You beat me to it. :up:... foundationalism itself is wrong (as are all forms of justificationism, including coherentism and infinitism as well) and consequently no beliefs are properly basic. Proper rationality isn't about believing nothing unless it is properly justified from the ground up, but about only believing things that cannot be critically ruled out. — Pfhorrest
I beg to differ. Here's a couple:No beliefs are properly basic. — Pfhorrest
Except for 'aspects of the world' within a narrow range of (non-planck) sizes & (non-relativistic) speeds, our (unaided) senses do not. Our "view" is not a "belief" but a perceptual-cognitive bias (e.g. change blindness). Or what Hume aptly termed "habit of thought", which persists until we stumble upon (scientific observation, anyone?) instances of perception that are not "functionally accurate".No beliefs are properly basic.
— Pfhorrest
I beg to differ. Here's a couple:
- belief that our senses deliver a functionally accurate view of the world — Relativist
There aren't any grounds to doubt "there is an external world", thus no issue at stake, or question to answer, to believe or not. And solipsism isn't even false, it's nonsense (pace Witty).- belief that there is an external world (i.e. solipsism is false).
What is "the world"? The only idea of a world I have is from my senses. Sometimes what I think they're telling me doesn't line up with other things I think they're telling me, but all I have to work with is what my senses seem to be telling me, and the best I can do is try to make consistent sense (no pun intended) of that as a whole. I don't have a foundational, basic belief that my senses are delivering an accurate view of something else beyond what I sense; what I sense just is what seems to be, and though it might not be, I have no reason to doubt that seeming unless other senses seem to contradict it.I beg to differ. Here's a couple:
- belief that our senses deliver a functionally accurate view of the world — Relativist
What difference is there between an "external" world and, I presume, an "internal" one? Is the world I describe above an internal one or an external one? How could I tell the difference between those (nominally) two things?- belief that there is an external world (i.e. solipsism is false).
So what if it's a narrow range? It is a range that has been relevant to our survival- as one would expect if it is a product of natural selection.Except for 'aspects of the world' within a narrow range of (non-planck) sizes & (non-relativistic) speeds, our (unaided) senses do not. — 180 Proof
David Armstrong terms these "non-verbal beliefs", and I think that's an appropriate way to view it because these ground all other beliefs about the world- including the inferences of science.Our "view" is not a "belief" but a perceptual-cognitive bias (e.g. change blindness). Or what Hume aptly termed "habit of thought", which persists until we stumble upon (scientific observation, anyone?) instances of perception that are not "functionally accurate".
As I said, our sense of the world is FUNCTIONALLY accurate. We do not walk off cliffs; we do not eat rocks; we perceive and avoid predators.What is "the world"? The only idea of a world I have is from my senses. Sometimes what I think they're telling me doesn't line up with other things I think they're telling me, but all I have to work with is what my senses seem to be telling me, and the best I can do is try to make consistent sense (no pun intended) of that as a whole. — Pfhorrest
That doesn't entail a basic belief, because it is LEARNED. Basic beliefs aren't learned, they are innate. Plantinga suggests we perceive God through a theoretical "sensus divinitatus", analogous to vision, or hearing.I would argue the belief in gods or a god is a basicality mainly because to get large groups of people to work together you need a false belief or perhaps a real belief — christian2017
Right. So not "basic", acquired (only by survivor species) via adaptation. In other words, emergent traits (i.e. habits) not "beliefs", or propositional assertions. Why conflate physiological, perceptual and neurological functions (i.e. inputs-throughput) with epistemic / cognitive states (i.e. reflexive outputs)?So what if it's a narrow range? It is a range that has been relevant to our survival- as one would expect if it is a product of natural selection. — Relativist
Hume refers to "habits of thought" in the context of reflexes dispositions traits skills etc acquired through being "taught", observation or trial & error practices (e.g. play). I add perceptual / cognitive biases to that. (Memo: "Innatism", like teleology, has been debunked. :roll: ) These are not 'answers to questions' with a truth-value aka "beliefs". And even if they were, by your own admission the result of natural selection - emergent (from adaptation), not "basic".It is not mere "habit" that infants perceive objects beyond themselves. It's not taught.
Being acquired as part of species development doesn't negate the fact these beliefs are innate to the individual, and that is sufficient for being basic.So not "basic", acquired (only by survivor species) via adaptation. In other words, emergent traits (i.e. habits) not "beliefs", or propositional assertions. Why conflate physiological, perceptual and neurological functions (i.e. inputs-throughput) with epistemic / cognitive states (i.e. reflexive outputs)? — 180 Proof
Right, he uses that narrow view of belief, but he considers perceptions (including the sensus divinitatus) as part of the belief forming process. Seeing a tree produces the belief that a tree is before us. Perceiving God produces the belief of God.Platinga seems to be talking about propositions. — creativesoul
...that a belief is properly basic only in certain conditions; these conditions are, we might say, the ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself. In this sense, basic beliefs are not, or are not necessarily, groundless beliefs.
There seems to me a contradiction involved in setting out basic beliefs as dependent on anything. — Banno
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