Have you never experienced empathy, or observed it in the behaviour of others?
Any argument which denies empathy as fact is unsound.

the term 'ontology' applies to the 'discipline of the study of Being' in a manner that includes, or at least implies, the first person perspective. And I think that is crucial to understanding what 'ontology' really is about. — Wayfarer

This isn't up for debate. Amateur etymology is no substitute for 2000 years of philosophical tradition because you want to push a moonshine philosophy that no one, no where holds. Stop lying to people.

"The question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us—"What is Being?"—is in other words "What is substance?"... Substance is thought to be present most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants and their parts substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed of these, either of parts or them or of their totality; e.g. the visible universe and its parts, the stars and moon and sun" (Aristotle, Metaphysics VII).

"A few examples should help. Over there, on the other side of the street, stands a highschool building. A being. We can scour every side of the building from yhe outside, roam through the inside from basement to attic, and not everything that can be found there: hallways, stairs, classrooms and their furnishings. Everywhere we find beings... Moreover Being does not consist of our observing beings. The high school stands there even if we do not observe it". (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics).

Kindly take your made-up, non-philosophical pseudo history and put it in the bin where it belongs. I will continue to call you out on this rubbish everytime you post it.

I doubt that very much. This conception is so prevalent in the west we take it as part of human nature, but there's no reason to assume it's universal. — Xtrix

I'm no Wittgenstein but check out language as Andrew M suggested. All languages I know of have a subject-verb-object structure and maybe, just maybe, if there are languages that lack it we may gain some insight into the issue herein discussed.

What would it mean to say that there's no subject-object distinction? Surely we're sufficiently removed in time and space from the moon landing in 1969 to validate it as an object and us as subjects. To say otherwise is, in my opinion, to claim that there's a causal connection between any and all would be subjects and would be objects rendering the subject-object distinction moot.

Have you never experienced empathy, or observed it in the behaviour of others?

Any argument which denies empathy as fact is unsound. — Galuchat

You must have misunderstood what I was writing about. In no way was I 'denying empathy'. Maybe read through the previous comments in this thread to see what I was getting at.

What would it mean to say that there's no subject-object distinction? — TheMadFool

It would mean that if I asked you for a cup of tea, you wouldn't know what to do.

You must have misunderstood what I was writing about. In no way was I 'denying empathy'. Maybe read through the previous comments in this thread to see what I was getting at. — Wayfarer

Same old pattern of avoidance: non-engagement with ideas that contradict your programme through obfuscation.

But not all objects are subjects it would seem, unless you attribute to rocks conscious awareness, which I doubt anyone would. — Xtrix

What about AGI in computers. Hypothetically. We can either presuppose that despite any behavioral characteristics machines are to rocks and planets different from what human beings are to them. Or otherwise, we can compare ourselves to rocks in our role of subjects by comparing them to machines first. Do we consider rocks as self-aware as ourselves? By many degrees of magnitude they lack the expressive, cognitive and reasoning parameters for that. But is the quality binary or is their sentience so insubstantial that it borders inconsequential by our usual standards. If the quality is binary, which side of the filter would AGI computers fall? And how different are computers from rocks then, fundamentally? A binary distinction I think already assumes an exosystemic component - i.e. a mind-body distinction.

P.S.: Maybe only thoughts have subject and object proper. And the human being is a vessel that serves as a locus for a collection of coherent thought processes that give rise to a sense of identity. These "thoughts" interact coherently to form the role of a "subject".

:up:

Over there, on the other side of the street, stands a highschool building. A being — StreetlightX

You and I are designated 'beings', and buildings are not. It's simple English.

non-engagement with ideas that contradict your programme through obfuscation. — Galuchat

You plainly misunderstood the passage you quoted from me. Would you like me to explain it further, or will you engage in the same old pattern of avoidance of ideas you find difficult?

P.S.: Maybe only thoughts have subject and object proper. And the human being is a vessel that serves as a locus for a collection of coherent thought processes that give rise to a sense of identity. These "thoughts" interact coherently to form the role of a "subject". — simeonz

:up:

You and I are designated 'beings', and buildings are not. It's simple English. — Wayfarer

You're like the Trump of philosophy. Ignoring all available evidence to shore up your terrible understanding of it.

The dictionary is ample evidence for a simple point.

Go away troll and stop miseducating people.

.....with philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

Readily accessible from the realization “existence” is a category, yet “being” is not. The first is irreducible, the second reducible to the first.

Sorta like.....”Heraclitus and Parmenides walk into a bar......”.

If those two had just sorted this nonsense out, back in The Day, we might not now have been “....strained and ruined by the nonsense of Hegelism...”
(WWR-2, Preface, 1818)

Maybe only thoughts have subject and object proper. — simeonz

Thoughts, strictly speaking, are the one thing that does NOT have subject/object dualism proper. In pure subjective privacy, the sole constituency of which is our thoughts, there is no need to communicate, therefore there is no need to qualify a relation between the thinker and the thought; they are the same thing. Internally, the thinker is the thought.

I think we need to learn to value the objectivity of a human being, or else we’re left to apply value through a sort of linguistic trickery. — NOS4A2

I agree.
Social awareness (perception and cognisance) has objective (fact-based) and subjective (value-based) properties. It:
1) Requires observation.
2) Is caused by the mirror mechanism (experience of others' acts, including simultaneous exteroception and interoception, and the activation of common and/or associated mental representations).
3) Causes intersubjectivity, sociality, imitation, and empathy.

If you look up the definition of the noun form of 'a being' in any dictionary, — Wayfarer

It amazes me you continue to argue about this. I’ll grant your point about the noun form in common usage —because it doesn’t make the slightest difference to what I’m talking about.

hat about AGI in computers. Hypothetically — simeonz

I’d consider them machines. Maybe in the future they’ll acquire “consciousness” of some kind, but we’re a long way out from that.

I'm no Wittgenstein but check out language as Andrew M suggested. All languages I know of have a subject-verb-object structure and m — TheMadFool

I’m not talking about grammar or world languages. I’m talking ontology. It’s discouraging that this has to be explained, repeatedly, in a philosophy forum.

What would it mean to say that there's no subject-object distinction? — TheMadFool

In my view it would mean that we’re not engaged with the world in a particular way (in this case, as “abstract thinking”). Heidegger would say something similar, only as a “present-at-hand” mode of being.

Once you’re in this mode, then a subject contemplating objects as a fundamental distinction can commence. But this is a “privative” mode- what human beings do for the most part does not involve subjects and objects at all.

So in some ways, the term 'ontology' applies to the 'discipline of the study of Being' in a manner that includes, or at least implies, the first person perspective. And I think that is crucial to understanding what 'ontology' really is about — Wayfarer

And what would that be exactly?

The Greek sense of being was phusis and, later, ousia. Neither privileges the first person perspective. A casual glance at an online etymology site just doesn’t tell you much.

I never claimed this. I have said 'being' in the noun form refers to living creatures. — Wayfarer

In common usage (maybe), which is completely useless to this discussion.

It seems to be the philosophical basis for modern science, at least since Descartes. — Xtrix

The subject object distinction is a metaphysical distinction; it makes sense when you have an account of souls separated from objects, or minds separated from worlds, mental separated from physical, primary separated from secondary quality and so on. To my mind, to say that the subject object distinction is part of the philosophical basis of modern science is very greedy, as scientific theories and styles of inquiry which produce them only interface with the subject object distinction as part of their intellectual heritage; and as we know, being in the intellectual heritage of a topic does not say anything about being conceptually foundational for or logically consistent with the topic.

I think it's more accurate to say that scientists will articulate justifications for scientific inquiry in the abstract in terms of something resembling the subject object distinction based on how common and pervasively applied a metaphysical intuition it is, rather than saying anything about whether the subject object distinction is really relevant to their work.

I’d consider them machines. — Xtrix

You probably mean objects incapable of being subjects. They will be machines by definition, no matter what. Or do you mean, that we are not machines, or fundamentally distinct from machines? If so, how?

Maybe in the future they’ll acquire “consciousness” of some kind — Xtrix

It is not obvious to me what does it mean for something to "acquire" consciousness. Is this a behavior modification or substance change or some other metaphysical phenomenon? Because stated in this way, how does one challenge any claim that something has or hasn't acquired consciousness. Also, it isn't clear to me what consciousness denotes - a behavioral pattern, a type of experience, etc. If it is a type of experience, how can a person know that it exists outside of their own being - i.e. the solipsism style argument.

but we’re a long way out from that. — Xtrix

Is time relevant? Or do you mean that the emergence of such advanced AGI is suspect to you for some fundamental reason?

I think it's more accurate to say that scientists will articulate justifications for scientific inquiry in the abstract in terms of something resembling the subject object distinction based on how common and pervasively applied a metaphysical intuition it is, rather than saying anything about whether the subject object distinction is really relevant to their work. — fdrake

Yes and no. I agree most scientists would repeat something like this as a philosophical grounding of their work, especially in the cognitive sciences, and that it does't really matter to the particulars of their research. But on the other hand, the particulars are seen in the light of fundamental notions, even if taken for granted and completely unexamined as they usually are. Every science has an ontological basis.

I think the subject/object distinction is one such fundamental notion for science, a variation of Kant, who took up Descartes' ontology, who in turn took up the Scholastic tradition, which of course was influenced by the Greeks.

It may not seem to matter, and it's often hard to care when modern science is so successful -- especially in terms of technology -- but the philosophical underpinnings are still worth questioning. I started this thread to see how many still question this particular notion, and as you can see, not many really do -- yourself included. That's interesting.

Thoughts, strictly speaking, are the one thing that does NOT have subject/object dualism proper. — Mww

I did not mean to say that all thoughts refer to the subject. In fact, I did not address (or honestly even think of) the distinctions between awareness, knowledge, self-awareness, etc. Indeed, only self-aware thinking incorporates the subject explicitly. Still, self-interest is present in most thought processes - even animal ones. So, although it is not formally present, the subject still emerges "organically", so to speak, from the coherent pursuit of personal advantage. Even if it is not directly expressed by the said thoughts.

Internally, the thinker is the thought. — Mww

Actually, this is exactly what I meant. That the subject arises in consequence from the coherent pursuit of self-centered objectives by the individual. This does not even imply self-awareness, unless the subject becomes the object of discussion itself.

You probably mean objects incapable of being subjects. They will be machines by definition, no matter what. Or do you mean, that we are not machines, or fundamentally distinct from machines? If so, how? — simeonz

Depends on what you mean by "machine," but yes I think that we're not only machines in the traditional sense. How so would require a separate thread regarding human nature, of which there's much to say. But quickly: I like Heidegger's conception of the being for which being itself is an issue.

It is not obvious to me what does it mean for something to "acquire" consciousnesses. Is this a behavior modification or substance change or some other metaphysical phenomenon? Because stated in this way, how does one challenge any claim that something has or hasn't acquired consciousness. Also, it isn't clear to me what consciousness denotes - a behavioral pattern, a type of experience, etc. If it is a type of experience, how can a person know that it exists outside of their own being - i.e. the solipsism style argument. — simeonz

True, no one has pinned down what consciousness means yet as a technical notion. Hence the use of quotation marks.

Is time relevant? Or do you mean that the emergence of such advanced AGI is suspect to you for some fundamental reason? — simeonz

What's relevant is that we don't know what consciousness is, and computers are non-human objects. So to answer your question more clearly: no, there's no problem here.

It may not seem to matter, and it's often hard to care when modern science is so successful -- especially in terms of technology -- but the philosophical underpinnings are still worth questioning. I started this thread to see how many still question this particular notion, and as you can see, not many really do -- yourself included. That's interesting. — Xtrix

I don't give much weight to the distinction, at least whenever I think it's relevant. I think that it generates intractable access problems (how does a mind move a body?); and the conceptual distinction between a subject and an object is still something which has to come from somewhere - why do these entities operate as if there's a subject object distinction and not others? I think it makes more sense to start from a metaphysics of events and interactions (like a process metaphysics) and build up minds and bodies (or subjects and objects and their transcendental structure) out of those than read things in terms of the subject object distinction.

Though I do think it makes sense in terms of a folk psychology construct; something like that it can be a valuable part of our manifest image but when it's treated as foundational or a given it occludes more than it helps.

I don't give much weight to the distinction, at least whenever I think it's relevant. I think that it generates intractable access problems (how does a mind move a body?); — fdrake

Well that's slightly different. Notice I didn't put "mind/body" in the title. To equate the subject with a "mind" is a different topic. But your point is taken nonetheless. I don't give it particular weight either.

To equate the subject with a "mind" is a different topic. — Xtrix

The kind of discussion that distinguishes a mind from a subject is already a more interesting idea than the usual elision of reason which joins them.

Edit: eg, subject as a universal constitution with its own phenomenological structure, a system in which conditions of possibility of experience make sense as an idea (ontological account), mind as particular concretion of that phenomenological structure which learns and experiences within the constraints of its constitution (ontic account) and thereby can discover the universal constitution through logical introspection.

Not that I buy that idea in the edit either, but at least it's got more meat to it than things like "you can't base metaethics on emotion, it's subjective!" or "physical theories are objective, anthropological theories are subjective" or "the warmth of a flame is subjective, whereas its temperature is objective". Or "materialism doesn't make sense because theories are subjective - the object is just a subject's apprehension of the object!"

The dictionary is ample evidence for a simple point. — Wayfarer

You're barking up the wrong tree here.

"Meaning of being in English

being
noun [ C or U ]
UK /ˈbiː.ɪŋ/ US /ˈbiː.ɪŋ/

C2
a person or thing that exists:"

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/being

And:

"In philosophy, being means the material or immaterial existence of a thing. Anything that exists is being. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies being. Being is a concept encompassing objective and subjective features of reality and existence."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being

Internally, the thinker is the thought.
— Mww
Actually, this is exactly what I meant. — simeonz

D’accord.

self-interest is present in most thought processes - even animal ones. So, although it is not formally present, the subject still emerges "organically", so to speak, from the coherent pursuit of personal advantage. — simeonz

This escapes me.

Note this qualification in that Wikipedia article:

Anything that partakes in being is also called a "being", though often this usage is limited to entities that have subjectivity (as in the expression "human being").

Which is the point I'm making. We do not, in common usage, refer to inanimate things as 'beings' - buildings, tools, artefacts, minerals and so on. There is no issue that they exist, but they're not referred to as 'beings', and this is philosophically significant.

Furthermore, the fact that the Wikipedia article equates 'being' and 'existing' does not obviate the philosophical distinction between these two terms. My argument is that the loss this distinction is a characteristic of modernity, generally, and the significance of the elision is more than semantic.

There is no issue that they exist, but they're not referred to as 'beings', and this is philosophically significant. — Wayfarer

How? And according to whom? The English word "being" and how it's used most of the time tells us what about the state of ontology exactly?

My argument is that the loss this distinction is a characteristic of modernity, generally, and the significance of the elision is more than semantic, but is a symptom of what has been described as the 'forgetting of Being'. — Wayfarer

So because most of the time, in everyday usage, we use the word "things" instead of "beings" for inanimate objects (as a matter of fact, for any object whatsoever), this is an example of the "forgetfulness of being" of modernity? Is that really what you're arguing?

"Forgetfulness of being" is indeed an interesting subject -- in Heidegger. But he's not meaning it in the way you are.