Are noumena part of space and time or not? If not, and they differ from things in themselves, then what are they (is it)? Saying noumena "mark the limit" just isn't clear to me. — Xtrix
What exactly is "gotten rid of" when the subject goes away? In that case, why not just say the thing in itself goes away too? Who's to say? — Xtrix
"The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility." (B311) — StreetlightX
"Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process of warning the latter that it must not presume to claim applicability to things-in-themselves but only to appearances" (A288, my bolding). There could hardly be a clearer distinction between the remit of noumena and the thing-in-itself than in this passage. — StreetlightX
So they're both "ideas"? This seems so riddled with confusion I really don't know how to respond. But if it makes sense to you, you're a smarter guy than me. — Xtrix
Which follows from that fact that the thing-in-itself, as I keep saying, is not defined by it's relation to the subject, as the noumenon is. — StreetlightX
Your argument in general is somewhat odd: it's true that both share a certain 'quality' (that of not being subject to space and time), but this alone cannot say anything as to their idenity. Two apples may be green, but that does not make them the same apple. — StreetlightX
Things we think aren't phenomena? "God" and "soul" and the "Universe" are not phenomena or knowledge? Than how can you speak about them at all? — Xtrix
I probably didn't explain it that simply after all. The way I understand it is that 'noumenon' is an idea of a limit beyond which sensory experience cannot go. A limit is itself an idea or at least a conceptual 'object' so 'noumenon' is in that sense an idea of an idea. — Janus
'Thing in itself' is an idea of an actuality which is totally independent of (and not merely a limit to) sensory experience and any and all human knowledge and understanding. — Janus
Similarly we talk about rivers of honey or flying horses. Mixing concepts or using meaningful words in wrong contexts where they mean nothing. — David Mo
though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; — Xtrix
Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. Things-in-themselves are unknown to us. — Mww
That's an interesting statement in the context of this thread. The relevant question is whether it points to a subject/object duality or to an underlying symmetry. That is the measurement problem. — Andrew M
One might say: noumena are things-in-themselves under the aspect of the transcendental subject. However, get rid of the transcendental subject, and one similarly 'gets rid' of noumena - but not things-in-themselves, which are subject-independant. — StreetlightX
If both are unknowable, how can we differentiate? — Xtrix
OK, but that's all phenomena as well, in my view. It's all experience — Xtrix
By their respective relation to the subject! I keep repeating this - in fact it was the first thing I said here: noumena are the limit of sensibility. They are only defined in relation to our capacity for knowledge. Things-in-themselves, by contrast, are defined by having no relation to our capacity for knowledge. The difference between not-X and not X. — StreetlightX
It's not true that numena are "only defined" by their relationship to knowledge. — David Mo
"The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, — StreetlightX
If the sensitivity disappears, the concept of the thing itself also disappears — David Mo
This makes of Kant an idealist in the Berkeleyian sense, — StreetlightX
You keep confusing the concept of noumenon or thing in itself with the existence of things. — David Mo
You keep stringing the two together without argument. — StreetlightX
but you ignore them. — David Mo
Not at all. I've repeatedly acknowledged that noumena can be understood as things-in-themselves. Only that the converse does not hold in all cases. — StreetlightX
Can you quote Kant to demonstrate that distinction? — David Mo
The second they (stimuli) hit the sense organs, they become representations to us, unless you argue that what effects us from "outside" corresponds exactly to what we sense, perceive, etc. That's fine, but it's not Kant. — Xtrix
So how are representations created? By the brain and nervous system on the "occasion of sense," through our cognitive faculty. — Xtrix
Saying we can't create representations "outside of us" is not true -- there's all kinds of things outside me: trees, books, rivers, anything at all. — Xtrix
Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves. — Xtrix
I think this stems from the above and not using sensation and perception in the same way I am. Again, I consider them phenomena, and by phenomena I mean literally anything experienceable. — Xtrix
I don't see how "things" and "representations" are different. — Xtrix
So whatever affects us certainly isn't empty to us -- it's any object at all, and not just trees and books but feelings, emotions, pains, thoughts, etc. — Xtrix
Imagining a pink unicorn is still an idea, yes? Imagination is an experience as well, bounded by our human limits. That's still part of phenomenology. — Xtrix
By their respective relation to the subject! — StreetlightX
I've run out of ways of saying the same thing. — StreetlightX
I have not understand what symmetry you refer. — David Mo
Anyway, Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg et alia thought that quantum mechanics posed a problem of subjectivity to science. — David Mo
Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory. — Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy
Bernard d'Espagnat (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_d%27Espagnat) devoted an article to the importance of Kant to understand quantum mechanics. — David Mo
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