I also thought being referred to living things, hence the great chain of being of theology from God on down to microbes, but not chairs or rocks. Unless we're talking pantheism.

The ancients may have used being to refer all things, but that's not how I understood the modern use of the word. A being was always something alive.

But as for the OP, the subject/object divide to is the difference between how we as animals experience the world versus how the world is.

No one cares how the word is (mostly) used in English. Least of all me. I'm talking ontology. Do we walk into a physics lecture and gripe about their "counterintuitive" use of the word "energy" or "work"?

I'm continually discouraged by the lack of any familiarity with ontology in this thread. I was hopeful in the philosophy forum, members would be somewhat educated in philosophy.

Fair enough. I don't feel the use of "present-at-hand" makes much sense in this context, but I get your meaning. — Xtrix

Give me an example where it does make sense.

The thing is quite a few members on here are ordinary language philosophy fans, and not great fans of metaphysics, so discussing the usage of words is important to them, since they're convinced philosophy goes wrong with a misuse of language, particularly when it comes to ontology.

I think we experience the world as if there is a subjective/objective divide, but the ontological situation is unclear, because we don't know the nature of consciousness. However, we're made of the same stuff as everything else, so I tend to think it's an epistemological divide.

Carrying this to its logical conclusion, taking into account your other thread on the problems the world is facing, it seems that the scientific bent of the human mind, albeit only expressed in a minority but widely claimed by all, which is the quintessence of the subject-object distinction, is actually an indication that the world has broken and is now present-at-hand. — TheMadFool

Give me an example where it does make sense. — TheMadFool

Well to say the world is "present-at-hand" simply means the theoretical, "rational" mode of being (which underlies science) where things show up as "before us"in the present moment -- as objects with properties, usually. Hubert Dreyfus often says the hammer becomes a "wooden stick with a metal blob at the end" -- a piece of equipment that has a certain weight, color, etc.

None of this is relevant when the activity of hammering is going transparently well -- or take your driving example, which is a good one. That would be ready-to-hand activity.

Given this, I think you mean to say that the current reliance on science shows how this present-at-hand mode of being is taking over the world?

The thing is quite a few members on here are ordinary language philosophy fans, and not great fans of metaphysics, so discussing the usage of words is important to them, since they're convinced philosophy goes wrong with a misuse of language, particularly when it comes to ontology. — Marchesk

Discussing words, their origins and the history of their meaning, is indeed important. That's not being done here. To resort to the dictionary is as useless here as it is in physics, as I mentioned before. No one cares about how "energy" is used in everyday discourse if you're discussing physics. Likewise, no one cares here either -- unless it somehow plays into a deeper analysis of the etymology of the word (in this case "being") in the context of the history of ontology (which is what we're concerned with). But that hasn't been done.

I think we experience the world as if there is a subjective/objective divide, but the ontological situation is unclear, because we don't know the nature of consciousness. However, we're made of the same stuff as everything else, so I tend to think it's an epistemological divide. — Marchesk

What "stuff" would that be? Atoms?

What "stuff" would that be? Atoms? — Xtrix

It's impossible to say whether things like 'atoms' really exist, nor does it actually matter. An 'atom' is a very simple concept, even meaningless for many elements in natural conditions, such as metals for example, because of 'electron sharing in substance 'pools' larger than 'molecules.'

But it doesn't matter, because such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself.

In the model, events change an object's state (subject) to something else (object) by an action (verb). Whether the object exists or not is irrelevant to the language used to describe it, because it is only describing an abstracted model of observed phenomena.

But it doesn't matter, because such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself. — ernestm

The term "material" is meaningless. Hence also the "material world."

Within a LARGER scope, it could be meaningless or not, depending on your metaphysical position, which ultimately can be no more than belief. Within the scope of science, the concept of an atom does have meaning, or we wouldnt be able to make sense of scientific theories.

Within a LARGER scope, it could be meaningless or not, depending on your metaphysical position, which ultimately can be no more than belief. Within the scope of science, the concept of an atom does have meaning, or we wouldnt be able to make sense of scientific theories. — ernestm

It's quite true that an atom makes sense in chemistry and physics. That has nothing to do with "material," which is meaningless. It used to have a meaning in science, in Newton's day, in terms of the mechanical philosophy, as "body," -- but that was abandoned long ago.

So to say

...such words refer to a scientific model to explain the observed material world, and not the material world itself. — ernestm

really doesn't mean anything at all.

'Material reality' refers to 'the physical world' in philosophy, for example, 'dialectical materialism.'

"Physical," "material," "body," etc., are honorific terms. They used to have a technical notion within mechanical philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries. They no longer do. Thus, "material world," "material reality," "physical world," etc., is completely meaningless. As is the mind/body "problem."

What "stuff" would that be? Atoms? — Xtrix

Fields, subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, cells, tissue, organs, brain activity, people, societies, cultures, ecologies, environments, planets, solar systems, galaxies, superclusters, filaments, universe, maybe multiverse. <= great chain of being

Ultimately, a bunch of quantum-gravity stuff forming complex, decohered patterns with some consciousness sprinkled in for good measure.

So literally everything? Fine. Good observation.

I would say we’re beings among other beings. “Stuff” is misleading.

The thing is quite a few members on here are ordinary language philosophy fans, and not great fans of metaphysics, so discussing the usage of words is important to them, since they're convinced philosophy goes wrong with a misuse of language, particularly when it comes to ontology.

I think we experience the world as if there is a subjective/objective divide, but the ontological situation is unclear, because we don't know the nature of consciousness. However, we're made of the same stuff as everything else, so I tend to think it's an epistemological divide. — Marchesk

I agree with you that the subject-object divide is not ontological, but epistemological. I think this is the confusion that Wayfarer describes in the ‘common language’ use of these terms - especially in relation to what is not an ‘object’. And I also agree with you that arguments about the ‘correct’ use of language are frequent here, both in ontological and epistemological discussions - particularly in discussions that bring these two together. I think when we attempt to define the ‘real world’ as it is and as we understand it - especially when we seek to deconstruct this subject-object divide - we venture onto ontological/epistemological ‘common’ ground, and are tempted to find ‘common language’ or dictionary definitions for support, despite the errors in understanding.

FWIW, I see ‘subject’ and ‘object’ as relative epistemological concepts that allow for a form of panpsychism. I certainly don’t see it ONLY in terms of human beings as subject and the world as object - that’s just where we start to understand the world. For me, there is something it is like to be a carbon atom (but not a rock), quantum information theory makes intuitive sense to me, and Ball’s variation on the twenty questions game (late in the video you posted) most beautifully describes for me the nature of our unfolding universe.

I would say we’re beings among other beings. “Stuff” is misleading. — Xtrix

It's not misleading since science is very successful in telling us what that stuff is. Granted, it's a bit murky once you get to fundamental physics, but we know the bigger stuff is made up out of that smaller stuff physicists call particles and fields.

Science is successful at telling us that this “stuff” is galaxies, cells, brain activity? Or is “stuff” now something else?

Science is successful in telling us all that stuff. But there's still plenty left unexplained like consciousness, causality, the right interpretation of quantum mechanics, and whether we should think of the world as being divided up into subjects and objects.

Science is successful in telling us all that stuff. — Marchesk

Science is successful in telling us stuff about stuff, and by stuff we mean everything.

So science is good at telling us that everything is everything. That galaxies and brain waves etc exist.

I’m getting bored.

I’m getting bored. — Xtrix

What is that you want from an ontological discussion? I think science helps informs us on what exists and what that stuff is made up of, at least down to a certain point. But it leaves unanswered other questions, like whether objects can have parts or whether math or information are at the bottom of it all.

I would say we’re beings among other beings. “Stuff” is misleading. — Xtrix

Okay, then what problem do you have with my modern update of the great chain of being, from the very small to the universe? Is there a problem with how science categorizes the different "beings", since you prefer that over "objects" or "stuff"?

I don't really see what the issue is with any of those terms, other than they're sufficiently vague enough to encompass everything, if one wishes to do so.

Substance dualism? On your view, how do Popper and Kuhn presuppose it?
— Andrew M

Because while they may not themselves explicitly refer to the res cogitans or the res extensa, they both discuss knowledge and theory from the subject/object formulation. — Xtrix

Can you be more specific? How does falsifiability and paradigm shift, for example, imply a subject/object dualism?

But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies.
— Andrew M

In psychology, particularly in studies of perception. It permeates the philosophy of language (Quine's "Word and Object"), cognitive sciences, etc. This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples. — Xtrix

Fair enough - I agree that dualism has had a significant influence in those areas. But my impression was that it is also commonly thought to be a mistaken view. See, for example, Dennett's Cartesian Theater criticism.

I would note that Quine opposed mind/body dualism. As did the ordinary language philosophers, particularly Gilbert Ryle (in his book The Concept of Mind).

My main area of scientific interest is physics and I'm not aware of any examples there, with the possible exception of the "consciousness causes collapse" interpretation of quantum mechanics. However that interpretation is more of historical interest these days, popular misconceptions notwithstanding.

ir enough - I agree that dualism has had a significant influence in those areas. But my impression was that it is also commonly thought to be a mistaken view. See, for example, Dennett's Cartesian Theater criticism. — Andrew M

I’m not sure about mistaken, but simply one formulation which happens to be the most dominant in the west.

Can you be more specific? How does falsifiability and paradigm shift, for example, imply a subject/object dualism? — Andrew M

Both deal with scientific theories, and a knowing subject is thus assumed.

And again, I’m not necessarily talking about mind/body dualism. I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object).

I think the duality is mostly the result of confusion. Try to define "object". Now try to define "subject". I find that I can't actually find a difference between them. They both seem to be words that we invoke to point to a certain actor. Subject has the connotation that said actor is conscious/ has a mental life, while object doesn't have that connotation. That's really the only difference I can think of.

Science is still a human enterprise, and looks at the cosmos through the human perspective, even if it is highly abstracted and methodologically rigourous. — Wayfarer

That science is a human enterprise conducted from a human perspective is entirely consistent with naturalism. The "view from nowhere" is just how a dualist sees naturalism. The dualist thinks that if the ghost is dispensed with, then so is the human viewpoint. (I would add that one can be a materialist yet still presuppose dualism, which is the machine option you note below.)

But both 'ghost' and 'machine' are abstractions or intellectual models; organisms are not machines, and the mind is not a ghost. But having developed that model, or is it metaphor, then scientifically-inclined philosophers sought to eliminate the ghost, leaving only the machine, which is just the kind of thing that lends itself to study and improvement. — Wayfarer

Which still presupposes the dualist framing (with one half eliminated). Naturalism, properly understood, rejects both the ghost and the machine. As an example, think of Aristotle's naturalism which included purpose, ethics, mathematics, and so on.

The way I approach a definition of 'mind' is 'that which grasps meaning'. But mind itself always eludes objective analysis, as it not objectively existent. — Wayfarer

The trick is to avoid reifying abstractions. We can wonder whether Donald Trump has lost his mind. We shouldn't also wonder whether he left it on the kitchen bench next to his car keys.

As Gilbert Ryle put it, "Descartes left as one of his main philosophical legacies a myth which continues to distort the continental geography of the subject. A myth is, of course, not a fairy story. It is the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another. To explode a myth is accordingly not to deny the facts but to re-allocate them."

:up: :ok:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5838/essay-number-one-perceptions-of-experience-and-experiences-of-perception

I’m talking more about Kant’s variation- that we as subjects have representations of the outside world (the phenomenon, the object). — Xtrix

That’s mistaken I believe. The ‘phenomenon’ is all there is for us - as opposed to the negative sense of noumenon. He is explicit enough about that I felt? It is a little confusing as we’re stuck with imprecise wording and ‘represent’ strongly suggesting ‘representing something’ where Kant meant more or less that ‘representing IS thing, not of some unreachable something’.

How about turning to neuroscience for how the weltenschauung is formed? We have a basic neurological make-up involving Afferent and Efferent pathways (sensory and motor/input and output), and embedded within this basic structure we have interneurons communicating. In this sense if we’re to try and place the ‘quality’ of the terms ‘subject’ or ‘object’ into play then how do we do so here?

In the simplest sense we likely parcel up afferent and efferent as ‘subject’ directed and the interneurons as ‘object’ directed.

If we’re going to completely remove physicalism from play then we’re kind of adrift. In terms of ‘being’ what is thought of ‘has being’, meaning a unicorn ‘is’. Often people get confused about ‘nothing’ too, yet ‘nothing’ is more or less what Kant was pointing toward in terms of ‘positive noumenon’ - which, ironically, is immediately only ever ‘negative noumenon’ (known as a limiting factor rather than as a ‘beyond’ factor: somewhat equivalent to ‘horizons’ in the phenomenological sense).

If you’re only interested in some illusionary ‘pure’ ontological perspective, then I am at a loss as to how you expect to approach such an issue as wholly separate from the epistemic condition we’re ‘surrounded’ by. The divisions of interest regarding ‘epistemology’ and ‘ontology’ are convenient delineations (just as ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are), but if we’re to untangle the use of making an object or subject distinction then we cannot, in any reasonable sense that I can see, hold strictly to the ‘ontic’ by framing it as redundant of any sense of an epistemic question.

Personally it’s obvious enough to me that the ‘objective’ is due to ‘intersubjectivity’ - if there was a permanent universal distinction between these ‘views’ that was perceivable then I don’t see how we’d perceive them at all - simply because two universal terms that meet wholly vanish into insignificance (what matters is what changes ‘in relation to’ so if there is no change in relation there is no ‘being’)*

*As an example of this if we all viewed the world as being of various tones of ‘yellow’ then we wouldn’t have any equivalent means of referring to ‘yellow’ other than to call it ‘light’ - it wouldn’t be a ‘tone’ as its absence would equate to no visual observation whatsoever. The only possible backdoor would be by way of some analogy of the limits of the human visual spectrum by referring to something like UV or IR in this hypothetical world fo ‘yellowness’.

That science is a human enterprise conducted from a human perspective is entirely consistent with naturalism. The "view from nowhere" is just how a dualist sees naturalism. — Andrew M

The view from nowhere exists because science has to abstract from human perceptual relativity to get at the way things are, and not just as they appear to us. Otherwise, we're left with ancient skepticism or some form of idealism.

I would note that Quine opposed mind/body dualism. As did the ordinary language philosophers, particularly Gilbert Ryle (in his book The Concept of Mind). — Andrew M

That's nice and all, but one still has to deal with intentionality, consciousness and epistemology.

Try to define "object". Now try to define "subject". I find that I can't actually find a difference between them. — khaled

Subject is the referent of any activity related to consciousness and/or subconscious.
Object is what is outside the subject.
Some (few) philosophers identify it, but the distinction is clear at the analytical level.