To a realist, it means that possibilities are real, even if they do not occur; — aletheist

To a realist on possibilities, they are real, sure. Again, I was trying to avoid disputes about "just how possibilities <<obtain-or-whatever-word-one-wants-to-use>>." I don't know what neutral word to use that won't devolve into squabbles over just what their ontological status is as something "there is."

there is more to reality than mere existence; — aletheist

I don't agree with this.

That Peirce had the views he did doesn't affect my own views. You seem to agree with Peirce the vast majority of the time, though, and he seems to be very influential on you. Much like Tom and David Deutsch (though not exactly like that, maybe, since Tom often seems to be Deutsch's PR firm or perhaps his father or something).

You seem to agree with Peirce the vast majority of the time ... — Terrapin Station

I have been reading a lot of his stuff lately, so I am trying it out in order to ascertain the extent to which I agree with it.

I really think that you're not grasping what a general form is. The general form gains it's intelligibility by participating in, or being part of a larger, more general concept. The concept "red" obtains intelligibility by its relationship to the concept of "colour", not by a visual representation of a red object. The concept of "human being" obtains intelligibility through its relationship to the concept of "animal", not by a visual representation of a human being. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems we are talking about different things. I am saying that any form, any general configuration of structure, so to speak, can be represented visually. Of course the bilaterally symmetrical form of a human being is related to the bilaterally symmetrical form of other terrestrial vertebrates. This can be seen most clearly by presenting visual images of the general bilaterally symmetrical structure showing four limbs, head and torso, and so on.

So, any general form at all that can be grasped can be represented visually. Even the general form of a piece of music can be represented visually as a score, but the score does not represent the differences between any actual performances of the piece of music. Going back to the maple leaf example, the particular form of a particular leaf can never be represented perfectly in a visual image. In that sense any representation of a particular leaf is like particular leaves, which are themselves, conceived in a certain way, representations of a general form. But that general form can only be perfectly symmetrical idealized form. In a similar way the score represents the perfect form of the music; the exact timing, syncopation, pitch and so; which no particular performance of the music can ever achieve.

So, I am claiming that any form that can be intuitively grasped can be represented in a generalized way as a visual image. If you want to disagree then you would need to provide an example that contradicts this claim.

As with everyone else, though, it would just be something that obtains in God's mind insofar as God is thinking about it. — Terrapin Station

Yes, but God, by definition, is always thinking about everything.

Yes, but God, by definition, is always thinking about everything. — John

Why would God need to think? It occurred to me a while back that God has no need for intelligence, because there are no problems God needs to solve. Intelligence is for animals, who are limited by their bodies and environments. They have challenges to overcome to survive.

God has none.

Perhaps God is thinking, including the thinking and intelligence of animals, and all problems are really God's problems.

Yes, but God, by definition, is always thinking about everything. — John

That doesn't help anyone else, though, unless you say that God's mind is everywhere at all times, so that nothing exists that isn't God's mind.

Yes, that's right.

Why would God need to think? It occurred to me a while back that God has no need for intelligence, because there are no problems God needs to solve. Intelligence is for animals, who are limited by their bodies and environments. They have challenges to overcome to survive. — Marchesk

Good point. It is said in traditional theology that angels have no need for speech.

The issue is, what is 'thinking'? Whole can'o'worms there. But one distinction I would make, is between 'discursive reason', which is conscious thought and calculation based on words and reasoning, and 'intuitive perception', which is of a different order altogether, e.g.:

Plotinus wishes to speak of a thinking that is not discursive but intuitive, i.e. that it is knowing and what it is knowing are immediately evident to it. There is no gap then between thinking and what is thought--they come together in the same moment, which is no longer a moment among other consecutive moments, one following upon the other. Rather, the moment in which such a thinking takes place is immediately present and without difference from any other moment, i.e. its thought is no longer chronological but eternal. To even use names, words, to think about such a thinking is already to implicate oneself in a time of separated and consecutive moments (i.e. chronological) and to have already forgotten what it is one wishes to think, namely thinking and what is thought intuitively together.

There are many parallels in Eastern philosophy.