You're taking my argument as an argument (and not a good one) supporting the existence of those things. — Coben

I didn't mean to. I intended to treat it as an argument supporting the reasonableness of positing their existence. That's why I talked about liklihoods, not possibilities.

You seemed to be suggesting (and confirmed in your last comment), that dismissing the concept of 'souls' on the grounds of physicalism was unreasonable because new things gain physical existence from time to time. I disagree. New things which were previously unknown are afforded physical existence from time to time. Things which have been posited for thousands of years have shown absolutely no precedent whatsoever of suddenly being afforded physical existence as a consequence of some new scientific theory. So a person dismissing such notions on the grounds of physicalism (as you say "ruling things out that have been considered non-material") would be entirely justified in doing so by induction.

where does 'knowing' fit into that? — Wayfarer

under my framework, to establish one self-consciousness we have to be able to explore all our boundary conditions that ware resonating within and their nature must be accessible/determinable wrt their form, function, or purpose in influencing the landscape that the consciousness agent in question is resonating with and within. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to observe a time-evolution history path where their ‘thought’ could in-fact modify those boundary conditions and that had a correlated, esp. if *expected*, effect on their conscious state of being to ‘feel’ they are alive and the executive center of the (resonating) system. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to learn and use those associations as tools to manipulate itself (the best it can) to achieve goal states of being. Towards a definition qualia consciousness, I’m thinking that the degree that the consciousness agent in question can do the above, it has ever higher orders of qualia consciousness.

How does it come about? — Wayfarer

you can think of the resonant condition as a time-evolving holographic standing wave pattern within the agent's cognitive vs sensory/motor 'container' boundaries.

I intended to treat it as an argument supporting the reasonableness of positing their existence. — Isaac

Yes, that's what I meant. That is what I meant I was not doing. It was not a positive argument in favor of their existence, it was an argument critical of a 'ruling out' via deduction [not induction].

Nope, because the specific deduction I am talking about is that 'since they are immaterial, and everything is physical, they can't exist'. I really don't know how to make that clearer. Souls or ghosts are immaterial. Immaterial things don't exist. Souls and ghosts don't exist. I encounter this all the time. I also see similar ones building from the word 'supernatural'. There is a lot of hidden paradigmatic baggage in the terms. Yes, often theists and others share some of that baggage [they have a dualism and place X in the non-material], but some do not and the baggage has assumptions in it that are not justified on both sides of, for example, the Christian dualist vs. physicalist divide.

I also specifically said 'rule out.'

I really don't know how to make that clearer. Souls or ghosts are immaterial. Immaterial things don't exist. Souls and ghosts don't exist. I encounter this all the time. — Coben

That's as may be, though I've never heard such a simplistic argument myself. But you actually said

Perhaps 'souls' or other 'things' are on a spectrum within what will be considered physical. — Coben

... so I was just responding to that. It's monumentally unlikely, that's all. I think, in all fairness, if I said "perhaps God will turn out to be a toad called Keith" people would certainly not take such a supposition seriously on a theology forum despite it being technically a possibility.

It is technically a possibility that souls might turn out to be real but such a possibility does not have its chances affected in any meaningful way by the discovery of things like quantum foam.

I can't speak for everyone making such arguments, obviously, but I suspect by 'physical' most mean 'that which has been demonstrated by scientific evidence to actually exist' a physical thing has to have a physical effect, that's how it is identified. There's a need for it in a model which otherwise works well.

So the point about rejecting souls on the grounds of their not being physical, is not simply saying that they are not part of some set whose membership criteria is arbitrary. It's rejecting them from ever being part of that set because of characteristics which will never fit (in all liklihood).

Take quantum foam. It may or may not get included in list of 'things that exist' but we'd be wrong to reject it now, not because of whether it's on the list or not, but because good, working models with detailed predictive capabilities have posited it. It isn't currently physical, but its being posited by a good theoretical model means it fits the criteria of the sorts of things which might be.

Souls are also not currently on list, but they are not part of a good explanatory model, their presence is not posited as part of any predictive hypothesis. So unlike quantum foam, they are unlikely to ever make the list. We can already tell this from their current status.

To laymen like me (and you, but I don't mean to assume), the question is simple. Has the entity been posited by a scientist? If it has, it may well make it into the list. If it hasn't then it's not going to unless there's some very good reason for its exception.

I was driving along listening to Never Goodbye from Max Richter's Hostiles. A scene of the sort the Hubble telescope makes came to mind and I realized that this is what ancient people wanted to know about heaven. They thought the sky was a dome, but we know it goes on and on.

We could define heaven as a rigid dome because that's what they thought it was, and therefore say there is no heaven.

Or we could say, as I just did, that heaven is whatever is up there. They were wrong that it's a dome, as we may be wrong in some profound way our descendants will laugh at.

It's all a matter of context. Swirl the contexts up into spaghetti and you get philosophical slop: perfect for the goals of a sophist: dazzle them with bullshit.

Perhaps 'souls' or other 'things' are on a spectrum within what will be considered physical. — Coben


... so I was just responding to that. It's monumentally unlikely, that's all. I think, in all fairness, if I said "perhaps God will turn out to be a toad called Keith" people would certainly not take such a supposition seriously on a theology forum despite it being technically a possibility. — Isaac

That quote was part of an argument against ruling out via deduction. So, you took a sentence out of that argument and put and treated it, precisely as I said, as part of another argument. I needed to explain potential areas where the argument was ruling things out it couldn't and also the metaphysical assumptions of that argument.

It is technically a possibility that souls might turn out to be real but such a possibility does not have its chances affected in any meaningful way by the discovery of things like quantum foam. — Isaac

And here you continue, in exactly the same vein, acting like I had said 'There's quantum foam, so ghosts are possible' When in fact it was part of an argument saying that the ontological qualities of 'the physical' have been shifting, so the deduction....the one I was arguing against, are problematic.

So, even after I point out what I was doing and it is clear in the post and then in my confirmation of it that I was not doing what you assumed - and even called such an argument a poor argument,
had I been making it -

You're taking my argument as an argument (and not a good one) supporting the existence of those things. — Coben

you continue to respond as if I was making the other argument.

And then you go on to tell me things I know as if my post entails that I need this layman to layman lecture, despite this apparant need being based on something I have now said several times I was not doing.

God is an atheist made the argument implicitly by saying everything is physical a number of posts back. Most people do not write out their arguments in short syllogisms. And I suspect in part, not in this specific case, which I have no idea about, the arguments would look in need of more bolstering than they are willing to give. I take you at your word that you have no encountered this argument. Me, after a couple of decades in forums like this, I have experienced it many times.

I have also experienced people shifting my posts and the posts of other people so that they can make the points they want to make rather than respond to the posts we wrote.

It's tiring.

Usually however, after I explain what I was arguing they go 'Oh, ok.', rather than continuing to argue against an argument I did not make

and, again,

in fact, specifically said was a poor argument. I mean, I said it was a poor argument and you spent yet another post telling me why you think it was a poor argument!

That quote was part of an argument against ruling out via deduction. — Coben

We can't rule anything ontological in or out by deduction. Deduction only deals in tautologies, we need induction from evidence to rule in or out some aspect of ontology. That's the point of what I'm saying. Induction requires evidence, and there is none for souls (whereas there is for quantum foam). The which is ruled 'physical', or may yet be, will be that for which there is evidence. That which is not, and will never be, is that for which there is no evidence - despite looking. And no, this is not certain because it is induction. Induction is never certain. To invoke uncertainty in an argument about ontology is just to make a category error, it's just not relevant to the argument.

If GMBA did say something like "we can be certain that souls don't exist because they are not physical", then he was either wrong because certainty is not an appropriate term in ontology, or he's using 'certain' contextually (the context being an ontological discussion) and meaning by it just 'very justifiable belief'. The matter of whether souls might one day become listed as physical is irrelevant to the incorrectness of his argument as all ontological entities are accepted on the grounds of evidence, so a concept's 'possibility status' has no bearing on the matter.

We can't rule anything ontological in or out by deduction. Deduction only deals in tautologies, we need induction from evidence to rule in or out some aspect of ontology. — Isaac

In order to rule out souls, we would need evidence that contradicts their existence. This is deduction. It's an application of the law of non-contradiction.

In order to rule out souls, we would need evidence that contradicts their existence. This is deduction. It's an application of the law of non-contradiction. — frank

No, because the concept of 'ruling out/in' by deduction is incoherent in ontology. Even if we had evidence which contradicted their existence we could not rule them out deductively. The evidence might later prove to be wrong. We can only say deductively that "either the evidence is wrong, or souls don't exist", but we can't say which by deduction alone (note deduction hasn't told us anything new here).

To say anything about souls (in or out) we have to say it on the grounds of an assessment of the evidence. Currently there is no evidence for souls, so they are ruled out. It's not certain, but the point I was making is that there is no greater certainty than that in ontology. Anyone claiming we can rule out souls deductively is 'not even wrong', ruling out things deductively is just not an activity of ontology. Same goes for someone saying we can't specifically rule out souls deductively as it implies there's things we can rule out that way, it misunderstands what 'ruling out' is in ontology.

(This is all presuming physicalist ontology, which was the context of the discussion)

No, because the concept of 'ruling out/in' by deduction is incoherent in ontology. Even if we had evidence which contradicted their existence we could not rule them out deductively. The evidence might later prove to be wrong. We can only say deductively that "either the evidence is wrong, or souls don't exist", but we can't say which by deduction alone (note deduction hasn't told us anything new here).

To say anything about souls (in or out) we have to say it on the grounds of an assessment of the evidence. Currently there is no evidence for souls, so they are ruled out. It's not certain, but the point I was making is that there is no greater certainty than that in ontology. Anyone claiming we can rule out souls deductively is 'not even wrong', ruling out things deductively is just not an activity of ontology. Same goes for someone saying we can't specifically rule out souls deductively as it implies there's things we can rule out that way, it misunderstands what 'ruling out' is in ontology. — Isaac

No. Just no. Proceed to whatever source of insight you trust and start over.

I was driving along listening to Never Goodbye from Max Richter's Hostiles. A scene of the sort the Hubble telescope makes came to mind and I realized that this is what ancient people wanted to know about heaven. They thought the sky was a dome, but we know it goes on and on.

Max Richter, one of my favourite composers/musicians.

I think you'll find the astrophysicists say it is a dome*, the ancient people might be the ones laughing at us,... if they were here.

* you know what they say when they say there wasn't a time before the Big Bang because time and space curve around. It all curves around if you go far enough.

we are trapped within cartesian substance ontology in a very perverse way. the very process (thinking) upon which Descartes premised the certainty of his existence is now rated as less real than the res extensa, the questionable existence of which gave rise to the original cartesian doubt.

Oh well.

Perhaps 'souls' or other 'things' are on a spectrum within what will be considered physical. Most people work with a dualism, either denying that there is one or assuming there is one. And matter is juxtaposed to the non-material. — Coben

There is no definition of 'physical'. If you look at what is going on in physics itself, it's riven with debates about parallel universes and many worlds and the like. People use the word 'physical' like the meaning is settled, like everyone agrees what 'the physical' is, but this is far from true. What 'physical' comes down to a lot of the time is, 'what science might agree to exist', and that excludes consideration of certain ideas and tropes, but this is as much a matter of history and social convention as it is science.

Materialism, meanwhile, really has no account of the nature of meaning, which I think is fundamental to this debate. If you read the real ardent materialists, they insist time and time again that 'the universe is meaningless' or that 'meaning' is a subjective or personal invention. But the problem is, first, that this itself is a value-judgement that is not supported by science. Scientific analysis 'brackets out' the subjective so as to arrive at a purportedly value-free perspective immune from bias and cultural influences. And it does do that for good reason - but such perspectives are always limited, by definition. They exclude factors which are intrinsic to lived experience, and then demand 'scientific proof' of such factors, having first excluded them, and forgetting that it's excluded them. And this attitude is so all-pervading in contemporary technocratic culture that it's simply taken for granted, it's the air we breathe.

So, back to 'soul' - I take this to be simply the totality of the being. Inclinations, proclivities, history and destiny - all of those factors that can't be grasped by a superficial or any obviously objective analysis. It is the 'meaning of being' considered as a whole. That can be reconciled with the perspective of 'embodied activity', which reflects the physical, social and cultural environment in which being appears and acts. We embody cultural tropes, archetypes, potentialities, and so on, that are beyond the purview of the physical sciences as such (although not necessarily in conflict with them.)

A scene of the sort the Hubble telescope makes came to mind and I realized that this is what ancient people wanted to know about heaven. They thought the sky was a dome, but we know it goes on and on. — Punshhh

Actually there's a really profound point behind this observation. The pre-Copernican cosmology really did believe in the crystal spheres, that heaven was the literal abode of the angels, the changeless eternal realm. All of that came crashing down with the Galilean/Copernican revolution, replaced by the shocking realisation of the 'appalling vastness of space', as Blaise Pascal put it, and the notion that the Universe was simply a vast ensemble of material bodies controlled by nothing more than physical laws. For us who have grown up in the modern and post-modern age, and simply take this for granted, we forget what an enormous shock this has been.

The danger is too great that a separate existence is as assigned to such “life” analogous to that of a soul. … The avoidance of nouns that are nothing but reifications of processes greatly facilitates the analysis of the phenomena that are characteristic for biology." --Mayr 1982 — frank

I agree but isn't there a need to separate the object of interest from the rest of phenomena and doesn't that require one to assign a label to the collection of properties that are of concern? I mean if I wanted to study mental phenomena it would be very convenient to put the collection of mental facts and events under one banner, here mind. I'm no expert but when people concern themselves with the mind, their focus is on the phenomena that constitute mental activity. I've never heard of anyone talk of the mind as separate from mental activity which would be odd and an error but I do come across people who distinguish the mind from the body. The former would be Mayr's error of reification but it isn't committed at all and making a region of interest an object for convenience is completely acceptable.

Actually there's a really profound point behind this observation. The pre-Copernican cosmology really did believe in the crystal spheres, that heaven was the literal abode of the angels, the changeless eternal realm. All of that came crashing down with the Galilean/Copernican revolution,

I don't recall being taught how much of a shock this was, as it surely must have been. Somehow I think they were in denial lead by the church.

However my point was that we are now back with a dome, well a sphere at least. All the space and time curve round before infinity is reached. There is no before the universe, there is no beyond because you always come back round in circles. This is rather prosaic and imprecise, but I think it captures the jist of it.

Likewise the soul was taken away by the materialists, leaving us with a meaningless chaotic universe. But now the soul is making a come back.

We will soon have turned full circle and find ourselves back where the ancients were. Not literally I hope.

you know what they say when they say there wasn't a time before the Big Bang because time and space curve around. It all curves around if you go far enough. — Punshhh

But the universe is expanding. What is it expanding into if there's a limit?

I mean if I wanted to study mental phenomena it would be very convenient to put the collection of mental facts and events under one banner, here mind. — TheMadFool

Yes. "Mind" acts as a rigid designator.

we are trapped within cartesian substance ontology in a very perverse way. the very process (thinking) upon which Descartes premised the certainty of his existence is now rated as less real than the res extensa, the questionable existence of which gave rise to the original cartesian doubt. — Arne

Good point. Naturalism ends up being dependent on dualism to express what it rejects. The Naturalist binds herself to conclusions with no theory leading up to them and then demands that we limit the scope of the question. The fact that this is exactly the modus operandi of the medieval Catholic Church should signal us that this isn't science.

Good point. Naturalism ends up being dependent on dualism to express what it rejects. The Naturalist binds herself to conclusions with no theory leading up to them and then demands that we limit the scope of the question. The fact that this is exactly the modus operandi of the medieval Catholic Church should signal us that this isn't science. — frank

well said. and a bit frightening.

Good point. Naturalism ends up being dependent on dualism to express what it rejects. The Naturalist binds herself to conclusions with no theory leading up to them and then demands that we limit the scope of the question. The fact that this is exactly the modus operandi of the medieval Catholic Church should signal us that this isn't science. — frank

I was listening to a discussion on Schopenhaur and someone suggested that he would consider the scientific approach as the communicative structure of the Devine. And that struck and I am not even a religious person. But the possibility should be humbling to the naturalist.

Naturalism ends up being dependent on dualism to express what it rejects. The Naturalist binds herself to conclusions with no theory leading up to them and then demands that we limit the scope of the question. — frank

No. Just no. Proceed to whatever source of insight you trust and start over.

I was listening to a discussion on Schopenhaur and someone suggested that he would consider the scientific approach as the communicative structure of the Devine. And that struck and I am not even a religious person. But the possibility should be humbling to the naturalist. — Arne

Do you mean that science is the way the universe comes to know itself?

Naturalism ends up being dependent on dualism to express what it rejects. The Naturalist binds herself to conclusions with no theory leading up to them and then demands that we limit the scope of the question.
— frank

No. Just no. Proceed to whatever source of insight you trust and start over. — Isaac

:razz:

It's true, though.

I am not sure what I mean is the question. I would suggest that based upon the comment, what Schopenhaur would mean is that science is the way we come to know the Devine. Though I personally have thought in terms of consciousness as the universe coming to know itself.

It's true, though. — frank

Ah well, if it's 'true' then that's alright. I never thought of checking to see if my propositions were 'true'. Where did you go to get that checked, I'll get mine checked right away?

Ah well, if it's 'true' then that's alright. I never thought of checking to see if my propositions were 'true'. Where did you go to get that checked, I'll get mine checked right away? — Isaac

I'm not being a jerk here, Isaac. I'm telling you that you have problems with super basic logic. Do what you will with that.

I'm not being a jerk here, Isaac. I'm telling you that you have problems with super basic logic. — frank

Telling someone they have problems with something 'super basic' when you know full well they are an intelligent adult just because they draw different conclusions to you is kinda being a jerk though, isn't it?

elling someone they have problems with something 'super basic' when you know full well they are an intelligent adult just because they draw different conclusions to you is kinda being a jerk though, isn't it? — Isaac

If you see that I'm tripping up on the fundamentals, tell me you think so, even if I think you're being a jerk for saying it. My ego will heal. I'll benefit from the heads up.

If you see that I'm tripping up on the fundamentals, tell me you think so, even if I think you're being a jerk for saying it. My ego will heal. I'll benefit from the heads up. — frank

Cool. Well you're tripping up on the basics.