayfarer

You dressed up the facts in a different clothing... you used differently slanted words to describe one of the tenets of the philosophy of science. It is one of the fundamental beliefs of scientific thinking that everything that happens can be explained rationally, without supernatural influences.

Yes, it is a tenet, and an underlying principle. You say it's wrong to reject the underlying principles of religion on a scientific basis, because science uses an underlying principle too.

This I can't debate. You are right about that. But you have to commit to one or to the other, because you can't commit to both. I commit to science. It appears, you commit to the power of the supernatural.

So be it. Please don't tell me that I am wrong in my belief; and I won't tell you that you are wrong in your belief. I just won't rely on someone to cure my blindness by touching me, and I don't believe that a corpse can be brought back to life by willing it. You believe that, and good for you.

The "miracle" is that there are millions who believe the same things you do. Philosophically speaking, nobody can fault them for that. Rationally speaking, the world would look very funny if things were run on the principles of religion.

I commit to science. It appears, you commit to the power of the supernatural. — god must be atheist

Not at all. What does 'supernatural' mean? It means, can't be brought within the ambit of current science, can't be objectively validated or proven or disproven in the lab. But the results of those investigations I mentioned are nevertheless empirical data. Jacalyn Duffyn, a haemotologist and academic historian of science, maintains that she's an atheist, but that in all these cases there are cures that can't be explained scientifically.

And I bet it's a lot easier for me to understand what you believe, or don't believe, than for you to understand what I believe. But I will try and say a few words on it. I am not conventionally religious, but set out to understand what Eastern religious mean by 'enlightenment'. I studied that in depth and detail. You will find, if you look into it, that there are core ideas which appear in many cultures and periods of history. Collectively these have been referred to as forming the 'philosophia perennis', the perennial philosophy. There are religious aspects, but also philosophical aspects, and even scientific aspects. But the cultural dynamics of the West are such as to have a created what I see the false dichotomy of religion v science, which I think you adhere to. Actually the the book mentioned in the OP, which, as I mentioned, I read, does have some interesting things to say about this, but I don't want to pursue it further here.

Reading Peirce is difficult. Here is an audio version of 'The Fixation of Belief". It might be easier to digest, and you can listen to it while you are doing other things.

https://youtu.be/gJAGMWZ3YQU

Peirce does not "replace" points with infinitesimals; they are two different concepts, and there is still a role for points--not as the parts of a line, but as the discrete boundaries between its continuous parts. — aletheist

As I said, these "discrete boundaries" cannot be real, because they would break the continuity. They are arbitrary and artificial, imposed as our pragmatic divisions in the continuity of time. Nor can such boundaries be "points", because they are vague (and this is borne out by special relativity), due to a combination of our inability to impose an actual "point" into the passing of time, and there being no actual points within the passing of time. Therefore the traditional concept of "point" really has no role in Peirce's metaphysics. Though he might discuss the "point" it's something he rules out as impossible, with his principles, just like Aristotle discusses "prime matter", but rules it out as impossible, with his principles.

He helpfully clarifies this in one manuscript (R 144, c. 1900) by referring to points (or instants) as limits and the line segments (or lapses of time) between them as portions. In later writings he reverts to "parts" for the latter, but suggests "connections" for the former. — aletheist

Peirce is very clear in his principles, that such boundaries or "limits" are vague. Therefore they cannot be points according to the classical definition. That you can refer to one time when he pondered the existence of points, does not mean that he didn't dismiss them altogether at a later time. The fact that he later calls them "connections" rather than "points", is an indication of this. The "connections" between the "parts" of temporal duration are not produced by clear cut points of "now", they actually must have extension inherent within, as is indicated by what is expressed in special relativity, the impossibility of giving "now" a particular point.

No, the very nature of infinitesimals/moments is that they are not distinct from one another at all. — aletheist

Yes, sure, but this is the very point I am arguing. The infinitesimals of the continuity are not actually distinct from one another, they are only separated through the arbitrary imposition of "points". However, we as human beings have not got the capacity to insert true "points" into a natural continuity. Therefore the so-called "points" which we actually use are not really points at all, they are divisions with vagueness inherent, not points. So we can throw the concept of "point" right out the window because it has no purpose for us.

f we have good reason from our phenomenal experience to posit that continuity is real, and the hypothesis of infinitesimals "provides the logical foundation for the reality of continuity," then we have good reason to conclude that infinitesimals are likewise real. — aletheist

The problem is that we know sensations deceive. A succession of still frames creates the illusion of continuous motion. So we cannot simply assume continuity is real.

What is the argument for denying the reality of infinitesimals? — aletheist

If the passage of time, or anything else for that matter, is assumed to be continuous, then it is assumed that there are no real divisions within that continuity. If that continuity is divided into parts, such a division is done for pragmatic purposes only, the divisions are arbitrary in that sense, not based in the assumption of any real parts, or real divisions. Therefore any "infinitesimals" produced by such a division are artificial, arbitrary, having no real substance to the divisors. And, we might just say that any such infinitesimal could actually be divided again, ad infinitum. There is no substance to the infinitesimal.

Instantaneous states are creations of thought for describing real events in time. We arbitrarily mark them at finite intervals, but the reality is continuous motion/change. — aletheist

Right, and since such "instantaneous states", or what you called above, "points", are required as divisors, to create the infinitesimals. Therefore the infinitesimals themselves are just creations of thought. Then, if we add the further development to Peirce's thought, that such "points" are not points at all, but vague divisors, we find that the infinitesimals themselves are lost into a veil of vagueness. Therefore our capacity to understand the thing which appears to us as continuous motion/change, completely breaks down and is lost into this incoherent sea of vagueness, that is if we adopt these principles.

Nonsense, Peirce consistently affirms that time is (potentially, not actually) infinitely divisible, and that this is always necessary (but insufficient) for true continuity. In fact, he asserts repeatedly that instants of any multitude, or even exceeding all multitude, may be inserted within any lapse of time--even an infinitesimal moment. — aletheist

if this is the case, then it is clear evidence that "infinitesimals" are completely fictitious and serve no purpose in the understanding of continuity. But this is not what Peirce argues so I do not believe it is true.

I do have my answer for you. I haven't forgotten. Running late for my work day, but I will get it to you within a couple of hours.

Please provide citations or (better) quotes from Peirce's writings to substantiate your assertions about his views, as I did for mine. I remain unconvinced that you have carefully studied them to gain a thorough understanding of his expansive mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical thought. Distinct points/instants are indeed arbitrary and artificial creations of thought, but indefinite infinitesimals/moments are real, with length/duration less than any assignable value and no discernible boundaries. We can only mark points/instants to divide lines/time into finite segments/lapses.

Well, Pierce actually wrote it, and it was published, about a century after the U.S. was founded. Maybe someone noted that already.

Scotus.....

- Agrees with Abelard that Unity is transcendental.

- Denies whatever is 'one' is an individual.

- Asserts that there is a kind of Unity that is 'less than numerical'.

- Asserts that 'common natures' have a 'degree' of reality (or being), BUT he strenuously denies that universals exist. Universality is a feature of our mental life (due to abstraction).

- Walks a line of thinking that falls between Plato and Aristotle.

- Against nominalists' claims that common natures are real.

- Against realists' claims that common natures are not universal.

- Accounts for causation in this 'degree of less than numerical'. (Experience and events provide this 'degree' of influential causation. Think about what science is now discovering about epigenetic/environmental/experiential influences.)

- Agrees with some of the Islamic polymath, Avicenna, views on common natures.

- Disagrees with Aquinas' views on common natures/species.

What constitutes an individual's essence is its 'difference' from another. We cannot grasp the lesser degree of common nature ( I would add consciousness here as well) because of our dependence on embodied physical sensation. (Again, think about epigenetics. We cannot know what influences our experiences and environment are currently having on what we will pass to our offspring because we are limited in space, time, and embodiment. We can only study what has happened in the past and the change between then and now.). Singular essences are unknowable to us, even though they ARE real. We refer to their reality indirectly by recognizing and differentiating what it is not. Example: Humans develop and recognize 'self' only in relation to that which is 'not' self.

The nominalists gleaned from Scotus what would fit their stance, and the realists gleaned from Scotus what would fit their stance. They have also done this with Peirce's work. The nominalists and realists were and are both misguided.

Moving forward from Scotus into the future of this misunderstanding.....

Ockham took the nominalist vein and ran with it, later influencing Martin Luther and Rene Descartes. Eventually becoming the protestant evangelical and scientism thinking we have today. They both still battle the realist perspective. But again, the nominalists and the realists are still both misguided. So we have all of these 'camps' of thought going round and round on this merry-go-round, and never getting off.

Physician Henry Stubbe (1632-1676) was considered to be the most noted Latin and Greek scholar of his age, as well as a great mathematician and historian. He was the first person to use the term 'semiotics'. Stubbe studied all of this in great depth, and actually tried to get the Christian community to acquire a better understanding of Islam because he too saw where the thinking split. Not that he was a proponent of Islam. He just understood what happened and was frustrated at the ignorance. Stubbe also understood that nominalism and realism were both misguided. The nominalist drive was just too popular, due to the promotion of ontological individualism. Everyone wanted respect for their own, personal, cognitive maps (their fixations of beliefs).

Even when John Locke wrote 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding' (the second time the word 'semiotics' was used), he was leaning to the nominalist view. He broke human understanding into three categories; Physics, Pragmatism, and Semiotics. However, 'semiotics' was kind of an afterthought of the time, and never held in high enough importance due to the popularity of nominalism and the new science frenzy choosing not to include it as a relative feature.

So, here we are today, dealing with a western culture steeped in ontological individualism, evangelical Christianity, scientism, etc., (Ilya Prigogine referred to the western schizophrenia) thinking that if they just keep insisting that the Muslims have a skewed perspective that one day the 'barbarians' will wake up. Well, I've got news for everyone. We all need to wake up!

The only way to make any difference in what has happened is to try and teach the general public how human beings actually develop and how life interacts with each other. If we only recognize ourselves and our 'medium' by what it is not, then we have to realize that the only way to learn and reach a shared understanding is through dialogue with others who have a different perspective.

THIS is my reason for being here, and what motivates me to do what I do.

The nominalists gleened from Scotus what would fit their stance, and the realists gleened from Scotus what would fit their stance. They have also done this with Peirce's work. The nominalists and realists were and are both misguided. — Mapping the Medium

With all due respect, this sweeping generalization is rather misleading. Peirce described his own view as "extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208; c. 1905), calling himself "an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much farther in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n; 1903) and "a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.470; 1907). It is not much of a stretch to say that his entire philosophy is the result of a lifelong crusade against nominalism, and there was no more disparaging statement from his pen than the charge that someone else was a nominalist.

"Miracles" and the "supernatural" cannot be relative to the current state of scientific understanding, unless you want to concede that modern westerners demonstrating our technologies to uncontacted peoples are performing genuinely supernatural miracles to them, because they lack the scientific understanding to explain how we do those things.

So if you want to say that we humans cannot perform supernatural miracles, even when other people don't understand how we're doing what we're doing, then instead "miracles" and "supernatural" must mean things that cannot in principle be explained by any science ever. That is the sense usually used by naturalists and atheists who say that there is nothing supernatural, no miracles: that anything can, in principle, eventually, be explained, even if we don't know how yet.

I argue that if we are in a state where we don't know whether or not that is true, all we can do is act in a way that assumes one answer or another, by either trying to explain things or not trying. So saying that something is supernatural or a miracle is tantamount to simply not trying to explain it. But assuming we would like to explain things, even if we're not sure if we can, it is pragmatically in our best interest to always try, and never to simply give up and thereby guarantee failure. In doing so, we implicitly assume that there is nothing supernatural, no miracles, and so on: just as-yet-unexplained phenomena, that are still natural inasmuch as an explanation is assumed (implicitly, by the fact that we're not giving up) to be possible.

Agreed

Peirce's view is described as "nuanced realism". It is realism of a different stripe, for sure.

Again, Peirce himself considered his realism to be "extreme." That does not seem very "nuanced" to me. :smile:

I will say that in my studies I have come across nominalists who try to align themselves with aspects of Peirce. Just look at what William James did with pragmatism. Peirce had to rename his 'pragmaticism' to differentiate it so as not to be stolen.

When taken in context to what he was up against, yes he referred to it as extreme, no doubt.

I look at Peirce's work throughout his years and in the context of the time and mindset.

I never said he followed Scotus precisely, but Scotus motivated him.

The trouble is a univocity thesis is first and foremost a nominalist one, at least with respect to how the term is being used in this thread.

Univocity always begins In the grasping of a distinction between the human individual and unity. God is recognised not be human at all, no matter how much they are together or connected. It is the ghost which haunts univocity. Everyone trying to collapse everything into unity is always going to get caught be the initial nominalist distintion they made in the first place.

It's obvious their claim to only unity is only trying to paper over, to hide a distinction implict in their reasoning in the first place, an exercise in pretending we are not distinct from God.