I think there is substantial agreement about what is 'true' in the world. — A Seagull

I agree (using your 'labelling' type definition of 'true'). But if the definition were limited to the sort of thing about which there is such agreement, then virtually no proposition in philosophy could be labelled 'true'.

think there is substantial agreement about what is 'true' in the world. — A Seagull
I agree (using your 'labelling' type definition of 'true'). But if the definition were limited to the sort of thing about which there is such agreement, then virtually no proposition in philosophy could be labelled 'true'. — Isaac

Propositions (or statements) can be labelled as 'true' when they are considered to be an accurate representation of an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true'.

"shorthand" must be the new tautology.

I maintain the proper distinction here is not between adjective and noun but between meaning and definition.

The former requires thought while the latter requires a dictionary which might define truth as "all things that are true."

In that sense, truth is very much the product of our encountering, engaging with, and coming to understand the entities within the world that we are in. When our assertions reveal those entities as they show themselves to be, then our assertions are true. When our assertions conceal how entities would otherwise show themselves to be, then our assertions are false. Either way, our regular and ongoing concernful engagement in the world is permeated through and through with truth. We are either trying to reveal or to conceal the world as it shows itself to be. Either way, we are in the truth/false business.

think there is substantial agreement about what is 'true' in the world — Isaac

low hanging fruit.

"shorthand" must be the new tautology.

I maintain the proper distinction here is not between adjective and noun but between meaning and definition.

The former requires thought while the latter requires a dictionary which might define truth as "all things that are true."

In that sense, truth is very much the product of our encountering, engaging with, and coming to understand the entities within the world that we are in. When our assertions reveal those entities as they show themselves to be, then our assertions are true. When our assertions conceal how entities would otherwise show themselves to be, then our assertions are false. Either way, our regular and ongoing concernful engagement in the world is permeated through and through with truth. We are either trying to reveal or to conceal the world as it shows itself to be. Either way, we are in the truth/false business.

I think that when we equivocate between adjectives and nouns so easily we are presented with errors of grammar, not meaning. Nominalizing adjectives is to mentally turn descriptive terms into nouns, giving being to things that cannot themselves be described. So though there are things that are true, there are no truths that are things.

So though there are things that are true, there are no truths that are things. — NOS4A2

Whether "thingness" can/cannot be attached to the term "truth" fails to enlighten. Though certainly many would consider truth to be a concept and a concept to be a thing and therefore the concept of truth would be a thing. But that really matters not as thingness is the ultimate Cartesian red herring upon which I will waste no more time.

The deeper issue is not which distinction (adjective/noun or meaning/definition) is more fraught with potential error. Instead, the deeper issue is which distinction is more useful to illuminating a meaningful understanding of the world in which you find yourself.

And if you think the grammar distinction is the way to go, then good luck to you.

Propositions (or statements) can be labelled as 'true' when they are considered to be an accurate representation of an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true'. — A Seagull

Sure, but that would be a really weird use of the word. Totally out of kilter with the way it's used at the moment so I don't think you'll get many takers.

low hanging fruit. — Arne

Indeed. That's the point I was making. If we're only using 'true' like 'blue', limiting ourselves to that which we all agree on, we're not going to have a great many of the most interesting concepts labelled 'true'. Maybe that's as it should be though.

Indeed. That's the point I was making. If we're only using 'true' like 'blue', limiting ourselves to that which we all agree on, we're not going to have a great many of the most interesting concepts labelled 'true'. Maybe that's as it should be though. — Isaac

Indeed. But that is not necessarily "as it should be." For Example A Seagull is essentially pushing a correspondence theory of truth that could be fruitful if tweaked.

Propositions (or statements) can be labelled as 'true' when they are considered to be an accurate representation of an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true'. — A Seagull

I would tweak it as "an assertion is true if the entity toward which it is directed shows itself to be as asserted." As a result, we move beyond a correspondence between a proposition and what the mind has labeled as true to a correspondence between a proposition and how entities within the world show themselves to be. We have now shed the pesky and unnecessary "representation of an idea".

Propositions (or statements) can be labelled as 'true' when they are considered to be an accurate representation of an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true'. — A Seagull
Sure, but that would be a really weird use of the word. Totally out of kilter with the way it's used at the moment so I don't think you'll get many takers. — Isaac

I don't expect to get many 'takers'. And yes it is at odds with many people's ideas about truth.

But that doesn't mean it is not part of a better system.

If one wants a simple, self-consistent and comprehensive philosophy, then IMO it is not only the best but the only way to go.

Propositions (or statements) can be labelled as 'true' when they are considered to be an accurate representation of an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true'. — A Seagull
I would tweak it as "an assertion is true if the entity toward which it is directed shows itself to be as asserted." As a result, we move beyond a correspondence between a proposition and what the mind has labeled as true to a correspondence between a proposition and how entities within the world show themselves to be. We have now shed the pesky and unnecessary "representation of an idea". — Arne

You seem to be making the assumption of 'naïve reality' whereby the world is pretty much or even exactly as we perceive it. For me this is a naïve assumption, albeit a popular one.

It makes more logical sense to only assume that we have a model of the world.

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is in the first place? — Monist

We understand, or learn how to use, "truth" in our language-games, including the "knowing" ones. Same as understand, or learn how to use, knowledge without "knowing" what knowledge is.

Similar question #2 Can we justify justification?

Can we even justify this question?

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is — Monist

Removing "in the first place" should clear things up, I would think. In other words, the question is non sensical.

A Seagull is essentially pushing a correspondence theory of truth that could be fruitful if tweaked. — Arne

But that doesn't mean it is not part of a better system.

If one wants a simple, self-consistent and comprehensive philosophy, then IMO it is not only the best but the only way to go. — A Seagull

'Better/, 'Fruitful' for what? What is it these systems are trying to achieve that you think this approach might make more likely?

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is in the first place?

Similar question #2 Can we justify justification? — Monist

I don't know what exactly truth is but the concept itself applies to propositions: if the propostions reflect states of reality then the propositions are true and if not the propositions are false. I'm probably stating the correspondence theory of truth which I feel has a very wide reach.

As for the notion of justification I think it stems of the simple fact that we can be deceived, either deliberately or otherwise. Imagine our ancestors (sorry but everyone seems to believe in evolution) whose primary concern, apart from scoodlypooping, was to tell predator and prey apart. Consider the scenario that a band of our hunter-gatherer forefathers chance upon an animal they've never encountered. How would they know predator or prey? A good place to start would be size, presence of fangs and claws. These other truths would settle the matter for them: Big, fangs and claws implies predator and if absent, prey.

As you can see any given proposition implies or is implied by some other propositions and so if ever we're in doubt, and that is almost always the case, we need the other truths or falsehoods which either imply or are implied by the proposition under consideration. In other words every proposition appears in a context of other truths and falsehoods and when we assess this background information we can determine truths. This is the nature of justification and it appears to me as quite a natural way of thinking.

There's a door in my room (reality) - it's true there's a door in my room.

The reality of the matter, is not the truth. The parts of that statement, don't connect neatly.

If I say, 'it's true there's a door in my room', it's in response to a contemplation or redundant.

Truth/lie is expansion of a subject and detection of an object.

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is in the first place? — Monist

One way in which it can work, is to (arbitrarily) declare particular basic sentences to be true. Next, all sentences that necessarily follow from these basic sentences are also true, in accordance with the rules of logic that you consider to apply. Therefore, a sentence is logically "true" when it has the same truth status as the basic sentences of the theory created by the basic sentences.

So, yes, agreed. Logical truth is injected from outside the universe-world-model in which it applies.

You seem to be making the assumption of 'naïve reality' whereby the world is pretty much or even exactly as we perceive it. For me this is a naïve assumption, albeit a popular one.

It makes more logical sense to only assume that we have a model of the world.


A Seagull

15 hours ago — A Seagull

You are mistaken. If anything, I am a robust realist.

I am discussing the already existing process by which we attach "true/not true" to an assertion directed towards entities within the world or within a model of the world and at those times when such judgments are needed.

The only value in knowing the world or model of the world may be different than it appears at the time the judgment is needed lay in its usefulness for consoling yourself when you have made the wrong judgment.

Oh well.

It makes more logical sense to only assume that we have a model of the world. — A Seagull

Yes, let us create a model of the world, declare it to be the real, and treat the world as less real than the model of the world. That is not a winning argument.

Accepting that the world in which you find yourself may far more complex than it appears to be does not require you to presume it is a model. It just requires you to accept that the world in which you find yourself may be far more complex than it appears to be.

It makes more logical sense to only assume that we have a model of the world. — A Seagull
Yes, let us create a model of the world, declare it to be the real, and treat the world as less real than the model of the world. That is not a winning argument. — Arne

One does not need to declare that a model of the world is 'real', all one needs to do is to realise that the model is all one knows about the world.

If one wants a simple, self-consistent and comprehensive philosophy, then IMO it is not only the best but the only way to go. — A Seagull
'Better/, 'Fruitful' for what? What is it these systems are trying to achieve that you think this approach might make more likely? — Isaac

What people want from philosophy ( or at least what I want from philosophy) is a simple, self-consistent, accurate and comprehensive system for describing what knowledge is and how it is achieved as this will allow for a more effective and efficient means of interacting with the world; a system that can link all facets of one's experience of the world from the inner to the outer without schisms or discontinuities and without arbitrary assumptions.

One way in which it can work, is to (arbitrarily) declare particular basic sentences to be true. Next, all sentences that necessarily follow from these basic sentences are also true, in accordance with the rules of logic that you consider to apply. Therefore, a sentence is logically "true" when it has the same truth status as the basic sentences of the theory created by the basic sentences — alcontali

Ok. you can 'declare particular sentences to be 'true'. But what then? What logical process are you going to use to find those sentences that 'necessarily follow from those basic sentences'? Even if you do have such a logical process, those sentences that follow and are declared 'true' are only true within that particular system; ie they rely on the truth of the original basic sentences for their truth.

One does not need to declare that a model of the world is 'real', all one needs to do is to realise that the model is all one knows about the world. — A Seagull

That is just a word game.

I am my world. And within my world is the realization that my world is all I know about the world.

Nothing is to be gained by saying:

I am my model world. And within my model world is my realization that my model world is all I know about the model world.

The best model of the world is the world.

If it helps, you may add the word "model" to the word "world" every time I use the word "world." It would probably be more efficient if you just did it in your head.

And you are welcome.

:-)

Perhaps the point to realise is that your model of the world differs from everybody else's and that their is no perfect or 'real' model with which to compare it.

Perhaps the point to realise is that your model of the world differs from everybody else's and that their is no perfect or 'real' model with which to compare it. — A Seagull

I already know that.

But adding the word "model" does not overcome the problem unless everyone knows that "model" is a synonym for "my" (as opposed to yours) and if "model" is a synonym for "my" then we can just use the world "my".

So not only is "model" not going to clarify any confusion regarding differences among or between worlds, it is actually likely to create such confusion in that it connotes replica, copy, facsimile, etc. as if my [model] world were some how less than real. And you may rest assured there are no worlds that are more "real" than mine.

Indeed. But that is not necessarily "as it should be." For Example A Seagull is essentially pushing a correspondence theory of truth that could be fruitful if tweaked. — Arne

There is no correspondence.

There is no correspondence. — A Seagull

Yes there is.

Propositions (or statements) can be labelled as 'true' when they are considered to be an accurate representation of an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true'. — A Seagull

In terms of correspondence theories of truth, your above statement would be restated as below:

Propositions are true when they CORRESPOND to an idea that is considered true.

It is not my intent to put words in your mouth. Instead, my intent is to simply clarify the "type" of theory of truth you are pushing. And the theory of truth you are pushing clearly is of the type referred to as correspondence. And that is okay. Correspondence theories of truth have been widely accepted since Descartes and continuing to the present.

That I disagree with them does not mean that they are incorrect (though they are).

Propositions are true when they CORRESPOND to an idea that is considered true. — Arne

And what is meant by 'an idea that is considered true'? Sounds tautological to me.

Propositions are labelled as 'true' when they are an accurate representation of an idea that a person believes.

And what is meant by 'an idea that is considered true'? Sounds tautological to me. — A Seagull

You are arguing with yourself.

1.
What I mean by an idea that is considered true is

an idea that the brain/mind has labelled as 'true' — A Seagull

Both versions are equally tautological. My restatement is concise and adds clarity.



2.
Similarly, there is no functional difference between

A.

Propositions are labelled as 'true' when they are an accurate representation of an idea that a person believes. — A Seagull

and

B.
"Propositions are labelled as 'true' when they" [CORRESPOND to] "an idea that a person believes."

Again, my restatement is more concise and adds clarity.



3.
It matters not to me if you prefer wordiness and lack of clarity. I am just trying to help.

Either way, the theory you are pushing is of the type contemporary philosophy refers to as "correspondence." And that is simply correct whether you agree or not.

Ok. you can 'declare particular sentences to be 'true'. But what then? What logical process are you going to use to find those sentences that 'necessarily follow from those basic sentences'? — A Seagull

You can use provability to verify how the truth of new theorems in a theory depends on the assumed truth of the theory's basic sentences.

Even if you do have such a logical process, those sentences that follow and are declared 'true' are only true within that particular system; ie they rely on the truth of the original basic sentences for their truth. — A Seagull

Yes, agreed.

The truth of the original basic sentences must necessarily be supplied from outside such system. Such atomic sentences are assigned truth values disquotationally. When reasoning from first principles, the truth of such first principles is always assumed. From within the system, its basic truths are deemed to be of arbitrary nature.