You seem to have trouble with copying. Get what I wrote right first... As I said, pay attention.

er, no. You've nothing to say.

2+1=1 mod(2)

Thus your entire argument falls apart. Sorry :cry:

How would that show it to fall apart? My view is that what's true is true, and that 'contingently' true and 'necessarily' true denote nothing extra. So whether 2 + 1 = 3 or whether it = 4, the point is that adding 'necessarily' adds nothing.

2+1=3 is contingently true; not necessarily true. But don't fret. The entire thread is unnecessary babble.

:roll:

What do you mean by 'contingently' true?

How about the rest of my post? You know, where the bulk of the arguments against you lie. Don't just nitpick the last line and ignore everything else. Also:

A contingent truth means that even when you are convinced it is true right now you can imagine a situation where it isn't — khaled

Can be interpreted to mean whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible not that they are one and the same.

Can be interpreted to mean whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible not that they are one and the same. — khaled

Yes, but we were talking about what metaphysically possibility might be, and you offered that. So now you're just being disingenuous.

How about the rest of my post? You know, where the bulk of the arguments against you lie. — khaled

I didn't detect any.

Are you saying that what it means to say that a proposition is necessarily true is that it is true 'by definition'?

we can easily imagine sums equalling numbers distinct from those they actually equal
— Bartricks

What we can imagine is someone making a calculation mistake. That's not the same as imagining that 3x18 = 58. Let's make it a bit simpler. 1 + 1 = 2. 1 + 1 = 2 is true no matter what because it's a definition. In the same way that "Married bachelors don't exist" is always true by definition.

You're saying something akin to: "One can forget the definition of bachelor for a moment and thus married bachelors can exist". In this case and the 3x18 case, it's not that someone can conceive of 3x18 =58 or of a married bachelor, it's that someone made a mistake. That's all you can imagine: someone making a mistake and forgetting the definitions.

In other words:
"1 + 1 = 2" is a necessary truth
"When I calculate 1 + 1 I get the sum of 2" is a contingent truth

Take your own existence. Can you imagine not existing? No.
— Bartricks

I can easily imagine a world in which I don't exist which makes me existing in this world a contingent truth. I cannot imagine the "experience of not existing" if that's what you're asking but that is not even a coherent concept. — khaled

I am arguing we cannot imagine 3x18 being 58 and that I CAN easily imagine a world in which I don't exist. You claimed the opposite in both cases.

Are you saying that what it means to say that a proposition is necessarily true is that it is true 'by definition'? — Bartricks

Yes. Example: There cannot be married bachelors.

I am arguing we cannot imagine 3x18 being 58 and that I CAN easily imagine a world in which I don't exist. You claimed the opposite in both cases. — khaled

Well, I just think both claims are false. People would not make mistakes in mental arithmetic if they were incapable of imagining the sum equally something it did not, in fact equal.

And I cannot imagine a world without me in it. All I can do is imagine my body not existing.

Anyway, it does seem from the above that you are now identifying 'necessarily true' with 'true by definition'. Is that right?

All I can do is imagine my body not existing. — Bartricks

Isn't that exactly what a "world without you in it" means? You either just lack imagination or you're being disingenuous

People would not make mistakes in mental arithmetic if they were incapable of imagining the sum equally something it did not, in fact equal. — Bartricks

When people make a mistake in arithmetic they are forgetting a definition or a rule somewhere. The fact that someone forgot a definition and got a wrong answer doesn't make that answer the truth. For example, one can forget the definition of bachelor for a moment but that doesn't mean married bachelors can exist

Anyway, it does seem from the above that you are now identifying 'necessarily true' with 'true by definition'. Is that right? — Bartricks

I literally just answered this. Yes. Though I don't think there is much point in moving on when we disagree on something as basic as "can you imagine 3x18 equalling 58"

So, what I propose is that there are no such things as either necessary truths or contingent truths. There are just truths. There are not two categories of truth. There are just truths and that's that. — Bartricks

I wish life was that simple.

To deny or negate a proposition that's a necessary truth will lead to a contradiction in all possible worlds. A contingent truth may be false and thus amenable to negation in some possible worlds.

Propositions like "I exist" inferred from "I think" are necessary truths because their negation is an impossibility i.e. leads to a contradiction in all possible worlds.

Propositions like "dogs have wet noses" are contingent since it's possible that there's a world where dogs' noses aren't wet. In other words, negating such propositions don't lead to a contradiction only in those worlds where the proposition is true and not in all possible worlds.

That there is such a distinction in philisophy suggests either a necessity or utility. Isn't it enough to know about this world alone? Knowledge of this world alone implies we would be walking around with a mixed bag of truths: there would be true propositions in our knowledge bank that are either necessarily true or contingently true. However, if our knowledge is to transcend this world, its odd peculiarities, we would need to gain knowledge of necessary truths.

Is it then necessary (your question) to know the difference between these two kinds of truths? I guess in a purely epistemological sense it would be quite unsatisfactory for a person to know a proposition that can be false in some other world; he would be limited to his world and its particular construction. Would it count as knowledge? I mean our "knowledge" that all intelligent beings have two legs, being a contingent truth, would probably fail us if ever we visited another planet where, say, mollusc-like creatures evolved intelligence.

This brings us to the issue of utility. Is knowing that there are two kinds of truths, contingent and necessary, useful? Indeed it would serve very well in sorting our knowledge on that basis for it would inform us which propositions are temporary and revisable and which propositions are permanent and fixed.

Isn't that exactly what a "world without you in it" means? You either just lack imagination or you're being disingenuous — khaled

No, that isn't what it means at all. Again: I can imagine my body not existing, but I seem unable to imagine that 'I' - the one doing the imagining - does not exist.
Yet I do not exist of necessity.
So inconceivability is neither constitutive of, or a reliable guide to necessity's presence.

When people make a mistake in arithmetic they are forgetting a definition or a rule somewhere. — khaled

Give any explanation you like, the simple fact is they often imagine that 18 x 3 = 58. It's why maths exists as a discipline. And it is why rules are formulated - for relying on our imagination is not a reliable way of doing anything other than the most basic of sums.

But even if everything I have just said is wrong - and it really isn't - it is absurd to think that your imagination either constitutively determines what is or is not possible (that somehow your imagination is in charge of reality), or that reality somehow has control over your imagination such that it has managed to forbid it from imagining that which reality cannot provide. The idea is simply farcical.

So, again, conceivability and necessity are not the same notion (nor is one a reliable guide to the other).

literally just answered this. Yes. Though I don't think there is much point in moving on when we disagree on something as basic as "can you imagine 3x18 equalling 58" — khaled

No, because you keep pressing the conceivability point, thus leaving me unclear what view you hold.
'Inconceivably false' and 'true by definition' are not the same. So you go on about conceivability, and then - out of nowhere - you claim that a necessary truth is 'true by definition'. Hence my confusion.

Anyway, you now think that what it is for a proposition to be 'necessarily' true (as opposed to just 'true') is that it is 'true by definition'.

Well, I don't think that captures the notion of necessity, for no word has its definition of necessity. I mean, you'd agree to that, presumably?

Bachelor 'does' mean 'unmarried man'. But it doesn't 'have' to mean that. It just does, yes?

That's true of all words. So if 'necessarily true' just means 'true by definition' then 'necessarily true' doesn't tell us anything more about the nature of reality than just 'true' would.

To deny or negate a proposition that's a necessary truth will lead to a contradiction in all possible worlds. — TheMadFool

I do not know what that means. To be clear, I accept that it is true that a true proposition is not also false (the law of non-contradiction). But I do not think that it is 'necessarily' true that a true proposition is not also false. Or at least, I do not yet know what 'necessarily' true means beyond just 'true'.

Talk of possible worlds is really no help here at all, for the notion of 'possible' is precisely what's at issue.

Talk of possible worlds is just a colourful way of saying 'metaphysically possible'.

For example, say I want to know what 'cheese' is, and you say 'cheese is fromage'. Well, ok, but I'm non the wiser for all you've done is given me another word to refer to the same thing.

It seems to me that this, at best, is what talk of 'possible worlds' does, if that.

I mean, what is a possible world? An actual place? Or just an imaginary one?

I do not know what that means. To be clear, I accept that it is true that a true proposition is not also false (the law of non-contradiction). But I do not think that it is 'necessarily' true that a true proposition is not also false. Or at least, I do not yet know what 'necessarily' true means beyond just 'true'.

Talk of possible worlds is really no help here at all, for the notion of 'possible' is precisely what's at issue.

Talk of possible worlds is just a colourful way of saying 'metaphysically possible'.

For example, say I want to know what 'cheese' is, and you say 'cheese is fromage'. Well, ok, but I'm non the wiser for all you've done is given me another word to refer to the same thing.

It seems to me that this, at best, is what talk of 'possible worlds' does, if that.

I mean, what is a possible world? An actual place? Or just an imaginary one? — Bartricks

It's impossible for a necessary truth to be false but it's possible for contingent truths to be false. What do you think "possible/impossible" means?

but I seem unable to imagine that 'I' - the one doing the imagining - does not exist. — Bartricks

So you’re trying to imagine the experience of not existing? That’s an incoherent concept. Of course you would not be able to imagine that, that’s like trying to imagine a square circle. If your body doesn’t exist the “I” (probably) won’t exist but it pointless to try to imagine what that would “feel like”.

the simple fact is they often imagine — Bartricks

We have very different definitions of “imagine” then. If someone can imagine 3x18=58 then I would take it that person can have a crystal clear mental image of himself putting 18 sets of 3 things each next to each other and getting 58 things. I don’t think people can do that.

'Inconceivably false' and 'true by definition' are not the same — Bartricks

I can’t think of an example of something that is inconceivably false that is not true by definition or vice versa. Though that could just be a lack of imagination. Care to provide an example?

That's true of all words. So if 'necessarily true' just means 'true by definition' then 'necessarily true' doesn't tell us anything more about the nature of reality than just 'true' would. — Bartricks

Yes it does, because you can substitute the meanings of the words in. For example: a married bachelor cannot exist can be translated to: A married unmarried man cannot exist. Which is obviously true and will remain true regardless of whatever word you use to encapsulate “unmarried man”.

So you’re trying to imagine the experience of not existing? That’s an incoherent concept. Of course you would not be able to imagine that, that’s like trying to imagine a square circle. If your body doesn’t exist the “I” (probably) won’t exist but it pointless to try to imagine what that would “feel like” — khaled

Yes, er, that's MY point - I cannot conceive of not existing. I cannot imagine it. But clearly that does not mean that I exist of necessity. So 'inconceivable' does not capture what philosophers mean when they say that a proposition is true of necessity. For the proposition "Bartricks exists" is one that I cannot conceive of being false, yet it is not a proposition that any philosopher I know of would say is of a kind that is 'necessarily' true (as opposed to just 'true').

So, I give you an example of something I - and anyone else who is clear about what is involved - cannot conceive of being the case, and you first say that you can conceive of it, and now you say that it is impossible to conceive of it. Okay, so again, "Bartricks exists" is a proposition whose falsity I cannot conceive of, yet that is not necessarily true. Thus, when we wonder what necessity is, conceivability is not a good guide.

I can’t think of an example of something that is inconceivably false that is not true by definition or vice versa. Though that could just be a lack of imagination. Care to provide an example? — khaled

To quote you, "I literally just did!" This proposition "Khaled exists" is, for you, a proposition you cannot conceive to be false, yes? But it is not true by definition. And it is not necessarily true.

Yes it does, because you can substitute the meanings of the words in. For example: a married bachelor cannot exist can be translated to: A married unmarried man cannot exist. Which is obviously true and will remain true regardless of whatever word you use to encapsulate “unmarried man”. — khaled

But you said that 'necessarily' true should be understood to mean 'true by definition'. But the definition of a term - and thus what you can substitute one word for - are not necessary truths. So, although it is true that bachelors are unmarried men, it is not necessarily true because the definitions of those terms are not necessary truths. It is not 'necessarily' true that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man'. It just does.

So I don't see how what you've said addresses the point. In effect all you've said is that so long as bachelor means unmarried man, a bachelor will be an unmarried man and vice versa. Well, yes. But that's no different to saying that so long as there is some cheese in my fridge it will be true that there is some cheese in my fridge. Yet clearly it is just 'true' that there is some cheese in my fridge - it is not necessarily true.

So 'true by definition' doesn't capture what 'necessarily true' means either.

If you are asking what I think 'metaphysically' impossible, or 'metaphysically' possible mean, then I do not know. That's my whole point. I think they do not describe real features of the world. And I think we can dispense with them and still do fine in terms of reasoning about things, for we can dispense with them and not find ourselves having to affirm contradictions.

We can still say a proposition is 'necessarily' true, but now the term will be functioning expressively - it will express our conviction that it is actually true, rather than saying something special about the proposition itself. That is how the word typically functions in everyday life.

But the idea that necessity and contingency are real features of the world, as opposed to expressions of conviction or doubt (and such like) is, I think, false.

If you are asking what I think 'metaphysically' impossible, or 'metaphysically' possible mean, then I do not know. That's my whole point. I think they do not describe real features of the world. And I think we can dispense with them and still do fine in terms of reasoning about things, for we can dispense with them and not find ourselves having to affirm contradictions.

We can still say a proposition is 'necessarily' true, but now the term will be functioning expressively - it will express our conviction that it is actually true, rather than saying something special about the proposition itself. That is how the word typically functions in everyday life.

But the idea that necessity and contingency are real features of the world, as opposed to expressions of conviction or doubt (and such like) is, I think, false. — Bartricks

Under what conditions do propositions deserve our convictions or our doubts?

Yes, er, that's MY point - I cannot conceive of not existing. I cannot imagine it — Bartricks

You CAN imagine a world in which the collection of molecules known as your body doesn’t exist correct? Therefore your body existing is a contingent truth. You’re trying to imagine the “experience of not existing” which is not a coherent concept so of course you’d fail.

For the proposition "Bartricks exists" is one that I cannot conceive of being false, — Bartricks

Really? You cannot imagine a world in which your parents never met?

first say that you can conceive of it, and now you say that it is impossible to conceive of it. — Bartricks

Maybe actually read what I’m saying. One can easily conceive of a world without themselves. That’s not what you’re trying to do. You’re trying to conceive of the experience of not existing, which is an incoherent concept like “square circle” and I don’t know why you’re trying to do that

This proposition "Khaled exists" is, for you, a proposition you cannot conceive to be false, yes? — Bartricks

No. And I never said that. I can easily imagine a world where the homo sapien referred to on this forum as “Khaled” doesn’t exist. What I cannot imagine is the “experience of non existence” which is, again, an incoherent concept. Because if said homo sapien didn’t exist there wouldn’t be an experience to imagine

But the definition of a term - and thus what you can substitute one word for - are not necessary truths. — Bartricks

I understand your point. I just think it’s trivial. However you swap around the terms and definitions “a married unmarried man cannot exist” will remain true. When someone says “true by definition” It usually means “if you substitute the definition in it will be clear that the statement is true” which is exactly what I mean.

Under what conditions do propositions deserve our convictions or our doubts? — TheMadFool

When Reason herself seems either to express a conviction that they are true, or a doubt about the matter, or seems to favour 'us' being doubtful about the truth of the proposition in question (given how we have acquired it).

So, it seems clear and distinct to our reason that 2 + 2 = 4 - indeed, our reason represents 2 + 2 necessarily to = 4, which is our reason's way of conveying Reason's conviction that this is so.

Thus, we are justified in believing very firmly that 2 + 2 = 4.

You CAN imagine a world in which the collection of molecules known as your body doesn’t exist correct? Therefore your body existing is a contingent truth. You’re trying to imagine the “experience of not existing” which is not a coherent concept so of course you’d fail. — khaled

No, that's question begging. Yes, of course I can imagine my body not existing. And most would agree that my body's existence is contingent. But that isn't what the notion of 'contingency' means (it does not mean 'is conceivably false'. For I find myself unable to imagine myself not existing, yet clearly my self's existence, no less than my body's existence, is considered by most to be contingent too.

So you're persisting with the idea that necessity and contingency has something to do with conceivability, despite the fact there is damning evidence that this is not the case, plus just taken at face value it seems absurd to think that our imaginations place limits on reality and vice versa.

Really? You cannot imagine a world in which your parents never met? — khaled

Er, we're going in tedious circles here - my parents created my body, not my self. So yes, I can obviously imagine that, but it's beside the point.

Maybe actually read what I’m saying. — khaled

Maybe YOU should do that - you don't seem to understand your own view, or why it seems to be two quite different views that you vacillate between.

However you swap around the terms and definitions “a married unmarried man cannot exist” will remain true. When someone says “true by definition” It usually means “if you substitute the definition in it will be clear that the statement is true” which is exactly what I mean. — khaled

No, first "a married unmarried man cannot exist" is not true if the 'cannot' means 'necessarily cannot', for it is by convention - and thus not necessary - that 'unmarried' means 'not married'.

And if you agree that 'necessarily true' adds nothing to 'true' (and that this is also true of contingently true') then you agree with me.

I remain astonished at you propensity for misunderstanding.

No you don't, for I am not exhibiting any misunderstanding. So I don't know what you're astonished at, but it isn't that.

But that isn't what the notion of 'contingency' means (it does not mean 'is conceivably false'. — Bartricks

:wink:

I would argue on many levels you are right. I believe in absolute truth for example but I believe it is very hard to approach the threshold of attaining absolute truth depending on what field of study you are into. Forensics and Crime investigation are fields of study where absolute truth is debated depending on the crime or "crime".

Another thing to note is that there are those who like to remain ignorant at all costs on one end of the spectrum and on the other end there are those like perhaps you who want the truth at all costs. "be as wise as a serpent and as gentle as a dove for he sends us out among wolves"

Thus, we are justified in believing very firmly that 2 + 2 = 4. — Bartricks

Wrong. 2+2=1
Figure it out.

You just don't learn, do you? :roll:

When Reason herself seems either to express a conviction that they are true, or a doubt about the matter, or seems to favour 'us' being doubtful about the truth of the proposition in question (given how we have acquired it). — Bartricks

How does that make the necessary-contingent distinction undesirable?

Yes, of course I can imagine my body not existing. — Bartricks

That’s what it means for you not to exist.... What you’re trying to imagine is the experience of not existing and your inability to do so doesn’t prove anything. If your body didn’t exist there wouldn’t be an experience because there wouldn’t be a self.

my parents created my body, not my self. — Bartricks

But surely without your body your self wouldn’t exist? That’s the assumption here. Your self is contingent on your body existing. Unless you’re suggesting that selves can exist without bodies in which case it becomes unclear whether their existence is contingent or necessary.

No, first "a married unmarried man cannot exist" is not true if the 'cannot' means 'necessarily cannot', for it is by convention - and thus not necessary - that 'unmarried' means 'not married'. — Bartricks

Ok how about “a married not married man cannot exist”. Mr nitpick

And if you agree that 'necessarily true' adds nothing to 'true' (and that this is also true of contingently true') then you agree with me. — Bartricks

Now when did I say that? I wouldn’t be responding to you if I agreed would I.

it seems absurd to think that our imaginations place limits on reality and vice versa. — Bartricks

But our logic/reason does? Both are just human faculties. Also categorizing truths into necessary and contingent doesn’t place limits on reality any more than Newton’s theory of gravitation forced the universe to behave according to his theory. Because our categorization can simply be flawed

two quite different views that you vacillate between. — Bartricks

I asked you to provide an example of something that is “true by definition” that is not “inconceivably false” or vice verse and you provided “khaled exists”. However it is conceivable that khaled doesn’t exist and nothing in khaled’s definition says he must exist. Therefore that example fails. I think both views are the same though I’m not sure on this point. As I said, could just be lack of imagination