The act is the sensation/seeing, the act cannot produce the cat that you see, only its presence in your visual field can. — jkop

I didn't say that the act of sensing is the cause of the cat.

You claimed that the cat is the cause of the sensation of the cat ("the present cat is the cause of sensing/seeing the cat"). I merely corrected you, by pointing out that the act of "sensing", is the cause of the sensation of a cat. The cat is not the cause of sensing nor seeing the cat. Rather, the living being which senses is the cause of this activity of sensing. Let's position the referred to activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being, not within the thing being sensed.

I merely corrected you, by pointing out that the act of "sensing", is the cause of the sensation of a cat. The cat is not the cause of sensing nor seeing the cat. Rather, the living being which senses is the cause of this activity of sensing. Let's position the referred to activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being, not within the thing being sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not correcting anyone by "positioning the referred" cat "to activity, seeing" within the sensing being, because then you'd neither refer nor see the cat, only your own activity of sensing (e.g. "data" or ideas or hallucinations of an invisible cat).

Our biology causates perceptual activity as the sense organs interact with physical force, radiation etc.. This activity is constituitive for seeing things, but it is the presence of a cat in your visual field which causes your biology to see a cat. The cat is what the perceptual activity is about when you see the cat.

Can things be the both a cause and an effect? Can they cause themselves? Seems incoherent. — dukkha

Seeming incoherences tend to arise from fallacies of ambiguity. For example, when using of the word 'see' in two different senses: for what constitutes seeing (perceptual activity), and for what you see (what the activity is about or directed towards). Unless the two are understood as different, then it may serm as if seeing would both be its cause and effect.

You're not correcting anyone by "positioning the referred" cat "to activity, seeing" within the sensing being, because then you'd neither refer nor see the cat, only your own activity of sensing (e.g. "data" or ideas or hallucinations of an invisible cat). — jkop

Can't you read? I'm not positioning the seen cat within the sensing being. I am positioning the sensation of the cat within the being, and saying that the cause of the sensation is the act of sensing. It is clearly not, as you claim, the cat which is the cause of the sensation.

Our biology causates perceptual activity as the sense organs interact with physical force, radiation etc.. This activity is constituitive for seeing things, but it is the presence of a cat in your visual field which causes your biology to see a cat. The cat is what the perceptual activity is about when you see the cat. — jkop

Then instead of addressing the correction which I made, to your mistaken proposition, you simply repeat it over again, using slightly different words ("...it is the presence of a cat in your visual field which causes your biology to see a cat"). Can't you see that you've already insisted on the possibility of hallucination, so you've already implied that it is possible to see a cat without the presence of a cat. Therefore it is impossible that the presence of a cat is the cause of seeing a cat.

And everyone responding seems to be nodding their heads, going, "Yup. Eye-beams."

What am I missing? — Real Gone Cat

Apparently my posts.

Hi TS,

Just returned to TPF for the first time since my last comment (the pesky real world got in the way this weekend).

Yes, you are fighting the good fight. But you do seem to be in the minority. I must say, that in my 50-something years, I have never experienced vision in the way suggested by the OP - nor do I know anyone who has.

Is it possible to see a cat if one has never been in your presence? It should be, if the mere act of sensing causes the sensation.

Yes, you might be able to imagine a cat if a mammal with whiskers and a propensity for fish were described - or you might accidentally imagine a walrus.

I'm not positioning the seen cat within the sensing being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet you wrote this:

... Let's position the referred to activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being, ... — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems fairly clear to me that you suggest to position the cat within the sensing being since we were talking about a cat that you see. Now if "the referred" does not mean the cat that you see, then what?

I think you'd agree that there is no cat within you when you see a cat but perceptual activity which enables you to see a cat when there is a cat to be seen in your visual field. You can't see your own perceptual activity at work when you see the cat.

I am positioning the sensation of the cat within the being, and saying that the cause of the sensation is the act of sensing. — Metaphysician Undercover

With respect to the OP which concerns the relation between sense organs and experience the location of the act of sensing is hardly an issue here. Obviously sensing is located within the one who's got the sense organs, not elsewhere (we're not discussing whether remote sensing is possible, are we?).

Is it possible to see a cat if one has never been in your presence? It should be, if the mere act of sensing causes the sensation. — Real Gone Cat

Why would you say that? A spark can only cause a fire if there is fuel. Cold temperatures can only cause ice if there is water. Sensing only causes the sensation of a cat when there is a cat. Your logic seems to be way off somewhere. Who knows where? Which premise allows you to say that if one has never sensed a cat without a cat present, then sensing cannot be the cause of the sensation. This is like saying that if a spark has never caused a fire without fuel, then a spark cannot be the cause of a fire.

You and jkop both seem to think that "to cause" means to create something from nothing. So that when I say the act of sensing causes the sensation of a cat, you think that this means that the act of sensing can create the sensation of a cat without a cat being present. Why do you think like this? We all know that "to cause", or "to create", is not to make something out of nothing, that is impossible. So if it is necessary that there is a cat present, in order for the act of sensing to cause the sensation of a cat, why does this produce a problem for you? How does this make the act of sensing not the cause of the sensation of the cat? If it is necessary for there to be fuel in order for the spark to cause a fire, how does this make the spark not the cause of the fire?

It seems fairly clear to me that you suggest to position the cat within the sensing being since we were talking about a cat that you see. — jkop

I said let's position the activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being. I am saying that seeing occurs within the sensing being. How in hell do you misconstrue this to think that I am saying let's position the cat within the sensing being?

Now if "the referred" does not mean the cat that you see, then what? — jkop

I said "the referred to activity", not the referred to thing. The referred to activity is the act of sensing.

With respect to the OP which concerns the relation between sense organs and experience the location of the act of sensing is hardly an issue here. Obviously sensing is located within the one who's got the sense organs, not elsewhere (we're not discussing whether remote sensing is possible, are we?). — jkop

OK, now we're getting somewhere. You've come around to agreeing with me that the act of sensing occurs within the being with the sense organs. Do you agree that the act of sensing is the cause of the sensation? If so, then why do you keep insisting that the object, the cat is the cause of the sensation?

The visual experience of seeing a cat is obviously caused by the presence of a cat in your visual field. Otherwise you'd be hallucinating. The biology of the being causes an activity by which things can be sensed but in which nothing is sensed, whereas the presence of the cat causes this activity to sense a cat. In this way the presence of the cat causes you to see the cat.

I find no counter argument to this in your posts (only stinking ad hominems).

Do you agree that the act of sensing is the cause of the sensation? If so, then why do you keep insisting that the object, the cat is the cause of the sensation? — Metaphysician Undercover

The visual experience of seeing a cat is obviously caused by the presence of a cat in your visual field. Otherwise you'd be hallucinating. The biology of the being causes an activity by which things can be sensed but in which nothing is sensed, whereas the presence of the cat causes this activity to sense a cat. In this way the presence of the cat causes you to see the cat. — jkop

From what I can read, Metaphysician Undiscover is saying something akin to "it's the ball hitting the window that caused the window to break" and jkop is saying something akin to "it's the boy kicking the ball that caused the window to break".

Ah, its the combination of sensing organs and cat that causes the cat to be observed. No observer and no cat, then no observation of a cat. I'm hip.

But when the cat is not present, the sensing organs are still sensing things - just not cats. It is the presence of the cat that causes the sensation to become that of sensing-a-cat rather than that of sensing-a-tree or sensing-a-cup. So to claim that sensing-a-cat is caused by the sense organs is not the usual way that the situation is understood.

Sensing is passive, not active. We do not get to choose what is in our visual field, other than by making gross decisions such as, "Do I walk into the living room where the cat lies?" Our sensations are dependent on what is present at the time - cat or no.

Pretty clear analogy, but... unlike the boy who must kick the ball to break the window the cat does not really act to produce the observer's visual experience of it. The cat's presence in the observer's visual field is not sufficient but it is necessary for having a visual experience of the cat. One could probably hallucinate it, but in hallucinations nothing is seen.

... the cat does not really act to produce the observer's visual experience of it. — jkop

I would amend that slightly. The cat does not cause the observer to have a visual experience, but it does cause the visual experience to be that of a cat. (See my comment just above this one.)

It is true that particular properties inherent in the observer at the time of observing (like color-blindness, as an extreme example) may direct what that observation is like, but it requires the cat to make the observation that of cat. Sensing is passive.

Here's how to reconcile them: Biological sense organs are nothing but a particular type of sense-perception.

That was easy.

The cat does not cause the observer to have a visual experience, but it does cause the visual experience to be that of a cat. — Real Gone Cat

I agree.

Sensing is passive. — Real Gone Cat

I would amend that slightly ;). Sensing is hardly passive but it is passively identifying what is sensed, for example, the cat.

Sensing is hardly passive ... — jkop

Given your exchange with MU, I am somewhat surprised by this.

Regarding vision, it seems reasonable to assert that sensing does not extend beyond the surface of the eye. We may make a similar argument for hearing, touch, et al. So in what way is sensing anything other than passive?

The notion that sensing is not passive is exactly what I object to in the OP - vision does not consist of eye-beams shooting out from the observer to interact with objects in the visual field.

Sensing is passive, not active. We do not get to choose what is in our visual field, other than by making gross decisions such as, "Do I walk into the living room where the cat lies?" Our sensations are dependent on what is present at the time - cat or no. — Real Gone Cat

This where you're wrong, sensing is not passive. There is an enormous quantity of activity occurring within the human body which constitutes sensing. Have you ever considered the activity required to touch something, or to taste something. Notice how some animals more primitive than human beings, but even babies as well, use taste as their primary sense for recognition.

Sensing is hardly passive but it is passively identifying what is sensed, for example, the cat. — jkop

I think this is a mistake though. You recognize, and admit that sensing is not passive, then you represent it as "passively identifying what is sensed". So this is a misrepresentation, you are taking something which is recognized as an activity, and representing it as something passive.

So to claim that sensing-a-cat is caused by the sense organs is not the usual way that the situation is understood. — Real Gone Cat

The "usual way that the situation is understood", is to fall for this misrepresentation claimed by jkop, to understand the activity of sensing as something passive (passively identifying). And so the "usual way" is a misunderstanding. It should be understood as actively identifying. To identify requires activity, it is not something passive.

Sensing is passive, not active. We do not get to choose what is in our visual field, other than by making gross decisions such as, "Do I walk into the living room where the cat lies?" Our sensations are dependent on what is present at the time - cat or no. — Real Gone Cat

Well we do make choices about where we look, and things like that, but that is not really relevant, because the activity of sensing is more of a non-voluntary activity. The question here is whether the internal activities of the sensing being, or the external things being sensed, are properly called the "cause of sensation". I think it's quite clear that the former is correct. Notice that it is impossible for the sensing being to sense if it were completely inactive, it would be dead, yet the sensing being can sense something which is inactive. So contrary to what jkop has claimed, the sensing being is necessarily active, yet the thing being sensed, like the chair across the room from me, may be completely passive.

From what I can read, Metaphysician Undiscover is saying something akin to "it's the ball hitting the window that caused the window to break" and jkop is saying something akin to "it's the boy kicking the ball that caused the window to break". — Michael

I don't think that's quite a fair analogy. There are three things at play here, the sensing being, the thing being sensed, and the sensation. So let's say that the boy is playing with the ball, the boy is the sensing being, and the ball is the thing being sensed. The sensation is the "play". Whatever it is that the boy is doing with the ball, whatever game he is playing, this is the sensation. So the boy is causing the game, or the "play", but the ball is a necessary part of the game. The game could not be carried out without the ball. Likewise, the sensing being is causing the sensation, through the act of sensing (playing), but there could not be an act of sensing without a thing being sensed (the ball being played with).

So in what way is sensing anything other than passive? — Real Gone Cat

It is an internal activity of the thing which is sensing. Therefore the thing which is doing the sensing, the sensing being, is necessarily active. However, the things which are being sensed, the objects lying around outside, are not necessarily active, they are passive.

What's active is what's constituitive for sensing: e.g. sense organs interacting with physical force, radiation, synaptic events in the brain etc. But sensing also involves a passive identification of what is sensed, for, as you say, "We do not get to choose what is in our visual field".

So it seems fairly clear that sensing is active in one use of the word but passive in another use.

Here's how to reconcile them: Biological sense organs are nothing but a particular type of sense-perception.

That was easy. — lambda

If you press on the side of your eye, your vision doubles. If you lose your eyes, you become blind, losing your tongue means you can't taste anything. If you lose all your sense organs/brain, then presumably you cease to have perceptions altogether and die. There's clearly something special about sense organs, that I don't think can simply be explained by saying that what clearly looks like a casual relationship between sense organs and perceptions is mere correlations of perceptions or coincidence. As in, it's just a correlation that one loses their taste perception after one loses their tongue, and there's no casual relationship between your tongue and your sense of taste. There's something deeper going on than that. I suppose I cannot prove this 100% though, but neither can we about a lot of things and yet we still believe it (eg, that I am talking to another conscious person through this forum).

... sensing is not passive. There is an enormous quantity of activity occurring within the human body which constitutes sensing. Have you ever considered the activity required to touch something, or to taste something. — Metaphysician Undercover

The action required to place one's sensing organs in better position to pick up incoming information (reaching out with the hand, bringing food to the mouth, etc.) can hardly be said to constitute active sensing. That is merely moving the sensing organs to to locations that are more likely to allow sensing to occur, but it is not the actual sensing.

Just because body activity occurs before sensing does not mean that sensing is active.

Yes, I can interact with the surrounding environment (picking up a cup, drinking the coffee inside, etc.), but this interaction is not the same as sensing the environment (feeling the smoothness of the cup, tasting the coffee). Sensing occurs at the sensing organs, not outside of them (as I interpreted the OP to be saying).

I can sit in quietly in my backyard and sense my surroundings - I feel the hardness of the chair, hear the birds in the trees, watch clouds drift by. What actions am I taking? What am I doing to the world?

OK, we can, in theory. separate the activity which is moving the body, from the activity which is the act of sensing.

I can sit in quietly in my backyard and sense my surroundings - I feel the hardness of the chair, hear the birds in the trees, watch clouds drift by. What actions am I taking? — Real Gone Cat

The activity of sensing is neurological, and by coincidence, the activity which moves the body is neurological as well. Are you sure that the proposed separation is tenable?

Hmm, I need to consider this a bit. My first reaction is that the neurological activity is in response to the incoming information, but I do not discount that the particulars of our bodies do effect our sensing (I have already cited color-blindness, for example).

Regardless, I still feel justified in asserting that the OP is flawed - sensing simply does not extend beyond the surface of the sensing organs.

Regardless, I still feel justified in asserting that the OP is flawed - sensing simply does not extend beyond the surface of the sensing organs. — Real Gone Cat

Well sure, we've gone beyond the mistakes of the op here, but is it really correct to say that sensing does not extend beyond the surface of the sensing organism? Isn't that exactly what sensing has evolved to do, allow us to make judgements about what is out there, beyond the surface of the sensing organism?

Consider seeing, aren't you seeing objects which are way out there? So sensing must in some way extend beyond the surface of the eye. Even if the sense organ only has access to what is right in immediate contact with it (whatever that might really mean), if we have ways of interpreting what is at the surface, which can tell us with a good degree of accuracy, what is way out there, how can you say that sensing does not extend beyond the surface? If we can consistently make correct judgements about what is way out there, through the use of sense alone, then obviously, sense must extend out there. Would you insist that you are not sensing these objects which you see way out there? I really think you are sensing distant things, and therefore it is quite obvious that sensing actually does extend beyond the surface of the sense organ. What about a bat's echolocation, isn't this clearly a case of sense extending beyond the surface of the sense organ? Why attempt to limit sensation in such an unnatural way?

I fully agree that there’s something special about mind-body correlations. There's definitely something 'deeper’ going on than mere coincidence. There must be a causal relationship behind mind-body correlations. But what is the nature of this causal relationship?

One thing that must be pointed out right from the outset is that causation must be ‘noumenal’, or imperceptible. And by restricting causation to that area of existence which is ‘noumenal’, we definitively rule out the possibility that human sense-organs are the cause of mind-body correlations since your own human sense-organs belong to that area of existence which is ‘phenomenal’, or perceptible. Something else, then, besides human sense-organs must be the cause of your mind-body correlations, but what? I think we can make several reasonable inferences about the attributes of this causal entity.

The causal entity must have the following attributes:

- Powerful (this causal entity must be of extraordinary power since it is creating and sustaining the entire perceivable world, which includes your mind-body correlations)

- Intelligent (this causal entity must be of extraordinary intelligence since it is creating and sustaining incredibly intricate and orderly perceivable relationships, including your mind-body correlations)

- Immutable (this causal entity must be unchanging since perceptions are constantly changing)

- Omnipresent (this causal entity must be omnipresent since it is causally present anywhere a perception exists and, on idealism, perceptions constitute the entire world)

- Spaceless (this causal entity must be non-spatial since space is an aspect of perception)

- Eternal (this causal entity must be eternal since it must exist outside the temporal succession of perceptions. It must also be eternal since it exists uncaused)

... I could carry on arguing for more attributes (like ontological simplicity) but I think you get the idea. We end up with a God-like entity who is the cause of experience (including the experiences that constitute mind-body correlations). Thus I conclude that the God of classical theism is cause of your mind-body correlations, not human sense-organs.

There’s really only two options here: You either have to claim your perceptions exist uncaused (which you yourself admit do not find plausible) or posit some God-like entity that causes perceptions.