Probably not. But Descartes set the stage for thinkers that came after him. See, for example, the passage from Magee's book on Schopenhauer that includes, "the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding". That is, the empirical world depends on its dual subject.
(Though note Wayfarer suggests that that passage might be misleading.) — Andrew M
Put differently, mind is an abstraction over a concrete particular, in this case a human being. — Andrew M
Consider the geocentrists whose a priori view was that Earth was the center of the universe and that the Sun moved across the sky. The heliocentrists replaced that with their own a priori view that it was the Earth that moved around the Sun. — Andrew M
Kant's a priori view was Euclidean. But Einstein replaced that with spacetime relativity. — Andrew M
yet appear to make sense by spitting out streams of words and pretending they have full control of them. — I like sushi
We don’t know what time is, what gravity is, nor what a bloody chair is. — I like sushi
Nor is the approach of Derrida much use here as he’d only mock the situation and ask ‘does existence exist?’ or some other flatulence. — I like sushi
For a writing to be a writing it must continue to "act" and to be readable even when what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because he is dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written "in his name. " One could repeat at this point the analysis outlined above this time with regard to the addressee. The situation of the writer and of the underwriter [du souscripteur: the signatory, trans. ] is, concerning the written text, basically the same as that of the reader. This essential drift [derive] bearing on writing as an iterative structure, cut off from all absolute responsibility, from consciousness as the ultimate authority, orphaned and separated at birth from the assistance of its father, is precisely what Plato condemns in the Phaedrus. If Plato's gesture is, as I believe, the philosophical movement par excellence, one can measure what is at stake here. — Derrida
but rather by training themselves to respond to stimulation (internal and external) with appropriate activity. Most of which, in humans uniquely, involves manipulation of, or preparation to manipulate, actual, external, symbols.
...What we mistakenly theorise as the presence of actual, internal ones. — bongo fury
Derrida is on par with Zizek in my view -- a completely incoherent waste of time. — Xtrix
According to the image of a template it can be assumed either that the world is chaotic in itself and only the template provides shapes or that the template matches some shapes that are independent of it. — David Mo
Use of the word "mind" is a convenient façon de parler (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). What it refers to is an integrated set of organism events which produce automatic and controlled acts (corporeal actions). — Galuchat
Somebody suggested that though there appears to be a multitude of electrons, there's really only one. — frank
On naturalism, there is no "reality of appearances". We're not trapped in Plato's cave. — Andrew M
Naturalism doesn't confer certainty. — Andrew M
The natural claim is that we can know things as they are (from our perspective as human beings). — Andrew M
[a quote about ]Schopenhauer that includes, "the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding". That is, the empirical world depends on its dual subject.
(Though note Wayfarer suggests that that passage might be misleading.) — Andrew M
I agree that we don't (exactly) know WTF we are talking about when we use words like chair or gravity or time. — jjAmEs
The ‘mind’ exists just as solidly as a ‘cat’ exists. The point is they are both referential - convenient and frugal - communications of shared experience. We know they are shared because we wouldn’t be able to ‘refer’ to them otherwise. The hard physicalistic position of ‘mind’ isn’t there but brain is, is a pointless stance. — I like sushi
Man, that’s a lot of templates. If there are an immeasurably large number of possible experiences, each one with its own template......where’d they all come from? — Mww
I do sometimes wonder if the very idea of templates originated with the Platonic forms. — Wayfarer
. But Plato thought of ideal molds for every single thing. A logical problem of infinite multiplication of forms. — David Mo
How does that account for mental arithmetic? — Wayfarer
1) Mind-body dualism is a non sequitur.
2) Human substance (being) is a unity having two properties (i.e., body and mind).
Could you say more?
Use of the word "mind" is a convenient façon de parler (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). — Galuchat
Talk of the mind, one might say, is merely a convenient facon de parler, a way of speaking about certain human faculties and their exercise. Of course that does not mean that people do not have minds of their own, which would be true only if they were pathologically indecisive. Nor does it mean that people are mindless, which would be true only if they were stupid or thoughtless. For a creature to have a mind is for it to have a distinctive range of capacities of intellect and will, in particular the conceptual powers of a language-user that make self-awareness and self-reflection possible. — Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - Bennett and Hacker
Put differently, mind is an abstraction over a concrete particular, in this case a human being.
— Andrew M
An electromagnetic dynamo is an abstraction. It's still a powerful thing. We smart humans can navigate these kinds of situations without straying into category errors. — frank
Consider the geocentrists whose a priori view was that Earth was the center of the universe and that the Sun moved across the sky. The heliocentrists replaced that with their own a priori view that it was the Earth that moved around the Sun.
— Andrew M
What is it about those views that make them a priori? — Mww
Even in Einstein, the observer in his own reference frame is in the Kantian view of Euclidean space and time. — Mww
On naturalism, there is no "reality of appearances". We're not trapped in Plato's cave.
— Andrew M
with the caveat that:
Naturalism doesn't confer certainty.
— Andrew M
The natural claim is that we can know things as they are (from our perspective as human beings).
— Andrew M
If we have to qualify it in this way, then does it really constitute 'knowing things as they are'? By conceding the perspectival nature of knowledge, you're more or less conceding Kant's point. — Wayfarer
And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, § 32
I'm wary of the use of the word 'creation' in this context. But thinking about it some more, it's close in meaning to what Andrei Linde says in the Closer to Truth interview that I linked to. Of course it seems obviously absurd when we think of it in terms of 'the world being in the mind' - but the problem is that when we're saying this, we're trying to envisage 'the world' and 'the mind' from the outside. There's the vast universe, the whole Earth is just a minute speck in relation to that. But we can't see it 'from the outside', we can't make an object of 'me knowing that'. It's a false perspective. — Wayfarer
the (contingently) prior background — Andrew M
An implication of the Kantian view is that two events that are simultaneous for one observer are simultaneous for all observers. — Andrew M
He's not saying that - but he's also questioning the (generally implicit) view that most of us have, that the world exists completely independently of our perception of it (as per scientific realism). — Wayfarer
If we see a straight stick partly submerged in water, we notice that it appears bent. This gives rise to the natural distinction between what something is (e.g., a straight stick) and how it appears under different conditions (e.g., the stick appears bent when partly submerged in water and it's possible to mistakenly think that the stick is bent). — Andrew M
There is only a problem if an object is defined in terms of outside/inside (thing-in-itself/appearance). If an object is instead defined in terms of what we observe (i.e., what we can ostensively point at) then we can know it as it is. Such as the stick from the above example. — Andrew M
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