Platonism would entail their existence independent of those objects. — Relativist

That's not correct. Platonism involves mind-independent objects. So, how does your triangle exist without consciousness?

The relations between consciousnesses seems indirect. — Relativist

Can you explain that better? For example, what does 'indirect' viz consciousness mean (subconsciousness/unconsciousness)?

That's not correct. Platonism involves mind-independent objects. So, how does your triangle exist without consciousness? — 3017amen

Mind independent ABSTRACT objects, right?

The abstraction "triangle" that exists in your brain is spatially located in your brain, so it is not the identical object located in my brain.

There are no consciousness to consciousness connections. You speak words your mind has formulated, the spoken words are transmitted through the air as sound waves, causing the other person's auditory system to react and ultimately interpret what was said.

There are no consciousness to consciousness connections. — Relativist

Then how could we use sense data to apprehend abstract triangles without consciousness?

The question remains: do immaterial objects exist? If so, what does it mean to exist? — Relativist

From a metaphysical standpoint, Charles Sanders Peirce drew a helpful distinction between reality and existence. The real is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it, while existence is reaction with other like things in the environment. Accordingly, abstractions and other immaterial objects do not exist, but some of them are nevertheless real.

Does Spider-Man exist? Do all fictions, past present, and future exist? What about possible fictions that never get authored? — Relativist

Metaphysically, Spider-Man and other fictions do not exist and are not real. However, they "exist" in logic where we redefine the scope of that term to a certain universe of discourse, rather than reality itself. Within the fictional world created by certain comic books, movies, etc. there exists an x such that x is Spider-Man; within the real world, no such x exists. On the other hand, those concrete comic books, movies, etc. obviously do exist metaphysically.

Think of time itself, as being both abstract and concrete. (Does time exist? And how does it exist, abstractly?) — 3017amen

What does it mean to say that time is somehow "both abstract and concrete"? I suggest that time is another example of something that does not exist, but is real. It is a law that governs existents, rather than an existent that reacts with other existents.

Time exists as a relation between states of affairs. I don't believe abstraction exist independently of states of affairs. — Relativist

I prefer Peirce's definition: "Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to different determinations of time." Or as he put it elsewhere: "Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence," such that "a real event" is "an existential junction of incompossible facts."

What does state of affairs mean? — 3017amen

According to Peirce, "A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it." Moreover, "A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition." As I suggested recently in another thread, every proposition signifies a state of things by attributing abstract characters to concrete things, and every true proposition signifies a fact. Again, the universe of discourse matters--e.g., it is a fact that Spider-Man wears a mask and shoots webs within the fictional Marvel world.

What does it mean to say that time is somehow "both abstract and concrete"? I suggest that time is another example of something that does not exist, but is real. It is a law that governs existents, rather than an existent that reacts with other existents. — aletheist

I think of the distinction this way:

Time as an abstract can be defined in this same abstract/paradoxical way. What we perceive we perceive as a present event-as going on now. However, when we perceive such an event, that event is no longer in the present. The actual 'present' exists only for an instant; the event becomes memory. It follows that we perceive the past to experience the present. In fact, it could be argued that the past and future truly exist, while the present is only a variable instant. To me, that whole definition/explaination is an abstract.

Time as concrete is simpler; lunar cycles, harvest season, the sundial, the clock, stop watch, etc.. It's interesting to note that the duration of time has seemingly decreased throughout history.

I think time and eternity can be seen as one in the same.

What we perceive we perceive as a present event-as going on now. — 3017amen

Peirce makes another helpful distinction between an event as a definite and entire change vs. a state of change as "indefinitely gradual"; i.e., strictly continuous. What they have in common is that both are realized only at a general determination of time (lapse), rather than at an individual determination of time (instant). For any event, the states of things at the commencement and completion of the corresponding lapse are "incompossible facts"; but during the lapse itself, neither of them is realized. The present is always just such a state of change, because various events are constantly in progress throughout the universe.

However, when we perceive such an event, that event is no longer in the present. The actual 'present' exists only for an instant; the event becomes memory. It follows that we perceive the past to experience the present. — 3017amen

I suggest instead that we directly perceive the event as it happens in the present, which again is an indefinite lapse (not a distinct instant) during which a state of change is realized. However, we then involuntarily make a perceptual judgment about the event, and this is indeed in retrospect; so all our knowledge is about the past. Peirce even defines the past as "that part of time with which memory is concerned" and the future as "that part of time with which the will is concerned," such that "Events past are recalled by memory supposing they acted on our sense; events to come are anticipated supposing they are subject to our will."

In fact, it could be argued that the past and future truly exist, while the present is only a variable instant. — 3017amen

On the contrary, using Peirce's definition, the past truly exists--it acts on us, and we react to it--but the future does not. The past is determinate, while the future is indeterminate; so the present "is plainly that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate." Likewise, the past is actuality, while the future is possibility and (conditional) necessity; so the present "is the Nascent State of the Actual."

Time as concrete is simpler; lunar cycles, harvest season, the sundial, the clock, stop watch, etc. — 3017amen

These are not real parts of time itself, but rather arbitrary intervals between states of things that are similar and regular enough for us to use them conveniently to mark and measure the passage of time.

It's interesting to note that the duration of time has seemingly decreased throughout history. — 3017amen

According to whom? What exactly does "duration" mean in this context?

It's interesting to note that the duration of time has seemingly decreased throughout history. — 3017amen

Please cite a legitimate reference. Is this claim related to the observation that time seems to pass more rapidly as we grow older? A psychological phenomenon.

To terminate this discussion let me reveal that on my desk is a small Egyptian box, 5cmX3cmX1cm, in which I keep both zero and infinity. So you have my word that, yes, they do exist. :cool:

Hey jgill!

It's really common sense. Clocks are just the way we take the abstract and make it concrete. In this case, a clock serves as a metering and measuring device that gauges change.

The other common sense part is based on history. From ancient sun dials to early Americans harvest season, to modern day atomic clocks, time has in effect, been shortened in it's perception of change.

Relativistic physics talks about "time" speeding up or slowing down depending on how fast you travel. All that changes is the speed of change from the object that travels faster or slower.

But yeah in an anecdotal way I've often wondered about that psychological phenomenon too, as to why time seems to go by faster as we age. Go figure :chin:

Clocks are just the way we take the abstract and make it concrete. — 3017amen

The clock itself is concrete, but the time that it marks and measures is still abstract, and the units by which it marks and measures time are arbitrarily defined.

From ancient sun dials to early Americans harvest season, to modern day atomic clocks, time has in effect, been shortened in it's perception of change. — 3017amen

So the duration of time itself has not decreased throughout history, only the smallest measurable unit of time; i.e., we can mark and measure time more precisely than our ancestors.

But yeah in an anecdotal way I've often wondered about that psychological phenomenon too, as to why time seems to go by faster as we age. — 3017amen

My longstanding hypothesis about this is that as each day passes, it becomes a smaller and smaller fraction of one's entire lifespan. One year out of ten is a sizable chunk, but one year out of fifty--not so much.

From a metaphysical standpoint, Charles Sanders Peirce drew a helpful distinction between reality and existence. The real is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it, while existence is reaction with other like things in the environment. Accordingly, abstractions and other immaterial objects do not exist, but some of them are nevertheless real. — aletheist

Hypothetically, suppose there are 2 "universes" (A and B), the products of independent big bangs, but separated by sufficient space (or dimensionally) that they are causally independent of one another. From A's perspective, does B exist? Is B real?

From A's perspective, does B exist? — Relativist

I am inclined to say no, since there is nothing in B that reacts with anything in A.

Is B real? — Relativist

I am inclined to say yes, since B is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

That seems problematic, since it makes existence relative, and both A and B have being.

The clock itself is concrete, but the time that it marks and measures is still abstract, and the units by which it marks and measures time are arbitrarily defined. — aletheist

Yep, agreed!!

So the duration of time itself has not decreased throughout history, only the smallest measurable unit of time; i.e., we can mark and measure time more precisely than our ancestors. — aletheist

Yep, but don't forget, as I suggested, it's the perception of it, that has changed. Of course, that begs other questions relative to sense data viz consciousness... . In other words, time appears to be just an illusion. Yet another mystery in life!

My longstanding hypothesis about this is that as each day passes, it becomes a smaller and smaller fraction of one's entire lifespan. One year out of ten is a sizable chunk, but one year out of fifty--not so much. — aletheist

Ha, yeah. I often thought of it that way too, only kind of like a cone that narrows. However, that cone that is narrowing, must indeed either be a subconscious/conscious phenomena.., or perhaps the quality of one's life gets better with time thus making time seem to go by faster... .

That seems problematic, since it makes existence relative, and both A and B have being. — Relativist

No, it simply maintains the definition of existence as reaction with other things in the environment. Existence is a special kind of reality, which is a special kind of being. Everything that exists is real, but there are realities that do not exist (e.g., some abstractions); and everything that is real has being, but there are beings that are not real (e.g., fictions).

Sure, but intuitively - A and B have equal, independent ontological status, and his approach doesn't seem to acknowledge that. Instead, it treats that alternate universe the same as an abstraction -real but not existing.

The point is that what exists for us is whatever can react with us. If it is utterly impossible for B to react with us, then we have no basis for claiming that B exists.

I suggest instead that we directly perceive the event as it happens in the present, which again is an indefinite lapse (not a distinct instant) during which a state of change is realized. However, we then involuntarily make a perceptual judgment about the event, and this is indeed in retrospect; so all our knowledge is about the past. Peirce even defines the past as "that part of time with which memory is concerned" and the future as "that part of time with which the will is concerned," such that "Events past are recalled by memory supposing they acted on our sense; events to come are anticipated supposing they are subject to our will — aletheist

I take no exception to Peirce's view or philosophy there (particularly since he is a close relative of James-pragmatism, ha). However, I'm not totally on-board with his esoteric definition of metaphysics...but like his thoughts and connection to the Will there. Thanks for sharing.
What is your take on his Objective Idealism?

On the contrary, using Peirce's definition, the past truly exists--it acts on us, and we react to it--but the future does not. The past is determinate, while the future is indeterminate; so the present "is plainly that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate." Likewise, the past is actuality, while the future is possibility and (conditional) necessity; so the present "is the Nascent State of the Actual." — aletheist

Not sure I agree with him there. How is that so? Is he saying that it is not reasonable, through induction, that the sun will rise tomorrow?

These are not real parts of time itself, but rather arbitrary intervals between states of things that are similar and regular enough for us to use them conveniently to mark and measure the passage of time. — aletheist

Yep, agreed!

According to whom? What exactly does "duration" mean in this context? — aletheist

I covered that in the previous post, I think, thanks again aletheist for sharing.

However, I'm not totally on-board with his esoteric definition of metaphysics. — 3017amen

I am not sure what you mean by "his esoteric definition of metaphysics." For Peirce, "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being." Accordingly, "Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities and things together." These three modes of being correspond respectively to abstract characters as denoted by general terms, concrete things as denoted by quantified variables, and prescissive facts as signified by propositions.

What is your take on his Objective Idealism? — 3017amen

I find it persuasive. "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws," such that "what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits." Physical motion is thus a degenerate form of psychical thought or semeiosis. "Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible."

Is he saying that it is not reasonable, through induction, that the sun will rise tomorrow? — 3017amen

No, it is a reasonable but fallible prediction based on our knowledge of the real laws that govern existents. Propositions about the future are more appropriately stated as subjunctive conditionals--if the relevant circumstances were to remain unchanged, then the sun would rise tomorrow.

Thanks aletheist. Okay, but with respect to infinity, how does that square with the common paradox of past present and future? I thought you said that he denied future tense.

Or maybe he's thinking that everything is a subjective illusion... which on the surface I would have no quarrel with, viz the abstracts of time.

Okay, but with respect to infinity, how does that square with the common paradox of past present and future? — 3017amen

Again, I am not sure what exactly you have in mind here. How would you succinctly summarize "the common paradox of past present and future"?

I thought you said that he denied future tense. — 3017amen

I said that the future does not exist because it is indeterminate; i.e., nothing in the future is actual, it is either possible or (conditionally) necessary, which are two sides of the same modal coin. That is why I rephrased your declarative proposition in future tense as a subjunctive conditional. Among the popular modern theories of time, Peirce's view seems closest to the "growing block universe."

Or maybe he's thinking that everything is a subjective illusion. — 3017amen

Definitely not; again, there are realities which are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it.

Definitely not; again, there are realities which are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. — aletheist

Okay, that's what I thought. And so it begs the question of why. Meaning, in the context of the paradoxical concept of time/infinity, why does he make past and future tense mutually exclusive? He's embracing past tense as reality, yet denies future tense as reality, right?

Simple example: If someone on the west coast is making a call to someone on the east coast, are they not talking to someone in the future? What would Peirce say?

Sorry for all the questions, I'm sure I'm just missing something obvious there...

said that the future does not exist because it is indeterminate; — aletheist

There are components of the future that are determinate, for example: the positions of the planets with respect to the sun, at this exact time tomorrow. Does this determinacy mean it exists?

He's embracing past tense as reality, yet denies future tense as reality, right? — 3017amen

No, this conflates reality with existence. The past exists, because it is determinate; the future does not (yet) exist, because it is indeterminate. However, there are real possibilities and real (conditional) necessities in the future, just no real actualities. The present is when some of those future possibilities and necessities become past actualities. The "arrow of time" reflects how the universe is proceeding from an ideal state of complete indeterminacy at the hypothetical commencement of all time, when everything would have been in the future, toward an ideal state of complete determinacy at the hypothetical completion of all time, when everything would be in the past.

If someone on the west coast is making a call to someone on the east coast, are they not talking to someone in the future? — 3017amen

No, both of them are talking to each other in the present. The difference in their spatial locations has no bearing on their temporal relation. The fact that an east coast clock reads three hours later than a west coast clock is an arbitrary convention of how we mark and measure time, and reflects nothing about the real nature of time itself.

No, this conflates reality with existence. The past exists, because it is determinate; the future does not (yet) exist, because it is indeterminate. — aletheist

Ah, this is where Peirce is wrong. In theoretical physics, determinism/indeterminism relates to causation, not time or infinity, as in our case. The common example of indeterminacy there is the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle.

No, both of them are talking to each other in the present. The difference in their spatial locations has no bearing on their temporal relation. The fact that an east coast clock reads three hours later than a west coast clock is an arbitrary convention of how we mark and measure time, and reflects nothing about the real nature of time itself. — aletheist

Well, if that were true, then in reality, one would not be able to call anyone in any other time zone. But since we are capable of such, Peirce's philosophy appears flawed.

And so, all you can say there is that the past and future are, once again, abstract illusions. But the paradox presents itself when one tries, like apparently Pierce has tried, to deny any one of them. He's trying to make the reality of time and its tenses mutually exclusive.

He should accept both as abstracts, but more importantly, much like in the video (I had posted), past present and future is just an abstract. In other words, he should accept reality of future tense, but can relegate it to an abstract illusion.

There are components of the future that are determinate, for example: the positions of the planets with respect to the sun, at this exact time tomorrow. Does this determinacy mean it exists? — Relativist

Peirce's view was that nothing in the future is strictly determinate; i.e., he rejected determinism, which he usually called necessitarianism, instead embracing the reality of absolute chance. Again, it is better to say that if the relevant circumstances were to remain unchanged, then the planets would appear in certain positions with respect to the sun at a specified time tomorrow.

Ah, this is where Peirce is wrong. In theoretical physics, determinism/indeterminism relates to causation, not time or infinity, as in our case. — 3017amen

No, this is a category mistake. We are talking about philosophy--specifically, logic and metaphysics--not theoretical physics.

Well, if that were true, then in reality, one would not be able to call anyone in any other time zone. But since we are capable of such, Peirce's philosophy appears flawed. — 3017amen

Nonsense, time zones are arbitrary human constructs for marking and measuring time. The east coast is not three hours in the future relative to the west coast.

And so, all you can say there is that the past and future are, once again, abstract illusions. But the paradox presents itself when one tries, like apparently Pierce has tried, to deny any one of them. He's trying to make the reality of time and its tenses mutually exclusive. — 3017amen

I have no idea what you mean by any of this. If all past actualities exist, and some future possibilities and necessities are real, then neither past nor future is an abstract illusion. Again, what specific paradox do you have in mind? How is Peirce denying the past or the future? On the contrary, he is simply recognizing how they are different. If you want to insist that they are exactly the same, then we obviously disagree about that.

In other words, he should accept reality of future tense, but can relegate it to an abstract illusion. — 3017amen

If something is an abstract illusion, then by definition it is not a reality.

That seems to suggest he did not believe there are laws of nature, because these entail necessitation. Perhaps he had a Humean view of regularities rather than law.

That seems to suggest he did not believe there are laws of nature, because these entail necessitation. — Relativist

On the contrary, Peirce consistently affirmed the reality of laws of nature, although he held that they have evolved and are still evolving; and again, due to the reality of absolute chance, they are not strictly exceptionless.