Meillassoux falls back on his argument for absolute contingency of everything that is thought, that epistemologically all we really know are the actualization of certain contingent possibilities, and that the real structure of the world is comprised by these possibilities. He calls his position speculative realism.

Sure there's a connection (according to the realist). — Michael

But not according to anyone else? The sun is just an experience that has nothing to do with our talk of the sun? That sounds rather Landru-like, and it was one of the least convincing things he ever argued for.

But there's a physical connection between our brain activity (which is us thinking about the Sun) and things that aren't the Sun. — Michael

Sure. But those are likely cultural. I can think about a unicorn. I didn't invent the idea of unicorns. It was out there in the cultural landscape. Anyway, cognitive science would have something to say about all this.

And, again, we can (presumably) think about things to which brain activity doesn't have a physical connection, e.g. future, past, and distant events. — Michael

Why isn't there a physical connection to things in time or space? I don't get that at all. The sun isn't inside our brains. It's several million miles away, and 8 minutes old by the time we see it. But we talk about it, study it, predict it, explain it, etc.

Why isn't there a physical connection to things in time or space? — Marchesk

I said that there isn't a physical connection to future, past, or distant things. The first two because (unless eternalism is true) past and future things don't exist, and the last because of special relativity (i.e. the light cone).

The sun isn't inside our brains. It's several million miles away, and 8 minutes old by the time we see it. But we talk about it, study it, predict it, explain it, etc.

That's the very thing I'm questioning. What kind of connection is there between our brain activity (and our vocalisations and writings) and some other physical thing millions of miles away such that the former is a thought (or a statement) about the latter? It seems to me that if no sensible account of this reference-connection can be made then the very realist claim that we talk and think about things which are ontologically independent of our thoughts and speech is an incoherent one.

But not according to anyone else? The sun is just an experience that has nothing to do with our talk of the sun? That sounds rather Landru-like, and it was one of the least convincing things he ever argued for.

I was referring to the claimed connection between brain activity and some other physical occurrence far away.

That's the very thing I'm questioning. What kind of connection is there between our brain activity (and our vocalisations and writings) and some other physical thing millions of miles away such that the former is a thought (or a statement) about the latter? It seems to me that if no sensible account of this reference-connection can be made then the very realist claim that we talk and think about things which are ontologically independent of our thoughts and speech is an incoherent one. — Michael

Does it make any difference if it's 5 feet away versus 5 million miles? (I don't recall the sun's distance from Earth). Light takes time to travel regardless. Talking about a tree, a star, tea in China, it all takes time to get to us.


The kind of connection is all the physical events leading up to our knowledge.

he first two because (unless eternalism is true) past and future things don't exist, and the last because of special relativity (i.e. the light cone). — Michael

They did, or will exist, and GR suggests that they do. Also, the future is conjecture or projection for us, not knowledge. It's past events you're questioning, which can be a femtosecond or 5 light years.

Does it make any difference if it's 5 feet away versus 5 million miles (I don't recall the sun's distance from Earth). Light takes time to travel regardless. Talking about a tree, a star, tea in China, it all takes time to get to us. — Marchesk

It doesn't matter if it's 5 or 5 million feet away. What is the connection between brain activity and some other physical thing such that the former is a thought about the latter?

They did, or will exist, and GR suggests that they do.

But they don't exist now. So how can brain activity be physically connected to a thing that doesn't physically exist? And how can they be physically connected to present things beyond the light cone?

t doesn't matter if it's 5 or 5 million feet away. What is the connection between brain activity and some other physical thing such that the former is a thought about the latter? — Michael

Obviously, thought would need to be physical in a way that's connected to the physical thing. Computation is one such attempt to do so. How can a computer compute an action based on some event not inside the computer, or some event that doesn't exist now?

To express the general form is not to express the "perfect form". That is a mistake. It is to express what each and every one of the particulars has in common. — Metaphysician Undercover

All that "each and every one has in common" is that they approximate the perfect (that is ideal) form. So, for example if all the edges of the leaves vary from straightness,the dissections from dimensional equality, and the leaf from overall symmetry to different degrees, in different proportions, and in different ways and directions, respectively, then the perfect or idealized form is one showing straightness of the edges, dimensional equality of the dissections, and overall symmetry. This is also the generalized form of the leaf

You will not understand what "triangle" means from that visual representation, or even a number of them, you will have to refer to the definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's plainly wrong. From a drawing of any triangle, I can see immediately that it has three straight sides and three angles; and that is precisely the definition of a triangle. That the three angles must sum to 180 degrees is a necessary corollary of that, which obviously cannot be visually represented, but which, because of its very necessity, it is unnecessary to specify as part of the most essential definition. In fact the angles of some non-euclidean triangles do not sum to 180 degrees.

From a drawing of any triangle, I can see immediately that it has three straight sides and three angles; and that is precisely the definition of a triangle. — John

No actual drawing of a triangle has three perfectly straight sides and exactly three angles, as required by the definition. Every actual drawing of a triangle consists of irregular lines that have finite width and at least one distinct color, which are not part of the definition. We draw a triangle based on the definition, rather than extracting the definition from a drawing or group of drawings. Each drawing is a diagram--an existent (particular) representation that embodies the significant relations of a real (general) triangle, but is not itself a real (general) triangle. We have to distinguish and abstract the relevant aspects of the drawing from the irrelevant ones in order to recognize it as such.

No actual drawing of a triangle has three perfectly straight sides and exactly three angles, as required by the definition. — aletheist

Sure, but I have already said that myself. I have also said that the fact that the lines appear straight is sufficient for it to serve as a representation of the perfect form of the triangle. We have no other way to represent it other than by verbal description; which is more cumbersome. Imagine trying to give a comprehensive verbal description of the general form of the maple leaf.

We have no better way to represent it physically, but--at least arguably--we can represent it more perfectly in the imagination, in accordance with the verbal description.

Perhaps with simple shapes, but I don't believe it's true when it comes to complex shapes, even if they are only as complex as the maple leaf. In any case the physical drawing is the representation of what we imagine, and in regard to complex shapes at least, cannot simply visualize. Another point is, I don't believe it is possible to visualize a line without thickness.

Who said anything about visualizing? There are other forms of representation, especially in the imagination. Probably the most accurate general representation of any shape--whether simple like a triangle or complex like a maple leaf--is going to be one that is vague; as soon as you make it more determinate, it loses its generality and becomes a particular triangle or maple leaf.

A vague representation cannot adequately express the general characteristics of a form, certainly not of a complex form. No vague representation can express the general characteristics of the form of the maple leaf as adequately as the drawing of the maple leaf I posted earlier. That drawing is not a representation of any particular maple leaf but of the idealized general form of the maple leaf. The fact that the actual marks on the screen or paper have thickness or that the precise proportions of the general form are not shown is irrelevant. Such a drawing gives us an enhanced ability to visually and explicitly grasp the form of the maple leaf. Of course i don't deny that people have a prior implicit (vague) grasp of the form of the maple leaf; but such visual representations allow us to sharpen up those vague implicit understandings and make then more explicit.

A vague representation cannot adequately express the general characteristics of a form, certainly not of a complex form. — John

It depends on what you mean by "adequately." In a sense, no particular representation can adequately express the general characteristics of any form, simple or complex.

That drawing is not a representation of any particular maple leaf but of the idealized general form of the maple leaf. — John

It is a particular representation of the idealized general form of the maple leaf; in other words, a token of a type.

The fact that the actual marks on the screen or paper have thickness or that the precise proportions of the general form are not shown is irrelevant. — John

Only because we understand it to be so, in light of the purpose of the representation. If that drawing was instead intended to show how a specified hue is rendered on a computer monitor, then the color of the line would be the only relevant aspect.

... such visual representations allow us to sharpen up those vague implicit understandings and make then more explicit. — John

True, and experimentation on such a diagram can reveal relations that were not evident from its initial construction. This is precisely what makes diagrammatic reasoning so powerful.

Do you agree that representations stand for or refer to something other than themselves? — Terrapin Station

Yes I agree, that is the nature of a representation. Where we seem to disagree, is on whether or not something can be a representation, i.e. exist as a representation, without having a mind actively determining that it is a representation. Do you not think that if a mind could potentially determined that the thing is a representation, then the thing actually exists as a representation?

So what's the nature of the special kind of relationship between marks on paper and some other thing such that the former represents the latter? Is it a physical relationship? Is there a special chain of atoms that connects the ink to something else (and only that something else)? — Michael

No I don't believe that this special relationship is a physical relationship. But I don't think that any relationships are actually physical. Things are physical but I don't think that relationships are physical. Suppose that there are two atoms which are assumed to be related to each other, in the sense that they are part of a molecule. If we talk about the molecule, this is a physical object, a whole. If we talk about the individual atoms, then we have divided up the whole into parts, such that each atom is a physical object, a whole. If we want to talk about what makes the atoms exist together, as a molecule, we should consider that this is something non-physical.

I'd say that the relationship is a conceptual one (i.e. we have a particular kind of cognitive attitude towards the ink), which is why it can't exist outside of people's heads. — Michael

I think that non-physical relationships exist outside of peoples heads, because all relationships are non-physical, and there are real relationships outside of peoples' heads.. The relationship between the earth and the sun is non-physical. The relationship between two atoms, is non-physical. That is why these relationships can only be understood by mathematics, because they are non-physical, and mathematics is non-physical. But that relationships are non-physical does not mean that they only exist in people's heads.

It depends on what you mean by "adequately." In a sense, no particular representation can adequately express the general characteristics of any form, simple or complex. — aletheist

Yes, there can certainly be many representations of a general form and all of them are only ever more or less adequate. My argument with MU was actually over his assertion that there is a general form which is temporally prior to the advent of any particular form.

Only because we understand it to be so, in light of the purpose of the representation. If that drawing was instead intended to show how a specified hue is rendered on a computer monitor, then the color of the line would be the only relevant aspect. — aletheist

Well, yes, but we are specifically discussing representations of forms here not representations of colours.

I don't think we are actually disagreeing about anything significant here.

My argument with MU was actually over his assertion that there is a general form which is temporally prior to the advent of any particular form. — John

What about logically prior? I would suggest that a general form is a continuum of potential forms, and a particular form is an actualization of one such possibility.

Yes, I certainly agree that in one sense general forms are logically prior to particular forms. But from the point of view of the actual development of particular logics, the general logic of a form would seem to be impossible without particular forms from which to extrapolate it, even if those particular forms only occur in the context of verbal descriptions or graphic representations. I think it's one of those inherently paradoxical, multivalent questions.

Yes I agree, that is the nature of a representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, so how, outside of someone thinking about it this way, does a set of marks on paper or a piece of metal or whatever stand for or refer to something other than itself?

In your category of "someone" do you include God? Apart from that consideration; did undiscovered textual artifacts stand for or refer to anything during the period that no one knew about them?

Okay, so how, outside of someone thinking about it this way, does a set of marks on paper or a piece of metal or whatever stand for or refer to something other than itself? — Terrapin Station

Through the relationship which was established by the one who made the marks. When the person made the marks, there was a relationship between the marks, and the thing represented by the marks, which was produced by that person. If you deny that relationship, then you deny the reality of representation. What could ever happen which would annihilate that relationship?

All that "each and every one has in common" is that they approximate the perfect (that is ideal) form. — John

Well clearly, this is where we differ. I don't believe in the perfect, or ideal maple leaf. I don't think there is any such thing. I believe that the general form of the maple leaf is the things which they all have in common, a stem, veins, a specific number of points, and growing on a maple tree. To that extent, all maple leafs are perfect, in the sense that they fulfill the conditions for being a maple leaf.

No, that's plainly wrong. From a drawing of any triangle, I can see immediately that it has three straight sides and three angles; and that is precisely the definition of a triangle. — John

You're not seeing the point. If you see a drawing of an equilateral triangle, and someone tells you "this is a triangle", there is nothing to prevent you from believing that all triangles must have equal sides and angles. That is the problem, you cannot, as you claim here, infer the general from an instance of the particular. It is impossible because there is no way of knowing which of the aspects of the particular is essential to the general, and which is accidental. You just make the above claim because you already know the definition of a triangle, so of course you can see that definition in any triangle which you look at. But if you did not know the definition of triangle, you could not, with any degree of certainty induce the general definition from one instance of the particular.

My argument with MU was actually over his assertion that there is a general form which is temporally prior to the advent of any particular form. — John

What my original claim was, is that there is a form of the particular, which is necessarily prior to the existence of the particular material object. The form of the particular object exists prior to the material object itself. This is inferred from the fact that an object must have a particular form. And when the object comes into existence, as the object which it is, it must be predetermined what it will be, or else it will not come into existence as that object, or as any object at all (because every object is a particular object).

What about logically prior? I would suggest that a general form is a continuum of potential forms, and a particular form is an actualization of one such possibility. — aletheist

The point being then, that prior to the existence of any material object, there is the potential for that object's existence. But the potential for that object's existence is also the potential for the existence of many other things instead, so that general potential cannot necessitate the existence of a particular object. That is the nature of potential. We can call this potential the general, or universal. Now, in order that a particular object comes into existence out of this general potential, something must choose, or select, "cause", that particular potential. This particular potential is the form of the particular object, which is necessarily prior to the material existence of the object.

Well clearly, this is where we differ. I don't believe in the perfect, or ideal maple leaf. I don't think there is any such thing. I believe that the general form of the maple leaf is the things which they all have in common, a stem, veins, a specific number of points, and growing on a maple tree. — Metaphysician Undercover

The perfect form is just the idealized form, which is the same as the general form. Not just maple leaves have stems and veins. Another kind of leaf may have the same specific number of points, too; it is the averaged configuration of those points and the average length of the edges that join them that count as the general form. Growing on a maple tree is not a general form it is an attribute or associative definition.

That is the problem, you cannot, as you claim here, infer the general from an instance of the particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, the general is inferred from a number of particular instances, which would be, say, from drawings of all the kinds of triangles that you can imagine, or a collection of actual maple leaves. Nothing I have said contradicts this; in fact you have contradicted it by claiming that the general form is temporally prior to the particular instances.

This is inferred from the fact that an object must have a particular form. And when the object comes into existence, as the object which it is, it must be predetermined what it will be, or else it will not come into existence as that object, or as any object at all (because every object is a particular object). — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no idea why you purport that an object cannot come into existence without their being a (presumably) pre-existent general form which predetermines it to be what it is. What evidence could you possibly have for that claim.? What could such a "pre-existence" look like?

If a thing comes from something else, such as, for example, a maple leaf from a tree, then it could be the tree, another particular, as well as all the conditions of its environment at the time of its advent which determines the leaf's particular form. The form of the tree is determined by the seed, the form of the seed by a prior tree and so on. So particulars are always determined by prior particulars, not by prior "general forms".

Of course everything in the natural world, the whole natural order, may be an expression of either, on the one hand, the spirit, or on the other hand the scientifically conceived virtual realm of 'pre-form'; but the spirit is not a form, and the virtual world cannot be either; to say that about spirit would be to make the mistake of objectifying it, and to say it about the virtual would be to deny the science.

Through the relationship which was established by the one who made the marks. — Metaphysician Undercover

But what is that relationship on your view? Where does it obtain? Just what, ontologically, is it? That's what I'm asking you. Is it part of the ink or paint or whatever? Where is it located? What is it made of?

In your category of "someone" do you include God? — John

I wasn't thinking of God there, as I'm an atheist, but sure, for someone who believes in God, that would do. As with everyone else, though, it would just be something that obtains in God's mind insofar as God is thinking about it.

Apart from that consideration; did undiscovered textual artifacts stand for or refer to anything during the period that no one knew about them?

No. Things can't stand for or refer to something without someone thinking about them.

The perfect form is just the idealized form, which is the same as the general form. Not just maple leaves have stems and veins. Another kind of leaf may have the same specific number of points, too; it is the averaged configuration of those points and the average length of the edges that join them that count as the general form. Growing on a maple tree is not a general form it is an attribute or associative definition. — John

I really think that you're not grasping what a general form is. The general form gains it's intelligibility by participating in, or being part of a larger, more general concept. The concept "red" obtains intelligibility by its relationship to the concept of "colour", not by a visual representation of a red object. The concept of "human being" obtains intelligibility through its relationship to the concept of "animal", not by a visual representation of a human being. Notice that these are relationships of necessity, red is necessarily a colour, and a human being is necessarily an animal. This necessity is what makes the general form intelligible, as a concept. The visual representation does not provide this.

In the case of the maple leaf, it necessarily grows on a maple tree, so this is the necessary relationship which distinguishes the general form "maple leaf". You continue to adhere to this notion that a "form" is necessarily some sort of spatial representation, when I've already explained to you with the example of mathematical objects, that this is not the case. There is no necessity there. That is an illusion of necessity which has left you confused. Try to recognize that forms, or concepts are based in a logical order, an order of necessity, rather than a spatial representation.

I have no idea why you purport that an object cannot come into existence without their being a (presumably) pre-existent general form which predetermines it to be what it is. What evidence could you possibly have for that claim.? What could such a "pre-existence" look like? — John

I have been referring to a pre-existent particular form, that is my argument. There is a particular form of any particular object, which is prior to that object. Since we only understand the pure nature of forms, as general forms, because these are what is present within our minds, our approach toward understanding the particular forms is through our understanding of general forms. I've been through this logic, which demonstrates the necessity of a prior form, already twice for you. I'll reproduce it again, and you let me know what confuses you. But please release this idea that such a form must "look like" something. That is what we learn from the nature of general forms, they have no visual representation, they exist by the logical necessity of order.

Please read the following, and address your concerns directly to me. Don't ignore it and come back a few days from now complaining, I have no idea what you're talking about.

Let me try once again, to explain this issue. As time passes, there is as you say, "a succession of slightly different forms". At each moment of the present, the maple leaf is this particular maple leaf, it is not that particular maple leaf which it was at the last moment, because it has changed. Therefore at each moment the maple leaf is a new, and different object. So at each moment a new object is created, we can call them MLt1, MLt2, MLt3, etc., each collection of symbols referring to a different object. Let's take MLt3 for example. When that object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, MLt3, or else it is not MLt3. It does not come into existence as MLt2, Mlt4, or any random thing, it comes into existence as MLt3. Therefore we can assume that there is a cause of its existence as MLt3, a reason why it exists at that moment as MLt3, and not something else. This is the determining form of MLt3. Notice that in order for the object, MLt3, to exist at that present moment, as MLt3, it is necessary that the form of MLt3 existed prior to that. This prior form is not MLt2, it is not MLt4, because these are distinctly different. It is nothing other than the form of MLt3, which exists prior to the object MLt3, and ensures that object MLt3 will exist as that object, at that moment in time. — Metaphysician Undercover