Mind-Body problem really not a problem?

Pantagruel

Reading Popper's "Open Universe," he presents a model that, I think, intuitively sews up the connection between mind and matter - actually, between abstract ideas and matter - so neatly as to make me wonder why I ever thought this was a "hard problem" at all.

Popper's model of Worlds 1, 2, and 3, material objects, psychological events, and abstract ideas, fits in with his overall approach of "Scientific Realism". Basically, he points out that, when a mathematician writes down his discoveries, there is an overall interaction of World 1 to 3 objects, abstract ideas end up 'making marks on paper.'

Of course I can't replicate the power of the example independent of the fuller context of his ideas and writing. But, to that end, I can't strongly enough recommend the Afterword to "The Open Universe", called "Indeterminism is not Enough". It is powerful, cogent, concise, and only requires a general familiarity with Popper's main ideas, which he does recapitulate.

Sir Philo Sophia

Popper's model of Worlds 1, 2, and 3, material objects, psychological events, and abstract ideas, fits in with his overall approach of "Scientific Realism". Basically, he points out that, when a mathematician writes down his discoveries, there is an overall interaction of World 1 to 3 objects, abstract ideas end up 'making marks on paper.' — Pantagruel

this is not helpful to resolve what the mind is and how to model it. For it to be worthy of discussion here, IMHO, you have to, in clear detail, explain why a current AI computer is not, and cannot be, doing Popper's Worlds 1, 2, and 3. If you cannot articulate that then it is a complete waste of time to ponder it applying to the human mind (body).

Pantagruel

↪Sir Philo Sophia

What you said is a complete non-sequitur to the content of the post. Nothing whatsoever to do with simulations, or AI. It was a reading recommendation for people interested in the mind-body problem, in general, and this novel approach to it.

Sir Philo Sophia

↪Pantagruel

I disagree. If anyone claims that the mind-body work are, or relate in, a certain way and that way also applies to current, man-made AI systems, then the theory is almost useless to modeling how the mind-body [problem] actually work. So, why both reading that? You recommend it, you also have to defend/sell it, to some extent, as well.

Pantagruel

that way also applies to current, man-made AI systems, — Sir Philo Sophia

Nonsense. Neural nets, for example are architected at a conceptual level, whereas neurons actually fire based on chemical potentials. You can model neural nets using chemical potentials which then code for concepts, but it is far more inefficient. In any case, talking about a natural phenomenon most certainly has nothing whatsoever to do with the fact that human beings also happen to create a model for that phenomenon. You are begging your own question.

Sir Philo Sophia

In any case, talking about a natural phenomenon most certainly has nothing whatsoever to do with the fact that human beings also happen to create a model for that phenomenon. — Pantagruel

that is 'nonsense' in that Genetic algorithms automatically build models and solutions, some that even humans cannot think of. Also, NNs can create symbolic and pattern matching models of phenomenon which can also be used to automatically create programs that control physical bodies (incl. robots and conducting experiments). Sounds to me like those can already do Popper's model of Worlds 1, 2, and 3, material objects, psychological events, and abstract ideas.

I suspect you are heavily anthropomorphizing Popper's theories to exclude existing non-human examples of it. Also, you seem to be arguing degree, which is not on point b/c current machines have zero degree of mind or consciousness.

Pantagruel

↪Sir Philo Sophia

The mind-body problem is a feature of the universe and has been debated since time immemorial. Why, because man is suddenly capable of computational mimicry, does that suddenly become inseparable from the mind-body question? Simulacra have likewise been around for a long time. Do you also require that we must discuss the automata and simulacra of the ancient and medieval worlds?

Sir Philo Sophia

computational mimicry — Pantagruel

you can ponder hypotheticals and exalt the human mind as being uniquely non-corporeal all you want, but words mean something. And if the way you state/hypothesis something is using words, if those words also cover automata and simulacra of the ancient, medieval, or modern worlds then those/your definitions and/or theories cannot be seriously considered as meaningful/useful per my above.

Provide better definitions, words, and/or theories that cannot possibly be satisfied by automata, simulacra, etc. then you have something for us to talk about.

Pantagruel

↪Sir Philo Sophia

Saying that no serious discussion of the mind-body problem can begin without discussing AI is inane. I'm sorry to be blunt, but it is. Frankly, AI has no bearing at all on the mind-body question. Mind-body is about the interaction of thought and matter. AI is about simulating thought. You can "make" it about that if you want, but you're just shoving an ancient issue into a modern procrustean bed.

Sir Philo Sophia

Mind-body is about the interaction of thought and matter. — Pantagruel

that is only your anthropomorphic opinion, of course. Just b/c the ancient greeks could not ponder a thinking machine doesn't mean that modern philosophers should be stuck should be stuck in the mental box of the ancients. That is like if modern philosophers still believed Aristotle's philosophical belief that heavier objects drop faster in gravity. If physicists did not simulate falling bodies in a vacuum then Aristotle's philosophical conclusion on that would still dominate modern philosophical thought, and be completely wrong. Increasingly, mind-body philosophers might start looking more like endeavoring in a theology than a logically grounded quest for mind-body truth.

AI is about simulating thought. — Pantagruel

not true. AI is about reproducing human thought, which you may anthropomorphically call simulating it. So, you are saying that machines cannot have human kind/level of thought?

Pantagruel

↪Sir Philo Sophia

So, I'll just reiterate, you are hijacking the thread, and not in a nice way. I've studied lots of information theory, neurocomputation, neural networks, cybernetics, I've worked as a systems engineer, am quite familiar with data mining, data cubes, and I'm pretty clear on what AI is and what it isn't. So forgive me if I don't accede to your stubborn, if myopic, fixation.

Sir Philo Sophia

you are hijacking the thread.. I've studied lots of ...and I'm pretty clear on what AI is and what it isn't. So forgive me if I don't accede to your stubborn, if myopic, fixation — Pantagruel

I disagree. You are talking about current AI state-of-the-art. I am talking about the philosophy of AI (in light of current AI state-of-the-art) as a framework for grounding the philosophy human mind-body. To ignore and discount that, IMHO, it tantamount to a philosophy about what is time ignoring what Physicist theorize time is about wrt the human condition and matter.

OK, I'll leave your thread in your feel-good, anthropomorphic bubble..., but don't be surprised if you are the only one commenting on your thread... b/c you have not otherwise motivated any philo interest in your topic... I was just trying to help you on that... best wishes..

Pantagruel

:up:

Arne

The mind-body problem is a feature of the universe and has been debated since time immemorial. — Pantagruel

Please cite any pre-Cartesian debate regarding the "mind-body problem."

Pantagruel

↪Arne

There is a history of pre-Cartesian dualism here which talks about Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas.

In a book on Fichte (one of my all time favourite philosophers) Scott Scribner writes that "the mind/body split is the legacy of nous, the intellectualization of spirit". If you are interested, the evolution of the concept of "nous" and all the related descendant terms would be a fascinating project I'm sure.

Pantagruel

If you are interested, the essay I am highly recommending, Indeterminism is not enough, may be found here.

Arne

↪Pantagruel

thank you. I am definitely interested. However and as a technical matter, Fichte himself is certainly post-Cartesian and his own comments beg the issue of whether he himself would have thought in terms of mind/body if he were not post-Cartesian. So in that sense, I am looking for pre-Cartesian framings of the issue as mind/body. But I will certainly check out your recommendations.

Pantagruel

↪Arne

Right, in that book on Fichte, the comment was specifically about the ancient greek concept of the nous...

Arne

↪Pantagruel

Perhaps I could have been more clear. I am thinking of substance ontology in the sense of a substance being "self sufficient." Though Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas would speak in terms of "souls" being different from physical forms, I think one would be hard pressed to argue that any of them considered "physical" forms to be self sufficient. As a result, they are able to avoid the issue of how distinct and self sufficient substances can interact. For Plato only the forms are truly self sufficient and for Aquinas only the creator is truly self sufficient. So they avoid the cartesian mind body issue by the simple reduction of all to forms or to God. For them, there is no true dualism.

Athena

So will IA come to understand humans better then men understand women or women understand men?
Is having information the same as having a sense of meaning? Can neural network math produce a sense of meaning?

Pantagruel

↪Arne

What is the sense of "self-sufficient" I know Plato considers the soul to be independent of the body, so in that sense, it is "self-sufficient". How is the physical body not self-sufficient for Plato? Also, his approach is that the soul must somehow free itself from the body's influences. Doesn't this imply they are distinct, and that the body is not merely an illusion?

Arne

How is the physical body not self-sufficient for Plato? — Pantagruel

I was not as clear as I could have been. The issue is not that of how self-sufficient forms (such as soul and body) interact. Instead, the issue is how do distinct substances interact.

For Plato, the real is reducible to the single non-material substance of ideal form. So even if the Platonic body is self-sufficient, it is ultimately reducible to a non-material ideal form. Consequently, Plato never has to explain how the non-material interacts with the material.

For Descartes, the real is reducible to one of two distinct substances, i.e., res cogitans (a thinking substance) and res extensa (a material substance.). And the Cartesians have spent half a millennium trying to answer the reasonable question of “how do two ‘distinct’ substances interact?”

And to date, every Cartesian answer is ultimately reducible to some form of parallelism, magic (transcendence) or “They just do. Isn’t it wonderful?”

Pantagruel

nd to date, every Cartesian answer is ultimately reducible to some form of parallelism, magic (transcendence) or “They just do. Isn’t it wonderful?” — Arne

Yes. It kind of reminds me how physics can be accused of introducing "occult forces" when it discovers counter-intuitive phenomena, such as action at a distance, in its now many forms (gravity, spooky action, quantum entanglement, etc.)

Arne

↪Pantagruel

except physics as we know has not had 500 years to provide adequate answers to reasonable questions.

Pantagruel

I just started Popper's "Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics" last night. His introduction concerning the relationship between the direction and characterization of physics research and physical concepts, and the historic and prevailing ontological and epistemological "trends", vis a vis. subjectivism in physics is just brilliant. A very clear read.

Mind-Body problem really not a problem?

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