But, computation can give rise to virtual realities — Zelebg

Mere bit flipping by itself does none of that. It just flips bits according to rules. If this one's on turn that one off. Rule-based bit flipping. — fishfry

Othello for computers. — creativesoul

An associated question: What if the computer tells you it is aware of itself and not simply aware to the extent it can answer questions? What would be your test for self-awareness? — jgill

print("Hey I'm sentient in here. Send pr0n and LOLCats!")

But, computation can give rise to virtual realities
— Zelebg

What does that even mean?

Humans write the programs to create the virtual realities out of meaningless bit patterns.

Computation does nothing but flip bits.

this op is entirely nonsensical - it doesn't convey anything about the original argument, nor any insight into what might be wrong with the original argument.

Virtual reality is a simulated experience that can be similar to or completely different from the real world. — Zelebg

But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.

if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs - for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.

And speaking of Descartes, he anticipates such arguments: — Wayfarer

What if the computer tells you it is aware of itself and not simply aware to the extent it can answer questions? What would be your test for self-awareness?

Here is Descartes's direct quote. Note that he's anticipated your idea by almost 400 years.

Who or what is it that's having the experience?

The Chinese room argument holds that a digital computer executing a program cannot be shown to have a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness", regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave.

And speaking of Descartes, he anticipates such arguments:

His conclusion is already shown to be false by the work done with AI. — Zelebg

I believe that natural machines exist. — Qwex

signal-meaning pairs, — Zelebg

If that's what you are doing too, as I expect, you are in the respectable company of nearly everybody. It's a catastrophically tempting confusion.

It’s like arguing chemistry is just stupid atoms following laws of physics, so they can not possibly give rise to things like biology, language or consciousness. Where is the confusion? — Zelebg

That’s worse. Then it makes a wrong presupposition — Zelebg

... that his example — Zelebg

... is an adequate model of how understanding works. — Zelebg

It’s like arguing chemistry is just stupid atoms following laws of physics, so they can not possibly give rise to things like biology, language or consciousness. Where is the confusion? — Zelebg

The concept of Biosemiotics requires making a distinction between two categories, the material or physical world and the symbolic or semantic world. The problem is that there is no obvious way to connect the two categories. This is a classical philosophical problem on which there is no consensus even today. Biosemiotics recognizes that the philosophical matter-mind problem extends downward to the pattern recognition and control processes of the simplest living organisms where it can more easily be addressed as a scientific problem. In fact, how material structures serve as signals, instructions, and controls is inseparable from the problem of the origin and evolution of life. Biosemiotics was established as a necessary complement to the physical-chemical reductionist approach to life that cannot make this crucial categorical distinction necessary for describing semantic information. Matter as described by physics and chemistry has no intrinsic function or semantics. By contrast, biosemiotics recognizes that life begins with function and semantics.

Biosemiotics recognizes this matter-symbol problem at all levels of life from natural languages down to the DNA. Cartesian dualism was one classical attempt to address this problem, but while this ontological dualism makes a clear distinction between mind and matter, it consigns the relation between them to metaphysical obscurity. Largely because of our knowledge of the physical details of genetic control, symbol manipulation, and brain function these two categories today appear only as an epistemological necessity, but a necessity that still needs a coherent explanation. Even in the most detailed physical description of matter there is no hint of any function or meaning.

The problem also poses an apparent paradox: All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, the very laws they must obey. Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws.

So you think that atoms do "give rise" to language and consciousness?

The problem with all your posts is that they contain many unstated premisses, which, going on the evidence of what you do actually say are quite contentious and problematical in themselves.

So you say, can you show? Pick one issue, quote me, and actually point out what you think is the problem. — Zelebg

Why do you ask, what do you think? — Zelebg

He’s talking about simulation in the context of epistemological uncertainty. I’m talking about simulation in the context of ‘virtual entities’ to address “explanatory gap”. — Zelebg