Your right "I can't" wasn't the right way to say it. More that I wouldn't presume to.

Its devaluing to the point were my feeling about rape being wrong is no more valid than another's value that rape is good.
Or your value that we should do whatever we want as long as it doesn't harm others is no more valid than another's feeling that others well being doesn't matter. Or that a specific type of persons feelings don't matter.

All positions are equally valid in your view, or at least should be equally valid. There is no way to proceed in this case.

They're equally valid to what or to whom?

In other words, what determines validity, that is, just what is it that makes something valid?

This is to some degree my point. It seems we have to rely on our intuition to make value judgments yet we also assume that value judgments are purely feeling based and therefore inconsistent. So again there is no place to proceed.

Seeing you wouldn't buy into the idea of objective moral values I was rephrasing things to see if you're against the idea in principle. (Idea being that certain things are 'always' wrong).

(edit: I'm not framing you into a catch 22 situation here)

But if we assume that there is truth about morality as there is truth about our physical universe then we can use the same ideas we use to evaluate our physical universe. Mainly that we never say for sure that we have things right, but that we make progress towards the truth or towards aligning our ideas with truth, through our assumptions.

If we assume that all people are equal and we assume that we should proceed to allow everyone to act freely unless their actions harm others, we can move forward. And it some way we may be getting closer to the what the truth really is while never truly knowing what it is.

That may seem a little wishy washy, but it is what we do with the physical world. We assume there is truth and try to get closer to what that is.

You're not answering my question though. You brought up an objection based on what you take to be an "equal validity" implication. I'm challenging that objection by asking you to present a more in-depth analysis of just what the objection is positing. Equal validity to what or to whom?

Thanks for the clarification. No I don't believe there's any way to support the idea that anything is "always wrong" without qualification. After all, "wrong" (as well as "right") is always to someone.

We could say that something might be always wrong to a particular person, and it's logically possible that contingently, there could be something that everyone always feels is wrong, but that is highly implausible metaphysically given the variety that actually obtains.

Validity needs to be based on an assumption. There is no way around that. Our observations about the physical world work on the assumption that our perceptions are not entirely deceiving us. That we can use our observations to move closer to truth. Take away that assumption and there is no where to proceed. It may be a wrong assumption, but not having the assumption has no practical benefit. I think we need to make a similar assumption about morality. A basis to move forward with. Or an attempt to move forward.

I see your point, I could argue mine but I feel Sam Harris does it more eloquently.
If you wish:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hj9oB4zpHww&t=1194s

Do you understand the "to what" or "to whom" question?

Yes I do and the answer is valid to a moral truth. Just as scientific theories can be more or less valid to the truth. In both situations you assume there is truth and we have some sort of capability of moving towards it even if only for the reason of having practical benefits.

Okay, but you don't believe that the view I'm espousing would wind up saying that all stances are "equally valid to a moral truth" do you? After all, that there are moral truths is just what the view I'm espousing denies.

I wouldn't say he's making any sort of claim about objective ethics or anything being always wrong (to everyone or whatever) in that section of that presentation that you linked to.

All he seems to be doing us expressing his own moral views and also suggesting some very dubious ideas ignoring the is/ought distinction.

I think to say there is no moral truth is to say that all stances are equally valid which is why I oppose your view.

Perhaps you could explain why that implication is wrong.

I think to say there is no moral truth is to say that all stances are equally valid — Maximus

Which, per your answers above, amounts to:

"To say there is no moral truth is to say that all stances are equally valid to (a) moral truth."

That doesn't make the slightest lick of sense, does it?

In other words, to put it slightly more formally, you'd be claiming this:

"To say there is no F is to say that all x have property φ with respect to F."

That doesn't make sense, though, because if we're saying there is no F, then we'd not be saying that something possesses a particular property with respect to F.

Your making me clarify what I think you already know I mean, but maybe not.
Equally valid is poor phrasing once again. The concept of validity make no sense at all when talking about our positions on morality if there is no moral truth. (i see this as a problem). So there is no way for me to say we should or ought to prefer one idea over the other. Equally valid in the sense that neither is valid at all is more what i meant, but its better to say validity doesn't apply.

So then what does apply to prefer imposing one set of values over another?

Equally valid in the sense that neither is valid at all is more what i meant, but its better to say validity doesn't apply. — Maximus

That I'd agree with.

However, re this:

So there is no way for me to say we should or ought to prefer one idea over the other. — Maximus

The way you say that is that what we should or ought to prefer, on your view, is either the interpersonal behavior that you personally feel is preferable, that you feel a strong emotional support for, or behavior that has some causal connection to or upshot for behavior that you personally feel is preferable, that you feel a strong emotional support for.

When it comes to allowing versus disallowing things legislatively, for example, we're talking about interpersonal behavior, and you have to live amongst other people, so you're not going to want behavior you strongly disapprove of emotionally to be allowed so that it can either occur to yourself or to people you care about.

What's certainly not the case is that you have no preferences just because you realize that they're only preferences.

So lets say you are a part of a culture that shares your preferred values. Are there any grounds for being critical of another culture that are stronger than saying that's not what I would prefer?

Well, saying that it's morally wrong, etc. you'd presumably say is stronger. What I'm saying is that "it's morally wrong" IS just a statement of one's preferences, one's emotional reactions, etc. to the behavior at hand. I'm not saying, of course, that people necessarily think about it that way, that they have a belief that it's just a statement of one's preferences, one's emotional reactions, but whatever they believe it to be, that's all that it really is.

And that's all it needs to be.

Objectivists--well, or some of them at least--apparently have a belief that one can only object to something morally if it's not just a way that they personally feel, but if it's a fact embedded in the extramental world somehow; or at least they believe that that's the only justification for an objection. It's not clear why they believe this though. There doesn't seem to be any argument supporting that that's the only justification for objecting to something morally.

Though he is not advocating an absolutely objective truth, to me he does make a good case why we could accept an "ought" as an "is". The example of how our consciousness can be equated to suffering, how people are able to see others (living entities) suffer (empathize), show that, although still relative, there's some common ground there.

It's a hard topic, where Maximus mentioned earlier in this thread about "incepting" the "right" ideas into certain societies; I'm inclined to think that you can have all the right ideas yet if the material abundance isn't there, it's to no avail. Similarly, kids can grow up into arrogant nitwits at times if they've been spoiled too much. So sharing material abundance more equally could be morally upright, it could be morally wrong because people might not learn how to use such abundance, who are we to decide on such a question? and could the planet cope if anyone would be able to bask in material abundance?

I for one find it morally wrong to use moral relativism to refrain from ever contemplating such issues thoroughly or negate them. I find it hampers moral progress objectively if we don't treat our own capacity to envision such moral issues responsibly ...but that's just me.

I would say for sure that denying moral progress hampers moral progress

I don't think that anyone (except perhaps some high school kids who are more or less acting in a trollish way or at least who are wanting to not be bothered) who asserts moral relativism sees it as a means of avoiding contemplating this stuff or making moral judgments. The relativism/subjectivism vs. objectivism issue is really a metaethical issue after all--it's simply emphasized by those of us who want to make sure that we're getting right what morality actually is in terms of "the furniture of the world." Aside from the metaethical issue, it shouldn't have much impact on our moral contemplation.

That's nice to hear from someone who I'd considered a nihilist and expected to "hide" behind moral relativism. (where I 'was' always aware there's only so much you can read into people from observing their replies on an internet forum).

The general feeling I get from the interactions I have in my environment (which are skewed and mostly comprise the "lower" and middle social ranks of society in a very well developed part of the world) is that most people are either very adamant that there's something wrong objectively and we should all be working to negate that, claiming that things basically don't matter and you're supposed to do what makes you feel happy (rather sooner then later) or assuming they're the pinnacle of human development and others should head their opinion.

I'm biased in assuming most of these people are very well capable of coming towards a more nuanced view on many matters and am generally inclined to actively try and pursue a more nuanced view. (Where I feel it's adequate to mention that most of the people I might criticize are fairly morally praiseworthy when they are put into practice.)

Thanks for negating my preconceptions about you, I guess certain views have more nuance then I would give them credit for at first glance.

I don't know I will have to contemplate more.
On the one hand it seems like you are saying throw out justification and on the other hand it seems you are saying proceed as if there was justification.

Please don't conflate your conversation with Terrapin fully with my conversation, these threads can branch of to some extent. If anything it could show why it's so difficult in coming towards a clearly defined consensus when it comes to values, morality, meaning, etc. The subjectivity which is inherent in most all humans might make things appear more paradoxical then they actually are.

Am I right to think that Sam Harris is basically saying what is more moral is whatever leads to more happiness in a group sense and so we are left to argue what actually leads to more happiness? So in that way happiness may be subjective but morality objective.

I apologize but I prefer simple terms whenever possible.

I feel he rather advocates for an environment which we can agree on, makes most people thrive. It might be easier to see where there is a lack of such an environment (because people are suffering for instance) then necessarily stating in advance how the future needs to look like.

I don't know I will have to contemplate more.
On the one hand it seems like you are saying throw out justification and on the other hand it seems you are saying proceed as if there was justification. — Maximus

I think you're seeing the justification of ethical claims as necessarily needing to be rooted in objective morality, or moral truths. That's what I'm rejecting.

Well using feeling as justification seems shaky at best to me. I don't think America for instance used feeling to get where we are. I think Americans continually realized that they were not adhering to the ideas they believed in and so they continually evolved. The key being that they believed in the ideas. The group at one point felt slavery was okay. I think it took conviction from a belief to change it. At least in my opinion.

I think Americans continually realized that they were not adhering to the ideas they believed in and so they continually evolved. The key being that they believed in the ideas. The group at one point felt slavery was okay. I think it took conviction from a belief to change it. — Maximus

That sounds to me like you're talking about what I'm calling "feeling" though.