Ok, so if I pronounce it with similar emphases to 'hypodermic', that is "hypo-thesis", then I should use 'a' instead of 'an'?

I guess it makes sense then.

So...an heuristic?

To be falsifiable is to be able to be shown as false.

Agree? — creativesoul

Well yeah, vaguely, but that's exactly where the thread started. My formula (with modal inflection if required, but it's implied, so 6 words, and I think I win) is just a straight guess at a gloss that would (to me) explain and justify the widespread acceptance of the notion.

"Butter melts at less than one hundred degrees" — creativesoul

But the question is whether there is any problem with saying that a particular piece of butter (a particular statement) satisfies "melts at some temperature less than 100°C" (satisfies "renders counter-examples verifiable") even though it never got the chance to melt (to render a counter-example verifiable), because I ate it cold (because it had no counter-examples).

No true statement is falsifiable.

True statements cannot be falsified.

Those are two different claims. First one is wrong.

To be falsifiable is to be able to be shown as false.

Possible, not able. Almost synonyms, which is why jump to error is not obvious...

If a statement cannot be shown as false, then it is unfalsifiable.

A claim is falsifiable if some observation might show it to be false, says Wikipedia. So, proving a statement to be true does not invalidate the status of that statement as being falsifiable.

Additionally, instead of ‘claim’ or ‘statement’, better fit is ‘prediction’, which is a special kind of statement, a claim that invites verification. The word ‘prediction’ is meant to be used in exactly this context of testability, verifiability and falsifiability, it carries additional useful information. Therefore, to sum it up:

Falsifiability is testability.

A prediction is falsifiable if it is testable.

That works for me, although doubtless it is a post-hoc rule.

Nice.

If we lose "statements" and stick with predictions, things change rather remarkably. There are no true predictions(when uttered). We may agree on more than not regarding predictions.

To be falsifiable is to be able to be shown as false.

Agree?
— creativesoul

Well yeah, vaguely, but that's exactly where the thread started. — bongo fury

I find no issue with that, so it's something to keep in mind. If we arrive at something which contradicts it, we aught pause and reconsider.

If we lose "statements" and stick with predictions, things change rather remarkably.

Also confirmed/falsified instead of proved true/false brings more sense into sentences like this: first experiment confirmed prediction, but hypothesis remained falsifiable and it was tested again, however negative result falsified prediction this time, so at the end conclusion is inconclusive and the hypothesis remains falsifiable, forever, regardless of how many times it will be confirmed or falsified in the future.

If we arrive at something which contradicts it, we aught pause and reconsider.

There is a lot to reconsider. We have definitions of two concepts for verification, testability and falsifiability, both useless, less and more.

Wikipedia says testability is falsifiability with added concern that “there is some real hope of deciding whether it is true or false”, one day. Could it be any more vague? Of course, just take that whole part out and we get falsifiability, completely open to interpretation, or worse, without any interpretation.

Testability implies falsifiability, making it redundant, but scientific theories are defined by both testability and falsifiability, so there must be some real difference between the two or something doesn’t add up.

Wikipedia on testability has a bit of information that is completely missing from the falsifiability article itself -- falsifiability means counterexamples to the hypothesis are logically possible -- whatever is that supposed to mean and however it is supposed to apply in practice, or not.

Obviously now, definition of falsifiability needs to be far more specific, and if testability has additional concern of practical viability for experimental verification, then falsifiability must deal with the additional concept of ‘counterexample’ and narrow it down, or it remains pointless. Let me illustrate...

a.) I hypothesise life after death and predict all kinds of phenomena like near-death experience, ghosts, communication with the dead. Are those falsifiable predictions? Are they testable?

b.) I hypothesise many worlds, infinite number of universes and predict we will be able to see some kind of overlap when we discover super-strings or build a telescope three times the size of the Moon. Are those predictions falsifiable? Are they testable?

c.) I hypothesise consciousness is ‘integrated information’, it’s just how integrated information feels inside, and I can accurately predict levels of consciousness in awake, sleeping, anesthetized and comatose people. I also accurately predict already known observation that cerebellum is not relevant for consciousness. My hypothesis has been independently confirmed many times with strong evidence, it’s a theory, but are my predictions falsifiable?

d.) I hypothesise photons are made of unicorn tears, and I explain everything with a story that makes sense as much as quantum mechanics, but my equations are the same as QM, so I make all the same predictions and my theory is already validated as much, but can my predictions really be considered falsifiable? And even if they can, does that necessarily mean my hypothesis is falsifiable?

No ordinary statements or claims here. Testability deals with predictions, and falsifiability with counterexamples.

In order for a claim to be falsifiable it must already be false... or it's a prediction... which is neither true or false at the time it's first spoken/uttered. — creativesoul

Right but we don't know if it is true or false. When we say something could be falsified. We mean, if if it were false. What it refers to has qualities that allow for counter-evidence. It's a different type of 'can' or 'could'. And it is subjunctive. There is a subjunctive implicit in the sentence. If it were the case that is is false (and right now we do not know if it is) we will be able to falsify it. Some things that are false need nto have this aspect. I get your point, and perhaps it should be made more explicit in a description of falsifiability, but I think it also rests on an equivocation.

I'd say that is a misleading statement and a confusing one. I would not call it simply true, nor would I say it is simply false. Truth and falsehood are not binary.

I'm refraining from objecting.

Predictions are ordinary statements about what will happen.

Pardon me. Multiple conversations with multiple participants. Are you referring to the claim about butter?

Yes. If you click on your name in red with the arrow in my post (and this is a general rule) it will jump you to the post I (or anyone) is referring to. So you can always check that way what the heck people are referring to, even if they don't quote.

What would it take for it to be true?

Butter would need to melt at any temperature below one hundred.

So...

It's true.

No?

:brow:

What would it take for it to be false?

Butter would not melt at any temperature below one hundred.

Butter does.

So...

It's not false.

I find no issue with that, so it's something to keep in mind. If we arrive at something which contradicts it, we aught pause and reconsider. — creativesoul

Missing the point of the thread, which I take to be: what clarification of that vague and ambiguous assertion (the one you are pleased that I find vaguely agreeable) would convey the scope and central tendency of the un-packings that Popper and his followers would likely give it, so that the wiki article might (with this clarification) better help the reader avoid common mis-readings and (from the falsificationist point of view) spurious objections, such as yours.

I might worry that my formula had failed its task in your case, if you didn't already admit to being uninterested in likely falsificationist unpackings of the assertion.

In case you missed, I mentioned a piece of information missing from the article.

The Solution of Falsifiability
In Popper's later work... statement being falsifiable "if and only if it logically contradicts some (empirical) sentence that describes a logically possible event that it would be logically possible to observe." https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem

Thus, this should work better:

A prediction is falsifiable if it logically implies counterexample.
A prediction is testable if it is falsifiable and empirically feasible.


It doesn’t make sense a prediction could be falsifiable but not testable, so some things need to switch places, but nevertheless let us test these definitions and see if can falsify, or confirm temporarily, the definition of falsifiability itself...

a.) I hypothesise life after death and predict all kinds of phenomena like near-death experience, ghosts, communication with the dead. Are those falsifiable predictions? Are they testable?

These contradict scientific consensus, so it is not obvious what the predictions are in terms of empirical observations. Without explicit experimental proposal we only have empty assertions, we do not know what the prediction actually is and thus no way of knowing what possible counterexamples it may imply.

So the first step for a hypothesis to become a scientific theory is to describe exactly where, what, how and when at least one prediction is to be observed.

b.) I hypothesise many worlds, infinite number of universes and predict we will be able to see some kind of overlap when we discover super-strings or build a telescope three times the size of the Moon. Are those predictions falsifiable? Are they testable?

Telescope prediction is falsifiable, we either observe that overlap or we don’t. But I would not classify it as testable nor scientific. What’s the hurry? If we ever manage to build such a huge telescope, then your hypothesis will become testable and falsifiable, just wait.

Superstrings prediction, being out of realm for observations with current technology, must also be extra precise in defining experimental setup, otherwise it can not be classified as testable or falsifiable.

c.) I hypothesise consciousness is ‘integrated information’, it’s just how integrated information feels inside, and I can accurately predict levels of consciousness in awake, sleeping, anesthetized and comatose people. I also accurately predict already known observation that cerebellum is not relevant for consciousness. My hypothesis has been independently confirmed many times with strong evidence, it’s a theory, but are my predictions falsifiable?

Predicting already known cerebellum observation sounds suspicious, for some reason. In any case, I do not see how this can be falsifiable, it would be a biological paradox.

But predictions of the levels of consciousness are independently confirmed as quite accurate and currently it is the basis of the only method for such analysis in coma patients. Predictions fail, say 10% of the time, and this is considered confirmation, so to what percentage prediction failure has to rise in order to be deemed as falsification?

And here we also have infamous ‘explanatory gap’ and mind-body problem. I’m afraid any hypothesis trying to explain what _is consciousness, as opposed to _how it works, can not, in principle it seems, produce any prediction based on empirical observation.

Most such theory may propose to define consciousness inevitably falls among the lines of “that’s how quantum collapse feels inside”, “that’s how information feels inside”, or “that’s how universe feels inside”.

We must therefore conclude that all of those so called theories of consciousness are ultimately untestable and unfalsifiable, definitely not scientific, but more like a crackpot fringe.

d.) I hypothesise photons are made of unicorn tears, and I explain everything with a story that makes sense as much as quantum mechanics, but my equations are the same as QM, so I make all the same predictions and my theory is already validated as much, but can my predictions really be considered falsifiable? And even if they can, does that necessarily mean my hypothesis is falsifiable?

QM. The whole theory is based on statistical simplification of measurement tables and predictions thus follow “naturally”, kind of like my prediction that the sun will be bright when you look at it.

In QM you first measure, then you hypothesise by abstracting description of that experimental setup and explaining it with whatever nonsense, so then you just simply predict what you already measured.

We must therefore conclude that quantum mechanics is a fraud, I mean it is not falsifiable and thus not scientific, more like a crackpot fringe.

the question is whether there is any problem with saying that a particular piece of butter (a particular statement) satisfies "melts at some temperature less than 100°C"... — bongo fury

All butter melts at some temperature less than one hundred degrees. So, I suppose I'm not seeing this problem that you're referring to.

In case you missed, I mentioned a piece of information missing from the article. — Zelebg

SO, go fix the article.

Be Bold - all you gotta do is click Edit.

this problem that you're referring to. — creativesoul

I am?

But the question is whether there is any problem with saying that a particular piece of butter (a particular statement) satisfies "melts at some temperature less than 100°C" (satisfies "renders counter-examples verifiable") even though it never got the chance to melt (to render a counter-example verifiable), because I ate it cold (because it had no counter-examples). — bongo fury

Just to be clear, the question was meant to be rhetorical, and the answer no.

It's a complex, ill-posed and frankly outdated assertion. Firstly, an observation O can only materially entail the contradiction of a hypothesis H in a closed finite world. For in an open-world, the meaning of the material implication O => ~H isn't empirically reducible to observations, and is instead an auxiliary hypothesis, A, which isn't itself entailed by some other observation on pain of infinite regress. So in an open world we have A => ( O => ~H) , and hence O => (~A OR ~H)

It's a complex, ill-posed and frankly outdated assertion. Firstly, an observation O can only materially entail the contradiction of a hypothesis H in a closed finite world. For in an open-world, the meaning of the material implication O => ~H isn't empirically reducible to observations, and is instead an auxiliary hypothesis, A, which isn't itself entailed by some other observation on pain of infinite regress. So in an open world we have A => ( O => ~H) , and hence O => (~A OR ~H) — sime

And secondly?

For in an open-world, the meaning of the material implication O => ~H isn't empirically reducible to observations, and is instead an auxiliary hypothesis, A, which isn't itself entailed by some other observation on pain of infinite regress. So in an open world we have A => ( O => ~H) , and hence O => (~A OR ~H)

Can you show that idea with practical example?

But that doesn't say what falsifiability is. — Banno

Falsifiability is a quality of an assertion such that juxtaposed with its negation, one or the other can be verified.

Falsifiable hypotheses can be shown to be false.