How is solipsism, specifically the part where you deny the existence of other minds, tenable when cogito ergo sum can be used to confirm the existence of all thinking beings? — TheMadFool

Cogito ergo sum does establish that "Thought" exists now: There is thought now, is how I like to generalize that aphorism. However the "I" seems like an add-on. Maybe the "I" is illusory, erroneous, or doubtful (to use the Cartesian language). So possible Cogito Ergo Sum applies to some kind of "universal mind" of which egos are illusory sub-units. This would be a consistent solipsism. I don't really think this is true, myself, but it is at least arguable.

Cogito ergo sum does establish that "Thought" exists now: There is thought now, is how I like to generalize that aphorism. However the "I" seems like an add-on. Maybe the "I" is illusory, erroneous, or doubtful (to use the Cartesian language). So possible Cogito Ergo Sum applies to some kind of "universal mind" of which egos are illusory sub-units. This would be a consistent solipsism. I don't really think this is true, myself, but it is at least arguable. — Pantagruel

Well, in what way do you suppose that the "I" is illusory? To the extent that I've understood, I = personhood, and personhood has to do with memory which preserves a record of an individual's experiences and doesn't that indicate the existence of an "I" that experienced what's recorded in memory?

If you think carefully, even memory doesn't quite prove the existence of an "I". Memory is, in essence, a record of the past - a history as it were. The mere existence of history cannot mean the existence of a permanent "I" that remained constant through that history. Why? Think of the history of humans. There's a record of our history that stretches many thousands of years into the past. It is the preserved memory of humanity and yet humans in the course of that time have been born and have met their deaths like in a relay race, passing the baton (memory) so to speak from one participant to another. Memory, by itself, is insufficient to infer the existence of an "I" that remains constant throughout life and beyond.

Yet, in a certain sense, we could say that the memory itself is the "I": the recorded history itself constitutes the "I" instead of presuming that an "I" exists that has memories. Such a conception meshes well with our beliefs that where memory goes, the "I" goes. To make matters clearer, the conventional concept of an "I" is much like a memory card - distinct from the contents and viewed as a receptacle of memories. Yet, this view is fails to cohere with the belief that the "I" is defined by its memories: the contents of the memory card is the "I" and the memory card itself is nothing more than a temporary storage device for the memories, the "I".

I extrapolated the possibility that the I is illusory from the general modification of CES.

It is a standard objection or caveat to "Cogito Ergo Sum" which you can investigate by looking at the Wikipedia entry. Personally, I formulated the modification independently.
"The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I," is more than the cogito can justify. "

So if Cogito Ergo Sum does not implicate an "I" it has no direct ramifications for Solipsism, and could be conformant along the lines I suggest.

Solipsism (/ˈsɒlɪpsɪzəm/ (listen); from Latin solus, meaning 'alone', and ipse, meaning 'self')[1] is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.
— Wikipedia

How is solipsism, specifically the part where you deny the existence of other minds, tenable when cogito ergo sum can be used to confirm the existence of all thinking beings?

If I can say the mind of an other is uncertain then that other may say the same thing of my mind, and so on, making every mind of uncertain existence and yet anyone, everyone can say, truthfully, "cogito ergo — TheMadFool

Why are you saying that solipsism denies the existence of other minds?

Read your definition (I've seen others which I consider much better)...and nothing in it suggests that solipsism denies the existence of other minds.

Solipsism is weakness or an incomplete theory of an alternate reality.

Is it stupid to think you're the only one? Then great danger may be before you...

The cogito only claims to establish the existence of the mind of the one doing the thinking. It has nothing at all to say about the existence of other minds having thoughts that the "I" thinking the cogito is not the thinker of. So if you're in a place of doubting the existence of everything, the cogito only saves you from doubt in your own existence. Other minds, if they exists, cannot doubt their own existence, but they could doubt yours, and each others', and so you can doubt theirs too.

How is solipsism, specifically the part where you deny the existence of other minds, tenable when cogito ergo sum can be used to confirm the existence of all thinking beings? — TheMadFool

Cogito ergo sum only confirms the mind of the thinker. Other thinkers and their minds do not necessarily exist. Your opinion is an invalid inference of Cogito Ergo Sum.

I extrapolated the possibility that the I is illusory from the general modification of CES.

It is a standard objection or caveat to "Cogito Ergo Sum" which you can investigate by looking at the Wikipedia entry. Personally, I formulated the modification independently.
"The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I," is more than the cogito can justify. "

So if Cogito Ergo Sum does not implicate an "I" it has no direct ramifications for Solipsism, and could be conformant along the lines I suggest. — Pantagruel

Ok. I understand that the I can't be inferred to just from the fact that cogitation occurs. Yet, the fact that thinking occurs must mean there's a thinker. What's the difference between the I and the thinker?

Why are you saying that solipsism denies the existence of other minds? — Frank Apisa

It says so in the wikipedia entry on solipsism:

Denial of material existence, in itself, does not constitute solipsism.

A feature of the metaphysical solipsistic worldview is the denial of the existence of other minds — Wikipedia

Frankly speaking, if radical skepticism a la Descartes permits one and only one conclusion - that one can be certain of only the self as a thinker and nothing else - then it follows that the existence of other minds is doubtful.

Solipsism is body-art. A simple illusion. A personal and impersonal standpoint, the logic of the universe is bent somehow; the colors are put on hold for second" Oh may I be the only one who exists". From our perception of the vast constellation, we can imagine what it is like to be alone. In your own universe, is solipsism normal?

Is alone the wrong thing and is together the right thing?

Is it stupid to think you're the only one? Then great danger may be before you... — Qwex

:chin:

The cogito only claims to establish the existence of the mind of the one doing the thinking. It has nothing at all to say about the existence of other minds having thoughts that the "I" thinking the cogito is not the thinker of. So if you're in a place of doubting the existence of everything, the cogito only saves you from doubt in your own existence. Other minds, if they exists, cannot doubt their own existence, but they could doubt yours, and each others', and so you can doubt theirs too. — Pfhorrest

It's the simultaneous doubt about and certain knowledge of the existence of our minds that's the problem. Using the cogito ergo sum argument everyone's existence is certain but solipsism would have the existence of everyone in doubt. We can actually use the cogito ergo sum argument against solipsism by saying that because everyone doubts the existence of others, a doubter, obviously a thinker/I exists in everyone.

What's the difference between the I and the thinker? — TheMadFool

Well, yes, that is the question.

It's the simultaneous doubt about and certain knowledge of the existence of our minds that's the problem. Using the cogito ergo sum argument everyone's existence is certain but solipsism would have the existence of everyone in doubt. We can actually use the cogito ergo sum argument against solipsism by saying that because everyone doubts the existence of others, a doubter, obviously a thinker/I exists in everyone.

The problem begins when one identifies with this “thinker” and nothing else. Doing so one has no choice to believe in solipsism as a logical conclusion because the body is a sort of buffer or shroud that exists between him and the rest of reality. So, despite all evidence to the contrary, he believes himself to be not unlike a little man in his own head observing the Cartesian theater. We need not prove these little men, these “thinkers” and “doubters”, and leave solipsists to their own devices.

It's the simultaneous doubt about and certain knowledge of the existence of our minds that's the problem. — TheMadFool

Doubt and certainty are epistemic, and so relative to each thinker. Each thinker has certainty about their own mind's existence and doubt about all other minds' existence. So each thinker finds themselves concluding that they are the only mind that exists. It's only from our non-solipsistic perspective, assuming that all of these bodies we see talking about this stuff, all have minds inside them like ours, that we can talk about this kind of thing. From any individual solipsist's point of view, theirs is the only point of view, so whether "other people" would find themselves certain of their own existence is irrelevant, because that solipsist doubts that any "other people" exist to begin with. A figment of my imagination can't be certain of its existence, because it doesn't have a first-person point of view to think the cogito from. So if "everyone else" are all figments of my imagination, the cogito doesn't prove anything about their existence.

Well, yes, that is the question. — Pantagruel

You have nothing to say on that point?! :chin:

The problem begins when one identifies with this “thinker” and nothing else. Doing so one has no choice to believe in solipsism as a logical conclusion because the body is a sort of buffer or shroud that exists between him and the rest of reality. So, despite all evidence to the contrary, he believes himself to be not unlike a little man in his own head observing the Cartesian theater. We need not prove these little men, these “thinkers” and “doubters”, and leave solipsists to their own devices. — NOS4A2

:chin:

Is there no contradiction in re cogito ergo sum and solipsisim?

1. Solipsisim: doubt the existence of other minds

2. Cogito ergo sum: I'm certain I exist AND I am an other mind to someone at least.

3. As an other mind my existence is doubtful but by cogito ergo sum, I'm certain of my existence.

4. My existence then is certain and also doubtful. A contradiction, no?

2. Cogito ergo sum: I'm certain I exist AND I am an other mind to someone at least. — TheMadFool

This is the problem. The Cogito doesn't establish that there are other someones for whom I am an other mind. I'm only certain that I exist. If there are other minds like me, they're probably certain that they exist, but (with only the Cogito to go on) I am doubtful about that there are any such other minds to begin with.

If there are a bunch of different minds, all of them solipsists, then they are all in contradiction with each other. But if I start off doubting everything, including that there are such other minds, and I find certainty that I exist via the Cogito, then my picture of the world is still consistent with itself: it's of a world in which I am certain I exist and doubtful that anybody else does. I might be wrong, but not because I'm inconsistent with myself.

The Cartesian cogito only establishes as evidence (without possible contradiction) the existence of the "I" as "something" (a substance) that thinks. From there Descartes is forced to find some evidence -as evident as the previous one- that the external world and other minds exist. And he fails.

Empiricists used this failure to discredit rationalism. Indeed, the latter was forced to admit solipsism or to accept another criterion of evidence. The first is not to anyone's liking. The second leads to an empiricist criterion of truth. But it is not so clear that empiricism nullifies solipsism. As Berkeley shows.

This is just an epistemological battle. No blood. Only wit.

This is the problem. The Cogito doesn't establish that there are other someones for whom I am an other mind. I'm only certain that I exist. If there are other minds like me, they're probably certain that they exist, but (with only the Cogito to go on) I am doubtful about that there are any such other minds to begin with.

If there are a bunch of different minds, all of them solipsists, then they are all in contradiction with each other. But if I start off doubting everything, including that there are such other minds, and I find certainty that I exist via the Cogito, then my picture of the world is still consistent with itself: it's of a world in which I am certain I exist and doubtful that anybody else does. I might be wrong, but not because I'm inconsistent with myself. — Pfhorrest

It is apparent that the cogito argument proves that even if we were to be radically skeptical, there is one thing we can never doubt: we can be certain of a doubter, call it I/self, for to doubt implies a doubter; thoughts, ergo a thinker. We agree on this.

If I am to marry solipsism with Descartes' cogito ergo sum argument, then because Descartes proves that the only certain truth we can know of is our own existence and nothing else, it follows that the existence of other minds is in doubt or is doubtful.

Imagine now that I'm a contemporary of Descartes. Descartes, cogito ergo sum, claims that he's certain of only one truth: that Descartes exists. Now, I read his argument and following the same logic come to the conclusion that I, TheMadFool, exists. Neither Descartes nor I is certain of the existence of the other. In other words, there are not one, as solipsisim requires, but two doubters i.e. there are at least two minds. We can extend this logic to everyone, generating as many doubting minds as there are people and where there's doubt there's a doubter, an other mind.

I'm relying on a more general notion of doubt, not necessarily confined to the self as in the cogito ergo sum argument, but also about other minds. If every mind can doubt the existence of every other mind it implies that every mind is doubting and where there's doubt there's a doubter.

When Descartes doubt that everything but his mind exists, he is also doubting that you exist to be doubting that he exists: he does not experience your doubting, only his own. You of course think the same about him as he does about you. Assuming you both actually read exist, and follow from doubt to the rejection of each other’s existence, then you are both wrong. But not because your own beliefs are in contradiction with themselves: you each consistently conclude that you are the only mind, and that nobody else exists to be doubting their own existence, only you are doing that.

Does anyone ever say "TheMadFool" is the only one who exists?

You base theory on "How do I Know?" - "it could be" - "the logic would be different" - "I don't know it yet."

No-one is here with the scientific answer for their solipsism.

Is this all in your mind - is the logic bent? The logic has not presented itself as bent.

What shadowy essence keeps you here?

You have nothing to say on that point?! — TheMadFool

Well I'm not a solipsist. In fact, I believe that mind is a community phenomenon, and being an adherent of Systems Philosophy I embrace the maxim, unity through diversity. It seems evident to me that consciousness functions through concepts that are fundamentally inter-subjective. The ends or objectives of thought become trivial unless they involve a community of minds I think.

How is solipsism, specifically the part where you deny the existence of other minds, tenable when cogito ergo sum can be used to confirm the existence of all thinking beings? — TheMadFool

But it can't be. It can only confirm, it if can, that one mind. I think therefore I am relates to 'I'.

If I can say the mind of an other is uncertain then that other may say the same thing of my mind, and so on, making every mind of uncertain existence and yet anyone, everyone can say, truthfully, "cogito ergo sum". — TheMadFool

That other mind can be uncertain about me, if it exists, but I can't. We are priviledged in relation to our own consciousness. We understand how they might doubt our existence as we can more easily doubt theirs than our own.

When Descartes doubt that everything but his mind exists, he is also doubting that you exist to be doubting that he exists: he does not experience your doubting, only his own. You of course think the same about him as he does about you. Assuming you both actually read exist, and follow from doubt to the rejection of each other’s existence, then you are both wrong. But not because your own beliefs are in contradiction with themselves: you each consistently conclude that you are the only mind, and that nobody else exists to be doubting their own existence, only you are doing that. — Pfhorrest

What is the highest doubt that can be entertained? That nothing is real, but even then one can't doubt that there is a doubter, viz yourself that is doubting. In short one is absolutely certain that one, as a doubter, really exists. Incipient in this is the uncertainty of, what you term, other minds. After all, if one can be certain of only one truth and that truth is one's own existence, then everything else must be uncertain or doubtful and that includes other minds. I'm repeating myself here but I'm trying to grasp the logic so kindly accommodate me.

Therefore, the cogito erg sum argument actually puts in doubt, a la solipsism, the existence of other minds. That implies everyone is free to doubt the existence of other minds but in doing so, do they not doubt [the existence of other minds] and does that not mean the existence of a doubter, and does that not, in turn, mean that everyone exists, being the doubters they are?

How would a solipsist reply to this?

S/he might say that since the existence of other minds is itself in doubt, there is no way we can posit that there are doubters out there. Radical skepticism still in place concerning everything outside and beyond the self, I can't rely on the testimony of others to confirm that they too have used the cogito ergo sum argument to establish the certainty of their own existence - it could be an illusion.

Let's begin at a point that is beyond doubt: that we have access to 1) our internal selves and 2) the external behavior of others. Our internal selves can be directly experienced but the internal selves of other minds can only be inferred from their external behavior. The cogito ergo sum argument basically uses our ability to get at our own internal selves and since that is all that's possible in an indubitable sense, the value of the external behavior of other minds is vastly diminished to be almost useless in inferring anything at all. Yet, if we give ourselves some leeway, and assume that external behavior can be used, to some degree, to infer the inner selves of other minds, we see that there is a substantial amount of correspondence between our own behavior and that of other minds i.e. we can match thoughts to behaviour in us to thoughts and behavior in others. Ergo, allowing for some inference from external behavior, we may conclude that other minds do exist because they, crucially, exhibit behavior consistent with a sense of doubt about reality and where there is doubt, there's a doubter.

making every mind of uncertain existence — TheMadFool

Actually, every mind is sure to exist, insofar as every mind thinks its own certainty.

Community of individuals.

everyone can say, truthfully, "cogito ergo sum". — TheMadFool

How do you know they are being truthful? How do you know they are thinking? That's the point of solipsism. If you already give that there are other minds that can truthfully say cogito ergo sum then, of course, it won't be compatible with solipsism

3. As an other mind my existence is doubtful but by cogito ergo sum, I'm certain of my existence. — TheMadFool

Other to what? If you accept solipsism you are the ONLY mind. There is no "other"

Why are you saying that solipsism denies the existence of other minds?
— Frank Apisa

It says so in the wikipedia entry on solipsism:
Denial of material existence, in itself, does not constitute solipsism.

A feature of the metaphysical solipsistic worldview is the denial of the existence of other minds
— Wikipedia — TheMadFool

Actually, it doesn't.

Here is the entry:

Solipsism (/ˈsɒlɪpsɪzəm/: from Latin solus, meaning 'alone', and ipse, meaning 'self')[1] is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.

Solipsism suggests that the only thing one CAN BE SURE of is self...or more particularly, one's own mind. Everything else MAY NOT exist.

And of course, that is a possibility. I know "there is something going on" which I call "my thinking" or "my mind."

But how can I possibly be sure that you exist...or anyone else?

Scary as hell!

If I were all that exists...the first thing I would do is to create an illusion world where I would be just a tiny cog in a great OTHER. The idea that "I" being all that exists is the ultimate horror. Being GOD would be the ultimate terror.

I am only sure of my mind, therefore it might be that I am the only one.

"Therefore, it might be", is something uncertain itself.

I am certain my mind(What is Mind?) exists (and is solitary; is this right?) but can't be certain other minds exist.

What is mind? Is a good question; do you think your mind is solitary?

The only thing I'm sure of is my genetic build.

Solipsism is either weakness, in regards to being in reality, or a theory of an alternate reality(that is usually incomplete).

One way to look at the Descartes speculation about other minds is not to look at it as a matter of proving the viability of certain theses but a method of confirming what we are most certain of.

The viability of the power of math to solve problems is not anchored upon what that activity might be in some narrative of existence but because it does not care.

The certainty that is desired is not about confirming our personal existence. We are stuck with that. It is the least interesting thing.

Does anyone ever say "TheMadFool" is the only one who exists?

You base theory on "How do I Know?" - "it could be" - "the logic would be different" - "I don't know it yet."

No-one is here with the scientific answer for their solipsism.

Is this all in your mind - is the logic bent? The logic has not presented itself as bent.

What shadowy essence keeps you here? — Qwex

:chin:

Actually, every mind is sure to exist, insofar as every mind thinks its own certainty. — Mww

How do you know they are being truthful? How do you know they are thinking? That's the point of solipsism. If you already give that there are other minds that can truthfully say cogito ergo sum then, of course, it won't be compatible with solipsism — khaled

That's true and I mentioned this problem in another post.

Being GOD would be the ultimate terror. — Frank Apisa

:up:

That other mind can be uncertain about me, if it exists, but I can't. We are priviledged in relation to our own consciousness. We understand how they might doubt our existence as we can more easily doubt theirs than our own. — Coben

To All

Descartes began his musings with radical doubt and realized that doubt must entail a doubter; cogito ergo sum. Of everything else, Descartes wasn't sure or was uncertain/doubtful for he couldn't rule out that it was all an illusion.

Solipsism is essential Cartesian in that it to states that one can be only sure of one's own existence and that the existence of other minds is doubtful.

The crux of the matter is that, being a radical skeptic, nothing can be taken for granted: we doubt everything, our senses and our minds too. To use computer terminology, both the input devices and the processor are unreliable. Nevertheless, that there's some processing going on (thinking/doubting), it follows that there's a processor (thinker/I). Beyond that, everything is totally dark for the radical skeptic for he can't trust his own mind nor his senses.

My main concern is whether there exist other minds, like Descartes, capable of coming to the same conclusion of their own existence by employing the cogito ergo sum argument? Even if there are other minds capable of Descartes' argument, Descartes himself can never be certain of the existence of other minds for the evidence that other minds exist must pass through his senses and be processed by his mind, both of which, for the radical skeptic, are unreliable except when inferring the existence of Descartes himself using the cogito ergo sum argument. Radical skepticism creates an unbridgable gap for knowledge of the external world, the world that is beyond the self in general, and other minds in particular.

Consider now the options that are available to us: either other minds exist or other minds don't exist. What would either option entail and what does our world look like? The general intuition we all function under is that other minds do exist. Perhaps, unlike radical skeptics like Descartes, we trust our senses and minds just to the right degree to enable the inference that other minds exist: each one of us seems capable of thought and our behavior matches with beings capable of thinking. Now, if the solipsist claims that it's doubtful that other minds exist, he must mean either that our senses and minds are unreliable or that the evidence for the existence of other minds is compatible with their non-existence. The first possibility is obvious; after all if we can't rely on our senses and minds, we must doubt every sensation and inference. The second possibility is slightly different for it claims that all the behavior that we exhibit which we consider to be indications of thinking is also compatible with the non-thinking beings, beings that only appear to be thinking but are actually not thinking at all: P-zombies?

Consider now the options that are available to us: either other minds exist or other minds don't exist. — TheMadFool

I'll throw out a third options. Other minds are both other minds and also part of the same mind. A bit like a subpersonality in one of us.

Perhaps, unlike radical skeptics like Descartes — TheMadFool

I am sure he assumed other minds existed most of the time, just not while trying to find a foundation for knowledge in that exercise he's famous for.

Now, if the solipsist claims that it's doubtful that other minds exist, he must mean either that our senses and minds are unreliable or that the evidence for the existence of other minds is compatible with their non-existence. — TheMadFool

Some solipsists are saying there are not other minds, period. Not merely that the evidence is compatible with this but it is also the case. Not saying that's a strong position or not, just mentioning there is a third here.

The second possibility is slightly different for it claims that all the behavior that we exhibit which we consider to be indications of thinking is also compatible with the non-thinking beings, beings that only appear to be thinking but are actually not thinking at all: P-zombies? — TheMadFool

Sort of...could be facets of the one beings dream. IOW we don't need organisms that have all the qualities of life we do but no consciousness, but phantoms. These solipsists would then, I think, not be physicalists or even dualists, but idealists or something similar.

This is my argument, not tredding in the mucky waters.

The only thing separating our minds from the simulation is our bodies; otherwise every spirit would say "I am [this part of the] simulation".

(Something needs to be added here but I'm not intelligent enough, yet.)

In the simulation are other bodies, but I cannot tell if they have minds.

However, other bodies have consciousness potential, whether they're 'online' or not, it still makes logical sense; they fit into both normal reality and alternate realities.

Therefore, I think part of this existence is theorizing alternate realities.

The mind problem exists by way of a complex body continuum, and it begs the question, what alternate realities might/do exist?

This is my argument, tredding in the mucky waters.

I'm my mind, but I'm at the Super Store, taking in only a percentile of the available sensory data.

Is there another mind at the Park?

If there are no other minds then there is a lot of waste in the production of my reality.

I would consider it an attack...

Is it okay to think only some are P-zombies? Why would high quality lives not be conscious?

solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; — Wikipedia

I think you guys seem to accepting a false premise here. That is, I would say that the whole premise that you have any sense of certainty of knowledge or existence within one’s own mind cannot happen without knowledge of one’s embodiment within some external context. The “I” cannot exist unless it ‘knows’ what it is separate from. Humans form a mob of one mind because they are programed to turn their “I” into copies of the group “we”, where the “I” is lost, usually temporarily sometimes permanently. When a human becomes part of such a mob and shares common mind and actions then he/she ‘knows’ his mind is not alone or the only sentient “I” around, maybe much like as if they became that fifth state of (cognitive) matter, a (cognitive) Bose-Einstein condensate with the other minds.
IMHO, the “I” is no one thing but is formed mostly by many layers which we think as robotic automaton stuff, unified by some transcendental aspects that bring the qualia of conscious experience of “I”. Yet, I seriously doubt that qualia of conscious experience of you as “I” can happen without resonating with other external embodiments/minds. Otherwise, such a state of disconnected being is like having no language or models to describe (imagine) what “I” am about, so I’d be more like a reptile (just acting) than like a human (self-reflecting/introspection).