Subjects are called 'beings' for a reason; whereas objects lack being. — Wayfarer

You lost me here. Objects aren't beings?

The reference to Heidegger (who's fascinating to me) was very relevant indeed. I suggest "Being and Time" but more importantly, and too often ignored, his "Introduction to Metaphysics."

Do animals "have being" according to you? — Janus

I understand the expression 'sentient beings' to mean creatures endowed with sense. So I would take the expression 'beings' to include all sentient creatures. I don't think it includes trees and other vegetative life-forms. But it is not as if animals 'have' being, but that they are beings, not simply objects. The behaviour of objects can be described solely in terms of physical laws, whereas animals engage in intentional actions. They are, if you like, the manifestation of subject-hood. That's why:

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all. 1 — Thomas Nagel

You lost me here. Objects aren't beings? — Xtrix

It's true I can see other people as 'objects' in a sense. But think about the implications of that. When you refer to other persons, you use personal pronouns. You don't treat them as objects, as 'it' - at least, I hope not! - because you implicitly recognise that they are subjects themselves, and not just objects to be picked up and put down.

Of course, the whole point of materialist theories of mind is that subjects are simply the output of large numbers of objective processes which give rise to the illusion of subjective experience. In other words, denying that there is an essential distinction between objects and subjects, through reducing the latter to the former. But that is the sense in which materialism is de-humanising.

Re Heidegger - I've only picked up bits and pieces. I am loath to study him in depth and detail. But at least he wrote about 'the meaning of Being' and considered the nature of human existence, rather than regarding philosophy as elaborations on evolutionary biology or footnotes to Scientific Method.

That's a very interesting point and, incredibly, often overlooked when discussing human action. — Xtrix

No doubt, and is the ground for refutation of Hume’s human action by mere habit, or, which is the same thing, convention. I can tie my shoe via mere image without conscious thought because I already know all there is to know about tying shoes, that is, by habit. But that tells me nothing whatsoever about how I learned to tie my shoe in the first place.

It's true I can see other people as 'objects' in a sense. But think about the implications of that. When you refer to other persons, you use personal pronouns. You don't treat them as objects, as 'it' - at least, I hope not! - because you implicitly recognise that they are subjects themselves, and not just objects to be picked up and put down. — Wayfarer

By "being" I'm not talking about "sentient beings." By "beings" I mean to include literally any entity or "thing" whatsoever. This is where the miscommunication is coming from.

Re Heidegger - I've only picked up bits and pieces. I am loath to study him in depth and detail. — Wayfarer

I can see why. But once you give him enough effort, it's very interesting.

No doubt, and is the ground for refutation of Hume’s human action by mere habit, or, which is the same thing, convention. — Mww

I can tie my shoe via mere image without conscious thought because I already know all there is to know about tying shoes, that is, by habit. — Mww

These seem to contradict each other. What I thought you were talking about was habit, something in which the subject/object distinction (and even consciousness) often plays no role. That's not to reduce all of human behavior to habit, of course. Not sure how it's therefore the grounds for refuting Hume's thesis of human action by habit.

Subjects are called 'beings' for a reason; whereas objects lack being. I think this is a valid ontological distinction but one that is obfuscated in much modern thought. So it is wrong to treat beings as objects, except for technical purposes, such as demographics or epidemiology. (Interesting to note that the airline industry uses the expression 'sob' for those lost in airline crashes, where the term stands for 'souls on board'. )

I never knew that about the souls on board. Neat.

Living creatures are objects insofar as they are finite, have a surface, move as one, and so on. I think we should treat humans as objects, not because it objectifies the human, but because it humanizes the object. We’ve already tried applying spirits, minds, souls, and other words; and these figments end up gaining prominence over the object itself, so much so that the objects—human beings—were sometimes destroyed in order to redeem them. So I think we need to learn to value the objectivity of a human being, or else we’re left to apply value through a sort of linguistic trickery.

I see the as relational antonyms because they’re relational antonyms. Many mistaken them for complimentary antonyms. — I like sushi

Yes, exactly.

I still don’t really understand what is being asked for. — I like sushi

So the ordinary language distinctions seem to have been rejected. The thesis seems to involve an amalgamation of Cartesian substance dualism (and perhaps Cartesian certainty) and transcendental idealism. And an as yet unexplained connection with modern science.

Have I slayed the dragon my quest? — I like sushi

No, you first must venture down the rabbit hole...

Yes, that's a linguistic distinction. That's not what I was getting at, as I feel I've made clear already. — Xtrix

It seems you're asking whether others see things differently from Cartesian dualism and/or Kant's transcendental idealism. And, further, that they seem to provide the philosophical basis for modern science.

I do see things differently from that. Per your second claim, I think Descartes, Hume and Kant all left a mark on how science was subsequently practiced. But in modern times, Popper and Kuhn are probably the main influences (and Positivism before that).

But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies.

I'm wondering how many people in this forum still see the world in this way or something similar to it. It seems to be the philosophical basis for modern science, at least since Descartes. — Xtrix

Although it may not be a conscious decision, all thought and action implicity assumes the subject-object distinction. I, the subject, think of and do to objects. I think the subject-object paradigm has proven its worth in the vast amount of accumulated knowledge we have in our libraries.

If at all there is something off about it then it must mean that the subject isn't sufficiently detachable from the object in terms which we can roughly speak of as causality. I maybe wrong about this but I believe quantum physics has phenomena that blurs the line between subject and object e.g. the double slit experiment with electrons where the act of observing by a subject changes the outcome of the experiment, the object. However, the question remains whether findings at a quantum level can be extrapolated to the world of humans - mind and body.

Also I recall that some very clever person, whose good name I forgot, once suggested that the universe is trying to understand itself which I assume is via evolving conscious thinking lifeforms like humans and, hopefully, other intelligent life elsewhere; lifeforms capable of actively investigating and discovering the inner workings of the universe. In such terms the universe is both subject and object.

Thematically, self-reflection, when the subject makes an object of itself, has its origins in philosophy. Socrates, the father of western philosophy, famously claimed that the unexamined life is not worth living. I'm sure eastern philosophy too has a similar tradition.

Presumably, philosophy, understanding the self, not only just an individual but humanity as a whole, was the first step in the journey of the universe in understanding itself.

As I see it, the process of 'objectifying' is specific to the modern outlook. I am of the view that pre-moderns did not instinctively think of the world in the objective terms we now take for granted, because the world was seen in terms of an 'I - you' relationship rather than in terms of things or objects; the Universe was animated by spirit. I think that shift to the objective is a matter of historical conditioning or development of consciousness (a theme which I believe is explored in depth by Owen Barfield.)

This is why the use of the term 'objectivity' as the criterion for what is considered truly existent, is a characteristic of modern thought, generally (i.e. to determine whether something is real, we ask if it is 'objectively real'). To the extent that this sense of the 'I-you' relationship was eliminated, then what remains are individual subjects and individual objects of perception; a stance which would have appeared incoherent from the pre-modern p.o.v. (because, lacking in reason or cause.) — Wayfarer

Seems like you and everyone here in this thread is trying to argue for their own objective truth - informing readers how things truly are, and even how things were in your explanation of pre-moderns, for everyone. You're explaining how the world is independent of anyone's beliefs and perceptions.

If everything is subjective then why tell others how things are for you as if it would somehow apply to others?

When talking about pre-moderns are you talking about your history or the history of the world?

Of course, the whole point of materialist theories of mind is that subjects are simply the output of large numbers of objective processes which give rise to the illusion of subjective experience. In other words, denying that there is an essential distinction between objects and subjects, through reducing the latter to the former. But that is the sense in which materialism is de-humanising. — Wayfarer

The only options are de-humanization or anthropomorphism? Maybe it's something in between.

It would only be de-humanizing if you think humans are the only potential subjects. What about other apes, elephants, dolphins or pigs?

But in modern times, Popper and Kuhn are probably the main influences (and Positivism before that). — Andrew M

Popper and Kuhn are interesting, but themselves presuppose Descartes' ontology.

And an as yet unexplained connection with modern science. — Andrew M

I have an interest in Husserl ... ‘Crisis’ maybe?

Objects are what is. Subjects are about what is.

reason thinks it can see itself, know — Mww

Its associated with sight. If thought reduces to linguistic use, then why do we say "I see" when we understand something? Why not "I hear."? Maybe language was originally mostly visual like sign language.

What I thought you were talking about was habit, something in which the subject/object distinction (and even consciousness) often plays no role. — Xtrix

I was. Except consciousness, which inescapable under any conditions of human action whatsoever, depending on what one thinks consciousness to be, of course.

Tying shoes is somewhat simplistic, granted, but if it is the case that instances of imaging is the modus operandi of the mind when there is no need of a subject/object dualism, the question then arises, what is the origin of those images. Psychologically speaking, it is memory; origin, philosophically speaking, it is a priori pure reason, the very thing Hume denies as having any such power.

The reason this matters, is that habit cannot explain the first learning of what may eventually become habitual. Pure reason, on the other hand, has no problem with it. Again, depending on whether one accepts that there even is such a thing, as opposed to pure naturalistic determinism, or the myriad of relative absurdities in between.

Anyway.....didn’t mean to go so far afield.

Maybe language was originally mostly visual like sign language. — frank

A reasonable assumption, yes. Then came drawings, geographical markers, all sorts of visual aids. Generally though, I think conversants engaged in some dialogue has the listener recalling from his own congruent experiences, images relevant to the speaker’s words.

Not too much controversy there, right? Other than giving the rabid solipsist a gigantic soapbox.

Its associated with sight. If thought reduces to linguistic use, then why do we say "I see" when we understand something? Why not "I hear."? Maybe language was originally mostly visual like sign language. — frank

It's is because we are visual creatures. Most of our information about the world is provided visually. Our visual field has more distinctions within it than our auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactile fields do. We tend to think the world is at it looks, not as it sounds or smells. Dogs and dolphins will probably disagree.

As I see it, the process of 'objectifying' is specific to the modern outlook. — Wayfarer

I don't think so. I think the issue arises due to a philosophical conflict between dualism and naturalism, an issue that exercised pre-moderns as much as moderns. Descartes' mind/body dualism is one manifestation of that. Plato's ideal Forms (as distinct from the shadowy physical world) is an earlier manifestation of dualism.

Even in your apparently simple construction, there's something unstated, which is that 'Bob' is an object for Alice, whereas Alice is an object for Bob. Whether there are objects without subjects, or subjects without objects, is left open. — Wayfarer

On a natural view, there is a relational symmetry between subject and object. We can notice that Bob is hit by a falling branch. Or we can notice that a falling branch hit Bob. The subject and object are interchangeable and the details of the kind of referent that Bob and the branch each are is abstracted away. That is useful for scientific modeling where one might want to consider Bob and the branch as abstract natural systems that can be represented (in language) in a myriad of different ways and for different purposes.

Whereas on a dualist view, subject and object are ontologically distinct and relationally asymmetrical. Science can properly describe objects but not subjects, which are beyond it's purview. On that framing, naturalism overreaches, objectifying subjects and purporting to provide "a view from nowhere". But that is to misunderstand naturalism, which does neither of those things.

Popper and Kuhn are interesting, but themselves presuppose Descartes' ontology. — Xtrix

Substance dualism? On your view, how do Popper and Kuhn presuppose it?

I have an interest in Husserl ... ‘Crisis’ maybe? — I like sushi

A crisis in philosophy perhaps, not so much in modern science. :-)

I was. Except consciousness, which inescapable under any conditions of human action whatsoever, depending on what one thinks consciousness to be, of course. — Mww

Please rephrase. This makes no sense.

The reason this matters, is that habit cannot explain the first learning of what may eventually become habitual. Pure reason, on the other hand, has no problem with it. — Mww

I'm not sure "pure reason" really explains all habits either.

"Subject" and "object" are an indispensable part of our conceptual framework, but it's entirely possible (and I'd argue necessarily true) that all subjects are objects and all objects are subjects. "Subject" and "object" are roles, not classes of entities.

Substance dualism? On your view, how do Popper and Kuhn presuppose it? — Andrew M

Because while they may not themselves explicitly refer to the res cogitans or the res extensa, they both discuss knowledge and theory from the subject/object formulation.

Although it may not be a conscious decision, all thought and action implicity assumes the subject-object distinction — TheMadFool

I doubt that very much. This conception is so prevalent in the west we take it as part of human nature, but there's no reason to assume it's universal.

But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies. — Andrew M

In psychology, particularly in studies of perception. It permeates the philosophy of language (Quine's "Word and Object"), cognitive sciences, etc. This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples.

But it is not as if animals 'have' being, but that they are beings, not simply objects. — Wayfarer

Well, I was using your terminology.

objects lack being — Wayfarer

So for you it is not Berkeley's "To be is to be perceived", but rather 'To be is to perceive'? That would be a very eccentric use of the term; do you have some philosophical justification for using the term in such a strange way; a usage that no other philosopher in the tradition has ( to my knowledge) employed?

I have been asking about this for a while too. This also seems to underlie Wayfarer's theism somehow, where he holds that "God does not exist" but that in some sense still "there is a God", because God has being or is a being rather than existing or being an existent or something like that.

Yes, it is puzzling! For me God (or any other purported being) either exists or does not exist (regardless of our beliefs). And the term "to exist" is synonymous with the term "to be". I think this, or something very like it, just is in accordance with the logic of common usage.

Or at least Ockham.
— bongo fury

Hmm, really? That's interesting. Never read Ockham. Where does he touch on this? — Xtrix

... and Aristotle, apparently.

Now I say that utterances are 'signs subordinated' to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, by a proper acceptance of the word 'signs', the utterances always signify the concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but rather because utterances are imposed to signify those same things that are signified by the concepts of the mind. In this way the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies that same thing...

[...] And the Philosopher says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'marks of affections that are in the soul'[4];So also Boethius[5], when he says that utterances signify concepts. And generally all writers, in saying that all utterances signify affections or are the marks of those [affections], do not mean anything other than that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying those things that are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul...

[...] the concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to voluntary imposition.
— http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Ockham/Summa_Logicae/Book_I/Chapter_1

Hence the etymology of "idea" involving "image", as in a photographic trace. (Natural as opposed to conventional.)

And the undeniably fruitful connection of (the notion of empiricism in) philosophy of science to (the notion of empiricism in) developmental psychology. How we learn to read messages from nature.

Still, I see Goodman and Quine as reasserting convention, and rather kicking against...

This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions — Xtrix

E.g., Quine's behaviourism, and Goodman's semiotics-without-the-mentalism.

This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples. — Xtrix

:up:

Or we can notice that a falling branch hit Bob. The subject and object are interchangeable and the details of the kind of referent that Bob and the branch each are is abstracted away. — Andrew M

However, there's something that this glosses over: that if Bob is hit by the branch and injured, he's rushed to hospital and cared for, whereas the branch is put out with vegetable waste. Sure, the impact on Bob can in one sense be explained in physical terms - the branch weighed such and such, and fell such a distance - but the impact in terms of 'consequences for Bob's life' cannot.

Whereas on a dualist view, subject and object are ontologically distinct and relationally asymmetrical. Science can properly describe objects but not subjects, which are beyond it's purview. — Andrew M

And that's why!

On that framing, naturalism overreaches, objectifying subjects and purporting to provide "a view from nowhere". But that is to misunderstand naturalism, which does neither of those things. — Andrew M

I think it does exactly that. This reaches its highest (or lowest) point in materialist philosophies of mind, which seek to deny the reality of mind altogether, as we've discussed many times (and which is plainly absurd, as far as I'm concerned).

And the point of Nagel's book of that title, is precisely that science attempts to arrive at a perfectly objective point of view through quantification and scientific method, however, that in the actual world, points of view are always those of subjects, so not a 'view from nowhere' at all. I think the view of scientific realism that it arrives at a view of the cosmos as if from no perspective is a falsehood, and is the point of the 'blind spot of science' critique. Science is still a human enterprise, and looks at the cosmos through the human perspective, even if it is highly abstracted and methodologically rigourous.

I do advocate a form of dualism, with the crucial caveat that mind is not something amenable to objective analysis, meaning that it's impossible to characterise objectively. So whereas Cartesian dualism posits two distinct 'substances' (in the 17th c philosophical sense), I think this is an abstraction and simplification, even if one that nevertheless portends something fundamentally true. But the Cartesian attitude then gives rise to the insoluble problem, how can res cogitans affect res extensa if the two are wholly distinct and separate? Which in turn gives rise to the whole 'ghost-in-the-machine' argument. But both 'ghost' and 'machine' are abstractions or intellectual models; organisms are not machines, and the mind is not a ghost. But having developed that model, or is it metaphor, then scientifically-inclined philosophers sought to eliminate the ghost, leaving only the machine, which is just the kind of thing that lends itself to study and improvement.

The way I approach a definition of 'mind' is 'that which grasps meaning'. But mind itself always eludes objective analysis, as it not objectively existent. Indeed it's precisely the mysterious nature of the mind that makes materialists want to deny that it's real! They rail against 'woo woo' but deep down they realise that their own nature is fundamentally mysterious, and this infuriates them.

Seems like you and everyone here in this thread is trying to argue for their own objective truth — Harry Hindu

'Your own objective truth' is an oxymoron.

By "being" I'm not talking about "sentient beings." By "beings" I mean to include literally any entity or "thing" whatsoever. This is where the miscommunication is coming from. — Xtrix

But I think that the fact that we can't differentiate "beings" from "things" actually conceals a very profound philosophical truth. A chair is not a being, but a cow is a being. When Heidegger talked of 'forgetfulness of being', was he talking about forgetting his car keys?

Well, I was using your terminology.

objects lack being
— Wayfarer — Janus

OK then - objects are not beings.

Beings are capable of perceiving, whereas inanimate objects (minerals, for instance) are not. Is it 'strange and eccentric' to say that?

This also seems to underlie Wayfarer's theism somehow, where he holds that "God does not exist" but that in some sense still "there is a God", because God has being or is a being rather than existing or being an existent or something like that — Pfhorrest

God is not a God.

That's needlessly pedantic. There is... whatever God is. That's not to say that God is an individual in some set that contains more than himself. I just don't know what phrase you would use to disagree with the thesis of atheism, while avoiding using the word "exists".

Beings are capable of perceiving, whereas inanimate objects (minerals, for instance) are not. Is it 'strange and eccentric' to say that? — Wayfarer

I think the common way of putting it would be that some beings are capable of perceiving and some are not.

Is there any good philosophical reason to depart from that common mode of parlance?