Yeah, I think I'm gonna fold my chair and go somewhere else now.

:up: :strong:

OK, but pragmatically I see no reason why a philosopher can't in principle answer a question purportedly exclusive to a therapist. And, I mean no disrespect to either or both professions. — Wallows

And there's also no reason why a philosopher can't bake a cake or lay a wall. Not sure what your point is.

Have you ever been to therapy, may I ask? — Wallows

No, why on earth would I go to therapy?

I would suggest that actual goodness is superior to theoretical goodness, in the sense that the purpose of goodness is exactly to be realized or enacted. So a practical ethic that realizes some good is superior to the practice of theoretical ethics. Exactly in this sense that Stoicism, yes it has many dimensions, but always the bottom line is that it guides personal development in a practical sense. — Pantagruel

It's possible to imagine the perfect car - inexpensive, fuel-efficient, low maintenance, etc - but until one can be constructed, thus felt, bought and driven, nobody will take you seriously. Practicality matters. This reminds me of Plato's world of forms. Supposedly these so-called forms are the perfect originals of which the physical world is just an imperfect image. If so then what we call theory, usually the perfect ideal original, becomes as valuable as original manuscripts to make practical copies of. The same applies to theoretical ethics and practical ethics. The latter is just a case of trying to fit the former within the limitations of the world as we know it which, because it is imperfect, renders practical ethics, not useless, but not completely satisfactory.

Yes, that's the gist. — Bartricks

I'm glad that we both see this. It's a great theme.

That was my point about how it is possible to be insane and a philosopher. — Bartricks

Excellent. I thought so but wanted to check. If we understand the philosopher as the pursuer of truth through reason against his own comfort and community if necessary, then indeed he can be seen as insane.

But Reason doesn't just talk about the truth, but also about how we ought to behave. — Bartricks

What do you make of the is/ought problem? Various 'great' philosophers have taken the position that reason just tells us what is, not what ought to be. As I see it, the 'ought' is where bias tends to manifest. I remember my early concept of the scientist/philosopher. He or she just coldly looked for patterns in reality. He or she could see what others couldn't or wouldn't because he or she resisted the all too human urge to tell reality what it should be.

Let's just focus on one of those bizarre assumptions that you insist I must make, namely that we "aren't essentially mythological as opposed to metaphysical beings". Now, what do you mean? Do you mean that I have to assume I exist? — Bartricks

No, it's nothing so silly as having to assume you exist. What I am talking about is the nature of language. In short, language is not like math. It's full of metaphor and ambiguity. To me the linguistic turn in philosophy was reason in its pursuit of truth looking into its method. Certain philosophers have hoped to purify language, to find a version of language where exact reasoning toward truth would remain possible. But I don't think they did or even can succeed.

Basically we can do it in math because we can formalize everything. Everything result can be checked with a computer, even if that result also has intuitive meaning for the mathematician. But metaphysics that wants to talk about human things like ethics and reason itself is stuck in language. We can come to some consensus in the fog and metaphor. But this fog, along with ethical/political bias, helps explain, it seems to me, why philosophy tends to be many, many philosophies that try to swallow and negate one another.

To use language is mostly like riding a bike. The words pour out of us. We are intelligible to one another because we live in the same 'form of life,' which can't be made completely explicit to build the kind of foundation metaphysics needs.

Heidegger constantly reminds us throughout Being and Time, the account of 'inauthentic' life of everyday anyone is not to be interpreted evaluatively or morally but rather ontologically. It is an a priori Existential of being human: "the anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action" (p. 2). Thonhauser writes: "To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right" (ibid.).
First of all and most of the time (Heidegger's zunächst und zumeist, BT 370), humans live following the social rules that they apprehend in some kind of mindless, non-explicit, anonymous manner. — link

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/from-conventionalism-to-social-authenticity-heideggers-anyone-and-contemporary-social-theory/

No one should take Heidegger on faith, but I think he makes a strong case on this issue. As does Wittgenstein.

While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects (i.e., as the bearers of determinate properties that exist independently of the Dasein-centred context of action in which the equipmental entity is involved). Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent. — link

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/

Here's Heidegger in his own (translated) words. When we are absorbed in using a tool, it becomes 'transparent ' in the sense that we don't focus on it but what we are trying to achieve.

The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call ‘readiness-to-hand’. (Being and Time 15: 98) — H

I mentioned this because I think language is a like the hammer. The theoretical mode depends on the automatic ease we have with it most of the time. We can never define all of our terms. We can never get behind our tacit knowhow. We can of course do our best, but reason has a vanishing foundation, an abyss for a foundation. Language is received like the law. We can't question that 'law' without obeying it to do so, 'following the social rules that they apprehend in some kind of mindless, non-explicit, anonymous manner.'

This is why the philosopher as philosopher needs at least an ideal community, for which he is not insane, even if he is insane within his actual community. To speak a language is to be a 'we' on an automatic-unconscious level on only an 'I' at the high, conscious level.

Or what say you?

It is precisely because the philosopher's questions can only be answered by careful reasoned reflection, whereas the therapist's questions require detailed empirical investigation, that we have separate disciplines dedicated to answering them. — Bartricks

I think I see what you are getting at here. For you the philosopher is not operating empirically. This sounds like what's called armchair science. I googled and found a defense of it as 'traditional philosophy.' I just skimmed the intro, but here's a quote.

The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most
part, on reason and reflection. — link

https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1525&context=etd

Thinkers like Rorty have made strong cases against 'armchair' science, but then Rorty thinks philosophy has died into cultural criticism (that the dream of reason is dead.)

On a different note, I can imagine the therapist as more of an engineer or person of tacit know-how who doesn't prioritize theory but rather results. A therapist might be understood as a kind of musician of the soul. All that matters is results, not the results-independent accumulation of explicit knowledge. But I don't have much experience with therapy. I'm doing armchair philosophy.

To be honest I used to be a stoic. And I can say it isn't even therapeutic from my personal experience. All it does is conceals emotions you're feeling without having an outlet to it. And just like a bubble, your emotions will burst. I truly think if something bothers you, address it head on. Life's too short to dodge negative things around you. Either embrace it or fight it.

I think the one part where stoicism has it right, is specifically Marcus Aurelius when he talks about how you can't control people and things around you, but only yourself. You can influence people but you cannot control them and that's key in my opinion.

Stoicism surely can't be merely therapy. The stoic ideas were formulated with a metaphysical doctrine in mind. It is the relation between the therapy and the metaphysics that effectively makes stoicism a philosophy.

Again, relevance?

I said that philosophy is the project of using reason to discover the truth.

You then provide a quote that makes a different point - a point about the attitudes of truth-seekers.

You then tell me that the author of the quote was a sceptic.

I do not understand the relevance of either the quote or scepticism, but as you also asked whether I considered scepticism a philosophy, I said something about it - namely that, as I understand 'scepticism', it is, or can be a philosophy if the sceptic believes their position is supported by reason.

You then tell me that I have not understood scepticism.

So I asked what you understood the term to mean.

Rather than answering, you give me a potted history of scepticism - without telling me what you actually understand the term to mean.

Anyway, this is pointless as you're not addressing anything I've actually said or the OP. This thread is about Stoicism, not scepticism. — Bartricks

You asked me what I think scepticism to be. Well, I understand scepticism through the words of actual sceptics. As for stoicism? You don't understand that either apparently. I dealt with that one by actually quoting stoics since that's what we are talking about, not some halfwitted understanding someone cooked up during lunchbreak.

To be honest I used to be a stoic. And I can say it isn't even therapeutic from my personal experience. All it does is conceals emotions you're feeling without having an outlet to it. And just like a bubble, your emotions will burst. I truly think if something bothers you, address it head on. Life's too short to dodge negative things around you. Either embrace it or fight it. — Reverie

Exactly. Stoicism is not supposed to be an ongoing battle, but an acquiescence. You don't fight with your own expectations, you examine them and learn to let go the ones that aren't realistic, while making efforts at self-improvement. If that is a chore to you, then of course it isn't going to be pleasant, and it isn't going to work. As you have said, embrace it or fight it. :)

I’m not sure Stoicism is against grief. I think the issue is more about grieving the death of someone who is still alive. Once they are dead then grief is faced.

I get what you’re saying overall though. I just don’t think it sensible to take any perspective on life to an extreme view - this is why I remain suspicious of buddhist ideas.

I don’t think Stoicism is primarily about ignoring human emotions and being a lump ‘living in the moment’. My general take is that it’s about a rational means of keeping emotions in check, rather than bring numb, making choices based on what is possible, rather than fanciful, and understanding and accepting your own limitations. The later is something I’m not convinced about tbh as I think humanity is able to achieve so much because we believe beyond our own abilities and occasionally surpass ourselves.

Live, Look and Learn:

Maximize Your Potential: The Stoic Life in Accordance with Nature

https://dailystoic.com/stoicism-nature/

Hmmmm never thought of stoicism to be metaphysical but I must say you're right! In essence it's the numbing of the internal in able to appreciate the spiritual, nice!

What do you make of the is/ought problem? Various 'great' philosophers have taken the position that reason just tells us what is, not what ought to be. — Eee

I do not see a problem, just a dogma that - to those who cleave to it - generates a problem. Our reason gives us insight into the norms of Reason - that is, into what Reason prescribes.

It is by our reason that we learn about a prescription to seek out and beleve what is true. That is a norm. And I take it that the word 'ought', though ambiguous, in this context denotes some kind of prescription or bidding.

So, the judgement that we 'ought' to be generous is a judgement about what Reason prescribes - she prescribes generosity.

She tells us to seek out and believe what is true. She also tells us to be generous and kind and honest.

There is no is/ought problem, as such, for these are all oughts. It is just that they can sometimes conflict. Sometimes, for instance, it would not be moral to seek out and believe what is true.

Where Hume was right is that our reason - and so, by extension, Reason herself - seems ignorant about the extended world, the world of sense. Reason seems to know that the world of sensible things has a basic character, but nothing very specific. Hence why we cannot, by reason alone, figure out whether water will suffocate us, to use one of his examples. We have to observe the world to find that out - although again, not without assistance from our reason, for it is by reason (not sense) that we are told to do this (that is, to observe and to make inferences about future events on their basis).

But Hume was wrong and quite unjustified in taking this further and declaring Reason dumb about matters of substance and reality. indeed, I think his position is quite incoherent. Reason's prescriptions - about which true and false claims can be made - include both the prescription to seek out and believe what is true, and moral prescriptions, and the prescription to pursue our own desires, and no doubt some more besides. My point is that they are all kinds of prescription, and we cannot even begin to learn which descriptions are true until we start to attend to the prescriptions of Reason. So, prescriptions are, in a very real sense, prior to descriptions.

I will respond to the rest later.

So, let's just be clear - because I'm getting a bit sick of the ugly combination of ignorance and self-righteous indignation that so many of you lot instantiate - you just called me a halfwit, right?

I dealt with that one by actually quoting stoics since that's what we are talking about, not some halfwitted understanding someone cooked up during lunchbreak. — Ying

Yes? So, as far as I'm concerned, that now makes you - you - a really rude person who can, with justice, be spoken to in a fashion that would be rude were it applied to anyone else. That's what I do. I talk to rude people - like you - in the manner you deserve.

Now, again, stop attacking me - stop suggesting I'm a halfwit - and actually address the OP.

Stop quoting and put things in your own words, otherwise a) it is not clear that you understand at all what is in the quote and b) it is not clear whether you endorse what is in the quote.

Was I wrong - half-witted - to say that a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance? Was I wrong to say that a core Stoic belief is that grief is irrational?

Stoicism surely can't be merely therapy. The stoic ideas were formulated with a metaphysical doctrine in mind. It is the relation between the therapy and the metaphysics that effectively makes stoicism a philosophy. — Pelle

My claim is not that Stoics are therapists, or that Stoicism is therapy, but that it is either therapy, or a collection of true, but banal ethical injunctions (such as 'be good'), or controversial but false claims, such as that guilt is irrational and that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance.

In reality, Stoics flit between these - that is, they may defend a controversial ethical claim - such as that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance - by appeal not to evidence (as a true philosopher would), but by appeal to the supposed therapeutic benefits that may come from believing it.

I’m not sure Stoicism is against grief. I think the issue is more about grieving the death of someone who is still alive. Once they are dead then grief is faced. — I like sushi

Yes, possibly, but then the Stoic makes their stand on grief banal. So, for instance, in reality it would appear that grief is sometimes rational, sometimes not - sometimes healthy, sometimes unhealthy. Grieving the death of people one has no close relationship to, for instance, seems unhealthy, especially if it is accompanied by a tendency to feel less, or no greater grief for the deaths of those with whom one does have a close relationship.

But if 'that' is what the Stoic is saying - that sometimes grief is rational, sometimes not - then their view is banal. And although individual Stoics may put more meat on the bone by supplying more detail about when and where grief is rational, at this point there would seem to be nothing distinctive about Stoicism.

If, on the other hand, Stoicism is to be a distinctive philosophical view, then it needs to say something substantial about these matters, and what they say would need to be supported.

For instance, let's say that a Stoic argues that grief is irrational because death is not a harm to the one who dies. Well, that's a substantial - non-banal - view. The problem, however, is that it appears to be false.

Stoics claim to be informed by Reaosn - indeed, to see reality as underpinned by Reason in some sense (and I agree with that). But our reason represents death to be a harm and grief to be appropriate - so in this respect anyway, the Stoics seem to say things that fly in the face of what Reason says.

That's the point at which the Stoics will typically appeal to well-being rather than truth.

you just called me a halfwit, right? — Bartricks

Err, no. I called out your definition of stoicism as being less than 24 karat. Didn't say anything about you personally though. Besides, even smart folks miss the mark every once in a while. I'm pretty sure I said some stupid things in my time too.

Yes? So, as far as I'm concerned, that now makes you - you - a really rude person who can, with justice, be spoken to in a fashion that would be rude were it applied to anyone else. That's what I do. I talk to rude people - like you - in the manner you deserve.

Didn't you say: "Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Then there's Ying - he does neither", earlier? Not exactly the epitome of politeness either. :rofl:

Now, again, stop attacking me - stop suggesting I'm a halfwit - and actually address the OP.

Stop quoting and put things in your own words, otherwise a) it is not clear that you understand at all what is in the quote and b) it is not clear whether you endorse what is in the quote.

Don't tell me what to do. Well, I mean, you could try, but it won't get you very far. :p

As for my understanding of stoicism, well, lets just say that I'm not wholly uninformed,. Copies of the works of Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Diogenes Laertius and the "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus (yeah the sceptic; books 2 and 3 deal with stoic epistemology, one of the few sources where you actually get to read about that since the texts dealing with the groundworks of stoicism by Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of Soli have been lost to the mists of time.) grace my bookshelves. I also have a book which contains all the anecdotes and extant fragments of Crates of Thebes ("Die Weisheit Der Hunde" by Georg Luck. I also have a copy of "The Cynic Philosophers: from Diogenes to Julian" from the Penguin Classics series, but that one isn't nearly as complete as the book by Georg Luck. Anyway, Crates of Thebes was a teacher of Zeno of Citium, but you knew that already, right?). In any case, I certainly wouldn't call myself an expert on the school, but I'm more informed than your average run of the mill guy off the streets I guess.

And when it comes to endorsing the quotes, and stoicism by extension, no, I don't agree with stoicism in most cases. Scepticism and cyncism are more to my preference when it comes to hellenistic philosophy.

Was I wrong - half-witted - to say that a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance?

Yes. As in, you're wrong about that being a core belief of stoicism (they also pointed to other causes like greed and being ruled over by emotions; stating that the stoics boiled the entire issue down to just ignorance would be a gross oversimplification). Not making any claim on you being a halfwit or not. That's not for me to decide.

Was I wrong to say that a core Stoic belief is that grief is irrational?

Yes. Like I said, Seneca has works explicitly dealing with the grief that comes from the loss of a loved one.

He literally states:

"I am grieved to hear that your friend Flaccus is dead, but I would not have you sorrow more than is fitting. That you should not mourn at all I shall hardly dare to insist; and yet I know that it is the better way. But what man will ever be so blessed with that ideal steadfastness of soul, unless he has already risen far above the reach of Fortune? Even such a man will be stung by an event like this, but it will be only a sting. We, however, may be forgiven for bursting into tears, if only our tears have not flowed to excess, and if we have checked them by our own efforts. Let not the eyes be dry when we have lost a friend, nor let them overflow. We may weep, but we must not wail."
--Seneca the Younger, "Moral Letters to Lucilius", letter 63

Didn't I post this one already?

"Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Then there's Ying - he does neither", earlier? Not exactly the epitome of politeness either. — Ying

It matters not just what someone says, but when they say it. You had already started to be rude at that point - started to talk about me, not the argument and had said I hadn't done my homework and then had the temerity to try and take me to school (though not by actually addressing anything I'd said, but by quoting others on irrelevant topics).

As for my understanding of stoicism, well, lets just say that I'm not wholly uninformed, — Ying

but I'm more informed than your average run of the mill guy off the streets I guess. — Ying

Why do you just assume that's not true of me too? Again, the rudeness. You just assume I'm ignorant. Yet I have made substantial claims - in my own words - about Stoicism and rather than provide evidence that they are false, you have asserted my ignorance.

Now, I actually have evidence that you're not very well informed, because I said some things about Stoicism that are true and you said that I needed to do my homework - which implies you think they're not true.

Was I wrong - half-witted - to say that a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance?

Yes. As in, you're wrong about that being a core belief of stoicism (they also pointed to other causes like greed and being ruled over by emotions; stating that the stoics boiled the entire issue down to just ignorance would be a gross oversimplification). Not making any claim on you being a halfwit or not. That's not for me to decide. — Ying

Potato, potarto. No one does wrong willingly, yes? That's a core Stoic view.

And it is false, yes? I mean, obviously false.

You quote Seneca:

but I would not have you sorrow more than is fitting. That you should not mourn at all I shall hardly dare to insist; and yet I know that it is the better way. — Ying

But you don't interpret the quote correctly (or at all, in fact). He does not dare to insist that you not mourn at all, but that's entirely consistent with believing that it is nevertheless irrational to do so. And indeed, in saying hat it is the better way he means that it is more rational - so ideally rational response to death is no grief at all, yes?

Seneca is confirming what I said, not refuting it.

So, you just changed your initial claim into something else? You first stated that "a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance", which then became "No one does wrong willingly, yes? That's a core Stoic view". Hmmm, suspicious. Like, moving the goalposts, suspicious. :rofl:

Oh. and this is what you stated in the opening post:

"As an example of the latter, take the view - often associated with Stoicism - that it is irrational to feel grief for those who have died.

Now, on its face that claim seems false. Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. They have reason to feel grief. They are not a model of rationality, for they are either failing to recognise a reason to grieve, or failing to respond to a reason to grieve - a reason most of us recognise."

Seems like you claim that stoicism advocates that one shouldn't feel grief at all ("Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. ". The quote I provided says otherwise.

Now, to be fair, here's what Diogenes Laertius states in his "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" (Life of Zeno):

"And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others’ prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole."

So, yes, they hold grief to be an "irrational mental contraction". What the Seneca reference shows however is that their idea of how to deal with grief is much more nuanced than just never feeling any.

So, you just changed your initial claim into something else? You first stated that "a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance", which then became "No one does wrong willingly, yes? That's a core Stoic view". Hmmm, suspicious. Like, moving the goalposts, suspicious — Ying

No, Stoics also make the first - Socrates famously maintained that all wrongdoing was a product of ignorance and Zeno followed him in that belief.

Plus, depending on what assumptions one makes about the connection between reasons and motivation, they're not even obviously distinct claims - there's a long tradition of believing that what one takes oneself to have reason to do, one is necessarily motivated to do (seems to have been Socartes' view, for instance, and it continues to be held in some form or other up to the present day).

If that's true then any desires that prevent one from doing as one ought are themselves symptomatic of ignorance.

Seems like you claim that stoicism advocates that one shouldn't feel grief at all ("Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. "). The quote I provided says otherwise. — Ying

No, read the quote again. Read what it actually says, not what you think it says.

No, Stoics also make the first - Socrates famously maintained that all wrongdoing was a product of ignorance and Zeno followed him in that belief.

Plus, depending on what assumptions one makes about the connection between reasons and motivation, they're not even obviously distinct claims - there's a long tradition of believing that what one takes oneself to have reason to do, one is necessarily motivated to do (seems to have been Socartes' view, for instance, and it continues to be held in some form or other up to the present day).

If that's true then any desires that prevent one from doing as one ought are themselves symptomatic of ignorance. — Bartricks

From Diogenes Laertius' "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" (ch. on Zeno):

"Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice. . .; magnanimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests.

Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge."

and:

"Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless."


So. According to Diogenes Laertius, the stoics "hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge". This isn't the same as claiming they held that "wrongdoing is a product of ignorance", or at least, I don't see it that way.
Your other claim, that stoics hold that "no one does wrong willingly", seems to be refuted by the notion that they hold the "bad man" to be "callous and relentless". Apparently they held that such folks actually do perform "bad" acts willingly. Seneca had first hand experience of such "bad men", since he knew Nero personally (cost him his life in the end).

No, read the quote again. Read what it actually says, not what you think it says.

Seneca seems to state that grief is a natural (another stoic tenet was that one should live in accordance with nature... Just sayin'...) response but that we shouldn't prolong our grief unnecessarily.

Yeah, I think I'm gonna fold my chair and go somewhere else now. — Wallows

Prudent. I'm going to do the same. :)

Prudent. I'm going to do the same. :) — Ying

To be honest, though, the thoughts Bartricks is professing is not that different than the caricature of Stoicism that any newbie might encounter, through reading about "stoicism" from Jordan Peterson and his sage Stoic being a bloke on an SSRI's eating tons of lobsters.

I hope the visit organized by Baden and other mods, of Massimo Pigliucci, will benefit his understanding on the matter.

To be honest, though, the thoughts Bartricks is professing is not that different than the caricature of Stoicism that any newbie might encounter, through reading about "stoicism" from Jordan Peterson and his sage Stoic being a bloke on an SSRI's eating tons of lobsters. — Wallows

Yeah I guess. This thread did provide me with an excuse to read some stoic texts again, so there's that. A bit selfish (shellfish? Ok, never mind) but hey, I got something out of it at least.

I hope the visit organized by Baden and other mods, of Massimo Pigliucci, will benefit his understanding on the matter.

So the mods are doing the whole guest speaker thing again? I remember sending out emails to several big names back on the old forum. Simon Blackburn was willing to feature, Martha Nussbaum wanted someone to come to Chicago and Noam Chomsky actually took the time to send a reply, stating he was busy (not particularly surprising... Worth a try though, right?). I also emailed Peter Singer but I got an automated response, lol.

Read all about it:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7089/discuss-philosophy-with-professor-massimo-pigliucci/p1

What is banal to one person is insightful to another. A ‘banal’ comment I know :)

The category of ‘ethics’/‘morality’ is something very much part of ‘philosophy’. Stoicism is certainly about ‘ethics’/‘morality’. You may as well be saying ‘ethics’ isn’t philosophy or have I missed something?

If I’m wrong can you express why Stoicism isn’t related to ethics? You seem to be trying to parcel stoicism off as part of psychology rather than as part of ethics?

Note: I’m not trying to put words into your mouth just trying to understand where you place these items in relation to each other and why.

Thanks

More quotes. Can't you put things in your own words?

You seem to be trying to parcel stoicism off as part of psychology rather than as part of ethics? — I like sushi

I am saying that much of what Stoics say is not philosophical, but psychological. However, I am not saying that 'all' of what they say is. Far from it. I am saying that they often make philosophical claims.

But what one needs to be on guard for, is the tendency - when under argumentative pressure - to subtly change the topic from philosophy to psychology. That is, to stop doing philosophy and start doing therapy.

My claim is not that Stoics are therapists, or that Stoicism is therapy, but that it is either therapy, or a collection of true, but banal ethical injunctions (such as 'be good'), or controversial but false claims, such as that guilt is irrational and that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance.

In reality, Stoics flit between these - that is, they may defend a controversial ethical claim - such as that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance - by appeal not to evidence (as a true philosopher would), but by appeal to the supposed therapeutic benefits that may come from believing it.

You're essentially appealing to a dog-whistle. I'm willing to entertain that stoicism is heuristical in nature but I don't think that's inherently bad. After all, stoicism has done much to help the development of cognitive-behavioral therapy, and that would not have been possible if stoicism was completely devoid of profound ideas. Also, a therapeutical motivation doesn't necessarily have any bearing on the quality of the philosophy.