Maybe knowledge not as what is known, but of what can be known and how it can be known.

Two examples: 1) Kant's space and time, which he argues are simply the ways in which we organize our perceptions into meaningful experience. And 2) a bachelor is an unmarried man. in both cases no experience is necessary (beyond, perhaps, knowing the meanings of the words), nor indeed would do any good or be of use!

Modernity (read: the failure to read closely and think about exactly what was written) is quick to be dismissive of a lot of Kant, but as I think you can tell, that's a sophomore's mistake.

Thank you for your reply!

May I take “knowledge as what can be known and how it can be known” as a form of capacity?

If I understand it correctly, Kant uses space and time as an example to demonstrate how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible. Take Kant’s space(his argument for time and space is seemingly parallel to each other) as an example, as Kant argues, 1)space is not empirical. Empirical concept derives from experience, yet the experiences from which we would deprive space already presuppose the latter. And, Space is a priori. Though we can imagine objects away, we can never do so for space. 2)Space is not a concept, but an intuition, and followed Kant listed two arguments to support his claim.

However, even for a priori analytic knowledge, which is the trivial, definitional truth(like what you have mentioned in the example: a bachelor is an unmarried one, which we can know from merely the concept itself with no empirical experience), it has to, as you said in the bracket, beyond knowing the meanings of the words.
I understand that Kant’s a priori, defined by necessity and universality, is in its nature independent of empirical knowledge, but it seems like there needs to be some “experience” involved in the phase of “knowing the meaning of the words” in the first place to trigger the capacity of “a priori”(I feel like I am possibly making mistake here).
Under such conditions, is the “a priori” knowledge still counts as “a priori”?
If such capacity is not innate, I fail to figure out how can it escape the involvement of experience in the first place.

I started to read Kant’s pure critique of metaphysics recently and only finished up to Transcendental Aesthetics so far. Therefore, my sincere apologies in advance for my ignorant on the subject.

what is the trigger here to adopt the "a priori" knowledge? — Meichen Fan

“...Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other....”
(1787, B4)

to trigger the capacity of “a priori” — Meichen Fan

Maybe to express it in words. I read that one of two innate fears present in infants is of falling (the other, loud noises). That certainly implies a capacity.

I started to read Kant’s pure critique of metaphysics recently and only finished up to Transcendental Aesthetics so far. Therefore, my sincere apologies in advance for my ignorance on the subject. — Meichen Fan

Good for you! You're now ahead of 99.99% of people who express opinions on Kant. Nor apologies accepted or needed. And I see @Mww has chimed in, imo a very good thing for any discussion on Kant.

Question: reading Kant can be challenging, or at least work, compared to many things. Do you feel as if your reading "muscles" - for lack of any better term - are suddenly stronger as a result? When I read CPR and the returned to, for example, Shakespeare, Bill was suddenly a lot easier!

.

Nahhhh...you got it, bud. I was just passin’ through.

All a priori ideas are universal coming from a place we cannot conventionally experience by our limited senses. Yet we are able to tap into this intellect(universal laws) through practical-pure reasoning where there is no self interest or sense perception. Hence pure. As rational beings we then make determinant judgements a posteriori or reflective judgements a priori.

A priori always precedes a posteriori otherwise you would live off of mere animal instinct. It is our capacity of practical reasoning we are able to abstract ideas to explain our empirical experiences. By this capacity we also discover laws which cannot be sensed but yet hold universal sway morally on rational beings. I.e The law of contradiction shows if we made lieing a universal law, nature couldn't operate. We can't test this but we know it a priori.

Where these laws and ideas come from, Kant doesn't even know. He says himself he can rationalize the categorical imperatives, but cannot comprehend the cause of them. As for why man is able to give these laws unto himself adopting the maxim of freedom, Kant speculates intelligent design but doesn't postulate anything. He merely lays down the moral laws already there universally conceived only by practical reasoning

I think that's pretty right. We can't 'experience a priori truths by our senses' because by definition, they're not what Kant called 'sensible truths' (where 'sensible' means 'detectable by the senses). They're grasped by intellectual intuition, which is the capacity of the rational intellect. And the reason this is impossible to explain, is because such intuitions are themselves at the source of explanation. We can’t, as it were, get behind them.

Kant says himself he can rationalize the categorical imperatives, but cannot comprehend the cause of them. — One piece

That's because by definition the cause is above or prior to what it explains. So, perhaps, supra-rational, or an order of which human reason is an image or reflection. The Augustinian tradition would have no problems with that. But that shouldn't be taken to endorse any kind of theistic argument on Kant's part - early in his career he wrote the 'only possible argument for the existence of God' which considers such arguments, but later on he backed away from those views.

But I personally feel comfortable with the philosophical notion that reason suggests an order beyond its grasp.

May I take “knowledge as what can be known and how it can be known” as a form of capacity?

If I understand it correctly, Kant uses space and time as an example to demonstrate how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible. Take Kant’s space(his argument for time and space is seemingly parallel to each other) as an example, as Kant argues, 1)space is not empirical. Empirical concept derives from experience, yet the experiences from which we would deprive space already presuppose the latter. And, Space is a priori. Though we can imagine objects away, we can never do so for space. 2)Space is not a concept, but an intuition, and followed Kant listed two arguments to support his claim.

However, even for a priori analytic knowledge, which is the trivial, definitional truth(like what you have mentioned in the example: a bachelor is an unmarried one, which we can know from merely the concept itself with no empirical experience), it has to, as you said in the bracket, beyond knowing the meanings of the words.
I understand that Kant’s a priori, defined by necessity and universality, is in its nature independent of empirical knowledge, but it seems like there needs to be some “experience” involved in the phase of “knowing the meaning of the words” in the first place to trigger the capacity of “a priori”(I feel like I am possibly making mistake here).
Under such conditions, is the “a priori” knowledge still counts as “a priori”?
If such capacity is not innate, I fail to figure out how can it escape the involvement of experience in the first place. — Meichen Fan

I think I’m with you on this one. I agree that knowledge is a capacity, and I’ve encountered the same issue with Kant’s a priori, so I’m very interested to hear what @tim wood, @Mww or others have to offer here...

I understand that Kant’s a priori, defined by necessity and universality, is in its nature independent of empirical knowledge, but it seems like there needs to be some “experience” involved in the phase of “knowing the meaning of the words” in the first place to trigger the capacity of “a priori”(I feel like I am possibly making mistake here).
Under such conditions, is the “a priori” knowledge still counts as “a priori”? — Meichen Fan

The experience required here is experience in general. What a human mind needs to fully develop it's capacity for rational thought. It's not a specific kind of experience, e.g. "experience of space in and of itself".

Therefore, how can we distinguish "a priori" knowledge from innate ideas/knowledge? — Meichen Fan

Analytic a priori knowledge are definitions and possibly axiomatic rules. Synthetic a priori knowledge is what you can deduce by using analytic a priori knowledge as first principles.

Example:
* analytic a priori: axioms of number theory
* synthetic a priori : Fermat's Last Theorem

We do not know if analytic a priori knowledge would be innate. According to the intuitionistic ontological philosophy of mathematics, it somehow is. But then again, there are no reasons to believe or disbelieve these ontological views from within mathematics itself. Synthetic a priori knowledge, on the other hand, is absolutely not innate. It needs to be painstakingly discovered.

So, we cannot distinguish between analytic a priori knowledge and innate knowledge because that would require us to (rationally) know the origin of analytic a priori knowledge, which we do not, because we have no access to the construction logic of the human mind.

If the mind with "a priori" knowledge is not born with ideas/knowledge, what is the trigger here to adopt the "a priori" knowledge? — Meichen Fan

The mind must inevitably be born with some knowledge, if only, to bootstrap the learning process. Other analytic a priori knowledge is learned. Synthetic a priori knowledge is always learned, because its derivation from analytic first principles is necessarily performed according to conventional formalisms that are not innate.

This thread is confusing what we think with how we think.

Does a newborn baby know what an unmarried man or a bachelor is? If not then how can all unmarried men are bachelors be a priori knowledge? Unmarried men are bachelors is a defining statement. It defines what bachelor is and the statement is only useful when explaining to someone else who doesn't know what a bachelor is, is, like to a child.

Unmarried men is what our thoughts can be about, and require experience, while the logic of non-contradiction is how we think and arrive at truth.

Time and space are not objects of thought, but are how we think. When we objectify time in space we are making a category error. Time and space are what separate unmarried men from married men. An unmarried man cannot occupy the same time and space as a married man (the logic of noncontradiction). You might say time in space is how we distinguish one mental category from another.

Contrary to common misreadings, Kant expressly resisted and actively denied the conflation of the a priori with the innate: "The Critique [of Pure Reason] admits absolutely no divinely implanted (anerschaffene) or innate (angeborene) representations. It regards them all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, as acquired. There is, however, an original acquisition (Erwerbung)... consequently also of that which previously did not exist, and therefore did not pertain to anything before the act" (Response to Eberhard). And again in the Inaugural Dissertation: "Empirical principles not being found in metaphysics, the concepts to be met with in it are not then to be sought for in the senses, but in the very nature of pure intellect; not as innate notions, but as abstracted from laws whose seat is in the mind, by attending to the actions of the mind on the occasion of experience, and hence as acquired." (Sec II, §8, my italics).

The trouble of course is that Kant also strongly denied that the categories derived from experience either (this being more well known). The problem with both is that they make the 'agreement' of the categories to experience 'arbitrary', whereas for Kant, the agreement must instead be absolutely necessary (only this necessity can stave off the threat of skepticism). Critiquing what the calls the 'preformation system of pure reason' - Kant's name for innateness - he writes that in this case "the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept" (CPR, B168).

The entire stake of 'transcendental philosophy' was to chart a 'middle path' between both 'preformationism' (innateness) and mere empiricism. A 'middle path' that Kant referred to as the "epigensis of pure reason", or as per the above as an 'original acquisition'. Exactly how Kant tried to cash out this middle path, and whether or not he was successful at doing so, is a whole other question (arguably the entire development of German Idealism in the wake of Kant turned upon exactly this question: from whence did the categories arise, if neither innate nor empirical?). But as it stands, the a priori is not the innate, and to confuse the two would be a fatal misreading of Kant.

If such capacity is not innate, I fail to figure out how can it escape the involvement of experience in the first place.
— Meichen Fan

I think I’m with you on this one. — Possibility

Because observation grants a human is moral before he is intelligent, and because experience itself is absent in pre-intelligent humans, after all the metaphysical reductionism, pure practical reason is given as an innate condition in humans logically. Within the confines of a specific epistemological domain, human morality cannot be explained without the permission of pure practical reason, and in which intelligence is not yet a consideration.

Upon logical justification of pure practical reason, which determines empirical objects for itself manifest in the form of behaviors, the possibility of pure reason with no empirical objects whatsoever, is given, which then becomes the logical ground of all pure a priori conditions in humans in the development of their intelligence, within the confines of that same epistemological domain.

Knowledge is not a capacity, it is an end given from an epistemological method as means. Knowledge is not innate, but the conditions for the epistemological method from which knowledge is possible, is, and it can be called pure reason.

A priori is a relational determination in the human complementary cognitive system. It is merely in juxtaposition to a posteriori, the latter given from sensibility, the former absent sensibility. But absent sensibility itself has two conditions, absent immediate sensibility, or, that of which perception and its representations are not present at the time of cognition, and, absent any sensibility whatsoever in any time of cognition.

In the first, because perception may have instilled phenomena in the system at a former time, intuitions are given in accordance with them and is called experience. This is called impure a priori, and grounds all operations of the cognitive faculties by empirical, re: inductive, rules. This is why we don’t have to learn the same thing at each time of its presentation to us. Better known as consciousness and regulates knowledge. From the principle of complementarity, the opposite of this is ignorance.

In the second, because sensibility is not involved at all, there will be no appearances, no intuitions, no phenomena, hence no cognized experience. But we remain fully aware that there is still something happening, something is occupying our non-sensible cognitive faculties. In short, we remain as thinking subjects, but that to which our thought is directed is not of phenomenal nature because nothing has affected us by its appearance. Thus, that which we are thinking about, must already reside in us without having been put there by experience. This is pure a priori, and grounds all non-sensible cognitive faculties by logical, re: deductive, rules alone. Better known as understanding and regulates possible knowledge. From the principle of complementarity, the opposite of this is belief.

As an aside, thought in which neither rules of Nature nor rules of logic, as such, are employed, is opinion.

Empirical rules are determined from Nature, logical rules are determined from thought. It is clear that because we think even without perception, rules of logic are antecedent to rules of Nature, and from which follows necessarily, with the exception of accident or reflex, that a priori conditions are much more powerful with respect to our knowledge, than that which is given from Nature alone. For humans, a posteriori knowledge is impossible without a priori conditions, but the a priori, in and of itself, has no meaning except in relation to the empirical.

So.....a priori and a posteriori reduce to the manner in which our cognitive faculties operate. A priori does not use the faculties of empirical representation (sensibility), a posteriori does not use the faculties of conceptual representation (understanding). They work together equally for direct empirical knowledge, one merely conditions the other for indirect empirical knowledge, and they are entirely separate for rational knowledge.

And there you have it. The proverbial nutshell. Of course, the theoretical derivations need a healthy dose of.....mmmm......acceptance.

Or not...........

I know, I know. But like we talked about before.....it’s Sunday. What’s a guy gonna do, now that football’s gone. (Sigh)

Hegel thought Kant's categories were too static and put them on their head in order to create a movement.

Kant thought the conscience was God but saw no reason to affirm a deity from which it came from the conscience itself.

Descartes thought he could prove the existence of God from innate Ideas instead of analysis of conscience.

Because observation grants a human is moral before he is intelligent, and because experience itself is absent in pre-intelligent humans, after all the metaphysical reductionism, pure practical reason is given as an innate condition in humans logically. Within the confines of a specific epistemological domain, human morality cannot be explained without the permission of pure practical reason, and in which intelligence is not yet a consideration. — Mww

Excuse my ignorance: What would you say a ‘pre-intelligent human’ is? Of course, my issues with this may have something to do with the metaphysical reductionism, but intelligence, by my understanding, is the capacity to acquire and apply knowledge, which I would think was a condition of even practical reason, along with morality. Are you referring to intelligence here as a measurable value, below which intelligence arguably does not exist?

Intelligence may not be a consideration within a specific epistemological domain, but I would argue that it nevertheless defines/confines the domain itself. That’s how I understand it, anyway.

I’m still reading through the rest of your reply...

So.....a priori and a posteriori reduce to the manner in which our cognitive faculties operate. A priori does not use the faculties of empirical representation (sensibility), a posteriori does not use the faculties of conceptual representation (understanding). They work together equally for direct empirical knowledge, one merely conditions the other for indirect empirical knowledge, and they are entirely separate for rational knowledge. — Mww

So... a priori knowledge is still relative to the information integrated within the experiencing subject, just no longer considered susceptible to empirical information.

Would you say there are conditions in which a priori knowledge can be rendered susceptible? In other words, is it your belief that logical rules are eternal and universal, or are they simply a deeper level of acquired and applied knowledge, gained through pre-conscious and even continued sub-conscious interaction with the world? Are we fearfully protective of certain impure a priori knowledge, such that we ignore, isolate or exclude possible knowledge that threatens our favourable conceptualisation of reality?

A priori is a relational determination in the human complementary cognitive system. It is merely in juxtaposition to a posteriori, the latter given from sensibility, the former absent sensibility. But absent sensibility itself has two conditions, absent immediate sensibility, or, that of which perception and its representations are not present at the time of cognition, and, absent any sensibility whatsoever in any time of cognition. — Mww

I'm not quite sure at what you're getting at here. Where would instincts fall into this explanation? Are instincts a form of knowledge? Does a newborn baby "know" how to root and grasp? Are these a priori or posteriori? Is there any sensibility for them in those actions?

It also seems to me that to know that you possess a priori or posteriori knowledge would require some kind of feeling or sensibility for you to make that claim. What does a priori knowledge feel like compared to a posteriori and how do you tell the difference if not by some kind of empirical sense? What form does a posteriori or priori knowledge take for you to even refer to it with those scribbles, "a priori" and "a posteriori", which are themselves something that we can see (or hear if those scribbles were spoken)?

Pre-intelligent....the time of one’s rational development before the ego supervenes instinct.

Intellect is the common faculty; intelligence is the general content of it; intelligent is the particular condition of it. Wisdom is the exhibition of its employment.

Would you say there are conditions in which a priori knowledge can be rendered susceptible (to empirical information)? — Possibility

Sure. My experience with driving a car in general is entirely sufficient for driving a Ferrari at 180mph, even though I don’t have that particular experience. My experience of driving an F-35 is entirely lacking, but I know it is possible for an F-35 to be driven. On the other hand, I can prove the shortest distance between two points is a straight line by mere illustration, but I can never empirically prove the necessity of the pure a priori conceptions of quantity and relation, which establish the validity of lines and points.

A priori is a relational determination in the human complementary cognitive system.
— Mww
Where would instincts fall into this explanation. — Harry Hindu

They don’t. Instinct is innate and automatic, cognition is developed and reactive.

It also seems to me....... — Harry Hindu

Ok, no problem. Everyone is entitled to his own seemings.

Contrary to common misreadings, Kant expressly resisted and actively denied the conflation of the a priori with the innate: "The Critique [of Pure Reason] admits absolutely no divinely implanted (anerschaffene) or innate (angeborene) representations — StreetlightX

But as it stands, the a priori is not the innate, and to confuse the two would be a fatal misreading of Kant. — StreetlightX

I think you captured the exact concern that the OP posits.

My interpretation is the opposite. Firstly, these are Metaphysical queries. And as such, the innate sense of wonderment that human's have exist a priori.

The infamous 'all events must have a cause' is Kant's version of metaphysical questions that exist a priori, and/or are partially from an innate sense of wonderment.

Yes?

They don’t. Instinct is innate and automatic, cognition is developed and reactive. — Mww

Like walking, riding a bike and driving a car - after you've practiced enough these things are automatic and innate.

Ok, no problem. Everyone is entitled to his own seemings. — Mww

I was reflecting on your seemings, not mine.

Acquisition of skill, by definition, cannot be innate, in the general sense of the term. The ability to acquire a skill is merely evinced by an interest in it, for try as he may, one may never realize any fruition from his attempt. Even if one excels in a skill, without training or preparation, it would still be impossible to determine the innate-ness of such ability, as opposed to merely an extraordinary adaptation to it.

The rest is superfluous.