Free will would be an illusion. the agent would only be responding according to its program. — Metaphysician Undercover

you got misdirected and hung up on me saying I 'created', which had nothing to do with my rhetorical point/example to Zelebg re the robot not having true self-agency irrespective of who/why made its programming.

The point is that I do not accept your argument. You seem to be proceeding from the false assumption that only a self-conscious being can act freely. That's an assumption which begs the question. You are limiting, restricting what it means to "act freely" by defining it in a way which supports your metaphysics. If we release your restrictive definition, and proceed solely on descriptive principles you'll see that all sorts of beings "act freely". It is unreasonable to enact your restriction, saying that only self-conscious beings can act freely, just because it supports your metaphysics.

Why do you think it is that "choosing" requires that the individual be conscious of the fact that one is choosing? Does breathing require that one be conscious that one is breathing? Do you see what I mean? There is a term which describes the thing being done, "choosing". Why do you assume that the person must understand what it means to be "choosing", in order to be actually choosing?

The point is that I do not accept your argument. You seem to be proceeding from the false assumption that only a self-conscious being can act freely. — Metaphysician Undercover

are you saying that the standard definition/meaning of "free will" does not require an agent? do you believe the standard definition/meaning of "free will" requires "will power" to act on and carry out the 'will'?

Does breathing require that one be conscious that one is breathing? Do you see what I mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

is that a bad example? I mean, are you saying that breathing is an example of carrying out our 'free will'. That example actually makes my point, that is breathing is a pre-programmed part of the agent's system so cannot be part of the agent's free will. If you believe otherwise, please try hard to use your will power to stop breathing for more than 5 (or even 10) minutes and let us know how successful 'you' were at that test of 'free will'. I'm sure you have the 'will power' to do so... If we do not hear back from you anymore then we will assume you were right and you have ‘free will’ the way you say you do.

Why do you assume that the person must understand what it means to be "choosing", in order to be actually choosing? — Metaphysician Undercover

'free will' is not about only about anything that makes a choice. If it were then you can say the Earth is an agent and it has 'free will' to make weather of its choice. If the choices always happens automatically then no 'choice' by an agent is ever made at all. If you disagree with that then everything like inanimate objects have 'free will' according to your (et. al.) definitions and you've thereby reduced the term to be meaningless wrt how it is used for humans.

Sense is layered onto the brain(?)

Consciousness originates in the heart and simulates in the brain.

The heartbeat can be traded for any external stimuli, where the brain hijacks all the hearts momentum.

Thought, can be heart alone, or external stimulus.

Things may be moving too fast to say one is more significant than the other. Consciousness is the hearts and the brains continuum.

Perhaps not.

I feel I am close but, no cigar, if you know what I mean haha.

are you saying that the standard definition/meaning of "free will" does not require an agent? — Sir Philo Sophia

I do not believe that "agent" requires self-consciousness. For example there are conscious agents which are not self-conscious.

is that a bad example? I mean, are you saying that breathing is an example of carrying out our 'free will'. That example actually makes my point, that is breathing is a pre-programmed part of the agent's system so cannot be part of the agent's free will. If you believe otherwise, please try hard to use your will power to stop breathing for more than 5 (or even 10) minutes and let us know how successful 'you' were at that test of 'free will'. I'm sure you have the 'will power' to do so... If we do not hear back from you anymore then we will assume you were right and you have ‘free will’ the way you say you do. — Sir Philo Sophia

The point is that one can choose without knowing oneself to be choosing, just like one can breathe without knowing oneself to be breathing. There is nothing intrinsic to "choice" which makes it necessary that a person know that they are choosing in order to make a choice. If you are presented with possibilities you might choose one without knowing that you are choosing. A child makes choices before knowing what it means to choose. We do not wait until we know what "choice" means before we start making choices. So we make choices before we know that we are making choices. We choose without knowing ourselves to be choosing.

'free will' is not about only about anything that makes a choice. If it were then you can say the Earth is an agent and it has 'free will' to make weather of its choice. If the choices always happens automatically then no 'choice' by an agent is ever made at all. If you disagree with that then everything like inanimate objects have 'free will' according to your (et. al.) definitions and you've thereby reduced the term to be meaningless wrt how it is used for humans. — Sir Philo Sophia

Free will is about making free choices, notice the word "free". If an automatic response is called a "choice" (and no one in their right mind would call it that), it is not a free choice, because it is necessitated by the thing it is a response to.

And once again, the point is that a person does not need to know oneself to be making a free choice in order to actually be making a free choice. So you've just gone off on a tangent here.

If an automatic response is called a "choice" (and no one in their right mind would call it that), it is not a free choice, because it is necessitated by the thing it is a response to. — Metaphysician Undercover

so, sounds like you do not agree w/ @Zelebg that a robot operating 100% deterministic on its program is acting out 'free will' because it actions are necessitated by the thing it is responding to. is that right?

And once again, the point is that a person does not need to know oneself to be making a free choice in order to actually be making a free choice. So you've just gone off on a tangent here. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, would you say that human type/level of 'free will' is pretty much equal to the 'free will' of, say, a bee? Why so or why not?

o, sounds like you do not agree w/ Zelebg that a robot operating 100% deterministic on its program is acting out 'free will' because it actions are necessitated by the thing it is responding to. is that right? — Sir Philo Sophia

Right, I'm not even in the same ballpark as Zelebg. You and I might have some things in common

So, would you say that human type/level of 'free will' is pretty much equal to the 'free will' of, say, a bee? Why so or why not? — Sir Philo Sophia

Yes, I would think so. Free will only requires an agent to make a decision on the possibilities which are apparent. I would think that a bee does this. I think that even plants might make decisions, but their decisions are made much slower, depending on weather, nutrients in the ground, etc., and we don't really know very much about many of the actions of plants

The difference with human beings is that we have developed our consciousness in a way which aids us in comprehending possibilities, and assessing possible outcomes from our actions. So not only am I capable of apprehending a much wider variety of possibilities than a bee, I can also foresee the possible outcomes from my potential choices. This, I think, is where self-consciousness starts to play a role, when I realize that my decisions have consequences.

So, if you actually consider imagination to be a virtual experience then must it have qualia to render the experience part?

Experience is qualia, in that experience consists of one or more different and simultaneous qualities. So let us call it an event, external event and internal event. Why is either event experienced is the same mystery. Though, external events are always first converted into internal events before they are actually perceived / experienced.

Yes, that is free will, program does what program wants
— Zelebg

so, how can you have a 'will' w/o a sentient agent?

Sentient agents are sentient programs.

Standard definitions seem to require the "I" be present in the agent. So, my robot example won't cut it, esp. since it cannot ever have the cogito ergo sum dilemma. That is, how can one say it made a willful choice when it does not have self-consciousness to know it is choosing anything? thus, no free will there b/c you don't have a sentient free agent.

“I” is a kind of program. Are you saying your robot can not have “I” or that no robot ever can have it?

your robot is operating 100% deterministic on its program. So, your robot cannot represent or know itself.

Deterministic program does not equal deterministic function. But in any case, how is determinism relevent to "knowing itself"?

an agent can certainly learn and make choices w/o sentience or consciousness, and you seem to be contradicting yourself by saying that the purpose of sentience or consciousness (which the robot doesn't have) is so we can have "free will" (which you said the robot does have)

In one case I'm talking about 'conscious free will' as most people understand it. In the other case I am talking about my personal definition of free will which does not require consciousness.

The difference with human beings is that we have developed our consciousness in a way which aids us in comprehending possibilities, and assessing possible outcomes from our actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't think that is true. It has been demonstrated that rats have counterfactual reasoning:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982215002134

Free will only requires an agent to make a decision on the possibilities which are apparent. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, why is Zelebg's robot program not able to make a decision on the possibilities which are apparent? Seems to me like every program does that.

I would think that a bee does this. — Metaphysician Undercover

it has been well documented that bees act according to a social program any time they are among other bees so how can you call that 'free will' when their behavior/decisions is completely dictated by the 'will' of the collective at any time dictated by the collective? all social insects likely share the same 'programming'.

, I can also foresee the possible outcomes from my potential choices. This, I think, is where self-consciousness starts to play a role, when I realize that my decisions have consequences. — Metaphysician Undercover

this may be a fair point. However, only few creatures seem to exhibit self-consciousness , yet most all larger animals seem to have consciousness that can do what you say there; e.g., rats and birds do it. We all would agree that mammals have consciousness and all have 'free will'. Reptiles/amphibians less so, but still rather unquestionable. However, insects are pretty much like Zelebg's robot programming which you say has no 'free will'. Your definitions seems to be too lose to be coherent. Can you tighten them up to exclude the counter examples I point out?

Deterministic program does not equal deterministic function. — Zelebg

please give us an example of a stable deterministic program which is not constrained to a set of pre-determined behaviors and functions, yet achieves goals and/or has utility.

how is determinism relevant to "knowing itself"? — Zelebg

would you agree that all true independent agents acting in the world have a goal? would you agree that a more meaningful decision made by an agent when it "knows" that its decision(s) is/are best for its overall goals? would you agree that best overall decisions can only be achieved if the agent has a state of awareness (e.g., conscious) of its totality of needs and if the agent has the ability to realign its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals according to the experienced/predicted consequences of its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals ? If so, then would you not agree that a conscious agent is exercising more meaningful 'free will' than the automaton programmed agent, and a self-conscious agent exhibiting still more meaningful 'free will' than an only conscious agent?

At the other extreme, would we say that an automaton agent having no goals, and making purely random 'decisions' is acting out of any kind of meaningful 'free will'?

what we care about is meaningful animated/living 'free will' not trivial 'free will' of all mater.

In one case I'm talking about 'conscious free will' as most people understand it — Zelebg

your original statement did not qualify it that way or indicate you were talking about 'common wisdom'. So, if you acknowledge that the 'common wisdom' of most all philosophers/thinkers is that the purpose of sentience or consciousness is so we can have "free will", are you just playing with word of "free" separately from the word "will" as a synonym for 'make decisions' to a say computer program is 'free' to 'make decisions' so it the same thing as what humans call their 'free will'. That just seems like word games unless you ground your ideas in the human context and coherently address all my counter examples.

Experience is qualia, in that experience consists of one or more different and simultaneous qualities. — Zelebg

I disagree. We can experience many things that have meaning w/o the 'hard problem of qualia', like a shape of an object which has a very similar qualia to us as we expect the actual physical object to exhibit. However, the color red we 'see' in our minds is not a 'different and simultaneous qualities' it is a single, vivid, yet conjured projection which we somehow experience as a qualitative visual object apart from anything that can exist externally and not something that can be simply programmed like video game VR. I wonder if color qualia is in its own class. Are there other qualias that likewise have no basis for existing externally? Time qualia sort of exist externally via entropy and pseudo causality, but that arguably be another. any others?

Not common wisdom. Common definition of free will. What's this about, can you phrase it as question?

“I” is a kind of program. Are you saying your robot can not have “I” or that no robot ever can have it? — Zelebg

No, but those are not the only options. My current working hypothesis is that 'I' cannot be a program or process, but more of a state of matter/energy that may flow in a medium but not in a programming manner. My posts on other threads give details as to one implementation framework I have in mind.

Not common wisdom. Common definition of free will. What's this about, can you phrase it as question? — Zelebg

Sure, what do you say is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and exactly where/how do you reason that is not accurate/true?

Sure, what do you say is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and exactly where/how do you reason that is not accurate/true?

I do not. What are we talking about, what is the argument?

I do not. What are we talking about, what is the argument? — Zelebg

you say a simple computer program is exercising 'free will', and you just said that your definition is not "common wisdom or a Common definition of free will. So, I ask you to state what you believe "is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and clarify exactly where/how do you reason that is not accurate/true" I'm trying to avoid word games and semantics here.

What is not clear about that question?

I do not want to argue about semantics. I do not see where is this supposed to lead, what is the point or importance, what is your position, what is supposed to be my possition... I have no idea what are we arguing about or why.

Yes / no question would clarify.

I have no idea what are we arguing about or why. — Zelebg

your odd definition of 'free will'. You brought up 'free will' in this thread and the OP's topic relates to "I propose that the brain only generates the content of consciousness and not the self that binds it into a whole." One clear hallmark of consciousness is the common meaning of 'free will'. So, your statements saying that a simple computer program is exercising 'free will' would seem to contradict the OP's panpsychist position saying that consciousness (thus free will) can only come about via an "atomic unity evolving from other conscious natural beings in a panpsychist universe and as such can have real causal powers". If you can evidence your definition of "free will" is correct then that could be an argument against panpsychism.

Then you said that the purpose of sentience or consciousness is so we can have "free will", and later confounded your answer more by saying that was not your idea but "common definition".

So, is it not reasonable for you to state what you believe is the 'common wisdom' meaning of "free will" and why you disagree with it? Otherwise, we are left dumbfounded to make any sense of your various less than coherent positions/statements.

eager to hear your reasoned clarifications, unless you have none...

It's like you want me to argue something I do not care about. Simply state yes / no question so I know what is this about, or quote my sentence and point what you think is wrong with it.

It's like you want me to argue something I do not care about. — Zelebg

I'm just asking you for a clear definition of 'free will' and for you to compare/contrast that to the 'common definition' you apparently alluded to. If you do not care to do that then I dare say all your opinions on 'free will' are not meant to be taken seriously as they are not open for debate towards a truth, but just to state/spread your position.

please give us an example of a stable deterministic program which is not constrained to a set of pre-determined behaviors and functions, yet achieves goals and/or has utility.

A program that can redefine its set of defined functions and goals.

how is determinism relevant to "knowing itself"?
— Zelebg

would you agree that all true independent agents acting in the world have a goal? would you agree that a more meaningful decision made by an agent when it "knows" that its decision(s) is/are best for its overall goals? would you agree that best overall decisions can only be achieved if the agent has a state of awareness (e.g., conscious) of its totality of needs and if the agent has the ability to realign its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals according to the experienced/predicted consequences of its behaviors and/or beliefs and/or goals ? If so, then would you not agree that a conscious agent is exercising more meaningful 'free will' than the automaton programmed agent, and a self-conscious agent exhibiting still more meaningful 'free will' than an only conscious agent?

Questions are not answers. Answer to my question needs to begin with something like this: determinism is relevant to "knowing oneself” BECAUSE…

I'm just asking you for a clear definition of 'free will' and for you to compare/contrast that to the 'common definition' to apparently alluded to. If you do not care to do that then I dare say all your opinions on 'free will' are not meant to be taken seriously as they are not open for debate towards a true, but just to state/spread your position.

There is no clear definition of free will. It is sufficient that we agree on the definition relative to the context we are talking about. But what is the context we are talking about now? Did I say something you disgree with, then just quote it already and show me what it is.