You've yet to show me that I'm wrong, though. That is, you've yet to show me that by denying necessity I am committed to affirming contradictions. All you're doing is insisting I'm not playing by the rules.

I am playing by the rules, I am denying that playing by the rules requires affirming the existence of necessity.

If A is B and B is C, then A is necessarily C. — Zelebg

No, I think "if A is B and B is C, then A is C".

You will have shown that I am not playing by the rules when you show me that I am committed to affirming contradictions.

I think proposition A is true. Proposition A says "there is at least one true proposition". I think that's true, not false! — Bartricks

Okay, do you realize you just agreed to a necessary truth? By agreeing that there exists at least one true proposition, that is considered a necessary truth.

Okay, do you realize you just agreed to a necessary truth? By agreeing that there exists at least one true proposition, that is considered a necessary truth. — 3017amen

You do realize I absolutely didn't? This: "There is at least one true proposition" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one true proposition".

I think the former is true, the latter false.

Now get me to contradict myself.

You do realize I absolutely didn't? This: "There is at least one true proposition" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one true proposition". — Bartricks

Yes it is. Go back and read my first response.
Don't overthink it. It's easier than you think.

No it isn't.

"There is at least one total dumbo on this thread" does not mean the same as "There is necessarily at least one total dumbo on this thread". And if I deny the latter - which I do - I am not thereby committed to denying the former - which I most certainly don't.

Read your own sentences more carefully.

Don't overthink it. — 3017amen

Don't underthink it.

No, I think "if A is B and B is C, then A is C".

You can not say "no" when you repeated the same thing, just more vaguely. When speaking about any rules it is wise to be overly specific to avoid any potential confusion. And when educating someone about how logic works you might want to use the word "necessary" in order to underline the conclusion should be obvious from the premises. This is trivial semantic non-issue, waste of time.

Well, I am glad you've adopted my view - which is that 'necessary' functions expressively, not descriptively.

I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner, but that's ok. (Unfortunately, many people resort to that behavior as a deflection mechanism when denying facts.) It's a cognitive science thing too expansive to unpack here.

Maybe, 'contingent truth' will be easier for you to grasp.

First answer this question:

1. all events must have a cause

Is that proposition true or false?

I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner, but that's ok. (Unfortunately, many people resort to that behavior as a deflection mechanism when denying facts.) It's a cognitive science thing too expansive to unpack here. — 3017amen

In what fantasy world did you push me into a corner? You tried to show that I was committed to a contradiction, and I showed you in no uncertain terms that you were wrong. I believe it is true that there is at least one true proposition and I believe it is false that it is necessarily true that there is at least one true proposition. Those are not contradictory beliefs!

You are also misusing 'ad hominem'.

Maybe, 'contingent truth' will be easier for you to grasp. — 3017amen

Er, you realize you lost the last skirmish, yes? I rolled over you like a tank over a kitten. It's you, matey, who's having trouble grasping things, namely reality.

First answer this question: — 3017amen

Bossy.

1. all events must have a cause

Is that proposition true or false? — 3017amen

False.

Please share how you think it is false?

I think all events do have causes. I don't think they have to. But I think they all do. So there's no 'must' about it.

If p states that " all propositions are false "
Then p is also false which implies all propositions are true. Hence, p is also true.
We started with p being false and ended with p being true. Contradiction.
I think this example is more than clear enough, classic liar paradox that tells us that all propositions can't be false if they are of the same order type.

I think all events do have causes. I don't think they have to. But I think they all do. — Bartricks

If you are saying that you think all events have 'cause-s', you are saying that it is both a necessary and contingent truth. ( At first you said 'False', so I'm just trying to understand you.)

That's not an example of liars paradox, but this is:

1. this statement is false.

Liar's paradox is usually from the paradox of self-reference. My example is not referring to self-reference. It's an example of a necessary truth.

How does "all propositions are false" pose a difficulty for me?

I think the proposition "all propositions are false" is false. For I believe that some propositions are true.

As for a proposition like this "this proposition is false" - well, I think that proposition is either true or false, but I am not sure which. (Perhaps it is both - in which case it is a counter example to the law of non-contradiction. I think that law is true, but as I do not think it is a necessary truth, I do not see why a counter-example to it would be a problem for me).

So anyway, I fail to see how it poses a difficulty for the view I am putting forward here specifically.

I don't think we should use the word is as a relation between two propositions. Unless you meant to represent numbers.
If we say p=p, we don't add anything to the discussion and if we say p=q, we are saying two things are identical, which is nonsense. Here p,q represent proposition.

You example is correct but l don't see any problem with mine as it also refers to itself in a paradoxical manner.
Maybe l responded to an earlier post.

By necessary truth, do you mean proposition that are true by definition. For example "All bachelors are unmarried " is true by definition. It is necessarily true.

If you are saying that you think all events have 'cause-s', you are saying that it is both a necessary and contingent truth. ( At first you said 'False', so I'm just trying to understand you.) — 3017amen

I think all the events have causes. That's not the same as saying that all events must have causes.

I'm trying to understand you - I don't understand why you think the claim that all events have causes is equivalent to saying that all events must have causes.

By necessary truth, do you mean proposition that are true by definition. For example "All bachelors are unmarried " is true by definition. It is necessarily true. — Wittgenstein

How does the fact a proposition is true by definition make it necessarily true? Why not just 'true'?

What do you take the word neccessary to mean ?

In other words, if you said 'all events have a cause', then you would be suggesting a necessary truth.

On the other hand, if you said 'all events have causes' you would be suggesting a contingent truth.

What do you take the word neccessary to mean ? — Wittgenstein

I take the word to be expressive. So, when I use it it functions a bit like 'hooray' - that is, it expresses an attitude, rather than describes a feature. That's why I don't think there is any necessity in the world - for saying that a proposition is 'necessarily true' is really no different to saying it is TRUE!! That is, 'necessarily' does what caps lock does.

But when philosophers use it they mean, well, I am not really sure 'exactly' what they mean, which is why I think I can get by without the notion. But they say they mean things such as 'true in all possible worlds' or 'can't be false'.

n other words, if you said 'all events have a cause', then you would be suggesting a necessary truth. — 3017amen

Why? I don't see that at all.

necessarily true' is really no different to saying it is TRUE!!

But if l say a certain proposition is sometimes true , l also say that it is sometimes false. But if l say a proposition is always true, then it is never false. The word neccessary, always adds clarity to what we are stating. It is a good distinction.
If you say something is true, we don't know if you mean for this instance or for all cases.

If I say that something is always the case, that is not the same as saying that it must be the case.

Let's say I have existed since the beginning of time. It is now true to say that I have always existed. Yet that does not mean that I exist of necessity.

Those who believe in necessity would, I think, happily accept this. For they would accept that a proposition that has always been true is not thereby incapable of being false.

I think of necessary and contingency when I think of Cosmology. And when you say 'all bachelors are unmarried men' I think of that being an analytical truth. But I suppose you could call it a logically necessary truth, since it is true by definition or because it is 'necessarily true' by definition.

But I'm not sure that's proper. Or at least I haven't thought of it that way. Instead, I just call it an analytical truth or an a priori truth.

And so, I tend to categorize it in this way and define the a Priori-a Posteriori Distinction, the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, the Necessary-Contingent Distinction as follows:

•The analytic – synthetic distinction: Analytic statements can be proven true by analyzing their terms (they are tautological), meanwhile synthetic statements cannot be proven true by analyzing their terms.
•The necessary – contingent distinction: Necessary statements are necessarily true in all cases, meanwhile contingent statements depend on more information (they are conditional).
•The a priori – a posteriori distinction: A priori statements do not rely upon direct experience (they are rationalized), meanwhile a posteriori statements do rely on direct experience (they are empirical).

In my studies, necessary/contingent statements usually are in the context of theoretical physics. But there are all sorts of combinations thereto. For example, in Metaphysics, the infamous Kantian statement 'all events must have a cause' is of course a synthetic-a priori judgement or statement.

And that's because that statement makes a general claim on everything without having experienced everything, yet would require experience to explore/determine its truth value. And the Metaphysical part is our sense of wonderment about it, and why we even have the capacity which causes us to make the statement in the first place (or as Schopenhauer might posit, our metaphysical will to wonder).

Why? I don't see that at all. — Bartricks

In a cosmological context, this would be an example of 'why':

1.Every contingent fact has an explanation.
2.There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
3.Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
4.This explanation must involve a necessary being.
5.This necessary being is God.

But the vast bulk would accept that some truths are necessary and those that are not necessary are contingent. — Bartricks

That's not what I asked though. I don't think it is obvious that the vast bulk would say that this distinction is necessary to make. Saying that sounds to me as ridiculous as saying "You must solve this problem using the conservation of energy. You cannot solve it using Newton's laws even though it is possible to do so" to give a physics example.

I think no truth is necessarily true, but at the same time I do not think that it is true that a true proposition 'could be false'. — Bartricks

Care to elaborate? I think: "I am eating right now" is an example of a proposition that is true at the moment but could very well be false.

I think belief in God comes from being aware of the despair we have in our life without God. Only God can cure us from that despair. Those who do not believe in God are not even aware of being in despair and hence it is still a form of despair. Logical arguments will only convince those who already believe in God. I regard using logic in theology akin to taking away the beauty. Only a religious man can get closer to God and know of him. Rhetoric leaves one behind. We need to have faith just as we live every day hopefully thinking that we won't die today. We don't need to use reasoning to be assured.

I certainly said all this due to kierkegaard being your avatar.

I think your categorization in the Kantian fashion is very clear and useful. But, one of the category is usually subject to scrutiny, the category of synthetic a priori .

If l am not wrong, euclidean geometry was a part of the synthetic a priori but it turned out that it wasn't necessarily true as mathematicians developed non euclidean geometry. Since it was argued that synthetic a priori statement are necessarily true. It turned out that this category may not exist but it is still an open topic.