This is the first time I've heard of such a concept so it must have gone viral last night if it is generally understood. — Rich

Well...

Free Will

Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of actionunimpeded — Wikipedia

I think they just feel comfortable knowing that it had all been taken care of by some supernatural forces. Very common among religious people. — Rich

Free will is inseparably tied to the notion of choice. Remove choice and free will is meaningless. Since choice-making is programmable, it loses the utility of being a discerning factor in deciding whether free will exists or not.

Let me give you an example. In consequentialism, good and bad are differentiated by consequences. I'm saying conequences simply can't make the distinction. So, consequentialism is meaningless.

Do you want to have faith in your own 'first person' experience or in the 'third person' scientific view of human nature? — John

Good question. Please read the post above.

There it's no reason to mix up Free Will with choice. A human has constrained and influenced choice (of direction) in movement with unpredictable but probabilistic outcomes.

It's quite straightforward. If you believe that there is some supernatural force, e.g. God or Laws of Nature, determining everything, I am never the one to stand in the way of someone's religious beliefs.

It's ok. Thanks

Hey TMF, did this ever get resolved? (I too believe it's [free will] an illusion using the cosmic computer metaphor, and consequences of same being temporal and not eternal.)

Free will is a phenomenon, like gravity. So it isn't any more circular or tautological to describe free will in terms of its own evident operations than it is to describe gravity in terms of (in our environment) falling objects.

The notion that free will is problematic is one that gained credence mostly with modern science (particularly Newton) in the form of the Laplacian demon. This type of determinism has serious flaws, the uncertainty principle, being the most obvious. Karl Popper wrote a whole book on it (The Open Universe).

In any case, free will seems pretty self-evident to me, and not in the least bit complicated. Granted, it is possible to act in such a way that you abrogate your own free will (this is what Plato thought, evil actions by definition are not free, since they are inherently self-harmful). But for the most part, if you are paying attention and using your inherent powers of self-control instead of letting the universe provoke you into action, I think you probably are free. In my opinion, some people embrace the idea of free will as being problematic as an excuse for evading responsibility....

It is flawed, yes, and good explanation! I can't really put it better than TheMadFool did.

What I would add is, there're a lot of dimensions to a person and it's world, and the seismic factor probably had led to free will confusion.

i believe nurture and nature control everything we do (dna and situations). However I could go on and on how this concept doesn't completely (as in completely) nullify the idea of free will but i won't go into that right now unless you really want me too. In short i feel the OP is closer to the truth than most people would like to admit.

Choice is central to free will. Free will can be translated as the ability to make choices free from influences we have no control over. — TheMadFool

I know this post is 3 years old, but this seems like a the sort of definition that makes me consider free will to be something undesirable.
I am standing at the side of a road trying to cross safely, using my free will (or not) to choose when to do it. I have no control over when the cars go by. If I choose to be influenced by those cars and wait for a gap, then I don't have free will by this definition. If I free myself from those influences and use the free will, I cross at an effectively uniformed moment and probably get killed.

I know this post is 3 years old, but this seems like a the sort of definition that makes me consider free will to be something undesirable.
I am standing at the side of a road trying to cross safely, using my free will (or not) to choose when to do it. I have no control over when the cars go by. If I choose to be influenced by those cars and wait for a gap, then I don't have free will by this definition. If I free myself from those influences and use the free will, I cross at an effectively uniformed moment and probably get killed. — noAxioms

Indeed, this is the very essence of free will - to be able to deny/negate anything and everything, whether it's logic or morality or even the basic instinct of self preservation. The word "yes" always implies some form of agreement with whatever is being proposed i.e. you're being influenced to align yourself with some preexisting state of affairs; in other words your actions are being determined by something other than yourself. Saying "no" is freedom - free will - from any and all such influences. Getting yourself killed is indeed an expression of free will for you have denied the greatest impulse of being alive, self-preservation.

i believe nurture and nature control everything we do (dna and situations). However I could go on and on how this concept doesn't completely (as in completely) nullify the idea of free will but i won't go into that right now unless you really want me too. In short i feel the OP is closer to the truth than most people would like to admit. — christian2017

Kindly elaborate.

I'd like to run this by you all to for comments:

It seems that free will isn't just about choices; if it were then there would be no difference between us and computers with algorithmic decision trees (choices). However, free will is about choices that originate in a person - it can't have been put there, nor can the choice be an effect of a causal process that originates outside of the person. So, comparing human decision-making to computer processes simply on the basis that both involve choices is wrong because the issue isn't about the presence/absence of choices, it's about how these choices are made, specifically concerning whether they were part of a causal chain external to a person.

Kindly elaborate:

I don't expect you to read this. I feel you are way way ahead of most philosophers i know but if you like here it is:

Jesus Christ can predict our actions with 100% accuracy however,

On that professor's notion of is Jesus Christ schizophrenic?

Its hard to feel completely comfortable with why Satan was created and why (despite predestination doesn't directly directly directly directly contradict free will) he allowed us to make bad decisions. The Bible says the God/Jesus Christ doesn't think the way man does. I speculate that prior to the creation of the angels and the mortal non living gods that God perhaps some measure felt for whatever reason to start creating entities beyond the Trinity. While I personally am not opposed to the idea of the Holy Trinity and I do not fall out side of the orthodoxy of Trinitarianism, I do believe focusing on the theology of Trinitarianism as though it was core Christian belief, changes our focus from Jesus Christ's personality to some lesser Biblical truth. I don't believe Trinitarian theology is paganism but I feel the Christian church should focus on the personality of Jesus Christ as laid out in the old testament and the new testament. And once again a careful reading of the major prophets of the old testament will reveal a God and also a Jesus Christ that truly showed compassion to the people of the old testament and also to the people of the new testament. Now many will say that Jesus Christ wasn't alone before he created the angels and the other entities however perhaps my frailties make me fail to see beyond the idea that if i'm inclined to play a video game or build a tower out of a deck of cards, that there is either a sharp or dull impulse to push me towards that endeavor. We people have a God given dna and also a nurturing of our development (the situations we are put into) that sharply influence are predispositions. God/Jesus Christ I would argue based on the name Jehovah ("I_AM" or "I_AM_WHAT_AM", the latter being a questionable interpretation as far as I know) does not inherently know his origins nor can give a complex answer that caused him to have the personality that he has. We don't have that "problem". So let me speculate that when Jesus Christ decided to start creating the angels, mortal non living gods and other entities I believe under my understanding of what i consider rational, the actions of Jesus Christ/God in the beginning are sometimes attributed to what would commonly be called true randomness (as opposed to computer generated randomness or even the seemingly random nature of our Universe). I'm not saying that the personality of God/Jesus Christ is random but that due to my frailties I don't know how to describe this concept in a more accurate way.

So at some point he created entities that do not include the Trinity (I suppose the Trinity existed outside of time and forwards and backwards through eternity). I also speculate God/Jesus Christ spent time in the beginning just sitting there trying to understand what was going on before he started creating entities. I also speculate the time period prior to this "age" or self awareness loops around and some how pushes Jesus Christ into a sort of looping God/being that exists outside of time and thus you could say the time before time should more accurately be defines that substance or deity always has existed outside of time. Most of what i am writing in this post is my own speculation (perhaps shared by many Christians).

When he created the entities such as angels or mortal and non living gods, did he create them as spiritual or "physical" creatures (angels are created so you could say they are creatures). To my current understanding of the Bible the angels and mortal non living gods are spiritual. The question i ask is to what degree do these creatures have the tendency to mimic their creator. To what degree (1 to 100%) is their conduct predictable. Humans are 100% predictable but are gods or angels 100% predictable. And once again is 1% or 100% predictable? Satan was actually number 2 to Jesus Christ right from the beginning. Many of the demons to my understanding were in fact angels at one time. For now on i will refer angels (perhaps good servant gods) as angels and bad angels and also demons as "bad gods". So we have the Trinity, the angels and then the bad gods.

At some point Satan betrayed Jesus Christ/God and so on and so on.

Why do I say in the classical sense that Jesus Christ/God is not schizophrenic but at the same time Christianity is not a dualist religion. The Bible says
that God does not think at all like the way people do, so let me say this: I speculate the need to create Satan as to some degree inferior to the Trinity was in compliance to the basic logic that if you were an ancient warlord or ancient king, your ruling was not based on a hereditary nature but your kingship was attained through merit. This is not something you can say for modern kings. I speculate God/Jesus Christ gave Satan to some degree an inferior nature to the Trinity because this is not unkind but it is simply logical and rational. I would argue this could be said of all entities and it even carries over into the creation of people but I speculate that the relationship between the former concept and intended human frailty is atleast mildly close but it might not even qualify as a linear relationship (and ofcourse not one to one considering a one to one relationship is a type of linear relationship).

I would like to speculate and here i have much misgivings about this speculation (keyword speculation) that Satan surprised to some degree God/Jesus Christ considering his nature was spiritual rather than matter. I do believe perhaps matter and energy can be built from spiritual substance but perhaps we could say matter and energy is an extremely complex dancing of spiritual forces that vibrates continuously and makes matter and energy have the qualities that we witness on a daily basis. Perhaps dealing with Satan is like my brother playing me (the opponent) in chess, my brother is much smarter than me and will probably will win the match but he must stress slightly over the issue. I would argue if Jesus Christ played any human in chess, the match would in all practicality be over before it started considering the realities of Scientific determinism. Jesus Christ, I speculate, stresses to some degree when dealing with non living gods but when dealing with people the results of what would happen came in before anything took place. My last speculation is that to some small degree Jesus Christ acts as a sociopath only in the sense that he does a criminal profile of all the entities he ever created. In that sense (and i stress this is a very remote and vague relationship) to some very small degree that God/Jesus Christ can be said to have minor similarities to someone who has schizophrenia.

I will go on to further to say in the end each Christian will never worship another Christian, but we the Porcelain chess pieces on his chess board will be all worshiped by the living God. Is it lawful for God to love and adore his wife (The Christian Church). I speculate that it is. We the christians were used as living sacrifices to manipulate the great spiritual powers (angels and non living gods) that were in Heaven.

On why God/Jesus Christ gave us inferior and imperfect dna as opposed to perfect dna like himself, I speculate there are various reasons for that: going beyond the fact that Jesus Christ achieved his status as an ancient king or warlord achieves his status being not through heredity but through merit, I believe among many other reasons, Jesus Christ wanted to show love to an animal similar to him and to love an animal not because of what that animal can do for him but for what that he (Jesus Christ) can do for that animal. There is only one marriage or sexual relationship in heaven and for all eternity and that the marriage between Jesus Christ and the Christian Church. Once again just about all of this falls outside the pale of orthodoxy and is mostly speculation.

I'd like to run this by you all to for comments:

It seems that free will isn't just about choices; if it were then there would be no difference between us and computers with algorithmic decision trees (choices). However, free will is about choices that originate in a person - it can't have been put there, nor can the choice be an effect of a causal process that originates outside of the person. So, comparing human decision-making to computer processes simply on the basis that both involve choices is wrong because the issue isn't about the presence/absence of choices, it's about how these choices are made, specifically concerning whether they were part of a causal chain external to a person. — TheMadFool

Pulling the positive consequences of purpose given with religion or the belief in a diety, out of the equation, I would have to say the above quote is 100% correct.

Indeed, this is the very essence of free will - to be able to deny/negate anything and everything, whether it's logic or morality or even the basic instinct of self preservation. — TheMadFool

Maybe it would be better to let a proponent of free will do the defining of it then.
I'm a proponent of it, but my definition is very different than the one you quote in the OP.

I'd like to run this by you all to for comments:

It seems that free will isn't just about choices; if it were then there would be no difference between us and computers with algorithmic decision trees (choices). — TheMadFool

Since no demonstration of a difference has been identified, then it hasn't been demonstrated that we're in any fundamental way different from this computer, a supposed symbol of what we're not.

However, free will is about choices that originate in a person

If it is defined as a choice made by a person, then the test for free will can be done with a DNA test. The computer would fail that. It seems important to find a definition that we pass but the computer doesn't.

it's about how these choices are made, specifically concerning whether they were part of a causal chain external to a person.

And we're back to my example of crossing the street. I really would not want to make that decision without the causal chain of the information about the traffic playing a role as to when I choose to cross. I think the computer would fare better than I if I had the free will you describe here.

It seems that free will isn't just about choices; if it were then there would be no difference between us and computers with algorithmic decision trees (choices). However, free will is about choices that originate in a person - it can't have been put there, nor can the choice be an effect of a causal process that originates outside of the person. So, comparing human decision-making to computer processes simply on the basis that both involve choices is wrong because the issue isn't about the presence/absence of choices, it's about how these choices are made, specifically concerning whether they were part of a causal chain external to a person. — TheMadFool

I think I know where you are going with that. It reminds me a little of the so-called cosmic computer theory.

Consider briefly, that life is a computer metaphor. All the combinations of life choices exist within the computer program and are determined in advance. The keyboard represents volition or volitional existence. All the ethical (how to live a sad or happy productive life) choices are within our grasp, by virtue of the keyboard, and what we type-in.

Further (much like Wheeler's cloud), what we ask 'Google' through typing, determines what answers/possibilities we get. And sometimes, unfortunately, the computer locks-up or crashes. In a sense, the result is both determinancy and indeterminancy (causation and randomness) in life (and in nature).

The illusion of free-will exists because there is an active agent outside ourselves that actually created the computer program's hardware/software, where within itself exist all the possible life choices. We are free to make those choices from those that are given to us by the computer/keyboard. The causation is predetermined through said hardware/software.

Our choices still have the aforementioned consequences but only in a temporal sense; not eternal sense.

Feel free to poke holes...

There's a short book "Conscious Robots" by Paul Kwatz. It's a light-hearted read that gives an interesting perspective on the argument that there is no free will and other related ideas about happiness and pain. Lots of little thought experiments that are similar to arguments presented in this thread.

Feel free to poke holes — 3017amen

Don't mind if I do.

Consider briefly, that life is a computer metaphor. All the combinations of life choices exist within the computer program and are determined in advance. The keyboard represents volition or volitional existence. All the ethical (how to live a sad or happy productive life) choices are within our grasp, by virtue of the keyboard, and what we type-in.

Does all life have this? Does a dandelion have a keyboard? It would be like a keyboard attached to a solar sidewalk light: Not very responsive to the input from the keyboard.
Anyway, this model always neglects that detail. If the dandelion doesn't have a keyboard, then there is a threshold of life forms that have a keyboard and them that doesn't. It matters little where it is put, but the model should predict some fundamental difference between being on one side or the other of that threshold.

It seems the model reduces a human to a mere tool of the entity sitting at the keyboard. That's what a computer with a keyboard is: an appliance, an avatar for navigation in a different world. The computers without keyboards might be simpler, but they're actually doing more complex stuff since they're free to make their own choices rather than having the tough decisions deferred to the keyboard input. That seems to be a contradiction, that the self-sufficient computer would be less complex than the passive appliance.

Another problem with the model is that when my computer shuts down, I don't shut down with it. I'm aware that it's off, and I need to turn it on again to access that other world, but otherwise I'm still functional. That seems not to match actual experience.

Final problem is that nobody has ever found where the keyboard attaches to the computer. A real computer has to get input from a very specific place, and there's no hiding it if you take a computer apart.

Surely I'm not the only one to point out these issues, so how does the model deal with them?

The illusion of free-will exists ...

Here you call free will an illusion, implying a stance arguing against its existence. What is your definition of it, and is the computer model above an analogy of free will, or an analogy of the lack of it?

I think I have free will because my choices are my own, so it only seems to come down to what "I" means in that definition, but the definition seems to require no particular stance regarding the philosophy of mind.

Hi NA!

Thank you kindly for your critique. Let me try to enumerate your arguments or concerns first, so I can clearly understand them and then respond accordingly:

1. The dandelion obviously does not have a keyboard. However, much like other lower life-forms, it is likely to have emergent properties genetically coded for its survival. Is that what the concern is? Would panpsychism, in theory, resolve this descrepancy? Otherwise, the volitional keyboard could simply represent Metaphysical Will, which might be more aligned with consciousness anyway... .

2. The keyboard represents volitional existence. If you think that making it bluetooth-able and automated much like vehicle's without drivers, robots, and/voice commands, I would consider that analogy. But yes I see that the volitional keyboard does require human input as a conscious medium.

3. I'm thinking that the computer never shuts down, much like unterrupted power supplies for critical computer systems. However in this human metaphor, it can be easily put in sleep mode.

4. My definition of the Free Will illusion from my interpretation of your question, is more akin to Kant's metaphysics, and more specifically to Bishop Berkeley's Idealism/Metaphysics. (With a little bit of theoretical physicist Paul Davies the Mind of God thrown in LOL.)

What is your definition of free will then?

In my humble opinion, a key determinant for free will is awareness, self-awareness and also awareness of possible influences on our choices. This is important because self-awareness leads to the realization that one is part of causation and knowing what influences us helps in deciding how the chain of causation will unfold with our participation in the causal web.

I understand the requirement of choice for free will arises from the belief that determinism permits of no alternatives but for the one that is actualized and becomes real and so if multiple options are possible and if any of these could be realized then free will becomes possible.

However, the mere existence of alternatives doesn't prove free will for it must be possible for each of them to become real as in if they were different paths it must be possible to take any one of them to whichever alternate realities they lead to.

With the above description of what free will means (to me) we can now discuss how any choice is made. The accepted view is that we make choices based on our personal preferences which can be put down on a list. What appears on this list is nothing we've chosen as Schopenhauer once said "a man can do what he wants but not want what he wants". So, if determinism is true then it must be in terms of our preferences we had no control over.

Return now to self-awareness and awareness of influences over our choices and decisions. It enables us to construct the list of our preferences, the fingerprint of determinism and most strikingly negate/deny/reject all items on that list. Now, as mentioned before, determinism implies only one outcome and no other and we know that our preferences are determined for we had no role in deciding what would appear on our list of preferences and so our preference list was determined. The negation/denial/rejection of items on our preference list cannot have been determined because then the same set of pre-existing conditions has to cause both our preferences and the contradictions of our preferences which when counted is 2 (an effect AND the negation of that effect) and that's not possible because if anything is determined, there can be 1 and only 1 outcome. It's therefore likely that we have free will because we are self aware and capable of rejecting our preferences whatever that may be.

What say you?

1. The dandelion obviously does not have a keyboard. — 3017amen

I don't find it obvious. I mean, I don't think I have a keyboard, so if it turns out I do, I have no clue as to what has one and what doesn't. Under panpsychism, maybe everything has one, but probably not. Panpsychism says everything is conscious, not that everything is remote controlled by a non-physical will.

However, much like other lower life-forms, it is likely to have emergent properties genetically coded for it's survival. Is that what the concern is?

My concern is that one life form is a self-contained thing, and some closely related thing (perhaps its near descendant) evolves a new organ that not only detects something never physically detected before, but starts taking hints for choices from it instead of making those choices itself. Mind you, that sort of thing definitely did happen when the cerebellum say, which is used to calling all the shots, suddenly started getting new inputs from say the more recently evolved limbic system. So there is precedent for a new keyboard to suddenly appear, attached to a computer that didn't have one before. Thing is, we see the keyboard, and more importantly, we see the way it is connected to the more central computer.

2. The keyboard represents volitional existence. If you think that making it bluetooth-ableand [...] voice commands, I would consider that analogy.

The analogy can work with any of those mechanisms. Point is, they're all identifiable. There is an obvious point where the computer is taking its commands of what to do from that input. There seems to be no such point in us. We have physical sensory input, but no apparent extra-sensory input from this supposed non-physical keyboard. If our actions are made based on this input, there'd be a receptor for it somewhere. Descartes was aware of the problem and actually posited a point (a gland of all things), which has since been discounted.

automated much like vehicle's without drivers,

A self-driving vehicle are semi-autonomous and don't necessarily have a keyboard (steering wheel say). They make all their own decisions, except for where to go, so I agree still that such a car needs a clearly defined input from outside, and yes, it is pretty easy to identify that point of input.

How does the agent behind the keyboard know what the correct thing to do is? Suppose it is filling out a complex tax form using its free will. Does it tell the computer what number to put in the form, or does it just tell the computer to figure out the answer for itself? I'm wondering where such work is done in this model.

I'm thinking that the computer never shuts down, much like I'm unterrupted power supplies for critical computer systems.

But it does, at least to the ponit where the screen shuts off completely and gives no response to queries. It is still running to the point of critical systems (heartbeat, respiration and such). When my computer does that, I'm still fully there, but unable to do anything with the computer until it comes back. But when my body is in hibernate mode like that, so is the conscious agent. I don't find myself in some sort of boring sensory-deprivation state as you would expect from the arrangement you describe.
My feedback here is that the computer/keyboard model predicts different experience than is empirically observed.

However in this human metaphor, it can be easily put in sleep mode.

You need a different model then.

4. My definition of the Free Will illusion from my interpretation of your question, is more akin to Kant's metaphysics, and more specifically to Bishop Berkeley's Idealism/Metaphysics.

Sorry, but I am not particularly aware of Kant's metaphysics beyond the transcendental idealism. I know he asserts that a person cannot be held responsible for an act if his actions are determined (determinism, analogous to a computer running a program with no external inputs), but I'm not sure if he asserts said determinism (the metaphysical stance) itself. It seems that his definition of 'responsibility for an act' rests on an objective (not part of the universe) standard.
My analogy on this is always a position in a chess game, where the white pieces cannot be held responsible for the weak position it's in, but a player can be held responsible for it if (and only if) he has volition of which moves are made. So while chess is not hard-deterministic (no one side always wins), a given position may be the result of randomness instead of a player's choices. Only in the latter instance is there responsibility for the current state.
My objection I'm voicing here is that I am presented with no mechanism by which the pieces can be moved by the player since they occupy different worlds. There are thus only the pieces which cannot be held responsible for their position in the player's world.

Berkeley is a different story, pushing an idealistic view where seemingly all experience is fed to us by presumably God. I had to look it all up, since I'm also not familiar with his works. How does it avoid soplipsism?
I read this:

although God could make a watch run (that is, produce in us ideas of a watch running) without the watch having any internal mechanism (that is, without it being the case that, were we to open the watch, we would have ideas of an internal mechanism), he cannot do so if he is to act in accordance with the laws of nature, which he has established for our benefit, to make the world regular and predictable. — stanford

But if I open a person instead of a watch, I am presented with the ideas of an internal mechanism which is entirely deterministic, and hence in principle predictable without benefit of knowing what the real volition might have to contribute to a behavior. We're shown no idea of a keyboard port which would render the mechanism under the control of a real agent. So either we're presented with the idea of a body with no control by the person experiencing it, or God has presented us the ideas of a mechanism not acting in accordance with established natural law.

BTW, I consider myself to be a relational idealist, which I don't find described anywhere, but is based on taking Rovelli's RQM to its conclusion. It is a form of idealism that doesn't lead to solipsism.

I truly wonder what all these old (pre 20th century) philosophers would change in their views given the developments in science in the last century. Some churches have flat out denied the science, thus asserting that God and empirical observation are in contradiction. That seems a very dangerous stance to take.

↪noAxioms What is your definition of free will then? — TheMadFool

I stated this in my prior reply to you.

think I have free will because my choices are my own, — noAxioms

So free will is making your own choices. That's pretty different than the usual definition, I know, but when people say their choices feel free, that's what they're feeling.

It seems pointless to ask anybody (or anything) if they have free will, because the answer is always yes. So Bob is Bob, and makes his own choices. He answers yes. Dewey on the other hand has been possessed by an evil demon, and when asked if his will is free, the demon is the one that answers, and thus the answer is still 'yes'. Dewey no longer has free will, but cannot answer due to the lack of it. Bob is responsible for his actions, and the demon is responsible for Dewey's actions.
Trick is to ask a question in a way that Bob and the demon give distinct replies.

In my humble opinion, a key determinant for free will is awareness, self-awareness and also awareness of possible influences on our choices. This is important because self-awareness leads to the realization that one is part of causation and knowing what influences us helps in deciding how the chain of causation will unfold with our participation in the causal web.

Not sure here. Dewey can be quite aware of all this stuff you mention, but lacking free will, he is incapable of actually making the choices he concludes to be the better ones. But that's using my definition.
Your definition differs from the often implied 'has supernatural control' definition, which requires none of the qualities you mention. Self-awareness is a product of eons of evolution, while introspection is something easily programmed into any device. I don't see how awareness of external influences has anything to do with free will, except that it seems to be a useful trait for a moral agent, and free will is often associated with moral responsibility, but moral awareness is different from moral responsibility.

I understand the requirement of choice for free will arises from the belief that determinism permits of no alternatives

I think this is a misrepresentation. If I want vanilla, I am not coerced into choosing chocolate by deterministic physics. That's not how it works. Determinism is not a lack of choice, and not a lack of responsibility. Read the bit about chess in my prior post where I get into that more. On a side note, QM has shown pretty decisively that our universe is not deterministic in any sense that the future of closed system X can be predicted even in principle, even with arbitrarily large resources, so not sure why determinism keeps coming up in these discussions. I think the argument stems from the old philosophers working from say a Newtonian view of physics with everything being billiard balls bouncing around with perfect mathematical predictability.

Schopenhauer once said "a man can do what he wants but not want what he wants".

I think this is wrong. People override their base nature all the time, which is readily apparent when that override breaks down such as in disaster areas. Ability to want better wants is probably the core of moral behavior.

I think this is a misrepresentation. If I want vanilla, I am not coerced into choosing chocolate by deterministic physics — noAxioms

People override their base nature all the time, which is readily apparent when that override breaks down such as in disaster areas. Ability to want better wants is probably the core of moral behavior. — noAxioms

So, there's such a thing as base nature and we have an override capability. Where is free will in all this?

On a side note, QM has shown pretty decisively that our universe is not deterministic in any sense that the future of closed system X can be predicted even in principle, even with arbitrarily large resources, so not sure why determinism keeps coming up in these discussions. — noAxioms

QM doesn't provide any proof of free-will. How can it?

So, there's such a thing as base nature and we have an override capability. Where is free will in all this? — TheMadFool

Free will, as it is usually defined, means that Dewey, being possessed by a supernatural demon and thus under remote control, has free will. Bob does not. But hey, I never said I approved of the definition.

QM doesn't provide any proof of free-will. How can it?

QM is utterly silent on the subject. I said it show the universe to be non-deterministic in any subjective way. Determinism being false does not prove free will

First, can we agree on a few items:

1. Free will: a source totally detached from matter (detached from nature) which is the origin (cause) of
options, thoughts, feelings,... That is, the absence of (natural) laws, the existence of an "autonomous
mind", i.e. a principium individuationis.

2. Free Will viz QM provides no significance to the question of free will, relative to consciousness or conscious states. Quantum mechanics is indeterministic but it is not a-causal. There is always a cause, an explanation or reason, for any phenomenon; for example, when an electron which is pushed towards another electron. Both electrons are repelled, and their positions and velocities are undetermined. The cause of repulsion is that we joint both electrons. The electrons are not free to choose their repulsion.

3. Free Will means: I wonder whether one really wants what he wants,whether the origin of what I want is mine or is an effect of natural laws; whether there is an "ego"separate from nature (dualism). This is a less trivial question and this is the topic which is referred by many philosophers when they debate about freedom; Hobbes (1654) and Schopenhauer (1841)are two noteworthy examples.

4. The opposite of free will is materialism rather than determinism (?).

The QM and Free Will illusion :

First, can we agree on a few items:

1. Free will: a source totally detached from matter (detached from nature) which is the origin (cause) of
options, thoughts, feelings,... That is, the absence of (natural) laws, the existence of an "autonomous
mind", i.e. a principium individuationis. — 3017amen

What does 'original cause' mean? Most effects (I can think of no exceptions) are a combination of countless causes, the absence of which would likely have prevented the effect. Thus none of them is designated as being more original than any of the others.

Anyway, your definition sounds like something undesirable. Dewey possessed by his supernatural demon is the only guy who cannot do what he wills, and thus has free will. Read about Dewey 5 posts back if you don't know what I'm talking about.
Anyway, yes, I often hear free will defined something like that. I don't think I have that, and I certainly wouldn't want it. My definition doesn't work well either, because I cannot do everything I want to do.

Quantum mechanics is indeterministic but it is not a-causal. There is always a cause, an explanation or reason, for any phenomenon

Disagree. There are uncaused events, like radioactive decay, to name a simple one.

4. The opposite of free will is materialism rather than determinism (?).

Ah, there it is. Free will is not about freedom of will at all, but rather an assertion of a different mechanism (possession by a supernatural demon, as I phrase it) for said will. I'm not a materialist, but I also don't think I have the sort of free will you describe. Thus I'm not sure materialism is the necessary stance needed if one denies that sort of free will.

The dualism asserted implies free will only by definition, but does not demonstrate any greater freedom in what is willed since even if the will comes from non-matter, you still don't know if the process by which that supernatural will is implemented is any less a function of external causes other than ones self, than if the same process was implemented with matter. My street crossing example illustrates the sort of behavior resulting from will that is not a function of external causes beyond one's control. I cannot work that way since death would result in minutes.

What does 'original cause' mean? Most effects (I can think of no exceptions) are a combination of countless causes, the absence of which would likely have prevented the effect. Thus none of them is designated as being more original than any of the others. — noAxioms

Hi NA!

Gosh, there's so much information to unpack... If it's okay with you let's take one question at a time and then perhaps we can build something from there.

1. Whether it is logically necessary that there is something rather than nothing, or there's an infinite regression of turtle power, there will always be a question concerning an original or initial cause and/or origin of life, thus the Kantian judgement: all events must have a cause.

To further parse Will from Free Will though, I believe having a will implies consciousness or intelligence. For example, the theory of emergence in nature would imply genetically coded organisms, where metaphysical will in nature (Schopenhauer) would imply higher levels of consciousness.


Should we try to redefine the meaning of Free Will?

Gosh, there's so much information to unpack... If it's okay with you let's take one question at a time and then perhaps we can build something from there.

1. Whether it is logically necessary that there is something rather than nothing, or there's an infinite regression of turtle power, there will always be a question concerning an original or initial cause and/or origin of life, thus the Kantian judgement: all events must have a cause. — 3017amen

Kant is seemingly wrong then, because uncaused events have been demonstrated (well beyond Kant's time), although there are interpretations that posit hidden variables (that cannot be known) that are responsible for such things, so it isn't cast in stone I think. As for the structure that seems to be our universe, there's no particular reason why time should or should not be bounded at one end or the other. There's no entropy level to order it outside our own spacetime, so any cause that comes from there is arguably an effect since there's no particular relationship of cause->effect without an arrow of time. There's just potential bounds which can arbitrarily be labeled first and last.

I'm kind of quoting what little I know. I'm hardly an expert, but my takeaway on the subject is to not apply the laws of our spacetime outside of that spacetime, and positing the necessity of this 'original cause' is doing just that.

I don't see how any of this relates to free will. My view on the above topic is that the universe is not caused at all. It implies there was no universe, and later there was, which is absurd if time is part of the universe.

To further parse Will from Free Will though, I believe having a will implies consciousness or intelligence.

I know plants that seem to have a will, but by the same argument you can paint them as having consciousness as well then. Intelligence? That's a stretch...
I know of machines that have intelligence, but they're almost all slaves, so their will is not their own.
Anyway, consciousness (and probably intelligence as well) are about as poorly defined as free will, so your comment doesn't really help.

Should we try to redefine the meaning of Free Will?

You defined it quite precisely the last attempt. You want to abandon that? I just thought it a funny name to give to what seems to me to be the opposite effect.

Free will, as it is usually defined, means that Dewey, being possessed by a supernatural demon and thus under remote control, has free will. Bob does not. But hey, I never said I approved of the definition.

QM doesn't provide any proof of free-will. How can it?
QM is utterly silent on the subject. I said it show the universe to be non-deterministic in any subjective way. Determinism being false does not prove free will — noAxioms

It seems pointless to ask anybody (or anything) if they have free will, because the answer is always yes. So Bob is Bob, and makes his own choices. He answers yes. Dewey on the other hand has been possessed by an evil demon, and when asked if his will is free, the demon is the one that answers, and thus the answer is still 'yes'. Dewey no longer has free will, but cannot answer due to the lack of it. Bob is responsible for his actions, and the demon is responsible for Dewey's actions. — noAxioms

Can you kindly explain what you mean by this? Why is the answer always "yes"?

Can you kindly explain what you mean by this? Why is the answer always "yes"? — TheMadFool

It only works with my definition, for the reason I explained in the part you quoted.