It seems that some sort of atemporal causation is required to cause time but this is not the same as our familiar temporal form of causation. — Devans99

As I said earlier, bringing in 'time' into this has simply muddied the water as this discussion is showing.

The issue is to do with causation, not time. There's event causation - that's the familiar kind in which one event causes another event. But we know - know - that not all causation can be of this kind. It has nothing to do with 'time', but everything to do with the impossibility of there being actual infinities.

If all causation is by events (whether prior or concurrent) then we would have to have an actual infinity of events.

There cannot be any actual infinities of anything.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances.

Not, note, by the object undergoing some change - that would be an event. No, 'directly'. The substance causes the event, not by means of another event, but 'directly'.

That argument establishes that there is substance causation and that such substances exist. Furthermore, as such substances cannot have been caused to exist by any prior event - for then the regress starts again - such substances must be self-existent. That is, they exist by their nature.

The only kind of object that exists by its very nature is a simple object.

Thus we can conclude that there exist some simple objects and that these simple objects are ultimately causally responsible for all else that exists.

Time doesn't come into it. We can get to that conclusion without invoking time.

But note that 'creating time' requires timeless causation - which is exactly what substance causation would be, given that it is 'events' that are essentially in time.

If God is a simple substance with the power of substance causation, then God can create time by 'substance causing' it to exist. As substance causation is not causation by an event - and it is events that are datable - this explains how God can create time.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances. — Bartricks

I'm not sure how you can cause something without it being an event.

Do you think God is some sort of Boltzmann Brain? That seems impossible, the particles forming him must have been put in motion by something. Leading to another first cause. Also, the environment must be fine tuned for a Boltzmann to exist and there is no possible fine tuner (unless you introduce another first cause).

The only kind of object that exists by its very nature is a simple object. — Bartricks

Maybe God is indivisible which I guess would meet your definition. Or he could be composed of parts that all exist timelessly and permantly. I am not sure which.

I'm not sure how you can cause something without it being an event. — Devans99

Then you can't run the first cause argument. If every event if caused by a prior event, then you get an infinity of events. And if you're fine with that, then you don't need God.

On the other hand, if you're not fine with that and think that there needs to be an initial cause of any chain of events, than that initial cause cannot be an event, but must be a thing.

Those who run the first cause argument typically identify that thing with God.

Then you can't run the first cause argument. If every event if caused by a prior event, then you get an infinity of events. And if you're fine with that, then you don't need God. — Bartricks

Not fine with that. An actual infinity of anything is impossible IMO.

On the other hand, if you're not fine with that and think that there needs to be an initial cause of any chain of events, than that initial cause cannot be an event, but must be a thing. — Bartricks

And the initial cause must be timeless. And I don't think it is true that something from beyond spacetime could fit into spacetime. Might be like trying to get a pint into a half pint pot.

Maybe God is indivisible which I guess would meet your definition. Or he could be composed of parts that all exist timelessly and permantly. I am not sure which. — Devans99

You're the one who brought God into this by identifying the first cause with God - and I questioned how you got to this conclusion.

There are a variety of ways of arriving at broadly the same or complimentary conclusions.

So, every event must have a cause. But not every event can have been caused by another event, for that leads to a regress. So, objects - substances - must be able to cause things too.

So, therefore there are some objects that cause things to occur without themselves having to have been caused to cause them.

Also, not everything that exists can have been brought into existence by something else, for once more that lands us with an actual infinity (this time of things, rather than of events).

So, therefore some things must exist by their nature.

And it clearly must be those things - the things that exist by their very nature - that are causally responsible for everything else. (Denying this once more sets one off on a regress).

So now we have established the existence of substance causation (and note, being able to understand it is not a condition of its existence - we know it exists, even if we can't understand 'how' it can). And we have also established the existence of some self-existent things.

Another argument that adds to this: anything that exists is made of something. But not everything can be made of more basic ingredients, for - once more - that sets us off on a regress. So, some things are made of themselves and nothing else. Those things are 'simples' - simple things.

Clearly simple things are self-existent, because there is nothing more basic from which they are made, and nothing more basic into which they can be destroyed.

So, there exist some simple things and they are self-existent and they have substance-caused everything else.

Such a simple thing can have caused time to exist, for time - if it has been caused to exist -must have been 'substance-caused' to exist, as event causation would require time already to be on the scene.

But if you want to show that God's existence is implied by all of this, then you need to go even further and show that a) there is only one simple substance of this kind and b) that it is a mind (and then show how the other attributes accrue to this agent).

To my mind you have not done these last tasks. You have not provided any reason to think the simple existences that must exist must in fact number 1 and no more. And you have not provided any reason to think that this one simple existence must be a mind. And then there are the other attributes - why would it be omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent?

And the initial cause must be timeless. — Devans99

No, if - if - time has been created, then its cause will be a substance, not an event. Why? Because events happen in time.

But it is simply false that the initial cause must be timeless - for as I've stressed above, what stops it from being in time upon creating it? Nothing. indeed, it is the reverse - its remaining outside of time despite having created it - that seems incomprehensible.

So I think this talk of 'timelessness' is unhelpful. That which causes time would not be 'outside' time prior to creating it, because there's nothing there for it to be outside of. And upon creating it, it would be in it, not out of it. So it's not helpful - it's confusing (despite the popularity of such talk).

I mean, imagine I dig a cave. Now, prior to digging the cave, was I 'outside of the cave'? No, the cave didn't exist. When I dug the cave was I outside of the cave? No, I was in it - my creating it put me in it.

So, every event must have a cause. — Bartricks

Why are you certain of this? Because that's the way the world works now?

So when something happens, you don't wonder what caused it?

It's a self-evident truth of reason that every event has a cause. It's why we have disciplines that look into the causes of things.

All dumb mechanical systems tend to equilibrium:

We were talking about the beginning, your statement is about ending. And in the meantime dumb mechanical systems tend to aggregate into things like this:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biology

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpetual_motion

Dear god! So first you confused big bang with the heath death of the universe, which you then confused with perpetual motion. Triple confusion, you win!!

Why is god fine-tuned to produce fine-tuned universe?

Tell me, if there is nothing - absolutely nothing - can anything come out of it? Can something come out of nothing?

And the reverse - can something that exists, cease to exist altogether? I mean, can it literally disappear?

I think the answers to those questions is obvious - as obvious as the answer to "does 2 + 1 = 3?" . The answers are 'no' and 'no'.

Something cannot come out of nothing. So if anything exists, some things exist with aseity. And those things that exist with aseity will never go out of existence.

Let me anticipate your answer: physicists say otherwise and what physicists say is true even though they're talking outside their areas of expertise when they say such things....but physics, yay!!

It's a self-evident truth of reason that every event has a cause — Bartricks

Hence, a thought you hold true must always be reflected in nature. Metaphysical actuality.

Hence, a thought you hold true must always be reflected in nature. Metaphysical actuality. — jgill

Er, no. But if my reason and the reason of others represents something to be the case, that is the best and only possible evidence we can ever have that it 'is' the case.

Now, my reason - and the reason of many, many others - represents it to be a truth of Reason that every event has a cause.

That's good evidence - and I stress, the best and only evidence we can ever have of anything - that every event has a cause.

You could simply deny that every event has a cause because you don't like the thesis in question (pehaps because accepting it would lead to conclusions you don't favour). But then you are deciding how things are with reality rather than following evidence, yes? You'd be guilty of following 'you' rather than following Reason - and what's the point in that?

Or you could try and find other equally or more self-evident apparent truths of Reason with which this one appears to conflict - that is what a philosopher would do. If you do that, I'll happily change my position.

I note too that you haven't answered my questions.

So, again: when something happens, do you wonder what caused it?

And again: can something come out of nothing?

Can something completely disappear?

Hi
It is so difficult to juggle between a demanding day job and a philosophical pursuit after work. I was up t 5am doing my research believe it or not :) and then off to work few hours later :( :( 

Going to back to your comments:

I do apologise I wasn’t initially clear about what you meant by ‘self-explanatory’ but I think I now understand what you mean. And I also agree with you that there is often a conflation between something existing necessarily and some necessary existent.

It is like saying ‘if every house has a foundation, and this is a house, then there exist a foundation necessarily’ which doesn’t mean ‘there is a necessary foundation that cannot fail but to exist’. So far I agree.

I confess I haven’t had much time to properly reflect on this topic as my research is about something else (fortunately all philosophy is in some related) but if we carry a line of enquiry, independent of what Avicenna had said, we may perhaps be able to reach the below. Before I start let me say I don’t claim to have conclusive answers and my hope is to outline some possible options and possible lines of enquiry in favour of yesterday’s argument.

Here we go:

The first premise is the key premise which we often take as uncontested and elf-evident. And that premise states ‘every event has a cause’ or that ‘every event is dependent on some other event to bring it about’ including the event of an object coming into being and the position/state of that object, the how it is and what it is.

This premise maybe contested and requires an enquiry of its own. But I take it that most of us are willing to accept as a truism and I take it to be so here for the sake of our argument.

But as a side note I would say that we associate the ‘coming into being of anything’ with some force or energy. If something, an event or an object, was to come into being it would need some force to bring it about, which also applies to force itself which means force itself (energy) cannot just come into being without some force to initiate it (whatever that could mean). In explaining the Big Bang it is suggested (as a part of one of physics unknowns) that energy seem to enter the universe accelerating its expansion. But that doesn’t mean energy is created from nothing as it also could mean that the energy is coming from an unknown system into a known system, from outside of our universe into our universe, it doesn’t mean it was created from nothing. Unless of course we circumvent all this and say energy is neither created nor destroyed which then gives us a candidate for some uncaused being, namely force or energy. As I said this is a much bigger discussion that needs a more in-depth enquiry and research and I might be conflating force with energy here.

So for the sake of argument let us start with the premise, calls it P1, that ‘every event has at least one cause’ and see which conclusions this gives us. I have added ‘at least one cause’ to open the possibility of multiple necessary existents.

Now, although we have accepted that every event has at least one cause, we haven’t however conceded that every cause is an event. This option is still on the table, and it wouldn’t contradict P1 if we were to establish the existence of some non-events which were uncaused. It wouldn’t contradict P1 because all that P1 implied was about events, not non-events.

Also what we so far have from yesterday’s comments, is that if every event has at least one cause then we will have an infinite causal chain.

We then took the chain to be a set of all things caused and called it the contingent set.
Following our own enquiry we can then ask if the set itself is contingent (dependent on one cause or more) or not.

Now, if we take the set of all things contingent as one event, for simplicity, we can then refer to P1 and deduce that it must have a cause. But if its cause is an event than it is itself contingent (dependent on a cause) and belongs to the set.

For the cause of the set not to be contingent we can say it could be a non-event sitting outside of the set which itself wasn’t caused (since it is not an event) which caused and brought about the set.

This we called the necessary existent by which we meant something non-contingent.
So far is the summary of what we said before.

The valid point you made earlier is that just because the existence of something is necessary it doesn’t mean it is some necessary existence.

What this means is that ‘even if the house demands the existence of some foundation it doesn’t some foundation exists such that it cannot fail to exist’. This means we can easily imagine a world without the house and hence without the foundation.

This much is true. But as a reply I think we can say the following:

Given that there is a house in this world we can then conclude that there necessary exists a foundation in this world.

Meaning; given there is a world of events, we can conclude that in this world there necessary exists some non-contingent being. In other words given there is a world of events it is necessary that such an entity exists.

This should not be confused with the statement that ‘this non-contingent being is in fact contingent on there being a world of events’. This would be some strange backward causation meaning the non-contingent being is caused by the events which itself caused. No, what we mean by “given there is a world of events” is that we have reason to conclude “it is necessary that such an entity exists” given the original premise P1.

Sure, in a world where there are no events such a non-contingent being can easily not exist, but all that this statement says is that where there is nothing then nothing brought it about, which is the same as saying in a no-world there are no necessary being/s. I say no-world because an eventless world could be argued to be an empty world and as such no world at all. For how else could we descriptively discern a world that doesn’t exist from a world that has nothing inside it including the very notion of ‘inside’. This means the notion of necessary being/s applies to worlds that exist and not to worlds that do not exist. And I think this is a somewhat acceptable point for an argument in favour of the existence of the necessary being.

Sure in maths we can have empty sets but some mathematical talks are just abstract and not applicable to the real world.
(Remember as I said earlier I don’t claim to have conclusive answers but I think what we have so far is some path for a possible argument in favour of an Avicenna type argument)

OK, so from what we have so far we need to move onto why this non-contingent being needs to be unique and one in number.

Yesterday we also agreed this this thing must be simple and non-composite, so at least one in nature if not yet agreed to be one in number. That was agreed so because if it had parts it would be contingent on its parts. We then arrived at a simple definition.

You then commented then whatever explains this thing, meaning however we explain it in itself (its definition), then we can explain another in the same way. In summary whatever definition we give to the non-contingent being it can have multiple instances where each is explained in the same way. (This is what I think you meant but I might have misunderstood you)

If my understanding is correct then what we can say as a possible response is the following:
If the descriptions of some beings are exactly the same and are completely indiscernible then they could be argued to be the same thing, same as in one in number. So an argument can be made that if multiple objects are ‘qualitatively and descriptively’ truly identical then they are numerically identical too. For there would be no way to discern one from the other, implying all we have is just one thing after all. If we don’t agree to this then what we are saying is that single and multiple are descriptively and qualitatively the same which is a contradiction, unless we are going to radically change the concepts of ‘single’ and ‘multiple’.

In quantum mechanics some elementary particles are believed to be identical such that they may even occupy the same space. But in these cases is not true that they are completely indiscernible, because these particles have different trajectories and come together from different positions and, more importantly, have some combined effect different than each separately (such as wave interference even though they are not interacting) all of which offer us some justification as to why we say we have multiple photons while they are co-occupying the same space. All this means they are not truly and completely indiscernible. Granted the phrase ‘occupying the same space’ doesn’t really apply to photons but I use it for a lack of a better notion. All that matters is that photons pass through one another ‘not interacting’ and during that moment they are indiscernible and all we have is some combined effect.

In the case of the non-contingent beings it could be argued that unlike photons they are outside of time and space which too belong to the set, and as such the non-contingent beings are truly and completely indiscernible which would mean they are just one and the same thing; numerically one.

Most of the above needs tidying up but hopefully it gives food for thought.

We then took the chain to be a set of all things caused and called it the contingent set. — Miles

Ah, I didn't do that - I didn't call it 'contingent' (that would be the point at which the conflation occurs - the conflation I was warning against). For we then have these troublesome and distracting notions of contingency and necessity getting in the way (or being used in ways that will confuse).

If every event has a cause - and we are taking that to be self-evidently true - then because there cannot be an actual infinity of events, we must conclude that some events are not caused by events, but by substances.

We do not need to talk about contingency and necessity to get to this conclusion. I have reached it without invoking those concepts. All that is needed is the self-evident truth that all events have a cause, the self-evident truth that there are some events, and the self-evident truth that there cannot be an actual infinity of anything. Those claims are sufficient to get us to the conclusion that some events are substance-caused, rather than event-caused.

Whether any particular substance that does the causing exists of necessity, or does the causing of necessity, is really neither here nor there, so far as I can tell anyway. For I do not have to claim that all 'continent' events require a cause - just all events - or that all substances that cause things exist of necessity (just 'exist' is sufficient).

This we called the necessary existent by which we meant something non-contingent.
So far is the summary of what we said before. — Miles

Like I say, I do not think that's true. These terms 'necessary' and 'contingent' have just appeared at a certain point - I did not introduce them - and they seem to be referring not to actual necessity and contingency, but to other things. So, what you are calling 'contingent' are 'events'. But 'contingent' doesn't mean 'events' or 'set of all events' or whatever. And what you are calling 'necessary' are the substances that exist and are the ultimate causes of all events. But that is a strange use of the word 'necessary'. So again, I think what's happening is that completely different notions are being conflated.

If there are events, those events have causes. It doesn't matter whether the events are occurring contingently or of necessity - the same applies either way.

And there are no actual infinities of anything, so if there are events then ultimately their causal chains must trace to instances of substance causation, not event causation.

Again, no mention of contingency or necessity - for what I have just said is true regardless of whether the events are occurring contingently or of necessity.

And the substances that are doing the causing exist. That follows, but what does not follow is that they exist necessarily.

Meaning; given there is a world of events, we can conclude that in this world there necessary exists some non-contingent being. In other words given there is a world of events it is necessary that such an entity exists. — Miles

That, I think, does not follow. Here's what follows given my assumptions (those being 'every event has a cause' and 'there is no actual infinity of anything'). Given there are events, we can conclude that in this world there are substance causes. That is, there are substances and some of these substances cause events. Whether these substances exist of necessity or not is not something we can conclude from this argument. You are, it seems to me, committing the very mistake you highlighted earlier. You are going from 'given X, Y must exist" to "Y exists of necessity". Given that there are events, substance-causes must exist. But it does not follow from this that the substances in question exist necessarily.

So, in my view all of these things can be established:

There are substance-causes
The substance causes are simple
The substance causes are self-explanatory.

But I do not think any of that entails that they exist of necessity.

This is a reply to the second half of your post as I thought my reply to the first part was perhaps getting too long.

Yesterday we also agreed this this thing must be simple and non-composite, so at least one in nature if not yet agreed to be one in number. That was agreed so because if it had parts it would be contingent on its parts. We then arrived at a simple definition. — Miles

Because I do not want my view conflated with similar-sounding but distinct views - views I would not defend - I must take issue with what you've just said.

My argument for the actual existence of simple things is not that complex things are contingent. I have not made such a claim.

My argument is this: anything that exists must be made of something. But nothing can have infinite ingredients. So, some things that exist must be made of themselves and nothing else. Those things will be simple things - for that's just what a simple thing is. A simple thing is something made of itself and nothing else.

Simple things will not be material things. For material things are extended in space and anything that is extended in space is divisible and is thus composite.

So, simple things are immaterial. That is, they lack extension.

I have arrived at these conclusions without mention of contingency. Everything I have said holds true even if the complex things exist of necessity. So contingency and necessity are not the issue.

The existence of a simple thing is self-explanatory. Why? Because once we truly appreciate that we are talking about a simple thing, it's existence is explained. For instance, we cannot ask "what brought it into being?" for this thing, being simple, is not made of anything and thus is not the kind of thing that can be constructed. And we cannot sensibly ask "why does it continue to exist?" for again, being simple, there is nothing into which it can be deconstructed.

Thus, the nature of simple things explains their existence at least in so far as continuing to ask about their existence does no more than betoken a lack of understanding on the part of the questioner.

It is a short step from here to the conclusion that the substances that exist and are causally responsible for all else must be among these simple things. For the substances that exist and are causally responsible for all else clearly cannot themselves have been created, for that would set us off on the very regress that positing them was meant to stop. So, the substances that exist and are causally responsible for all else are uncreated things.

Well, the uncreated things are the simple things. For it is simple things alone whose existence is self-explanatory, and thus simple things alone that do not raise the question "what caused it to exist?"

Simple things exist. And simple things - some of them, anyway - are causally responsible for the existence of all else.

Thanks for the reply at this late hour. I must say at first glance I cannot see where you are substantially disagreeing with me apart from a couple of points which I address below:

The use of contingency and necessary is the following: contingent just means dependent on a causes/s. Necessary comes in because a set of an ‘actual’ caused event makes it necessary that some non-event/s caused them. Not that it is a necessary non-event (which is the conflation I eluded to earlier). But given we have an actual set of caused event it followed they were causes by some non-event/s. necessarily. No other option about because we have the set of caused things that demands such a being.

Put differently; you cannot both confirm that ‘if we have a house, we will have a foundation’ and deny ‘we have a house therefore we necessarily have a foundation’. This as I said doesn’t say ‘we have a necessary foundation’. It just says given we have a house, and given our own claim that all houses have a foundation, then we cannot fail but to have a foundation.

I agree with you, we can drop the notions of contingency and necessary and just talk about caused and un-caused, but then something goes missing when we want to say ‘now given we have a house it means we necessarily have a foundation’. Whether you like the terms or not, talk of necessity means given the world of events means we ‘cannot fail’ but to have a non-event causing it, meaning it is necessary that this is to in this world. Now, you can switch ‘necessary’ with ‘cannot fail’, I have no issue with that but both mean the same thing. You pick.

Then to say ‘some substances’ meaning multiple just begs the question as we have outlined a possible argument why it needs to be one in number and not multiples.

There are certain possible objections to the argument I have presented and I don’t think it is valid, but not as you stated them above.

The use of contingency and necessary is the following: contingent just means dependent on a causes/s — Miles

I think, perhaps, we are just using these terms differently. I would not use 'contingent' to mean that, for that rules out the possibility of deterministic causation. In a deterministic universe every event that occurs is necessary, yet it's occurrence depends on causes.

I would not talk of caused and uncaused, but of 'event-caused' and 'substance-caused'. Event causation can be indeterministic or deterministic, and I take it that the same would be true of substance causation too. Hence why I think it just confuses matters to keep talking of contingency and necessity.

So, the first-cause argument establishes not the existence of some 'necessary' existent, but the existence of a substance-cause or causes.

Whether you like the terms or not, talk of necessity means given the world of events means we ‘cannot fail’ but to have a non-event causing it, meaning it is necessary that this is to in this world. Now, you can switch ‘necessary’ with ‘cannot fail’, I have no issue with that but both mean the same thing. You pick. — Miles

I suggest we drop all talk of necessity and its cognates, just to see if that's (ahem) possible. Obviously I am guilty of sometimes using such terms for convenience, but as I don't think anything - anything at all - is necessary (a view I hold tentatively and will drop at a moment's notice if it becomes incoherent), let's just say that something 'is' the case, rather than 'must' be.

So, if I am being tediously accurate, I would not that every event 'must' have a cause, but that every event 'does' have a cause. And I would say not that if events exist, some substance causes 'must' exist, but that if events exist, then some substance causes 'do' exist, and so on. Whether it is possible to talk this way throughout, I am not sure. But it seems to me to be an interesting experiment.

I do agree with you that these terms are toxic.

My main point however is that it is unavoidable to say ‘there must be’. As I said before if we agree all houses have foundations, and then also agree we do in fact and actually have a house, then it follows, unavoidably, that there must be a foundation. It is working the problem backward.

Basically what we are saying is that ‘given we have some current conditions, and given these conditions depend on an X then it means we must have an X since our current conditions demands it’. It doesn’t mean the X is some necessary being that would exist even if conditions where different, which would the conflation you and I agree on. Which would be equal to saying ‘we don’t have a house but must have a foundation’. This is not what we are saying.

And I do appreciate you reaching some of the conclusions, such as simplicity, in your own way rather than echoing other people’s views. I applaud that and this is how it actually should be.

These debated are very enjoyable and helpful to me. I hope to you and others too.
Speak soon

The issue is to do with causation, not time. There's event causation - that's the familiar kind in which one event causes another event. But we know - know - that not all causation can be of this kind. It has nothing to do with 'time', but everything to do with the impossibility of there being actual infinities.

If all causation is by events (whether prior or concurrent) then we would have to have an actual infinity of events.

There cannot be any actual infinities of anything.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances.

Not, note, by the object undergoing some change - that would be an event. No, 'directly'. The substance causes the event, not by means of another event, but 'directly'.

That argument establishes that there is substance causation and that such substances exist. Furthermore, as such substances cannot have been caused to exist by any prior event - for then the regress starts again - such substances must be self-existent. That is, they exist by their nature.

The only kind of object that exists by its very nature is a simple object.

Thus we can conclude that there exist some simple objects and that these simple objects are ultimately causally responsible for all else that exists.

Time doesn't come into it. We can get to that conclusion without invoking time.

But note that 'creating time' requires timeless causation - which is exactly what substance causation would be, given that it is 'events' that are essentially in time.

If God is a simple substance with the power of substance causation, then God can create time by 'substance causing' it to exist. As substance causation is not causation by an event - and it is events that are datable - this explains how God can create time. — Bartricks

I agree we should take phenomenological views out of the matter, because what everyone is stating is metaphysical. Another thing, let's clean up the semantics and terminology. The main standpoints that everyone is taking is too vague to be effective. t.

Immanence- Are the causal relata immanent, or transcendent? That is, are they concrete and located in spacetime, or abstract and non-spatiotemporal?

This question is connected to the question of category. If the relata are transcendent, then they are facts. If they are immanent, then they are events, or one of the other candidates such as features, tropes, or situations.

In practice, one finds two main arguments on the question of immanence. First, there is the argument from pushing, which maintains that the relata must be immanent so as to push things around. Second, there is the argument from absences, which maintains that the relata must be transcendent so that absences can figure in causal relations.

Pushing: The main argument for immanence is that only immanent entities can interact. This argument is nicely summarized by one of its opponents, Bennett: “Some people have objected that facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world, which makes it categorically wrong for the role of a puller and shover and twister and bender.” (1988, p. 22; see also Hausman 1998) According to the pushing argument, only concrete spatiotemporal entities can be causes and effects.

Therefore, not all causation is by events. Some of what is caused to occur must be caused to occur not by any event, but by objects - substances. — Bartricks

These substances that youre talking about have anything to do with, the gaps in cause and effect possibilties?
Absences: The main argument for transcendence is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Absences are said to be transcendent entities. They are nothings, non-occurrences, and hence are not in the world. Thus Mellor says, “For the ‘C’ and ‘E’ in a true causal ‘E because C’ need not assert the existence of particulars. They may deny it… They are negative existential statements, made true by the non-existence of such particulars,… Here Mellor is arguing that, in the case where rock-climbing Don does not die because he does not fall, Don's non-falling and non-dying are causally related, without there being any events or other immanent entities to relate.

And again: can something come out of nothing? — Bartricks

I would guess not, but I am not certain. Zen has quite a bit to say about no-thingness.

It's a self-evident truth of reason that every event has a cause.

And again: can something come out of nothing?

Truth is logical, semantical and mathematical, while empirical observations only have statistical certainty. Just because we have not seen it doesn’t prove it can not be, otherwise not so many people would still believe in gods.

Things materializing from another dimension that is normally not part of our universe would appear to come out of nothing, for no reason and without a cause. On the other hand, to exit out of time is to exist never and to be unable to act, which is not only not observed, it is semantic self-contradiction and fallacy in itself to begin with.

Immanence- Are the causal relata immanent, or transcendent? That is, are they concrete and located in spacetime, or abstract and non-spatiotemporal? — BrandonMcDade

1. Assume that a substance has existed forever in spacetime
2. Then it has no temporal start point
3. If it has no temporal start point, it has no temporal start point + 1
4. If it has no temporal point n, it has no temporal point n+1
5. So it does not exist
6. So nothing can exist forever in spacetime
7. So God cannot be immanent within spacetime.

It is not only not observed, it is semantic self-contradiction, fallacy in itself to begin with. — Zelebg

Just because we only have experience of existence within time, does not mean that atemporal existence is impossible, it is just something that we are not familiar with.

Your logic circuit is malfunctioning. I repeat what I said, try to read it again.

And now to mathematically prove how something comes out of nothing!

0 = -x + x

This means two things, and it is actually not quite “something comes out of nothing”. I’ll explain in a separate thread…

My main point however is that it is unavoidable to say ‘there must be’. As I said before if we agree all houses have foundations, and then also agree we do in fact and actually have a house, then it follows, unavoidably, that there must be a foundation. It is working the problem backward. — Miles

I do not think it is unavoidable - not at the moment - for we can just replace every 'must be' with 'is'. So, let's agree that all houses have foundations (not that they 'must', but just that they do), and also agree that what is in front of us is a house, then we conclude that this house has a foundation. Not that it 'must' but just that it 'does'. You say it 'must', I say it 'does' - but we both believe equally confidently that it has a foundation.

And rather than saying of this argument:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

that the conclusion 'must' be true if the premises are, we say instead that the conclusion 'is' true if the premises are.

So I think we can dispense with all talk of necessity with no real loss.

In light of this, I think my arguments show that the following is true (not that it 'must' be true, just that it is in fact true):

Substance-causation is a reality. Some simple substances - at least one, but perhaps more - exist and are the ultimate cause or causes of all else.

Some simple substances exist. They have not been caused to exist, and they are going to continue to exist (conclusions we can reach by just reflecting on their natures). But we can resist adding that they 'must' exist and 'must' continue to exist.

I do not deny that we have apparent evidence of necessity - many of our rational intuitions represent some truths not just to be true, but necessarily to be true. My point is just that the 'necessarily' doesn't really add anything and we can dispense with it.

Another thing, let's clean up the semantics and terminology. The main standpoints that everyone is taking is too vague to be effective. — BrandonMcDade

I do not think that's true. My standpoint is not vague. Nor am I using excessive terminology or using it oddly.

By contrast, you are doing precisely this.

Immanence- Are the causal relata immanent, or transcendent? That is, are they concrete and located in spacetime, or abstract and non-spatiotemporal? — BrandonMcDade

What are the words 'immanent' and 'transcendent' adding apart from confusion? Also you seem to be confused. I use the term 'material' to refer to an object that is extended in space, and 'immaterial' to refer to an object that is not. But immaterial objects are - or can be - as concrete as any other. Indeed, if anything it is material objects whose concreteness is questionable.

My mind, for instance, appears to be an immaterial object, for it seems to make no sense to wonder what shape, size or colour it has, and my reason represents my mind to be something that is not divisible (which it would not be if it was extended in space). So, my mind gives every appearance of being immaterial. Yet it is as 'concrete' as you like, for it exists with total certainty.

In practice, one finds two main arguments on the question of immanence. First, there is the argument from pushing, which maintains that the relata must be immanent so as to push things around. Second, there is the argument from absences, which maintains that the relata must be transcendent so that absences can figure in causal relations. — BrandonMcDade

And again, how is this making matters clearer? It is an odd way of expressing a familiar argument - the argument from first causes.

Events have causes. But if all events have events as their causes, then there is an actual infinity of events. But there is no actual infinity of events. Therefore, not all events have events as their causes. Some events are caused by substances - that is, by objects.

In this simple way we arrive at the conclusion that there are objects that cause events - and are the ultimate causal originators of any and all causal chains.

Note, no mention was made of materiality or immateriality. The same argument could be run whether one is a materialist or immaterialist.

Obviously I think that materialism ultimately does not survive Reason's cold hard stare, but the first-cause argument does not presuppose materialism or immaterialism as its premises are compatible with both.

These substances that youre talking about have anything to do with, the gaps in cause and effect possibilties? — BrandonMcDade

I do not know what you mean. By a 'substance' I just mean a thing - something that has properties. But I don't know what you mean by 'gaps in cause and effect possibilities'.

My arguments are what they are and I have 5.

The first - a version of the first-cause argument - notes that events have causes. So, if there is an event, then that event has a cause.

Events themselves seem to cause other events. However, not all events can have other events as their cause, for that would set us off on an infinite regress.

Conclusion: some events are caused by substances - by objects - rather than by events involving objects.

The second - which I suppose we might call the mereological argument - notes that things that exist are composed of something. However, if everything that exists is composed of things simpler than itself - that is, if everything that exists has more than one ingredient - then we will be off on an infinite regress of ingredients. Thus, it would seem that some things that exist must be composed of nothing simpler than themselves - that is, they must have no ingredients, but are simple things lacking parts.

The third explores the implications of the second. We know from the second that some substances - some objects - are simple. But material objects are divisible and thus not simple. Thus, the simple objects whose existence the second argument has established, are immaterial objects.

The fourth, like the third above, also explores the implications of the second. Because simple objects have no parts, there is nothing from which they can be created, and nothing into which they can be deconstructed. Thus, a simple object is not the kind of thing that has been created, nor is it the kind of thing that is destructible.

The fifth unifies these arguments. We know that causal chains terminate with substances - that is, the first cause of any and all causal chains is a substance, not an event. These substances are not themselves caused to exist, for that would restart the regress they were invoked to stop. Thus, these substances are self-existent - that is, they have not been created, but exist by their nature. We know from arguments 2, 3 and 4 what these self-existence substances are. They are the simple, immaterial things from which all else is constructed. For nothing else fills the role the first argument created.