The inclination to walk away and hide from this, and the inclination to face the person with apology and repentance, involve completely different feelings which are derived from the very same event. — Metaphysician Undercover

The same feeling of guilt gives rise to two different responses: hiding the guilt or acknowledging it. These differences are due to different circumstances and additional feelings: fear of punishment, sense of moral responsibility, the link with the victim, etc. But the original feeling is the same: guilt for having damaged someone. I don't see why you think these are two different feelings.

It requires a further judgement of conscience to produce guilt from shame. Guilt involves the recognition that the cause of shame, hiding the deprived situation, or hiding from the deprived situation, recoiling into one's own presumed innocence, or naivety, is itself something wrong, a pretense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Shame may or may not be associated with guilt. Shame associated to guilt only arises when the crime is public. A criminal may feel guilty but not ashamed if he only knows his crime. There are a lot of examples. A criminal may feel guilty but not ashamed if he despises the society that reproaches him for his crime. See Jean Valjean in Hugo's Les miserables.

Conversely, you can feel shame without any sense of guilt: I can be ashamed when someone tells me that I am a coward. Where is the harm I have done to others? Where is the guilt here?

If there is guilt without shame and shame without guilt, it is necessary to reach a conclusion: they are different feelings.

f shame is, as you say, involved with external observation, this itself, is a reconsideration of the event, and that's an inconsistency in your description.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? The situation that causes shame can be effective immediately, like a reflex, without thoughtful consideration. Where is your problem?

The same feeling of guilt gives rise to two different responses: hiding the guilt or acknowledging it. — David Mo

I am talking about the inclination to hide, and the inclination to confess, which exist at the very same time. I am not talking about having chosen one or the other in response. These are distinctly different feelings associated with the supposed "guilt". To say that the person has conflicting feelings, and that's what "guilt" is, to have conflicted feelings, does not describe a feeling of guilt. All you do is avoid analyzing the actual feelings involved, and class distinct and opposing feelings together as the feeling of "guilt".

If there is guilt without shame and shame without guilt, it is necessary to reach a conclusion: they are different feelings. — David Mo

As I said, there is no guilt without shame. Guilt is an extension of shame. The primary judgement by the conscience is that there is a specific type of deprived, unpleasant, uncomfortable situation, and this is shame. A secondary judgement assigns blame for the deprived situation and this is the designation of guilt. Notice that there cannot be a judgement of guilt (responsibility for the wrong), without first a judgement that there is something wrong. And, the judgement that something is wrong is what produces shame.

As I explained to unenlightened, proceeding to that secondary judgement, assigning blame, the judgement of guilt, is not necessary. When we recognize that the uncomfortable feeling (shame) is a response to a situation which is apprehended as a deprived situation (something's wrong), we can act immediately to rectify the situation; thereby relieving the shame, without any judgement of blame or guilt. But if the uncomfortable feeling of shame was not present we would not be moved to act in this way. This I believe is the intent of the Catholic tradition of confession, we can act to remove the shame without proceeding to guilt. That is the essence of forgiveness, we all act together to improve our situation, remove the unpleasantness of shame, without resorting to judgements of guilt.

Why? The situation that causes shame can be effective immediately, like a reflex, without thoughtful consideration. Where is your problem? — David Mo

The situation must be remembered, or else the shame will disappear as quickly as it appeared, just like a reflex. If the shame is ongoing, then exposure to the situation which causes the shame must be ongoing as well. If it is a past event which causes the shame, then that past event must be remembered, if the shame is to persist.

If it is the thought of an external observer which causes the shame, as you contend, then in order for the shame to be ongoing, the memory of the event, along with the thought of an external observer of the event, must be present to the person. This is a reconsideration of the event.

Suppose though, that the feeling of shame is created simply by the apprehension of an external observer, regardless of the act, and therefore without any reconsideration of the event. This is what is required if shame occurs without a reconsideration of the event, shame is caused solely by the apprehension, even if imagined, of external observers, regardless of the situation. Then we would always be in shame all the time, regardless of what we were doing, wearing, etc., because shame would simply be caused by the recognition of a possibility of external observers. But this is clearly not how shame is. Sometimes the thought of external observers creates pride, conceit, and vanity, while sometimes it creates shame. These are opposing types of feelings, created from the apprehension of possible observers. So it is clearly not the recognition of external observers which creates shame.

To say that the person has conflicting feelings, and that's what "guilt" is, to have conflicted feelings, does not describe a feeling of guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where did I say that?

Where did I say that?

As I said, there is no guilt without shame. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not true. I've already given you an example.

A criminal may feel guilty but not ashamed if he despises the society that reproaches him for his crime. See Jean Valjean in Hugo's Les miserables. — David Mo

Can you answer to my objection? I doubt it.

The primary judgement by the conscience is that there is a specific type of deprived, unpleasant, uncomfortable situation, and this is shame. — Metaphysician Undercover

That definition serves many different emotions. It's not specific. It doesn't distinguish anything.

A secondary judgement assigns blame for the deprived situation and this is the designation of guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

Social condemnation can serve to designate both shame and guilt. If they are distinguished it is because social condemnation is based on different things. Your "definitions" do not define anything in particular.

Everything that follows fails because it is based on undefinition from the beginning. It is an empty discourse.

...regardless of the act... — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't make any sense. The act is a fundamental part of shame: being seen (really or imagining) doing something that one shouldn't be doing at that moment by the observer who shouldn't be seeing it. This is the exact definition of the situation that causes shame.

I hesitate to interrupt a roundabout at full gallop, but are you guys disputing the meaning of words, the nature of psyche, ethics, or something else?

Honestly, I don't know.

but are you guys disputing the meaning of words, the nature of psyche, ethics, or something else? — unenlightened

Honestly, I don't know. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe you, but I'm discussing facts. That shame and guilt are two different emotions. That guilt is not a consequence of shame and that the time sequence does not intervene at all in the definition of both. (By de way, these are facts commonly accepted in psychology).

Whether they are called one way or the other doesn't matter to me. What is absurd is to say that one is a subspecies of the other as Metaphysical Undercover has said. This is a false statement of fact.

In guilt there is implied a victim. In shame there is not a victim. Examples: regret to have raped a woman. Disgust to myself for being a coward. Don't you see the difference, unelightened?

I'm discussing facts. — David Mo

Why are you discussing facts? Do they not speak for themselves?

In guilt there is implied a victim. In shame there is not a victim. Examples: regret to have raped a woman. Disgust to myself for being a coward. Don't you see the difference, unelightened? — David Mo

These are not facts. This is a distinction you are making that has some merit in terms of clarity and convenience, but does not at all exhaust the meaning and usage of the words.

But let us then impose your distinction on the myth of the Fall: we might say that Adam and Eve feel guilty about disobeying God and eating the fruit, and also ashamed of their nakedness. So these are different and separate, but the ancients in their folly have conflated them. Why have they done that do you think?

I believe you, but I'm discussing facts. That shame and guilt are two different emotions. That guilt is not a consequence of shame and that the time sequence does not intervene at all in the definition of both. (By de way, these are facts commonly accepted in psychology). — David Mo

You haven't done very well in any effort to explain why you believe guilt is an emotion. And for the reasons I've explained, it appears impossible that guilt is an emotion.. Guilt involves conflicting feelings, opposing emotions, therefore it cannot be an emotion. Guilt is a judgement of responsibility, blame. If you've ever judged anyone, including yourself, as guilty, you would see that the feelings involved with any particular instance of this judgement are extremely varied and conflicting. Have you ever been on a jury? That's why it's impossible that guilt is a feeling, or emotion, a judgement of guilt involves many distinct feelings and emotions.

If you really believe that guilt is a feeling, you ought to be able to describe this feeling to me, in a way which characterizes it as something other than an extension of shame. Instead you just refer me to other people who have claimed that guilt is a feeling, and insist therefore that this is a fact. The problem, as I've explained to you, is that there are two distinct urges (types of feelings) which follow from one's own judgement of personal guilt, one urge is to deny the guilt and hide responsibility, the other is the urge to face responsibility and make restitution. Since both of these very different, and conflicting types of feelings can be involved with the same judgement of guilt, it is impossible that there is a feeling called "guilt".

Do they not speak for themselves? — unenlightened

I don't understand the question. Please be clearer.

These are not facts. This is a distinction you are making that has some merit in terms of clarity and convenience, — unenlightened

That certain emotions arise in relation to a victim and others do not is not an arbitrary distinction. It is a distinction based on an undeniable and observable fact (except for our colleague, who has a personal logic). That some emotions only arise in function of an observer and others do not, is a distinction based on unquestionable and observable facts. That the emotions that arise in function of a victim are those that arise without the need of external observers but by an internal process is an observable and undeniable relationship. That this internal process is based on sympathy for the victim and the acceptance of certain norms related to it, while the triggers of the first emotions are based on the loss of self-esteem, are undeniable and observable facts that psychology has studied for some time. That the classification of moral emotions has been useful in those studies, is something that anyone who is a little aware of current psychology knows.I don't know of a single study of philosophy or psychology that doesn't make the distinction between shame and guilt. If you know of any, I'd like you to quote it to me. I'd be interested in it. Truly.

Why have they done that do you think? — unenlightened

In ordinary language, art or mythology, guilt and shame are sometimes intertwined. This is due to their proximity as moral emotions and because they have some of their characteristics in common: both are based on a concept of what should and should not be done (that's why they are moral) and both involve self-esteem (that's why they are also called emotions of the Self). In the case of the Bible the confusion is easier because it is the product of a society in which tribal pressure and morality are confused. This refers to the problem of the existence of societies dominated by the sense of shame-honour and guilt societies. Traditional Jewish culture would be among the first.

Have you ever been on a jury? That's why it's impossible that guilt is a feeling, or emotion, a judgement of guilt involves many distinct feelings and emotions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You confuse the guilty verdict in a court of law with the guilty feeling of the guilty. We're talking about the former. They are very different things

I would ask you once again, instead of wandering on your own, to take some of the examples in the articles I quoted and discuss them.

What does Judas Iscariot feel in the Bible? He feels guilty about giving up Jesus. Yes or no?
Matt 27, 3-5.

Do you want restrict to this biblical example?

there are two distinct urges (types of feelings) which follow from one's own judgement of personal guilt, one urge is to deny the guilt and hide responsibility, the other is the urge to face responsibility and make restitution. — Metaphysician Undercover

You confuse two things: the urge to hide the malicious act and the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act. You can try to hide the act without any feeling of guilt because of fear of punishment. They are two different things. This fear and feeling of guilt are not the same.

Guilt is the feeling of being responsible for a wrong committed on someone. Whether or not you want to make amends for that wrong comes after the discomfort of feeling guilty. Some people prefer to endure that discomfort and some people need to take away this charge. But the discomfort of guilt comes before the second step.

In the case of the Bible the confusion is easier because it is the product of a society in which tribal pressure and morality are confused. This refers to the problem of the existence of societies dominated by the sense of shame-honour and guilt societies — David Mo

Well I am confused too. Disentangle tribal pressure from morality for me. You see again, you seem to think you are talking about facts; you are aware of the fact/value distinction?

you are aware of the fact/value distinction? — unenlightened

Of course. It is a fact that guilt is a feeling that affects many people, who judge that what they have done is wrong. The fact is the burden of guilt. Value is how the guilty judges the fact. I don't judge if he is wrong in his belief. I am not a priest nor a moralist. I analyze the causes of his discomfort (fact). I am a psychologist.

This is due to their proximity as moral emotions and because they have some of their characteristics in common: both are based on a concept of what should and should not be done (that's why they are moral) and both involve self-esteem (that's why they are also called emotions of the Self). — David Mo

You see this just sounds like pontification of the most dogmatic kind. How can an emotion be moral or non moral, what even is it for something to be moral? These are the questions that I think need answering by looking at shame, but you are already using them to define shame as if morality is less problematic than emotion.

I am not a priest or a moralist. I analyze the causes of your discomfort (fact). I am a psychologist. — David Mo

Yes. And I am a philosopher. I analyse the causes of your confusion. You have no idea what you are talking about because the thing that is the proposed cause of the feeling you are analysing, does not exist in your philosophy. Guilt is reduced to discomfort and therefore painkillers will cure it. That is degeneracy of the first order.

How can an emotion be moral or non moral, what even is it for something to be moral? — unenlightened

When we talk about moral emotions in psychology and philosophy, we understand that they are those that affect my relationship with others. In addition to guilt and shame, this often includes pride, moral outrage and so on. Defining what is moral is complicated, but this definition is operative and serves to understand us in this field.

Every emotion can be altered by the use of drugs. This is a problem in psychiatry. What are effective, what are the side effects, etc. If the use of such drugs is morally acceptable, it is to move into the realm of philosophy. I have no problem entering it. I'm very interested in it. But they are two different problems. And don't make me say what I haven't said. Have you read Brave New World? A great novel that raises the philosophical problem.

For the record, the definition of guilt and shame I have given is the one used by philosophers as well. The ones I've read, at least. Scheler, Sartre, Taylor, Wollheim, Heller, etc. It is a universally accepted distinction, unless you have an example to the contrary.

When we talk about moral emotions in psychology and philosophy, we understand that they are those that affect my relationship with others. — David Mo

In the case of the Bible the confusion is easier because it is the product of a society in which tribal pressure and morality are confused. — David Mo

So shame and guilt are moral emotions and moral emotions are those that affect relationship with others, that is to say social relations, and the bible confuses morality and and social pressure.

You are so full of arrogant shit my head has just exploded and unfortunately I will be unable to engage further.

You are so full of arrogant shit my head has just exploded and unfortunately I will be unable to engage further. — unenlightened

I'm sorry you take things that way. A debate is just a debate and not having arguments to answer is no shame. It happens to all of us sometime.

Indeed! There is no shame and we are talking about nothing.

You confuse two things: the urge to hide the malicious act and the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act. — David Mo

There is no such thing as "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act". That one's act is truly malicious is a judgement. And, every time a truly malicious act is judged to have been committed the feelings are different, and mixed. That is why you are barking up the wrong tree here. We cannot, and therefore ought not try, to create a category of feeling called "guilt", because the feelings involved with guilt are so varied and mixed up.

You can try to hide the act without any feeling of guilt because of fear of punishment. — David Mo

Do you not see how you contradict yourself? The person here has "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act", and wants to hide that act because of fear of punishment. So you say that the person does not feel guilt. Yet you have defined guilt as "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act". So the person explicitly does feel guilt. It's blatant contradiction, and that's why your declaration of a feeling called "guilt" is incoherent and unintelligible.

Guilt is the feeling of being responsible for a wrong committed on someone. — David Mo

Being responsible, is a judgement, just like guilt, it is not a feeling. So you are just persisting in the same mistake here. We judge responsibility, we do not feel it. So a judgement of responsibility will have associated with it, the same variance in feelings between fleeing from, and facing one's responsibility.

You confuse the guilty verdict in a court of law with the guilty feeling of the guilty. — David Mo

There is no such thing as the feeling of the guilty. That's what I keep trying to tell you, the guilty have a multiplicity of different feelings, so it is impossible to conclude that there is such a thing as the feeling of guilt.

Do you want restrict to this biblical example? — David Mo

We're not going to get anywhere on this issue by discussing the Bible, because it can be interpreted in many different ways.

What does Judas Iscariot feel in the Bible? He feels guilty about giving up Jesus. Yes or no?
Matt 27, 3-5. — David Mo

I don't know what Judas felt. I am not him, and I would not trust a hand-me-down account to tell me what a person felt two thousand years ago. We have no model for how human feelings may have evolved over that time period. I believe Jesus' death was a staged event, a sacrifice planned before hand, so I think Judas would have had some very mixed up emotions at the time. I think that popular translations say that Judas felt "remorse". This would mean that he regretted being in the situation he was in.

When we talk about moral emotions in psychology and philosophy, we understand that they are those that affect my relationship with others. In addition to guilt and shame, this often includes pride, moral outrage and so on. Defining what is moral is complicated, but this definition is operative and serves to understand us in this field. — David Mo

This is the heart of the problem. Defining what is moral is not complicated nor difficult. Morality involves judgements of good/bad, right/wrong, correct/incorrect. As such, we separate morality from feelings and emotions, which are not based in judgements, though they influence judgements.

You want to conflate this separation, talking about "moral emotions". This would require that we bring judgements of good and bad right into the emotions, as inherent within these emotions. But clearly this is wrong, as emotions are occurring independent of judgement, influencing one's judgement, not vise versa.

I've said this already, and I'll say it again now, we need to address the subject of "conscience". The position of conscience in relation to judgements and emotions, and it's role in the development of these, is crucial to this issue. David, you seem to have an aversion to "conscience". Do you not believe that there is such a thing? If not, how do you propose that a human being makes judgements? You seem to believe that the judgement is already inherent within the emotion (moral emotions).

Here's an example of how we might seek to position "conscience" in this discussion. Generally, people say that "shame" is an uncomfortable feeling. But I've said, in this thread, that "shame" involves a judgement that the situation is less than ideal, deprived. So I've made the same mistake which I've criticized David Mo for here, placing the judgement as inherent within the emotion. Therefore we ought to describe shame simply as the uncomfortable feeling, and associate the judgement that the uncomfortable feeling is derived from the apprehension of a deprived situation, with conscience.

This allows that the emotion "shame" arises freely, prior to, and independent from any such judgement of good or bad. Now we can look at it, and see that we've come to associate this "bad" feeling with "bad" situations, and this is our habit, so "shame" has bad connotations. The problem though is that the situation which causes shame is not necessarily a bad situation, we've only come to look at it this way through some sort of habit of generalization. If we exchange the word "shame" for "embarrassment", we can use the new word to describe the very same feeling. But now we remove the bad connotations, because embarrassment can be felt equally in good situations and bad situations.

David Mo, I'll offer you a new starting point here, a compromise, if you'll put aside your notions of moral emotions, and guilt, as a distraction, and our discussion of this as a digression. Let's say that "shame", like "embarrassment", is associated with the way that we relate ourselves to others, just like you suggested. However, we must place this relation as independent from, and prior to any judgements such as wrong or right. So we have feelings concerning our relations with others, which are not at all influenced by moral judgements. Therefore we throw away your internal feeling of guilt, and we replace this with internal feelings which are derived from perceived relations with others, feelings which are independent from such judgements of wrong or right.

I've said, in this thread, that "shame" involves a judgement that the situation is less than ideal, deprived. So I've made the same mistake which I've criticized David Mo for here, placing the judgement as inherent within the emotion. Therefore we ought to describe shame simply as the uncomfortable feeling, and associate the judgement that the uncomfortable feeling is derived from the apprehension of a deprived situation, with conscience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you were right the first time. I think every emotion is a judgement. To have an emotion is to give a damn. To call it uncomfortable is already to have judged. The judgement provides motivation - grab that fig leaf.

I cannot apprehend my emotions as judgements. They seem to be nothing more than feelings which relate to the particular situations which give rise to them. But they really do not seem to consist of any judgements concerning the situation. "Grab that fig leaf" is the judgement. The emotion provides motivation to make the judgement, but isn't itself a judgement.

Suppose I start feeling embarrassed. This feeling wells up inside me, but the feeling itself doesn't really give me any information about the situation, which a judgement concerning the situation would give me. It's just a strange feeling. If I reflect, I will see a pattern of various times when I get this same sort of feeling. When I do something which attracts attention to myself, this tends to produce embarrassment. So I can make a judgement that this sort of situation, attracting attention to myself, causes embarrassment. But I really can't see how there could be a judgement already inherent within the feeling itself.

However, since that feeling really only comes in that particular type of situation, I might admit that logically there must be some sort of judgement inherent within the feeling. Whatever it is that produces the feeling, must have made a judgement of the situation, in order to produce the same sort of feeling in similar situations. But in my experience, I do not make a conscious judgement of the situation being an embarrassing situation. The feeling just pops up, and sometimes I'm embarrassed when I least expect it, or not embarrassed when I would expect to be embarrassed. So whatever type of judgement this is, which causes the occurrence of embarrassment, it is not a conscious judgement, and that makes it awkward to even call it a judgement.

Do you not see how you contradict yourself? The person here has "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act", and wants to hide that act because of fear of punishment. So you say that the person does not feel guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

The contradiction is only in your head. It is not true that guilty is a judgement and not a feeling. The criminal that hide his crime just because he fears to be punished has no feeling of culpability, although he knows he has done something wrong. This is a very common fact between mafiosi and pathological killers. This contradict your claim that guilt is only a judgement.

There was something wrong with me. I just don’t remember being such a monster. I don’t feel evil. — Kendall Francois, serial killer

I think every emotion is a judgement. — unenlightened

This is the absurd conclusion. In fact, the argument invalidates any kind of emotion. They all involve cognitive processes. Fear, for example, also involves an assessment of the situation. I judge that I have done wrong, I judge that there is something dangerous in the situation, I judge that this is outrageous. Then there are no emotions. Neither fear, nor indignation, nor guilt, nor shame, nor love, etc. are emotions, according to your argument. An absurdity.

To say that cognitive processes are present in emotions at some point does not deny that emotion exists, only that it is a complex phenomenon that affects both mind and body.

Therefore we throw away your internal feeling of guilt, and we replace this with internal feelings which are derived from perceived relations with others, feelings which are independent from such judgements of wrong or right. — Metaphysician Undercover

No agreement is possible. All so-called moral feelings involve relationships with others and a certain sense of right and wrong. Indignation, pride, resentment, guilt, shame, etc. are different because their cause is different: the evil that I have committed, the ideal of the 'I' that I have violated, the evil that has been infringed upon another person, the harm that has been done to me, the act that others approve of, etc. Consequently they are associated with different ideas and also have different effects. Therefore, moral emotions are mental complexes that cannot be broken down, except analytically. You cannot take away "the judgment" -as you say-or the feeling that is associated with them, because they are part of that emotional complex that psychology studies.

So we can't agree on the basis of a monumental error. You pretend to invalidate all psychological studies of emotions. You don't seem to care about such a feat. I do care.

The emotion provides motivation to make the judgement, but isn't itself a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

So whatever type of judgement this is, which causes the occurrence of embarrassment, it is not a conscious judgement, and that makes it awkward to even call it a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could escape your contradictions by eliminating the term judgement. An unconscious judgment is not a judgment strictly speaking. It would be more correct to say that there is an evaluation or perception of the situation.

I cannot apprehend my emotions as judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I can sympathise. judgement is commonly considered the province of the thinker, the rational faculty. But while rationality can make the measurement, and decide which dick is bigger, it cannot decide whether bigger or smaller is better, one has to have a feeling about it.

Reason is and ought to be the slave of passion. — Hume

Which is to say that reason can tell you what's what and what's not, but only passion can make you care, and so only passion can make you act.

Suppose I start feeling embarrassed. This feeling wells up inside me, but the feeling itself doesn't really give me any information about the situation, — Metaphysician Undercover

Nor should it. It is a response to the situation; the character of the emotion directs the action which in the case of a 'negative' emotion is to change the situation in some appropriate way, eg to cover one's nakedness. Without the judgement that nakedness in this situation is 'bad', the cover-up makes no sense and would not happen. Reason alone is incapable of making such a judgement.

Philosophy has been very poor at understanding psychology because philosophers (and psychologists) like to think of themselves as ruled by reason, and studiously avoid these basic insights of Hume that lay the foundations of a clear understanding of human nature. This is what I call 'identification' and it always leads too prejudice. I like to think of myself as rational; therefore I am rational. Therefore it is rational to cover my genitals.

The contradiction is only in your head. It is not true that guilty is a judgement and not a feeling. The criminal that hide his crime just because he fears to be punished has no feeling of culpability, although he knows he has done something wrong. This is a very common fact between mafiosi and pathological killers. This contradict your claim that guilt is only a judgement. — David Mo

Exactly, the contradiction is in my head, as all contradictions are always, necessarily, in someone's head. So this does not make the contradiction any less real. The feelings I have concerning guilt are contradictory, and that is a fact.

So you again demonstrate the same contradiction here. It is nothing other than the apprehension of culpability which drives a person to hide one's own crimes. if someone did not recognize one's own actions as culpable, there would be no need to hide the action . So you are continuing with the same contradictory nonsense, to say that the person who hides one's own crimes does not feel culpability.

No agreement is possible. All so-called moral feelings involve relationships with others and a certain sense of right and wrong. Indignation, pride, resentment, guilt, shame, etc. are different because their cause is different: the evil that I have committed, the ideal of the 'I' that I have violated, the evil that has been infringed upon another person, the harm that has been done to me, the act that others approve of, etc. Consequently they are associated with different ideas and also have different effects. — David Mo

This distinction does not make any sense to me. All feelings start with "I". That is what a feeling is, something inside of me. Attempting to make a distinction between feelings which start with "I", and other feelings, is just to make a randomly arbitrary set of classifications, because all feelings start with "I". So to say that ideas associated with feelings starting with "I" are distinct from ideas associated with other feelings, is just an untenable designation.

Therefore, moral emotions are mental complexes that cannot be broken down, except analytically. — David Mo

Of course any "breaking down" is analytical only, but that does not mean we cannot make valid analysis based on sound principles. Your distinction of feelings which start with "I", and other feelings is nothing other than a breaking down, an analysis. But it is not based in sound principles.

You could escape your contradictions by eliminating the term judgement. An unconscious judgment is not a judgment strictly speaking. It would be more correct to say that there is an evaluation or perception of the situation. — David Mo

This demonstrates your continued refusal to address "conscience", and this amounts to a denial of facts. The facts are that we make judgements, and, that judgements are very closely related to feelings. Your refusal to address judgement is the "monumental error" here. You propose a division between "I" based feelings, and other feelings, when this division is nothing other than a distinction between judgement-based feelings, and non-judgement-based feelings. Now you say let's pretend that judgement is not relevant here. It is clearly you who is making pretense.

Yes, I can sympathise. judgement is commonly considered the province of the thinker, the rational faculty. But while rationality can make the measurement, and decide which dick is bigger, it cannot decide whether bigger or smaller is better, one has to have a feeling about it. — unenlightened

I'm not sure I can accept this. You are distinguishing judgement, as the measurement of does x qualify as good or bad, from the knowledge of what constitutes good and bad. I can accept this distinction, in principle. However, you then associate knowledge of good and bad with feeling, as if the difference between good and bad is something we feel rather than something which is decided by rational judgement.

What I see is that these are two distinct types of rational judgement. The knowledge of what constitutes good and bad must be given to us through rational judgement, or at least something other than through feelings or else we would not be able to judge feelings as good or bad. A good feeling would necessarily be good, and a bad feeling would necessarily be bad, and all of our judgements (measurements) as to whether something is good or bad would be based on whether the thing was producing a good feeling or bad feeling. However, ethics and moral principles are based in the assumption that we decide the essence of, or nature of, good and bad, according to rational principles, not by our feelings.

Which is to say that reason can tell you what's what and what's not, but only passion can make you care, and so only passion can make you act. — unenlightened

Now you've introduced another principle, "passion". Passion is what makes a person act, but passion is something distinct from the two forms of judgement discussed above. Knowledge of what is good and what is bad does not inspire one to act. Nor does the judgement (measurement) that a certain thing is good inspire one to act. Procrastination is an example of seeing what is good but not doing it. So we need to put "passion", which is inspiration, in a different category altogether.

Nor should it. It is a response to the situation; the character of the emotion directs the action which in the case of a 'negative' emotion is to change the situation in some appropriate way, eg to cover one's nakedness. Without the judgement that nakedness in this situation is 'bad', the cover-up makes no sense and would not happen. Reason alone is incapable of making such a judgement. — unenlightened

Sure, I see this clearly, but the problem is when the feeling inclines one toward a certain action, but the action is judged as bad, so the action must be suppressed. I cannot say that I ought to do what the feeling inclines me to do, as you seem to imply. I appeal to rational principles to over rule the feelings, and decide what I ought and ought not do, based on these principles. So the bad feeling of shame or embarrassment is telling me to coverup and fix the negative situation to make the bad feeling go away. It is inclining me toward a reflexive judgement that the situation is bad. But a rational judgement might be telling me that the bad feeling is misleading me. There is no need to coverup, I ought to suck it up and live through the bad feeling, for the sake of a higher (rational) good.

if someone did not recognize one's own actions as culpable, — Metaphysician Undercover

This sentence doesn't make sense. What is guilty is not the action but the person. I recognize myself as guilty of having done something wrong. Please submit your objection correctly written. When you've done that, we can discuss what you mean.

You are distinguishing judgement, as the measurement of does x qualify as good or bad, from the knowledge of what constitutes good and bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not made this distinction. One can rationally judge (or make a proposition, what is the same) about what is good or bad. But there is also the feeling that what I am doing is wrong, which may happen in a direct or non-reflective way, as you yourself will later acknowledge. But this is not a judgment about right or wrong, but about my action.
This has nothing to do with ethics, which is a philosophical discipline about what good means, but with the way human beings behave and feel. Psychology, if you like. Ethics can consider this as a fact, but it is not its main objective.

This distinction does not make any sense to me. All feelings start with "I". — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not spoken of " starting ", but of a type of emotion that concerns the ideal of the Self. It is shame.

This demonstrates your continued refusal to address "conscience" — Metaphysician Undercover

When did I say such a thing? The conciousness of something does not need to be reflexive. Although it often is. I'm aware that I'm being watched, without having to reflect on it.