But what is that relationship on your view? Where does it obtain? Just what, ontologically, is it? That's what I'm asking you. Is it part of the ink or paint or whatever? Where is it located? What is it made of? — Terrapin Station

Those are all good questions, but if they are unanswerable, perhaps they are not so good. I'll start with "where is it located?". As I've been explaining to John, the relationships of necessity which are proper to intelligible objects, forms, are non-spatial relationships. They are relationships of logical order, and "order" is a temporal concept. So "where" it is, is rather meaningless. We have to seek its temporal position.

There are many types of relationships which are not well understood by human beings. Consider the relationship between the earth and the moon, which we call gravity. Gravity might be a property of these two physical objects, such that the two objects are interacting with each other through the means of gravity. But this would mean that a part of each object reached out and touched the other object, and that the existence of these two objects actually overlapped each other. This is counter-intuitive because it implies that the two objects exist at the same place, gravity being a part of each object, and overlapping. Relativity theory separates the gravity from the objects, such that the gravity is understood as a property of space-time. But space-time is a conceptual medium so there is a category separation between the real objects, earth and moon, and gravity which is a property of the conceptual medium, space-time. So that representation of this relationship called gravity, is unacceptable as well.

This leads us to a third possibility in which gravity is real, existing with the real objects, earth and moon, but the gravity encompasses all the physical objects, as one (invisible) entity, while the individual objects, the earth and moon, are just the visible parts of that one entity. In this way, the solar system is one object, with visible parts; the unity (relationships) which makes it a whole is to be found in the existence of gravity.

It is a logical necessity which would force us to assume that these visible objects are part of an invisible whole. The thing which produces the relationships, gravity, and causes that entity (the solar system) to exist as a whole, is completely invisible. This is just an example of how difficult it is to understand such relationships.

What you ask about is the relationship of representation, and this is often present as meaning. We could say that meaning is one type of such a relationship, though some would equate relationships of representation as relationships of meaning. I am not so sure about such an equation. In any case, here, we have an object and the object represents. I think you'll agree with that. Do you agree that the thing which the object represents, is something which will only come to be in the future? So there is a relationship between the object, being the symbol (the representation), and something else, which will exist in the future. That is the type of relationship we are talking about here, a relationship between a present object and a future object.

As I've been explaining to John, the relationships of necessity which are proper to intelligible objects, forms, — Metaphysician Undercover

Say what? First, what the heck are we referring to exactly with "relationships of necessity"?

Although we might want to just jump ahead to your idea that there are existents with no spatial location. The very idea of existents (or subsistents, or whatever you might prefer to call them) with no spatial location is incoherent on my view.

Say what? First, what the heck are we referring to exactly with "relationships of necessity"? — Terrapin Station

Do you agree that red is necessarily a colour? That is what I mean by a relationship of necessity, a logical relationship, one such as the relationship between red and colour. A human being is necessarily an animal. An animal is necessarily a living being. A circle is necessarily a geometrical figure.

Although we might want to just jump ahead to your idea that there are existents with no spatial location. The very idea of existents (or subsistents, or whatever you might prefer to call them) with no spatial location is incoherent on my view. — Terrapin Station

I am talking about relationships which are non-spatial, yet still necessary, such as the ones listed above. I am not talking about non-spatial existents. You really are jumping ahead, to class a relationship as an existent. Existents are individual objects, things, and relationships are the means by which one existent is connected to another. Do you agree that there is a relationship of necessity between a mother and her daughter, yet this relationship is not described in spatial terms?

Do you agree that red is necessarily a colour? That is what I mean by a relationship of necessity, a logical relationship, one such as the relationship between red and colour. A human being is necessarily an animal. An animal is necessarily a living being. A circle is necessarily a geometrical figure. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do I agree with that? It depends on what we're saying, exactly. If we're referring to how we're naming things/defining terms, then no, I don't think there's anything necessary about that. If you're appealing to something like "natural kinds," I don't buy that there are natural kinds. If you're simply saying that the stuff we're conventionally naming red is a color, and a color is necessarily a color, I'd agree with that, or at least I'd say that I can't personally make sense of saying that logical contradictions can obtain.

It seems, by the way, like maybe you're forwarding the notion of analyticity that Quine argued against in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".

I am talking about relationships which are non-spatial, yet still necessary, such as the ones listed above. I am not talking about non-spatial existents. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you'd be talking about relationships that don't exist (or subsist, or whatever similar term you'd use for them)? How would there be those relationships in that case?

I'm not a realist on logic (or mathematics) by the way.

Do you agree that there is a relationship of necessity between a mother and her daughter, yet this relationship is not described in spatial terms? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree there is a relation there. I wouldn't agree that it's a necessary relationship (per my comments above). And I wouldn't say that it makes any sense to say that the relationship doesn't have a location/isn't physical, etc.

If you're simply saying that the stuff we're conventionally naming red is a color, and a color is necessarily a color, I'd agree with that, or at least I'd say that I can't personally make sense of saying that logical contradictions can obtain. — Terrapin Station

No, I'm not saying that a colour is necessarily a colour, though it is this same type of necessity which I refer to. I'm saying that red is necessarily a colour. If you don't agree with that, then so be it, you don't apprehend the same need which I apprehend. It is this need, which I apprehend, that makes me say that red is necessarily a colour.

You see the need to say that a colour is necessarily a colour, and if not there is contradiction, and consequentially unintelligibility. The same unintelligibility results if you do not see the need to say that red is necessarily a colour, and all the other examples which I provided. The relationship is necessary for the sake of intelligibility.

So you'd be talking about relationships that don't exist (or subsist, or whatever similar term you'd use for them)? How would there be those relationships in that case? — Terrapin Station

As I said, they are relationships of temporal order. An existing thing is related to something in the future, which does not yet exist. These relationships are understood as possibilities. When a particular possibility (relationship of this type) is recognized as needed, it is determined as necessary, and acting on this necessity brings about the existence of the future thing.

Take a logical premise for example. It expresses a certain relationship. The relationship is a possibility, in the sense that the premise is a proposal, a proposition which may be accepted or rejected. When accepted it becomes a necessity, as it is necessary for the sake of the conclusion. The conclusion is the thing which will come about in the future, as a result of accepting the possibility (the proposition, or premise) as a necessity.

The same unintelligibility results if you do not see the need to say that red is necessarily a colour, — Metaphysician Undercover

That wouldn't be the case just because you're saying it is, though. You're not at all explaining what you have in mind here.

An existing thing is related to something in the future, — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't agree that that's the case until the future thing comes to be.

When a particular possibility (relationship of this type) is recognized as needed, it is determined as necessary, — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't read that so that it doesn't sound like you simply do not understand modalities.

When accepted it becomes a necessity, as it is necessary for the sake of the conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

What in the world? I don't believe that's correct at all. For one, any conclusion can follow from different premises--a fortiori because we'd only need contradictory premises for it to follow. But that would even be the case (that any conclusion could follow from different premises) if we were using relevance logics.

The conclusion is the thing which will come about in the future, — Metaphysician Undercover

That's just ridiculously confused if you're intending it to at all be about conventional logic. Conventional logic isn't temporal.

The more you're responding, the more of a mess your comments are turning out to be. And none of this has anything whatsoever with answering what I asked you.

I can't read that so that it doesn't sound like you simply do not understand modalities. — Terrapin Station

I'm not talking about modalities, so if you're attempting to understand this under the terms of modalities, it's no wonder that you don't understand.

I wouldn't agree that that's the case until the future thing comes to be. — Terrapin Station

Do you agree that there is a relationship between the present state, and any possible future state, regardless of whether or not that future state actually comes to be? If so, do you agree that this relationship cannot be something existing?

The more you're responding, the more of a mess your comments are turning out to be. And none of this has anything whatsoever with answering what I asked you. — Terrapin Station

You asked me to explain the reality of relationships which have no existence. I understand these relationships as possibilities. What are you failing to grasp?

I'm not talking about modalities, — Metaphysician Undercover

Haha, you're talking about possibility and necessity, so yes you are. That's what modalities are.

Do you agree that there is a relationship between the present state, and any possible future state, regardless of whether or not that future state actually comes to be? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not at all.

You asked me to explain the reality of relationships which have no existence. I understand these relationships as possibilities. What are you failing to grasp? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, ultimately this is relating to explaining representation sans thinking about things as representations. But yeah, I asked about the idea of saying that there is something that doesn't exist, which is a simple contradiction--you're saying that there is something that there isn't. Again, the word doesn't have to be "exist." There are a number of other words people use for things occurring/obtaining/being/etc. But either there are possibilities or there are not, and if there are, on my view, they have to occur somewhere. There are no things "that there are" that do not occur somewhere on my view.

logical separation of thought and subject does seem problematic, especially if one is a physicalist and reduces thoughts to brain activity. We have this physical thing here which is the Sun and this physical thing here which is brain activity, but what is the relationship between the two such that the latter is a thought about the former? Is there a unique kind of physical connection between the two?

It's even more problematic when the thing thought of isn't the sort of thing that can be physically connected to brain activity, e.g. past, future, or distant things.

I just don't think that realism can provide a coherent account of reference (and so nor of truth).

Even though the subject of our thoughts might be conceptually distinct from thought (e.g. when I think about the Sun I'm not thinking about thoughts), it doesn't then follow that the subject is ontologically separate, just as even though the subject of a painting is conceptually distinct from paint (e.g. when I paint a unicorn I'm not painting paint), it doesn't then follow that the subject is ontologically separate (it's not that there's this painting of a unicorn and also that unicorn).

Meanwhile, I was still thinkin...

This is a problem for the Kantian position that holds that whatever is 'in itself' is unknowable, that all we really 'know' are the presumptions that make the reality we see possible. This is a problem because it means that 'knowledge' of what is real, is not about the real, it is about these presumptions---which are not concepts but the basis of the relationships between what we sense and our concepts.

Perhaps this is the wrong way to think about this. When we see a tree, we already have the concept of what a tree is, we are assigning what we see to what we know. There are two parts to this process. The claim that there is something there, and the assignment of what is there to our concepts.

The 'claim' is ontological, and it is either true or false in the 'thin' sense (the sense Quine outlines in "On what there is"), the assignment of concepts is epistemological and true in the 'thick' sense (K Fine "The Question of Ontology") and linguistic. The claim for existence only goes as far as stating a particular something exists, it is purely ontological and either true or false but thin. The assignment of meaning to the claim is epistemological, it is linguistic and true or false in the thick sense.

This move seems to abandon the gap between the appearance and the 'transcendental'. The scientist doing brain investigations are studying the ontic character of the brain. Neurons firing, may be how I come to see a tree, this process is responsible for the claim, but its the epistemologically assignment of meaning to what is sensed that provide me with knowledge.

Haha, you're talking about possibility and necessity, so yes you are. That's what modalities are. — Terrapin Station

No, logical modalities are a very specialized use of these terms, possibility and necessity. Check your dictionary, for the #1 definition of necessary: "requiring to be done". I have clearly explained that I am using "necessary" in this most common way, and "possible" in the related, and #1 way: "capable of existing".

If you refuse to recognize my usage, despite the fact that it is the most commonly incurred usage of these terms, insisting that I must be using these terms in some specialized way, which perhaps you would prefer, I assume willful neglect on your part.

But yeah, I asked about the idea of saying that there is something that doesn't exist, which is a simple contradiction--you're saying that there is something that there isn't. — Terrapin Station

Since you flatly refuse to recognize that in common parlance we refer to things which are possible, and things which are necessary, according to the primary definitions of those terms, and that these things referred to are not existing things, I'm afraid that I cannot further assist you in understanding what I am talking about.

With appropriate caveats about the limited usefulness of simplistic labels, it seems to me that Terrapin Station is a nominalist and Metaphysician Undercover is a realist, and this is why the two of you keep talking past each other. In other words, TS believes that only actualities have Being, such that existence and Being are equivalent; while MU believes that possibilities and habits/necessities also have Being, such that they can be real even though they do not (strictly speaking) exist.

No, logical modalities are a very specialized use of these terms, possibility and necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Citation for that?

you flatly refuse to recognize that in common parlance we refer to things which are possible, and things which are necessary, according to the primary definitions of those terms, — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not denying that (though I am denying that that's about senses of those terms that are different than the senses used in modal logic).

What I disagree with is the idea that if there are necessities and possibilities, there are no necessities and possibilities.

Do you agree that there is a relationship between the present state, and any possible future state, regardless of whether or not that future state actually comes to be? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not at all. — Terrapin Station

You do not recognize a relationship between what actually exists, and what is possible, therefore I assume that for you, any, and every, possibility is pure fiction. And since my position is dependent on the assumption that possibilities are real, we have nothing further to discuss.

If you do not believe that all possibilities are purely fictional, then what supports the reality of any possibility other than a relationship between it and an actually existent state?

I wouldn't say that I see possibilities as "pure fictions." But I simply see them as something not precluded from occurring given a world that's not strongly deterministic through and through. In other words, it's simply a way to talk about the fact that some thing(s) could happen. That doesn't make it the case that existent things and phenomena have relations to non-actualized possibilities.

If I were to think that the world was strongly deterministic through and through, I would probably see possibilities as what must happen but hasn't happened yet.

Would it be fair to characterize your view as "holding that the potential, or possible, is nothing but what the actual makes it to be" (Peirce, CP 1.422)? In other words, do you consider it incorrect to claim that never-actualized possibilities can still be real?

do you consider it incorrect to claim that never-actualized possibilities can still be real? — aletheist

Yes, although there's some ambiguity there given that "real" has historically been used with so many different connotations. And yeah, I'd basically agree with Peirce in that, although since this would often be misunderstood, I'd hasten to add that I'm not a strong determinist.

Yes, although there's some ambiguity there given that "real" has historically been used with so many different connotations. — Terrapin Station

Peirce's basic definition was that something is real if it has properties sufficient to identify it, regardless of whether anyone ever attributes them to it. He identified it with scholastic realism, and called his own position an "extreme" version thereof.

And yeah, I'd basically agree with Peirce in that, although since this would often be misunderstood, I'd hasten to add that I'm not a strong determinist. — Terrapin Station

Neither was Peirce; in fact, he was a strong opponent of what he called "necessitarianism." What I quoted before was his characterization of nominalism; hence my previous suggestion that you seem to be a nominalist, whereas MU appears to be a realist. I do not intend this as a pejorative, just hoping to clarify why the discussion has gone as it has.

wouldn't say that I see possibilities as "pure fictions." But I simply see them as something not precluded from occurring given a world that's not strongly deterministic through and through. In other words, it's simply a way to talk about the fact that some thing(s) could happen. — Terrapin Station

The point though, is that unless you allow real relationships between what has actual existence, and any real possibilities, then you have no way of distinguishing between real possibilities and fictional possibilities. Real possibilities are distinguished from fictional possibilities through relationships to what has actual existence. In other words, without such relationships anyone could claim all sorts of absurd possibilities, such as the possibility that I could jump to the moon, or some other nonsense. And so, if there are no such relationships, we must treat all possibilities as equally fictional, because they don't have any relationship to the real world, any stated possibility says absolutely nothing about the real world. Therefore your assertion that there are no such relationships produces the necessary conclusion that all stated possibilities are fictions, and there is no such thing as a real possibility.

Real possibilities are distinguished from fictional possibilities through relationships to what has actual existence. In other words, without such relationships anyone could claim all sorts of absurd possibilities, such as the possibility that I could jump to the moon, or some other nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that the idea of "fictional possibilities" really makes any sense. Something is either a possibility or it isn't. I can buy a distinction of logical versus metaphysical(/ontological) possibilities I suppose, but "fictional possibilities" seems rather nonsensical to me.

OK, let's try this then, we can start with logical versus ontological possibilities. Do you agree that ontological possibility is a sub-category of logical possibility? Anything which is an ontological possibility is also a logical possibility, but not every logical possibility is an ontological possibility. What distinguishes something as an ontological possibility, is a relationship which it has to the actual world. So logical possibilities do not necessarily have this relationship, but ontological possibilities do. Do you recognize the category of ontological possibility as a valid category, and therefore this relationship as something real?

Again, I wouldn't say that possibilities are real, although depending on alternate ways of defining "real," I might agree with that. However, it would have to be some way of defining real so that it doesn't amount to saying that non-actualized possibilities somehow exist/subsist/occur/obtain/etc. (whatever term like that that someone might want to use).

I agree with the subset comments. But I'd say what distinguishes ontological possibility from logical possibility is that logical possibility is simply something non-contradictory in the context of a particular logic, whereas ontological possibility is something non-contradictory that could obtain within the contstraints of a given actual world.

agree with the subset comments. But I'd say what distinguishes ontological possibility from logical possibility is that logical possibility is simply something non-contradictory in the context of a particular logic, whereas ontological possibility is something non-contradictory that could obtain within the contstraints of a given actual world. — Terrapin Station

Ok, so here's the point. If an ontological possibility is something which could obtain within the constraints of a given actual world, then mustn't we assume that there is some type of relationship between that possibility and that actual world? If relationships between things within that actual world are described as spatial relationships, this relationship must be something other than a spatial relationship.

Again, I wouldn't say that possibilities are real, although depending on alternate ways of defining "real," I might agree with that. However, it would have to be some way of defining real so that it doesn't amount to saying that non-actualized possibilities somehow exist/subsist/occur/obtain/etc. (whatever term like that that someone might want to use). — Terrapin Station

It is the relationship between the possibility and the actual world which is what I'm concerned with. That is what we were discussing, whether or not there could be real non-spatial relationships. So I'm not concerned with arguing that possibilities are somehow real but non-existent I actually suggested earlier that we start with the assumption that possibilities are non-existent. However, we still have to deal with the reality that some of these non-existent things have a relationship with existing things. It is the nature of this relationship which is relevant to my argument that a representation exists as a representation, without a mind.

If an ontological possibility is something which could obtain within the constraints of a given actual world, — Metaphysician Undercover

It only obtains when it's actualized. (All actuals are possible.) Otherwise, it's just a way of talking about the fact that something (some object, event, etc.) isn't precluded/prohibited by anything.

However, we still have to deal with the reality that some of these non-existent things have a relationship with existing things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying that something that doesn't exist (or occur, or whatever--it's important to not get hung up on the particular word we're using) has a relationship with anything is simply nonsense. There's nothing to have a relationship if it doesn't exist/occur/whatever term you'd use.

It only obtains when it's actualized. (All actuals are possible.) Otherwise, it's just a way of talking about the fact that something (some object, event, etc.) isn't precluded/prohibited by anything. — Terrapin Station

We're just going around in circles. You accepted that there is a difference between a simple logical possibility, and an ontological possibility. Ontological possibility has been designated as a special type of possibility Now we must allow that there is something which substantiates that designation. You can't say that a possibility is only ontological after its been actualized, because the actualizing of one possibility excludes many others, but prior to the actualizing of that one, the many were all ontological possibilities.

Saying that something that doesn't exist (or occur, or whatever--it's important to not get hung up on the particular word we're using) has a relationship with anything is simply nonsense. There's nothing to have a relationship if it doesn't exist/occur/whatever term you'd use. — Terrapin Station

I take this as a denial of ontological possibilities then. Clearly possibilities are not existing things. If we assume that there is no relationship between a possibility and an actually existing thing, then we have no principle whereby we can say that a possibility is an ontological possibility.

I explained this already:

Possibility in general is (p) just a way of talking about the fact that something (some object, event, etc.) isn't precluded/prohibited by anything.

Logical possibility is simply (p) a la something non-contradictory in the context of a particular logic, whereas ontological possibility is (p) a la something non-contradictory that could obtain within the contstraints of a given actual world.

Logical possibility is simply (p) a la something non-contradictory in the context of a particular logic, whereas ontological possibility is (p) a la something non-contradictory that could obtain within the contstraints of a given actual world. — Terrapin Station

OK, so as I said, "ontological possibility" is defined according to a relationship to an actual world. Do you not agree that to understand what an ontological possibility is, we need to determine the nature of this relationship?

It's not a relationship of something to something else. It's just a way of talking about the fact that something (some object, event, etc.) isn't precluded/prohibited by anything.

Well what you said, is that the ontological possibility is "something non-contradictory that could obtain within the constraints of a given actual world", So it clearly isn't just a non-prohibited way of talking, it is expressly prohibited by the constraints of an actual world. What I am trying to get at, is this relationship between that actual world, and the way of talking. There must be some relationship there, or else "ontological possibility" refers to nothing, it is fictional.

Oh, well, there's a relationship between how the world is ways of talking, sure. That's what I'm referring to when I say that it's a way of talking about the fact that something isn't precluded/prohibited by anything. "The world is such that x could happen." That's all that possibilities amount to. That doesn't mean, however, that possibilities occur (or whatever word we'd use) or that they're somehow "there" to have relationships with things when they're not actualized. But the actual world has a relationship with our possibility talk, sure.

That doesn't mean, however, that possibilities occur (or whatever word we'd use) or that they're somehow "there" to have relationships with things when they're not actualized. — Terrapin Station

To a realist, it means that possibilities are real, even if they do not occur; i.e., are never actualized. In other words, there is more to reality than mere existence; possibility and necessity are just as real as actuality. Peirce wrote about this in terms of three categories: Firstness (possibility, quality, feeling), Secondness (actuality, fact, action), and Thirdness (necessity, law, thought).