Are necessary and contingent truths necessary?

Bartricks

It is commonplace to distinguish between contingent truths - I am sat in a chair - and necessary truths - 2 + 1 = 3. A contingent truth is a proposition that is true, but is capable of being false. By contrast a necessary truth is a proposition that is true and is incapable of being anything but true.

For a while now I have been sceptical that there are any necessary truths (it is an unorthodox view, to be sure, but it is not without precedent - John Stuart Mill, for instance, held it as well). I admit that there do appear to be such truths - our reason does represent propositions such as 2 + 1 = 3 as being true not just here and now, but always and everywhere (that is, necessarily true). But I think, for reasons that do not need to be gone into here, that such appearances are deceptive and that necessity is not a real feature of the world. In everyday discourse we typically use the word 'necessary' expressively, not descriptively. To say that something is necessarily the case is to express one's confidence that it is, in fact, the case. Saying that a proposition is necessarily true is really no different to writing the word 'true' in capital letters. What I believe is that this is also how 'necessary' functions in the context of rational representations.

Just to be clear: I do not deny that it is true that the proposition 2 + 1 = 3 is true. I just deny that it is 'necessarily' true. Or rather, I deny that the word 'necessary' really adds anything to 'true' beyond expressing confidence, or some other attitude (either on our part, or on Reason's part).

It might be thought that if I deny that it is 'necessarily' true that 2 + 1 = 3 then I must think that all truths are contingent (that seems to have been Mill's view).

But I am suspicious that this may be a false dichotomy. For it seems to me that 'contingent' also plausibly functions expressively not descriptively. To say that something is 'contingently' true is to express either some kind of lack of confidence in its actual truth or a lack of confidence in its prospects of remaining true or to express the fact that one can conceive of its being false.

So, what I propose is that there are no such things as either necessary truths or contingent truths. There are just truths. There are not two categories of truth. There are just truths and that's that.

I am not at all confident that the position I have just described is coherent, but I am willing to try and defend it.

Monitor

I'm a little confused here. I thought that truth was un-analyzable. That, given any truth, one occupies a position to ask "Well how do you know that's true? Also that a necessary truth was one that any query relied upon to even ask a question in the first place. If I am just a brain in a vat, then there is no reason to save the dog from drowning. There is no dog, and perhaps no me, so there is no compulsion to act. No reason to consider a truth existing.

Wayfarer

ut I think, for reasons that do not need to be gone into here, that such appearances are deceptive and that necessity is not a real feature of the world. — Bartricks

Even to make this argument there have to be necessary truths. If what you argue is only contingent, then it has no binding power, as it only happens to be true from time to time, if at all, and there's no reason anyone should accept it.

Necessary truths comprise the relationship between ideas. 2 is always greater than 1, in all possible worlds, as a matter of definition. Again if it were not so, how could logic itself gain any traction?

The reason you don't think that the descriptor 'necessary' adds anything of value, is because you're thinking of it tautologically - in effect, what about 'necessary' is 'necessary'? And the response is, necessary truths are true necessarily. If they were true on some other grounds, then they wouldn't be necessary.

Bartricks

↪Monitor

I too am confused as I am not clear how what you've said connects to what I've said.

Bartricks

↪Wayfarer

Even to make this argument there have to be necessary truths. — Wayfarer

I don't see why. I have not claimed that necessarily there are no necessary truths, only that there are not in fact any.

If what you argue is only contingent, then it has no binding power, as it only happens to be true from time to time, if at all, and there's no reason anyone should accept it. — Wayfarer

None of that follows. First, I am not arguing that all truths are contingent, for I deny contingent truths too. Propositions are just true or false, they are neither necessarily true, nor contingently true - just true.

If a proposition is true, then there is (normally anyway) a reason to believe it (an 'epistemic reason'). But I fail to see why a truth has to be 'necessarily' true before we have reason to believe it - mere truth is sufficient. For example, I have reason to believe I exist, because it is true I exist. Yet clearly it is not necessarily true that I exist. So it is just plainly false that we lack reason to believe anything other than necessary truths.

Necessary truths comprise the relationship between ideas. 2 is always greater than 1, in all possible worlds, as a matter of definition. Again if it were not so, how could logic itself gain any traction? — Wayfarer

Well, take any law of logic you like, and call it 'necessarily true'. Well, I will just say that it is 'true'.

So this argument:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

is valid. You will claim that if its premises are true, necessarily its conclusion is. But I will simply claim that if its premises are true, then its conclusion is. We can both reason just the same - we will both reach the same conclusions, it is just that you will think your conclusions are necessarily true given the premises, whereas I will simply think they are true.

The reason you don't think that the descriptor 'necessary' adds anything of value, is because you're thinking of it tautologically - in effect, what about 'necessary' is 'necessary'? And the response is, necessary truths are true necessarily. If they were true on some other grounds, then they wouldn't be necessary. — Wayfarer

No, I just don't think necessity exists and I think the only evidence we have of its existence - namely rational intuitions representing there to be necessary truths - are more reasonably interpreted to be functioning expressively, rather than descriptively.

What I want to see is whether, by denying necessity and contingency, I am committed to affirming contradictions.

Wayfarer

I fail to see why a truth has to be 'necessarily' true before we have reason to believe it - mere truth is sufficient. — Bartricks

If you had six beers in the fridge, and I took some of them, then you would have less than what you put in. How many less, would be contingent on how many I had taken. But that there was less, is a necessary truth. If you knew I took two, then there would necessarily be four remaining (given that only you and I were involved.) I don't see anything else to say, but someone else might.

Bartricks

↪Wayfarer

If you had six beers in the fridge, and I took some of them, then you would have less than what you put in. How many less, would be contingent on how many I had taken. But that there was less, is a necessary truth. If you knew I took two, then there would necessarily be four remaining (given that only you and I were involved.) I don't see anything else to say, but someone else might. — Wayfarer

There were six beers in the fridge. You took two. Now there are four (which is fewer than there used to be).

god must be atheist

Bartricks: the reason you argue there is no necessity for distinguishing between necessary truths and contingent truths can be struck down by a counter-reasoning using common language very nicely. The problem is not that we can't give you convincing arguments. The problem is we can't give you some brain power to understand, digest, and internalize those arguments.

This is a major fault of the website. I blame the website for our inability to increase the understanding of reason in your otherwise head. After all, I can't blame you, me, or any other user for this; so it must be a problem with the website.

Prove to me that the reason we can't teach you how to become a reasonable person is the fault of you, of me, or of any one or more of the other users including you or me or neither of us, and I shalt rescind the claim that it's the website's fault.

khaled

↪Bartricks

Who ever said it is necessary to distinguish between truths in terms of contingent and necessary?

Bartricks

↪khaled

I think the bulk of the philosophical community - naming them all would take years.

But the vast bulk would accept that some truths are necessary and those that are not necessary are contingent. And they mean by this (well, 'precisely' what's meant is a matter of dispute) that some truths must be true - they are true 'in all possible worlds' - whereas others are not, they just happen to be true but it is possible for them to be false.

I think that every truth is just true. I think no truth is necessarily true, but at the same time I do not think that it is true that a true proposition 'could be false'.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

I admit that there do appear to be such truths - our reason does represent propositions such as 2 + 1 = 3 as being true not just here and now, but always and everywhere (that is, necessarily true). But I think, for reasons that do not need to be gone into here, that such appearances are deceptive and that necessity is not a real feature of the world.

Not necessary as some world feature, but necessary by definition. Therefore such truths can be found only in logic, mathematics and similar axiom based derivation of truth statements. The question then is really about choice of axioms, but they are considered 'self-evident' rather than 'necessary'.

On the other hand, knowledge of the world features is empirical and ultimately only statistical, so no absolute or necessary truths there. Except, perhaps, this one: “I think, therefore I know I exist”.

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

I don't really follow you.

Let's say I define 'bachelor' as 'never married man'. Well, as Roger is a never married man, then Roger is a bachelor. That's what I'd say. But presumably you'd say that as Roger is a never married man, then 'necessarily' he is a bachelor. That's what I'd deny.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

There is nothing to follow, only to understand what "necessary by definition" means. Do you not see it's self-contradiction and pointles to deny what you defined, why would you want to do that?

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

All you are doing, it seems to me, is insisting that there are necessary truths. You are not showing me why I must, on pain of incoherence, accept them.

So, once more, I accept this definition of a bachelor: a bachelor is a never married man. I accept that Roger is a never married man. And I conclude that Roger is therefore a bachelor.

No contradiction there. I have not said anything about Roger that contradicts what I have said about the meaning of the word 'bachelor'

But again, I take it that you would insist that as Bachelors are, by definition, never married men, and Roger is a never married man, then it follows 'of necessity' that Roger is a bachelor.

That's precisely what I deny.

You haven't, then, explained necessity by explaining how necessary truths are truths of definition, for your explanation presupposes that necessity exists, rather than explaining its existence.

Again, I accept that it is true by definition that Roger is a bachelor, yet I deny that there are any necessary truths. I have not, so far as I can tell, contradicted myself.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

It is like the concept of thought experiment. So if I say let us imagine that A=B, you either play along or you don't. But instead you want to accept a premise just to deny it, and if you do not see the contradiction, at least you should realize how pointless it is.

That's precisely what I deny.

Ok, let us hear your reasoning then.

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

But instead you want to accept a premise just to deny it, and if you do not see the contradiction, at least you should realize how pointless it is. — Zelebg

I am arguing that we do not need necessity - that we can dispense with it and still be able to reason about reality just fine, find out stuff, and not commit ourselves to affirming contradictions. And I am saying the same about contingency.

That's what I'm arguing here. So to challenge me you'd need to show that I am wrong about that. But what you're now doing is questioning the point of this. Well, the point is a) it would solve a lot of problems elsewhere, such as how to account for the truth of conditional statements, and b) I think there's a good case for thinking that necessity and contingency are not real. But that case would be undermined if dispensing with them would commit us to affirming contradictions.

Ok, let us hear your reasoning then. — Zelebg

I am not arguing here that necessity and contingency do not exist - although that is what I think - I am arguing that we do not need to affirm their existence. That is, we can, as I say, get along just fine without them. It is that claim - that we can do without them - that I am defending, and I am defending it by showing how those who claim otherwise cannot show me that I must commit myself to contradictions when I deny the reality of necessity (maybe they can - but they haven't yet).

So you, for example, said that necessary truths are truths of definition. But I did not see how the existence of truths of definition would commit me to accepting the existence of necessary truths. For, again, though I accept that it is true by definition that bachelors are never married man, and accept as well that Roger is a never married man, I just conclude from this that therefore Roger is a bachelor.

Roger is a never married man. Never married men are bachelors. Therefore Roger is a bachelor. What would adding "must be" do apart from serving to emphasise the obviousness of it all?

Bartricks

↪god must be atheist

Take. Your. Meds.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

Roger is a never married man. Never married men are bachelors. Therefore Roger is a bachelor. What would adding "must be" do apart from serving to emphasise the obviousness of it all?

If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C.

You are talking about semantics and you want to say “necessarily” is superfluous? It means the conclusion “logically follows” or is “implied by proposition”, that better?

So your interpretation of logical necessity is simply too rigid, unless you want to question the logic of why it “logically follows” A should equal C in the above example?

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C. — Zelebg

That's what you say. I say "if A is B, and B is C, then A is C".

It means the conclusion “logically follows” or is “implied by proposition”, that better? — Zelebg

I don't think those don't mean the same as 'necessarily'. For instance, most would hold that the laws of logic are necessary truths, but they do not mean by that that they somehow 'follow' from something.

Plus even if they are synonymous, my position would then be that we can do without them and rather than saying 'logically follows' can simply say 'consequently is the case' or some such.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

Plus even if they are synonymous, my position would then be that we can do without them and rather than saying 'logically follows' can simply say 'consequently is the case' or some such.

Consequently is good too, but maybe not exactly hitting the point, which is to illustrate conclusion is exclusively defined by the proposition.

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

No, I wouldn't say 'exclusively'. I don't see what that adds.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

It adds constancy, assures predictability, determinism. It says “no magic allowed”, no god or other some such potential devil could sneak up from outside of the equation and change the result or conclusion. It simply reiterates or underlines ‘rules of the game’ set by axioms, in the service of education for example.

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

It adds constancy, assures predictability, determinism. — Zelebg

What does the 'it' refer to?

t says “no magic allowed”, no god or other some such potential devil could sneak up from outside of the equation and change the result or conclusion. — Zelebg

I don't follow you. I'm not arguing for magic. I mean, it is necessity and contingency that seem to require magic, not their absence.

Anyway, whatever desires of yours the reality of necessity would or would not satisfy, I am arguing that we can dispense with the notion and not be committed to affirming contradictions. You have yet to show me that I am wrong about that.

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

Ah, I now see that the 'it' refers to 'exclusivity'.

Well, in a way what you've said just underlines my point - which is that words like 'necessary' 'always' and so forth, function to express convictions, desires, that kind of thing, rather than to describe some feature of reality.

Some propositions are true and some are not. And there are methods we can employ to distinguish the true from the false. But we do not need to invoke the concepts either of necessity or contingency in order to be able to do this, I think.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

What does the 'it' refer to?

Just read “necessary” as “always”, and may god help you find less trivial thoughts to think about.

Bartricks

↪Zelebg

I don't think that's what 'always' means (since something could always be the case, yet not be necessarily the case).

'Has' to be the case would be more accurate. And that's what I'm denying - I'm denying the reality of has-ness. There are true propositions. But adding to the claim that a proposition is true that it 'has' to be true describes nothing real about it, it just expresses conviction, I think.

It's hardly trivial.

Anyway, once more you've yet to show me how denying the reality of necessity commits me to affirming contradictions.

3017amen

I propose is that there are no such things as either necessary truths or contingent truths. There are just truths. There are not two categories of truth. There are just truths and that's that. — Bartricks

Hi Bartricks!

Both truths still exist, much like objective truths and subjective truths.

Here's an appetite whetter for necessary truths:

1. There is at least one true proposition.

Is that true or false?

Bartricks

↪3017amen

Both truths still exist, — 3017amen

Well, I'm sceptical about precisely that - but happy to be corrected. (By that, of course, I mean that I am sceptical that 'necessary' and 'contingent' truths exist, but I do accept that those truths that have been said to be necessary or contingent are true - so I agree that the truths exist, I just do not think a 'necessary' or 'contingent' describes anything real about the truths.)

1. There is at least one true proposition. — 3017amen

Yes, I agree that that is true.

3017amen

↪Bartricks

If you believe it's true then it's true by logical necessity. Here's why:

There is at least one true proposition. Call this proposition A. Is A necessarily true? Suppose I contend that is false. Call this proposition B "A is false."

But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true.

It is therefore logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions.

Zelebg

↪Bartricks

It is trivially non-issue unless you are questioning starting axioms.

If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C.

That is not a statement about metaphysical or any kind of world or reality, or anything in particular, but about constraints that are set by axioms which you must follow throughout your argument or otherwise it will end up being incoherent, contradicting, or otherwise deemed to be logically false.

It’s just rules of the game. You may question starting axioms, but to accept them and start playing the game just to immediately say “I quit, I don’t like the rules anymore”, that’s more than just crazy, it’s also funny because it’s beautifully pointless.

Bartricks

↪3017amen

If you believe it's true then it's true by logical necessity. Here's why:

There is at least one true proposition. Call this proposition A. Is A necessarily true? Suppose I contend that is false. Call this proposition B "A is false."

But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true.

It is therefore logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions. — 3017amen

So, I think proposition A is true.

What about the proposition "A is necessarily true"? No, I think that proposition - proposition B - is false.

I think A is true, and B is false. So far so good.

But now you say this - "But if A is false so is B because B is a proposition. And if A is false, there are no true propositions. So A must be true"

That's clearly confused. I think proposition A is true. Proposition A says "there is at least one true proposition". I think that's true, not false!

But this proposition "Proposition A is necessarily true" I think is false. That proposition says not that there is a true proposition (which I think is true), but that it is necessarily true that there is a true proposition - which I deny.

So you absolutely haven't demonstrated that I am committed to contradicting myself. Not yet, anyway.

It is therefore logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions. — 3017amen

And that is false. That's just to state that it is necessarily true that there are some true propositions. I deny precisely that. There are some true propositions, but it is not necessarily true that there are some true propositions.

Are necessary and contingent truths necessary?

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