In what sense is this particular prediction "testable"? What specific experiential consequences can we deductively explicate from it? How would we then go about inductively evaluating whether there really are parallel "worlds"? — aletheist

That particular prediction is tested in every quantum interference experiment, and every experiment involving "non-locality". Quantum computing is also a test, as are certain proposed experiments involving reversible quantum computers.

A particularly striking and simple test is the Elitzur-Vaidman Bomb-Tester, in which you get to blow up a laboratory and perhaps kill yourself in a parallel world.

https://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9305002

but when the initial decision is made to entertain the notion of many worlds, then a whole series of consequences flow on from that. But I'm sceptical of the very first assumption. Actually, I'm not just sceptical - I'm dismissive of it. I think it is a fantasy. Everett himself says he had been drinking when the idea came to him. 'Hey, what if all the outcomes are real?' — Wayfarer

If you dismiss Many Worlds, what theory do you replace it with?

Everett never mentioned Many Worlds in his publications, he focused on solving the measurement problem thus formulating quantum mechanics in a manner suitable for addressing quantum gravity.

Because you have never studied quantum mechanics, you keep claiming the many worlds are an assumption. This is pure ignorance. I'm getting a bit tired of repeating that the branching nature of the wavefunction - which gives rise ultimately to the many worlds - is a prediction of the theory. It can't be avoided without ad-hoc modification of unitary quantum mechanics.

Try this book:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Emergent-Multiverse-Quantum-According-Interpretation/dp/0198707541

If you dismiss Many Worlds, what theory do you replace it with? — tom

I said that quantum physics is on the border of what can be known. Maybe there will be no theory to replace it with. Maybe it's something we'll never know.

Because you have never studied quantum mechanics, you keep claiming the many worlds are an assumption. This is pure ignorance. — tom

This is a philosophy forum. Papers published in the technical journals of physics are not part of the curriculum. Besides, I think that many physicists are engaging in metaphysics without even knowing that they are doing that. Sean Carroll is arguing that untestable predictions ought to be regarded as scientific merely because they're mathematically elegant.

Imagine how the world would look if all the imaginary elbow room provided by many worlds and multiverses were swept away. Imagine if we had to face the cold light of day knowing there were implications of physics that we simply can't understand, instead of inventing fantastic mathematical extravaganzas to 'make sense' of them.

The author of the book I recommended is a philosopher. David Wallace works in the philosophy department of Oxford Uni.

Here he is talking.

https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/plurality-worlds

I notice in the side-bar the comment 'The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to make sense of physics without action-at-a-distance, objective randomness, or any strange role for "observer" or "consciousness".' My view is that the proposed solution is worse than the perceived problem.

That is because you are a stranger to philosophy and reason.

The author of the book I recommended is a philosopher. David Wallace works in the philosophy department of Oxford Uni. — tom

Wallace is committed though to a very particular view. Here is part of Chapter 1 of his book:

The algorithm may be ‘ad hoc, under-motivated, inherently approximate’, but it still allows predictions of stunning precision. Isn’t the point of science to make predictions? Why care about supposed ‘problems’ with a theory if it still generates predictions of this degree of accuracy?

But this misses the point of science...the purpose of scientific theories is not to predict the results of experiments: it is to describe, explain, and understand the world. And quantum mechanics—as described in the previous sections—fails to do this. No ‘description of the world’ is to be found in the quantum algorithm (p.25) of section 1.3. At best, we will find an approximately specified description of the macroscopic degrees of freedom. About the microscopic world, the algorithm is silent.

One robust response to my comments might be: so much the worse for what we thought science was for. Could it not be that our hopes of ‘describing, explaining and understanding the world’ turn out to be optimistic—even naive? Could quantum mechanics not be telling us to lower our sights, to be content with a more modest picture of science as a mere predictive tool? After all, ‘experiments’ can be construed quite broadly: the quantum algorithm suffices to predict all macroscopic phenomena. Why not be content with that? — David Wallace

Personally I am content with that and find Wallace's view of the philosophy of science overblown and too dismissive of alternatives. But then I am a die-hard empiricist, and don't accept that the desire for an elegant theory should override scepticism about metaphysical claims. Obviously, Wallace goes on to express his discontent with what he calls an 'instrumentalist' view of science, and his argument for metaphysical (scientific) realism.

Peter Woit's blog is an entertaining alternative that treats multiverse claims with some scepticism, while insisting on scientific rigour, if anyone is interested: http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/

I think we should at minimum be clear that the Deutsch view is a minority position within physics; it doesn't stand for science against ignorant philistines masquerading as amateur philosophers.

on the grounds of the inherent implausibility there being parallel universes. Given the assumption there are, there are mathematical 'solutions' to various paradoxes and conundrums. But if their grounding assumption is unreal, then what kinds of 'solution' are they really? — Wayfarer

They would be no solution at all. But this would imply the QM formalism being either wrong or incomplete. And QM is a very well tested theory.

QM is counterintuitive to humans because we don't knowingly encounter things in superposition in everyday life. People intuitively think we live in an classical world where particles have precise positions and momenta at the same time. But we don't - we live in a quantum world and so it's really our intuitions that need to change.

Once we stop thinking of superposition states as possible states that the particle can be in (the classical intuition) and instead as actual states that interfere with each other (the quantum intuition), then the idea of parallel worlds (or branches or paths) naturally follows.

The philosophical issue is whether mathematical equations provide insight into the world we live in, or whether they are mere Platonic abstractions that nonetheless may have instrumental value.

Your diet is deficient in irony :-)

But this would imply the QM formalism being either wrong or incomplete. — Andrew M

ONLY given a particular, and physicalist, notion of what constitutes 'reality'. There are alternatives that are not based on materialist premisses - for example, Bernard D'Espagnat's 'Vieled Reality' which is nearer to Neo-Kantianism. Werner Heisenberg favoured a Platonist approach. And I don't think any of the MWI advocates have any grasp of Platonism or Kant, because they're too committed to physicalism. It really is a metaphysical problem, masquerading as scientific theory.

Notice that in David Wallace's podcasts on MW, it states upfront the fact that among the problems that are solved is that of the requirement for there to be an observer - the crux of the measurement problem. MWI disposes of that by saying that there is 'no collapse', i.e. all the observations are equally real in some parallel world. Doesn't that just strike you as being a monumentally bizarre idea - that there are endless replicas of the universe? If you can't see how bizarre it seems, then I'm afraid we do live in different worlds after all.

I keep an eye on Woit's blog. I only understand a fraction of what he says, but what I understand I'm generally in agreement with.

I think we should at minimum be clear that the Deutsch view is a minority position within physics... — mcdoodle

...which is well on its way to becoming a new religious movement, complete with iconic heroes (Deutsch, Everett, Tegmark), and eschatology (i.e. realisation of human consciiousness in silicon.)

The philosophical issue is whether mathematical equations provide insight into the world we live in, or whether they are mere Platonic abstractions that nonetheless may have instrumental value. — Andrew M

What you're not allowing for is the possibility of 'real abstractions'. In your view 'abstractions' are simply 'mental phenomena', which must be consequent to the physical, right? Mental phenomena are the products of the brain, which is the product of evolution, which is ultimately governed by physical laws, right? So there is no way to understand how 'abstractiions' can be real in any objective sense.

But, note this passage from Heisenberg, in his lecture The Debate between Plato and Democritus'. Democritus (and Leuccipes) founded atomism, the idea of an ultimate material point or particle; Plato on the other hand, represents objective idealism, the philosophy that ideas precede forms.

During the nineteenth century, the development of chemistry and the theory of heat conformed very closely tot he ideas first put forward by Leucippus and Democritus. A revival of the materialist philosophy in its modern form, that of dialectical materialism, was this a natural counterpart to the impressive advances made during this period in chemistry and physics. The concept of the atom had proved exceptionally fruitful in the explanation of chemical bonding and the physical behavior of gases. It was soon, however, that the particles called atoms by the chemist were composed of still smaller units. But these smaller units, the electrons, followed by the atomic nuclei and finally the elementary particles, protons and neutrons, also still seemed to be atoms from the standpoint of the materialist philosophy. The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do.

But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.

Underline added. Heisenberg is suggesting that sub-atomic particles can't be said to exist in the way stones or flowers exist. In what way do they exist? Elsewhere, he says they are:

something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.

Heisenberg called this "potentia," a concept found in Aristotle. So in this framework, the observation made by the physicist 'actualises' the potentially-existing 'object' into a particle, which doesn't really exist prior to that observation.

Now I don't think realism can cope with this, because something like a sub-atomic particle either exist or they don't. And if they don't exist, then what is at the foundations of our purportedly material reality?

The 'Copenhagen Interpretation' doesn't solve the issue. It simply points it out. It's not a school of thought, it's not a philosophy or a method. All it consists of, are various observations from those associated with Bohr's institute in Denmark, concerning what can and can't be said on the basis of quantum mechanics. But as I said before, I think the admission of there not being an answer, is preferable to speculative metaphysics which purports to provide an answer based on questionable premisses.

They would be no solution at all. But this would imply the QM formalism being either wrong or incomplete. And QM is a very well tested theory. — Andrew M

But you know that is an understatement by a very long way! Ignoring the fact that our culture and technology is based on QM -we spend hours a day interacting with it and through it, not even the LHC can detect a hint that there might be the slightest problem.

Then of course there is the fact that QM is full of surprises. How is it possible that a conjectured law to explain atomic spectra, should also reveal entanglement, superposition, teleportation, quantum computing and the multiverse? Luck?

The philosophical issue is whether mathematical equations provide insight into the world we live in, or whether they are mere Platonic abstractions that nonetheless may have instrumental value. — Andrew M

Instrumentalism, apart from being wrong for other reasons, cannot explain the surprises.

Notice that in David Wallace's podcasts on MW, it states upfront the fact that among the problems that are solved is that of the requirement for there to be an observer - the crux of the measurement problem. MWI disposes of that by saying that there is 'no collapse', i.e. all the observations are equally real in some parallel world. Doesn't that just strike you as being a monumentally bizarre idea - that there are endless replicas of the universe? If you can't see how bizarre it seems, then I'm afraid we do live in different worlds after all. — Wayfarer

Yes, it sounded bizarre when I first encountered it. But having worked through the math, there's really no way around it. The other interpretations are just creative attempts to avoid the straightforward implications of QM.

Everettian QM is unitary, local, causal, realist, parsimonious, explanatory and testable - just the sorts of things one would expect of a robust scientific theory. On the other side is Copenhagen QM, which just shrugs and says the math is meaningless and the world is intrinsically unknowable.

So that is the context for judging these two interpretations. Everettian QM violates our natural intuitions, but has all the hallmarks of a correct theory.

What you're not allowing for is the possibility of 'real abstractions'. In your view 'abstractions' are simply 'mental phenomena', which must be consequent to the physical, right? Mental phenomena are the products of the brain, which is the product of evolution, which is ultimately governed by physical laws, right? So there is no way to understand how 'abstractiions' can be real in any objective sense. — Wayfarer

I think of abstractions in an Aristotelian sense, not Platonic sense. That is, universals exist when they are instantiated in things. In this sense, abstractions existed prior to people being around to talk about them. They are something we discover, not create.

Underline added. Heisenberg is suggesting that sub-atomic particles can't be said to exist in the way stones or flowers exist. In what way do they exist? Elsewhere, he says they are:

"something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality."

Heisenberg called this "potentia," a concept found in Aristotle. So in this framework, the observation made by the physicist 'actualises' the potentially-existing 'object' into a particle, which doesn't really exist prior to that observation. — Wayfarer

It's a creative theory. But what does it mean? Do potentially-existing objects interfere in the double-slit experiment?

But you know that is an understatement by a very long way! — tom

Indeed. But I'm leaving open the possibility of extra postulates. For example, QM would be incomplete if there were demonstrated to be disappearing worlds, per Copenhagen.

It's a creative theory. But what does it mean? Do potentially-existing objects interfere in the double-slit experiment? — Andrew M

I assume you understand that there is a distinction between past and future. An actually existing object owes its actual existence to the fact that it has been actualized. The act which causes its existence is in the past. A potentially existing objects is one that has not yet been actualized. It is in the future. The act to cause its existence has not yet occurred. Do you recognize the difference between a past act and a future act? The past act has already occurred, and so it has existence in time. The future act has not yet occurred and so it does not exist in time.

I understand the distinction. So how do you explain double-slit interference patterns in terms of potentially-existing objects?

Potential is real, and therefore must have some type of existence, though it is distinct from actual existence. We can assign "actual existence" to what has occurred, and this is the basis for observation. Anything observed, has occurred. The existence of an actual object is something observed. The object is in the past, as it has been observed. There are no objects in the future, yet the potential is there. What type of existence could this potential have? Clearly it is non-temporal existence, because time only occurs at the present, as time passing. Only things in the past have experienced time passing, so only things in the past have temporal existence.

But having worked through the math, there's really no way around it — Andrew M

But it may not be simply a mathematical issue. What is measurable might be only one aspect of what is there. Notice this comment that Wallace makes (quoted by McDoodle):

One robust response to my comments might be: so much the worse for what we thought science was for. Could it not be that our hopes of ‘describing, explaining and understanding the world’ turn out to be optimistic—even naive? Could quantum mechanics not be telling us to lower our sights, to be content with a more modest picture of science as a mere predictive tool?

I think it's much more likely that there's something basic that we don't understand, than parallel universes.

It's a creative theory. But what does it mean? Do potentially-existing objects interfere in the double-slit experiment? — Andrew M

Hey, we're discussing Werner Heisenberg. He's not simply 'a creative theorist' but one of the founders of quantum physics. I don't claim any kind of deep knowledge of his philosophy of physics but I think he probably has good 'street cred' on the subject.

But as I understand it, such things as sub-atomic particles are not 'existents' in the way that we intuitively understand such things. That is actually the import of the passage I posted. He says when say of flowers and stones and the like that they exist, we can't use the same terminology about sub-atomic entities. They're on the borderline between existence and potentiality. So when you ask of them 'do they exist', the answer is neither yes nor no; it's 'it depends on what you mean by "exist"' or 'it depends on what question you're asking'. So their existence is not un-ambigious, which is what is the real problem for physicalism and realism. On the other hand, if one is not a scientific realist, then it's not that big a problem.

What type of existence could this potential have? Clearly it is non-temporal existence, — Metaphysician Undercover

Earlier on the other thread on this topic, there was a discussion about the interference pattern in the double-slit experiment. I noted that the interference pattern is independent of the rate at which electrons are fired. So I put that question to Physics forum, and also Stack Exchange, and sure enough, the physicists there said that 'time is not a boundary condition' of the interference pattern.

The question I then asked was, are other kinds of wave-functions also independent of time? What is the significance of a timeless wave? That question didn't produce a response. I think it's significant, but to prove it, I would probably have to go and re-enroll in physics and spend 5 years on it. But, intuitively, what it tells me is that the probability wave is not a function of time, and I think that has profound philosophical significance.

not even the LHC can detect a hint that there might be the slightest problem [with quantum physics]. — tom

What about the so-called Nightmare scenario? This is a hard thing to summarise but describes the possibility that if there are no super-symmetric particles, that the standard model seems 'unnaturally fine-tuned'.

The absence of new particles almost certainly means that the laws of physics are not natural in the way physicists long assumed they are.

So actually, even though physics produces highly accurate results, there are huge conceptual gaps.

Why is this reality apparent as opposed to other possible worlds? — Question

Why not?

I think it's much more likely that there's something basic that we don't understand, than parallel universes. — Wayfarer

The basic thing that we don't understand is the nature of time. There is One fundamental principle which is well proven by experience, and therefore produces the most sound base for any ontology, which is ignored, neglected, or even dismissed by most physicists. This is the basic assumption that there is a substantial difference between future and past. We know that this is true, because things in the past have already occurred, and things in the future have not yet occurred. This simple fact has far more influence over the way that we live our lives than any other definable fact. It permeates all aspects of all our actions, languages, and concepts. For some reason, at the level of theoretical physics, and metaphysical speculations carried out by physicists, there is a tendency to deny this simple fact. I see it as an unwarranted attempt to simplify the complex, an unjustified application of Occam's razor.

The substantial difference between future and past necessitates the assumption of two distinct types of substance, one proper to the past, the other proper to the future. We cannot assign substantial existence (the existence of substance) to the present, because the present appears to us as a division between future and past, and such a division has not temporal extension. Substance necessarily has temporal extension. So we have two distinct types of substance which bear the labels actual (past) and potential (future). Of course one must be transformed into the other, and this is what occurs at the present, actualization, what we call activity. This produces the concept of "becoming", which refers to the activity at the present.

Now we have another difficulty to overcome. Activity necessarily requires time, temporal extension. But we've already relegated temporal extension to the past and to the future, producing a timeless boundary at the present. The boundary between past and future, the present, can no longer be considered to be timeless, because we must allow that becoming occurs at the present, and becoming is a concept with temporal extension inherent within it, just like substance has temporal extension inherent within. The only logical option is to assume another dimension of time, which is proper to becoming.

So we temporal extension, in the classical sense, which refers to the tradition concept of time. This assumes a non-dimensional point in time, derived from the non-temporal point which separates future from past. We can map out many different time periods, containing duration of time, in the classical sense. But this non-dimensional, non-temporal point, dividing two periods of time, is artificial. And, it is an inadequate representation. It is derived from the assumption of a non-temporal division between past and future, "the present is a point in time". It is inadequate, because from this assumption "becoming" is unintelligible, it defies the laws of logic. This problem with becoming has been demonstrated over and over in different ways by different philosophers. In order to render becoming as intelligible, we must be able to assign to it a temporal order. This is a passing of time which occurs at the present, within that artificial point, that divides future from past. This newly found dimension of time is completely different from time as referred to in the classical sense, because it is ongoing within the point which divides between two classically separated durations of time. The challenge is to establish principles of consistency between the two, to create one concept of time, consisting of these two dimensions.

Earlier on the other thread on this topic, there was a discussion about the interference pattern in the double-slit experiment. I noted that the interference pattern is independent of the rate at which electrons are fired. So I put that question to Physics forum, and also Stack Exchange, and sure enough, the physicists there said that 'time is not a boundary condition' of the interference pattern.

The question I then asked was, are other kinds of wave-functions also independent of time? What is the significance of a timeless wave? That question didn't produce a response. I think it's significant, but to prove it, I would probably have to go and re-enroll in physics and spend 5 years on it. But, intuitively, what it tells me is that the probability wave is not a function of time, and I think that has profound philosophical significance. — Wayfarer

So from my perspective, there really is no "timeless wave". The wave-function must be measured according to the other, undeveloped, dimension of time. It is proper to the realm of becoming, as all energy is. "Energy" refers to a relationship between what actually is (past), and what potential is (future), so its existence is proper to becoming, which can only be measured according to the new dimension of time. What this perspective opens up to the mind, is the vast realm of unknown, which lies on the other side of that newly dimensioned point in time, the present. This is the realm of the not yet actual, the future. Since it is prior to the passing of time at the present, it is truly timeless. Our only means of access to it, is to develop the dimension of time which is proper to the present, becoming and the wave-function. By doing this, we can establish a mathematical relationship between the realm of what actual existence (past), and the realm of potential existence (future, 2nd type of substance). But without this relationship, which can be defined as a unified concept of time, we have no approach to this non-empirical realm.

Potential is real, and therefore must have some type of existence, though it is distinct from actual existence. We can assign "actual existence" to what has occurred, and this is the basis for observation. Anything observed, has occurred. The existence of an actual object is something observed. The object is in the past, as it has been observed. There are no objects in the future, yet the potential is there. What type of existence could this potential have? Clearly it is non-temporal existence, because time only occurs at the present, as time passing. Only things in the past have experienced time passing, so only things in the past have temporal existence — Metaphysician Undercover

Your explanation needs to account for the double-slit experiment. What goes through the slits, if anything, such that an interference pattern is observed on the back screen?

The basic thing that we don't understand is the nature of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who is 'we'? I know for sure I don't understand it, and I'm pretty sure I'm not going to find out the solution on a philosophy forum. (Not wanting to be rude, or anything like that.)

...local realism doesn’t work. For example, say you are experimenting with entangled photons. As soon as you measure one of the entangled photons in a detector and find that its polarization—that is, the orientation of its waves—is horizontal, the other one in the pair is instantly projected into a horizontal state. And this happens not because the photons were both horizontally polarized from the beginning. That is contradicted by the experiments. It doesn’t matter whether you look at the two particles at the same time, separated over large distances, or one after the other; the results are the same. So it seems as if quantum mechanics doesn’t care about space and time. — Anton Zelliger

As I said - outside of time. Sub-atomic particles belong to a different order to that of pheneomena, which always appear in time.

Your explanation needs to account for the double-slit experiment. What goes through the slits, if anything, such that an interference pattern is observed on the back screen? — Andrew M

The slits are an object, and so have actual existence. Their existence justified by past observation. Objects have substantial existence, and I divided substantial existence into two categories, past and future, actual and potential respectively, such that the two are fundamentally incompatible. What goes through the slits is energy, and as I explained in my post, energy exists in the realm of becoming, which occupies the boundary, or separation between the two types of substance. It exists at the present. Therefore nothing substantial goes through the slits. That something moves through the slits is just our way of describing relationships between substances.

This is how we understand motions, as relationships between different substances. When we deal completely with actual objects, we deal with different types of objects, all within one category, observed existence, that of the past. We establish relationships between these objects and this is what we call motion. Notice that motion is completely conceptual. It is not necessary that any objects "really move", it is just the case that the observed relationships change, and this we call motion.

Now, introduce the second type of substance, future existence. All substance of the future is potential rather than actual, so there is a boundary which separates these two principal categories. The concept of energy allows that not only actual objects are related to one another, but potential objects as well are admitted into these relationships. The deficiency in this concept is that the proper separation between the two fully incompatible categories is not respected. Thus actual objects, may be related to potential objects, as if they are both one classification, objects, without accounting for the categorical separation. If the categorical separation I describe is real, then it seems impossible that potential objects "really move", because there is no real object to move. And if this is the case, the status of the movement of actual objects is also thrown into doubt.

So consider that energy is just an extension of the concept of motion, and as I said, motion refers to the relationships between objects. These relationship change, and we call this motion. "Motion" refers to our descriptions, not the objects themselves. If all the objects being related to each other, are observed objects, actual, in the past, then then we can maintain consistency in our descriptions of the relationships. But if some of the objects are actual objects, and some are potential, and they are related through the concept of energy, then there is a deficiency according to the failings in maintaining this categorical separation. The described motion, energy through the slits, is a description which relates things on one side of the slits to things on the other. But as I said, the concept of energy is deficient as it does not properly provide for the categorical separation between actual things and potential things. Therefore we have no determination of what goes through the slits, an actual thing or a potential thing. If it's a potential thing, then it is impossible that it really moves through the slits. If it is an actual thing, it is doubtful that it really moves through the slits.

Who is 'we'? I know for sure I don't understand it, and I'm pretty sure I'm not going to find out the solution on a philosophy forum. (Not wanting to be rude, or anything like that.) — Wayfarer

In this case, what I refer to with "we" is what I believe to be every human being in the world. None of us have the adequate understanding of the nature of time, which is required to produce a coherent understanding of the nature of existence. And as I said, the modern tendency is to insistently produce simplifications. You might say, it keeps the mathematics eloquent. But to over-simplify something very complex is a mistake if you are attempting to understand that complex thing.

Where else, other than a philosophy forum would you expect to find out the truth about these matters? You know that it is a metaphysical issue rather than a physical issue, so a metaphysician is more highly qualified to tackle such problems than a physicist. But there is no funding to hire a metaphysician to bring issues against established institutions of science. So you might only find one taking advantage of a public forum, at one's own will, occupying one's own free time. Also, consider that physicists such as Lee Smolin for example, who advocate for the "reality" of time, and advance notions which question the completeness of special relativity tend to get ridiculed and ostracized: http://motls.blogspot.ca/2009/08/why-lee-smolin-is-immoral-double-faced.html Pay particular attention to the final paragraph where the blogger is concerned about influence over the general public who control the funding agencies.

Wayfarer, have you ever heard the saying that history repeats itself? Consider ancient Greece, where Socrates frequented the forum in an effort to expose the sophists as the fraudsters which they were. At that time, someone like yourself might say, I would not expect to find out the truth about these matters from a 'philosopher', at the forum. Philosophers were frowned upon for the very reason that they went against the institutions. But the information has to start from somewhere, and it wasn't until Socrates worked to exposed the sophists as fraudsters, who were simply seeking money to support their stream of false information, that Plato established the Academy.

Modern speculative physics is the very same thing, sophistry. It is highly educated individuals simply seeking money to support their stream of false information. If they are to be rousted, as the sophists which they are, where else to start this movement other than a philosophy forum?

None of us have the adequate understanding of the nature of time, which is required to produce a coherent understanding of the nature of existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough, point taken. I'm aware of Lee Smolin's books, but I don't know if I'm up to reading them.

Modern speculative physics is the very same thing, sophistry. It is highly educated individuals simply seeking money to support their stream of false information. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you, but I don't think the likes of you and I sounding off about on forums is going to make the least difference.

Fair enough, point taken. I'm aware of Lee Smolin's books, but I don't know if I'm up to reading them. — Wayfarer

He's into Loop Quantum Gravity, did some work on string theory, but seems to think that may be a dead end. I read Time Reborn. I liked it because it challenges physicists to take seriously the idea that time is something real. It brings to light real problems in physics which lead toward the idea that time must be something real. However I was somewhat disappointed with the book because it offers no speculation as to what time is. The title hints that the book might go that way. If time is real, it must be something describable.

I agree with you, but I don't think the likes of you and I sounding off about on forums is going to make the least difference. — Wayfarer

Oh come on, please don't shatter my illusions. This is my little fantasy world here, let me live it and leave me to my pleasures. If it's not hurting anyone, leave me in my deluded state. It's not like I'm trying to force you to join me.

"....local realism doesn’t work. For example, say you are experimenting with entangled photons. As soon as you measure one of the entangled photons in a detector and find that its polarization—that is, the orientation of its waves—is horizontal, the other one in the pair is instantly projected into a horizontal state. And this happens not because the photons were both horizontally polarized from the beginning. That is contradicted by the experiments. It doesn’t matter whether you look at the two particles at the same time, separated over large distances, or one after the other; the results are the same. So it seems as if quantum mechanics doesn’t care about space and time."
— Anton Zelliger — Wayfarer

As you probably know by now (even if you don't like it!), local realism works just fine under Everettian QM. If you measure one of the photons and its polarization is horizontal, you can then deduce that the polarization of the other photon is also horizontal. That's because the initial measurement entangles you on the same branch as that pair of photons (and not the vertically-polarized photon pair). So QM respects space and time - no superluminal effects required.

I certainly don't want to do that, MU. It's more that in this matter I'm excruciatingly aware of how much I don't know.

It works, given that there are 'branches'. But then Ptolmaic epicycles worked, given that there were crystal spheres.

It preserves time and space at the cost of introducing parallel worlds.

The Ptolemaic epicycles were ad hoc additions to preserve geocentric intuitions.

The branching is intrinsic to QM. So it's dynamical collapse and hidden variables that are ad hoc, in order to preserve classical single-world intuitions.