I'm pretty sure I'm a philosophical zombie.

lambda

The human being who appears at the center of one's visual field - the human being normally identified as 'myself' - is normally assumed to be conscious. This being is normally assumed to not be a p-zombie. Indeed it is assumed to be the only example of a non-p-zombie that can be known for sure.

But I don't think this assumption stands up to phenomenological scrutiny. After all, that human being is just another experience! And whatever "has" experiences cannot itself be an experience.

The entity 'having' experiences must transcend experience. It must be essentially unperceivable. For if it were perceived then it would immediately cease to be a perceiver. And this criterion for 'perceiver-hood' definitively rules out the possibility that humans 'have' experiences since humans are themselves just another experience, including the one that appears at the center of my visual field ('myself').

So the human being cannot be the entity that is 'having' experiences. It cannot be the thing that is conscious. And a human being who is not conscious is a p-zombie, by definition. Thus I conclude that I, the human person at the center of visual space who is currently typing this message, must be a p-zombie.

And this means the analogical inference for other minds can actually be turned on its head and used to establish that everyone else is a p-zombie!

Ciceronianus

So, you're a p-zombie because you cannot be conscious because you're conscious you experience yourself. Fine.

apokrisis

↪lambda

Your argument relies on a representationalist view of perception - one where the brain "displays data", leaving open the question of "to who?".

Any modern neurocognitive tale would instead want to take an ecological or ennactive approach where there is no such homuncular set-up. There is no entity experiencing the experience. There is just the process of experiencing via the process of entification. What "we" experience is a discrimination of a self from a world.

Punshhh

↪lambda

A logical analysis of your being cannot answer whether you are a philosophical zombie, or not. It has to be taken on faith.

m-theory

↪lambda

It depends on how you define the term conscious.

Either consciousness is decidable or it is undecidable.

If consciousness is decidable then solving the problem of other minds simply means discovering the correct algorithm of consciousness.

If consciousness is undecidable then we can never be sure if we or anybody else is consciousness.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decidability_(logic)

Marchesk

If consciousness is decidable then solving the problem of other minds simply means discovering the correct algorithm of consciousness. — m-theory

How would one go about showing that consciousness is decidable? I take it that if it is, consciousness can be computed, which means a Turing machine can be conscious.

Although, it makes me wonder. Would an abstract algorithm be conscious, or just the instantiation of it?

m-theory

↪Marchesk

It is not really a matter of showing consciousness is decidable it is about a semantic choice.

What do we mean by the term consciousness?

We use the term consciousness in way that seems to assumes that consciousness is a decidable thing.

So if we choose to define consciousness as a thing which is decidable then all that indicates would be that the algorithm that produces consciousness will entail the ability to compute that it is conscious.
Deciding that you are conscious would then be a necessary condition of consciousness.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessity_and_sufficiency

The philosophical implication would be that there is no real hard problem of consciousness in the sense that consciousness is undecidable.
As well, If consciousness is defined as a thing which is decidable then the problem of other minds is not an undecidable problem either.

The alternative to this is that we assume consciousness is not decidable in which case we cannot be sure if we are conscious or not, nor could we be sure that others are conscious.

Also I am not sure it is possible to demonstrate that consciousness is undecidable?
That is to say if consciousness is necessarily undecidable....
how would you show that?

Terrapin Station

And whatever "has" experiences cannot itself be an experience. — lambda

Whether or not that's the case, whatever has experiences isn't a p-zombie.

So that one was easy to figure out!

lambda

↪Terrapin Station

I fully agree - whatever 'has' experiences is a non-zombie.

But I am arguing that whatever this entity is that 'has' experiences cannot be a human being. This would entail that all human beings - including the human body you think of as 'yourself' - are p-zombies.

Terrapin Station

↪lambda

I wouldn't say that you actually present an argument--well, or present one that at works--for why (part of) an entity can't be experiences though.

lambda

↪Terrapin Station

This is my argument:

1. Whatever 'has' experiences must transcend experience.

2. Human bodies (including my own) do not transcend experience.

3. Therefore, human bodies (including my own) cannot 'have' experiences.

4. If human bodies (including my own) do not 'have' experiences then they must be p-zombies.

5. Therefore, all human bodies (including my own) are p-zombies.

What premise didn't I present an argument for?

Terrapin Station

Whatever 'has' experiences must transcend experience. — lambda

What about something that IS experiences? Why are you seeing it necessary as something that isn't experiences "having" experiences?

At any rate, what's the argument for that premise?

lambda

↪Terrapin Station

The argument for that premise is the impossibility/incoherency of the contrary.

It is necessary to posit a transcendent entity that 'has' experiences because otherwise you will end up explaining the very phenomena you are seeking to explain in terms of itself, which is circular/incoherent.

Furthermore, if it was true that experiences are capable of having their own experience then why is this so at odds with observation? I never observe an experience having its own experiences. Do you?

Terrapin Station

Furthermore, if it was true that experiences are capable of having their own experience — lambda

Say what? Part of what you are is experiences. You don't need to posit something with possession of those experiences. Experiences are simply a kind of phenomena that occur.

It is necessary to posit a transcendent entity that 'has' experiences because otherwise you will end up explaining the very phenomena you are seeking to explain in terms of itself, which is circular/incoherent. — lambda

Ontology in no way hinges on explanations, which is what you're suggesting there.

Wayfarer

Experiences are simply a kind of phenomena that occur. — Terrapin Station

But they only occur to living subjects, as far as we can tell. I mean, horses and dogs also seem to be 'subjects of experience', but they can't reflect on experience like humans can.

The entity 'having' experiences must transcend experience. It must be essentially unperceivable. For if it were perceived then it would immediately cease to be a perceiver. — lambda

That argument is strangely similar to one from the Upanishads. So, I can concur with that, but I don't see how this entails anything whatever about 'zombies'. The point about 'p-zombies' is that they are *not* subjects of exprience at all. They appear to be experiencing beings, but they have no self-awareness or experiences as such, which is what makes them zombies.

Janus

↪lambda

The body can be known as an object of experience, but not as a subject of experience: is that basically what you are saying? The body can be inferred to be the subject of experience, but the problem is, we don't know, and probably never will, what that could mean? I can feel my body 'from the inside' so to speak, but can I justifiably claim that it is my body feeling my body; or my body feeling itself? What else could it be though? What if my body is itself a spiritual entity or the symbolic expression of one? Must it be nought but a determinate bit of flesh?

Terrapin Station

But they only occur to living subjects — Wayfarer

I agree that they only seem to be a part of what some living subjects are. That doesn't have anything to do with my comments about lambda's logical confusion based on him seeing experiences as something necessarily "possessed" by things that aren't (partially) experiences, though.

Re other animals, I think there are better reasons to believe that dogs, horses, etc. have experiences something like typical human experiences than there are reasons to not believe that.

Terrapin Station

I can feel my body 'from the inside' so to speak, but can I justifiably claim that it is my body feeling my body; or my body feeling itself? — John

My point is that this way of thinking and talking about it is confused , and it easily leads to conceptual errors. Bodies rather are feeling/experiences/etc.; or rather, that's at least partially what they are. They aren't something different from/aside from that that then possess and handle feelings/experiences like one might possess and handle a basketball.

I'm pretty sure I'm a philosophical zombie.

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions