So, sticking to meat-eating - well, 'I' did not create the meat industry or kill the animals whose meat is now on sale to me in shops. And I did not actively cultivate an appetite for meat. So, it is not my fault that animals are being reared and systematically killed for their meat. — Bartricks

Not your fault at all. But you can take actions to improve the well being of others. Are you obligated to?
Isn't that exactly the type of moral questions that people will simply have subjective opinions about? Personally, I would not condemn the meat eater as immoral. However, I do see something to admire in the vegetarian.

As to your dig that I'm "dug in".... Well, let's just say it's interesting psychologically when two parties won't budge on their positions, but one party thinks the not-budging only makes the other person seem stubborn. — Artemis

For sure. As far as I can tell, most of us are pretty "dug-in" on pretty much everything. I actually spend time trying to figure out how to not be "dug-in". As you can probably tell from some of our conversations (I think there was only 1 or 2 where we somewhat strongly disagreed), I usually fail. But now, I will hopefully at least remember not to blame the other person :grimace:

. If you think it is, then you simply have a crude position. — Bartricks

Ah, yes, well, I'm sure the beauty and clarity of some simple truths are lost on those who confuse refinement with the logical equivalent of a poorly twisted pretzel. :smirk:

I often feel the same way. I guess some stubbornness is warranted since you're otherwise just like a flag waving wherever the wind blows you. But complaining about the same steadfastness in other people is what makes little sense.

Just to be clear - your position is that doing X knowing that Y will be a consequence is the same as intended Y? And that the distinction - the well known distinction between intention and foresight that is at the heart of the doctrine of double effect and discussed ad nauseam in philosophy journals - is confused and has no moral relevance?
That's ridiculous.

doctrine of double effect and discussed ad nauseam in philosophy journals - is confused and has no moral relevance? — Bartricks

Having read much of the literature myself, I know that philosophers make a distinction between the concepts of intention and foresight... but if you actually read the literature yourself you really ought to be aware that the disentanglement of the theoretical categories of these things does not mean philosophers think that they are actually disentangled in actions.

But basic logic should have suggested to you that it hasn't been settled with the conclusion of "confused and of no moral relevance," because if so there would be no continued discussion "ad nauseam."

Furthermore, you'd know that philosophers distinguish even more than just "intention and foresight." They also include motive, which is much of what you're talking about, actually.

Just to be clear - your position is that doing X knowing that Y will be a consequence is the same as intended Y? — Bartricks

And, just to be clear, that kind of obvious scenario is not really up for debate with many philosophers. They're more worried about side-effects and probabilities.

But we'll see if you're up to the task of discussing the subject at that level of complexity... since you're being rude already about the basics *shrug*

Ha, 'complexity' indeed - no, I have pointed out repeatedly that buying meat in the supermarket is not equivalent to taking out a hit on a cow. That's obviously true and part of what explains why it is true is that, even if one foresees that a cow will die as a result, one is not acting with the intention that this occur.

Now, you've taken issue with that. But that's a clear case. The debate over the intention and foresight distinction is a debate over less clear cases - it is over how, more precisely, to draw the distinction, not because there isn't one there or because it isn't morally relevant (there are clear cases where it is), but because there are greyer cases.

but if you actually read the literature yourself — Artemis

Why do you think I have not read the literature? I think you haven't.

For instance, above I drew attention to a way of drawing the distinction - a consequence of an action is foreseen rather than intended when the agent could, in principle, hope that it not obtain. It's well known in the literature. Who came up with it?

Why do you think I have not read the literature? I think you haven't. — Bartricks

Because you're making false claims about the literature.

For instance, above I drew attention to a way of drawing the distinction - a consequence of an action is foreseen rather than intended when the agent could, in principle, hope that it not obtain. — Bartricks

.... right, that would be then taking into account probability, which is entirely different from knowing A->B. If the subject truly believes that B might plausibly not happen, whether or not their hope is justified, then foresight wouldn't apply, because clearly they lack the relevant foresight.

But if you know the result of buying meat is that more cows will be killed, then that is foresight, and you did intend it. Whether that was your motive or not.

Well, you are not very familiar with the literature are you?

I asked you a question that anyone familiar with the literature would know the answer to.

You didn't answer it. Owned.

You didn't answer it. Owned. — Bartricks

What are you? 12?

I'm just going to give you some literature of your own to peruse right here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/#misinterpretations

"First, it is a misinterpretation to claim that the principle of double effect shows that agents may permissibly bring about harmful effects provided that they are merely foreseen side effects of promoting a good end. Applications of double effect always presuppose that some kind of proportionality condition has been satisfied. Traditional formulations of the proportionality condition require that the value of promoting the good end outweigh the disvalue of the harmful side effect."

And then definitely moving on, because it is senseless to talk with someone acting out as juvenilely as you are, especially when can't even do your homework about your own position right.

What are you? 12? — Artemis

What are you? Dishonest, perhaps? I mean, you've said you're familiar with the literature. Yet you can't answer my simple question.

By 'familiar with the literature' did you mean that you've just read some stuff on the internet? Methinks you did.

Have you found the answer to the question yet?

Grow up, then get back to me.

ah, well as we're giving advice: don't be dishonest. Don't say you're familiar with the literature when you're not. Reading a Stanford Encyclopedia page does not make you familiar with the literature. It is 'about' the literature, but it is not the literature.

Also, don't assume you know more than your opponent (until it becomes apparent that you do, that is - so, you know, the opposite of what's happening between me and you).

Oh, and don't give advice, just argue.

Grow up, then get back to me.

Why would I get back to you when a) you don't know your stuff, b) you think you do know your stuff (thus providing another depressing example of the truth of the principle that 'the less they know, the less they know it') c) you don't let any of this prevent you from offering condescending advice.

Then grow up, period. :kiss:

You grow up.

:rofl:

Not your fault at all. But you can take actions to improve the well being of others. Are you obligated to?
Isn't that exactly the type of moral questions that people will simply have subjective opinions about? — ZhouBoTong

I do not know what a subjective opinion is (aren't all opinions subjective, in that they are made of subjective states?).

Do you mean that opinions about moral matters are opinions about subjective matters? In that case I agree - morality is made of the commands and values of a subject, Reason, and so is therefore subjective - but that seems beside the point, for there remains a fact of the matter about what we have obligations to do, a fact that the kind of reasoning I am engaging in is supposed to give us some insight into.

I agree that by boycotting meat one could make a difference - but then by staying hooked-up to Mat I could make a difference, but I do not seem to be obliged to hook up to Mat, especially given that Mat's situation is not my responsibility. Likewise, if it isn't my fault the meat industry exists, and isn't my fault if others take my desire for meat as inspiration to go and kill an animal so as to sell its meat to me, then I think I probably don't have an obligation to forego buying it.

I mean, imagine my enemy makes Mat ill in a way that would require me to give up all sweet products for life else Mat will die. Am I obliged to forego all sweet products for life so as to avert Mat's death? Surely not. Something about me has inspired my enemy to place Mat in a position where he needs me to change my diet in order to live, but that does not make me 'morally' responsible for Mat's position and so doesn't seem to generate any obligation for me to forego sweet products for life.

I often feel the same way. I guess some stubbornness is warranted since you're otherwise just like a flag waving wherever the wind blows you. But complaining about the same steadfastness in other people is what makes little sense. — Artemis

:up:

I do not know what a subjective opinion is (aren't all opinions subjective, in that they are made of subjective states?). — Bartricks

haha, yes. You are absolutely right. I think I was adding emphasis and didn't realize I was writing nonsense - my bad. But drop the word "subjective" and the point stands (even if you include subjective it makes sense...it is just stupidly and confusingly redundant).

but that seems beside the point, for there remains a fact of the matter about what we have obligations to do — Bartricks

Well I view "obligations" as only part of morality. What each individual "feels" to be right seems the most dominant aspect and this is as far from objective as anything. If I can take action to help, my morality suggests that I am better (more perfectly living up to moral ideals) if I do help. Obligation is only an initial concern (if I am obligated, I am bad for not doing it...but there can be things that we are not obligated to do that one could still view as a moral positive). No one is obligated to cure cancer...but if one could, surely they should (I understand this is a wholly subjective conclusion)?

I agree that by boycotting meat one could make a difference - but then by staying hooked-up to Mat I could make a difference, but I do not seem to be obliged to hook up to Mat, especially given that Mat's situation is not my responsibility. Likewise, if it isn't my fault the meat industry exists, and isn't my fault if others take my desire for meat as inspiration to go and kill an animal so as to sell its meat to me, then I think I probably don't have an obligation to forego buying it.

I mean, imagine my enemy makes Mat ill in a way that would require me to give up all sweet products for life else Mat will die. Am I obliged to forego all sweet products for life so as to avert Mat's death? Surely not. Something about me has inspired my enemy to place Mat in a position where he needs me to change my diet in order to live, but that does not make me 'morally' responsible for Mat's position and so doesn't seem to generate any obligation for me to forego sweet products for life. — Bartricks

This seems to be defending meat eaters from moral condemnation. I do NOT condemn the meat eater as morally wrong (as someone who does not believe in or understand objective morals - I see very few definite obligations). I simply admire the individual that forgoes on personal pleasures in the hopes of making the world a better place.