Thats what I would consider a principal based ethic (“dont do this”), which I addressed in the OP.
Ok, so unintentional consequences...where do we put them on ethical scales here? Thats a good question.
I think intention is a determinate factor in judging right and wrong, in the sense that a certain threshold of due diligence is being met. As long as the person has met that threshold (aren't being totally thoughtless or grossly ignorant of the consequences of their actions) then we dont need to put those unintended consequences on our ethical scale.

I dont know what to tell you. I disagree that any structures I used meets the minimum necessary requirements to be considered a mathematical model and therefore subject to any other mathematical parameters. Even you used the word “approximate”, which is hardly sufficient for you to then smuggle in the other mathematical parameters such as a scalar metric.

So, can we pay off moral debt? Are we moral simply by having our moral acts (and all the good they do) outweigh the immoral acts (and all the bad they do)?
(Also, I realise good acts can have bad results and vice versa, I think we can cross that bridge when we come to it, which we very well may not have to) — DingoJones

We can pay off moral debt and i do believe wrong doing can be quantified monetarily. However I believe forgiveness even drastic forgiveness is entirely necessary for a functional society. Most organizations are unqualified to quantify wrong doing in monetary terms, but that is not to say it is completely impossible. I feel that to say wrong doing is unquantifiable either makes wrong doing trivial or it makes money completely trivial.

...you realise my use of the word “debt” is metaphorical, right?

Correct. Did i miss something? I'll reread what you wrote. I skimmed it the first time.

Im interested in some thoughts concerning how moral/immoral actions balance out.
When we judge a person as moral or immoral, it seems to me that we are measuring his moral actions against his immoral ones. We consider the act, its consequences, collateral benefit or damage and how it all fits morally speaking. An ethical cost/benefit analysis if you will.
If a person commits theft but regrets in it for some reason and spends the rest of their life giving most of what they have to charity (not necessarily a formal one, could just be to people he meets who are in need or whatever) then he has worked off some kind of moral debt. We might even say the person has paid their moral debt and has a surplus, moral credit, if they ended up with a huge imbalance of moral acts over immoral ones. (For example, stole a pack of gum but saved millions of lives and donated billions of dollars to charity)
If we can measure the moral balance in this way, I dont see any reason why even heinous acts of immorality couldnt be balanced out in the same way as my stick of gum example above. This is where Id like to be challenged, as Im not very comfortable with that conclusion.

The most obvious objection to that line of reasoning is principal based, that breaking the rules is breaking the rules and no action can justifiably balance another. Thats a more fundamental issue, I dont really buy into principle based ethics. For every principal, its trivially easy to show an instance where adhering to that principal is the act of a moral monster. For example, its wrong to lie. Well, what if the lie saves a billion people? The person who refuses to lie in that instance, is a moral monster. The only way to get around that contradiction is to make yet another appeal to principal, or commit semantic fallacy where the acts are considered separately (the lie was still wrong, the saving was right).

Id most like to discuss the first bit, but I recognise that it relies on a non-principal based approach to ethics. Perhaps someone would be sporting enough to consider this thread in the context of a non-principal based approach, even if they do not normally do so.

Anyway, what Im not interested in discussing is the objectivity/subjectivity of morality. This discussion doesnt require it and if you think it does then Im sorry to say Im not talking to you. (By which I mean, ignore this thread as its not addressed to you.)

So, can we pay off moral debt? Are we moral simply by having our moral acts (and all the good they do) outweigh the immoral acts (and all the bad they do)?
(Also, I realise good acts can have bad results and vice versa, I think we can cross that bridge when we come to it, which we very well may not have to) — DingoJones

yeah i should have read the whole thing. Yeah you are completely right with this post. Sorry.

No problem. :)

In order to talk about "balancing" moral actions, you need to somehow quantify the moral weight, or worth of actions, to be able to compare, add and subtract these quantities and to evaluate their cumulative magnitude. This basically describes a metric over the set of moral actions. I am not sure why you object to this characterization.

Anyway, my objection is not that your proposal has the structure of a metric - after all, any theory has a structure of one sort or another, and there is nothing inherently wrong with a metric structure. My objection, or rather my query is very simple: Why this theory? It has some intuitive appeal, but it also has objectionable implications. Is there something about this theory that makes the price worth paying? I suspect that you may be led by implicit assumptions (namely, that there must be something like a metric of moral worth) or seduced by the elegance and simplicity of this theory. I may be wrong, but so far you have shed little light on your motivations.

Actions can be judged on their merits, people can be judged on their tendencies to behave a certain way, and their past actions can be evidence of their tendencies, but the merits of peoples past actions don’t directly accumulate in a way relevant to the judgement of a person. That that is a category error assumed by the OP was my point.

You said:
“DingoJones This assumes a scalar metric of moral action that accumulates and follows the usual arithmetic rules. Why assume that?“

I didnt make that assumption. You are reframing what Im saying as a “scalar metric of moral action that accumulates and follows the usual arithmetic rules.” and then asking me why I went with a “scalar metric of moral action that accumulates and follows the normal arithmetic rules”. I didnt, you just said I did.
The reason why this is a sticking point for me is because your reframing explicitly imposes a set of rules (“arithmetic rules”) on the expression of my views, but thats just your reframing of it. I didnt assume that framing, you did.
If thats your only query, then I feel like its been answered now. Not much more for me to add so your welcome to the last word.

Ah, ok. In what way did I make a category error? Which categories?

Actions are not people, and each category of things has its own kind of judgement. Actions tell you something about a person, but accumulated action-judgements don’t add up to a person-judgement.

A person has few options.

Either one grows as a moral being, meaning at one point one will reflect and be confronted with their past actions and thoughts, and may come to regret some of them. Thereby one is doing their own penance through regret.

Or one stagnates as a moral being, meaning one does not reflect upon their actions. One would not grow wise or learn the nature of love.

Either way one does penance.

Im not treating them like they are the same thing, Im referencing one to gain information about the other. You dont think a persons past actions should be considered in moral judgements? Hitler is helping at a soup kitchen, you just have to conclude he’s a good person even if you know his history?

No, my point is just that it’s not as mathematical as that. It’s not like good deeds add up and bad deeds subtract and that just gives you a score by which to judge a person. Past deeds are evidence of a person’s character, but it’s possible that someone could do many horrible deeds and then undergo something that changes their character going forward, and that should be accounted for even before they being doing good deeds. Or someone could cause horrendous harm as a consequence of a small character flaw and awful moral luck, in which case the amount of harm doesn’t reflect on their character. The point is just that judgements of actions don’t linearly add up to judgements of character, especially not in a way that someone can have moral credit that they are then permitted to spend. Past actions are just a part of the evidence by which to judge someone’s present character.

Ok, I think I understand you now.

can we pay off moral debt? — DingoJones

If the only connection between two acts is that they are committed by the same person, it makes no sense to talk about debt and cancellation of debt.

If you do something bad against someone and then something good towards the same person, he may feel that you have made up for your bad behavior. Or if the good act was directed at his child or another relation, that may amount to the same thing.

Or you may assume that the bad deed was directed at God, then any good deed would also concern God. That, however, would be a theological question.

There is no logical reason why a bad act would increase the demand for a good act. You should do good regardless and even if you have already done good, that is no reason to stop.

There may however be emotional reasons, a personal way of doing repentance and no one has the right to argue against that. Sure, if the good deed makes you feel better, do it. After all, you should do it anyway.

But to talk about debt and pay back, both creditor and debtor need to be identical, i.e. if A harms B, A must later benefit B (and not C or D)

Im interested in some thoughts concerning how moral/immoral actions balance out. — DingoJones

If a person commits theft but regrets in it for some reason and spends the rest of their life giving most of what they have to charity (not necessarily a formal one, could just be to people he meets who are in need or whatever) then he has worked off some kind of moral debt. We might even say the person has paid their moral debt and has a surplus, moral credit, if they ended up with a huge imbalance of moral acts over immoral ones. (For example, stole a pack of gum but saved millions of lives and donated billions of dollars to charity) — DingoJones

So, can we pay off moral debt? — DingoJones

In my impression, the principle of karma in Buddhism works pretty much like you describe. It is considered to be some kind of accounting system across lives.

You suffer in this life for immoralities committed previously in this life, or in a previous life. If you commit new immoralities, you will suffer later in this life, or in a later life. Conversely, you will experience happiness later in this life, or in a later life, for your good deeds.

I am not sure that it necessarily balances out.

Your bad deeds get gradually written off as you suffer for them, but I am not sure that you can merely perform good deeds to reduce your future suffering. Perhaps, you can only write off your bad karma by suffering alone. A Buddhist monk could better clarify the details of how karma works.

Other religions simplify the same idea to merely carrying over good and bad deeds to the rest of your life, and the outstanding balance to the next life, with no reference to previous lives.

But to talk about debt and pay back, both creditor and debtor need to be identical, i.e. if A harms B, A must later benefit B (and not C or D) — Congau

B would be the “we” I mentioned in my OP. This is about humans judging humans.

But to talk about debt and pay back, both creditor and debtor need to be identical, i.e. if A harms B, A must later benefit B (and not C or D)
— Congau

B would be the “we” I mentioned in my OP. This is about humans judging humans. — DingoJones

We have to be dealing with the same consciousness to decide if the compensation is appropriate since there is no objective way to measure it. Say someone takes a human life, what would be an appropriate pay-back to mankind? What good deed could in any real since make up for this bad deed?

The law stipulates a certain punishment for murder, but that’s entirely arbitrary (punishment differs between various times and places). You may have an individual feeling about approximately what punishment would be right for a crime, but that can’t be reached by means of logic. What should be the punishment for murder? Capital punishment, life in prison, twenty years in prison, a million dollars? You may have a feeling about it, but it’s just a feeling. There’s no direct correspondence between killing and deprivation of liberty. Likewise, it would be impossible to decide on the correct compensation for murder.

On the other hand, the individual who is hurt by a crime could at some point declare that he is satisfied with the compensation. What could be the compensation for a punch on the jaw? A thousand dollars? A handshake? Since it is subjective, only the person involved can decide.

Objective/subjective is irrelevant. However you think of morality or the basis of morality doesnt matter, im asking about what those judgements would be.
You are still responding as though “B” is a person, but Ive already told you what “B” is. The specific judgements for what good compensates for what bad is getting ahead of the question. Does the principal of paying off moral debt this way make sense to start with? If we then determine that its sound in principal then we can talk about what kind of trade-offs make the most sense. (And subjective/objective basis of morality still doesnt matter).

So, can we pay off moral debt? Are we moral simply by having our moral acts (and all the good they do) outweigh the immoral acts (and all the bad they do)? — DingoJones

I don't believe in moral debt, per se. But I think as an analogy or metaphor it kinda works.

People here are suggesting that doing right all your life doesn't entitle you to suddenly murder anyone. True.

However, let's say you have a close loved one who's always had your back and they suddenly wrong you somehow, you're much more likely to refer to their previous goodness as a reason to forgive them (depending on the severity of the wrong, I suppose) than you would some stranger or not close acquaintance.

But as @Pfhorrest suggests, this is probably more due to our relative certainty that the loved one will not continue bad acts and the lesser known person might.

I think doing good things to "make up" for a bad deed aren't thus so much a way to eradicate "debt" as much as a way to prove regret, remorse, and reformation.

People here are suggesting that doing right all your life doesn't entitle you to suddenly murder anyone. True. — Artemis

What if you steal a pack of gum, but spend the rest of your life doing nothing but right to make up for it? Do we forgive the stolen pack of gum?

But as Pfhorrest suggests, this is probably more due to our relative certainty that the loved one will not continue bad acts and the lesser known person might. — Artemis

Sure, there would be instances where thats the case but Im asking about those circumstances where thats not the case, where its a member of society judged by the rest of society.

I think doing good things to "make up" for a bad deed aren't thus so much a way to eradicate "debt" as much as a way to prove regret, remorse, and reformation. — Artemis

Ok, so a few questions here. Is that in all cases, that you can never “make up” for a bad deed? (You steal a pack of gum, then replace the pack of gum plus work the store for free for a few weeks).
Does “making up” actually prove regret or remorse (morally speaking)? It seems like you could have other motivations, selfish or immoral ones.

So, can we pay off moral debt? Are we moral simply by having our moral acts (and all the good they do) outweigh the immoral acts (and all the bad they do)? — DingoJones

There is an interesting application of this idea with regards to punishment. We could consider punishment for past actions, like a jail sentence, a way of repaying a moral debt. You have incurred a debt by taking away someone's rights in some way, and now you pay for that by giving up some of your rights. Thus, the balance is re-established, albeit with everyone worse off.

If you could magically make Hitler into a good person (as in someone who will for sure do good going forward), his past misdeeds would not carry any weight on the appropriate moral judgement of him anymore. — Pfhorrest

That reminds me of another issue that gets debated concerning punishment: is it actually moral to change who someone is for the benefit of others? Not to encourage them to change, but to threaten them with (harsher) punishment if they don't?

If you could magically change Hitler into a good person, would you be destroying the previous Hitler, and would that be right?

There is an interesting application of this idea with regards to punishment. We could consider punishment for past actions, like a jail sentence, a way of repaying a moral debt. You have incurred a debt by taking away someone's rights in some way, and now you pay for that by giving up some of your rights. Thus, the balance is re-established, albeit with everyone worse off. — Echarmion

Sure, thats why they say former prisoners have payed their debt to society. I had in mind a moral sense of it though, but yes in principal its the same idea.

If hh could magically change Hitler into a good person, would you be destroying the previous Hitler, and would that be right — Echarmion

Yes. :rofl:

Is that a Hitler specific thing? What if me zap guys like Trump, Duterte or Orban with the nicening ray?

No, the principle of paying off moral debt doesn’t make sense even to start with, and the reason is what I have been trying to convey: There is no correspondence between the original transgression and the presumed reimbursement.

Whatever is paid back, most be paid back in kind, or else it just isn’t real. If you steal a hundred dollars, you can pay back a hundred dollars and at least there is some logical correspondence between crime and compensation. But when paying back in an unconvertible currency so to speak, there’s no way to reach satisfaction.

Let’s say you slap someone on the cheek and then pay a million dollars in compensation. The insult seems small and the compensation enormous, but since there is no correspondence between the two you have in no way erased the original insult. (The offended party may happily accept the compensation, but you’re right that that’s not the point). The insult stays and will stay there forever whatever you do.

You seem to imply in your argumentation that you can morally commit any immoral act as long as you pay back somehow, and that it is as if the bad thing you did never happened. No, what was bad remains bad. If you kill someone’s child and later save the world, that child will still be gone.

I think a terrible person can be reformed and even redeemed. I don’t think this is the case for everyone, though. As examples, Ghengis Khan and Adolf Hitler. They could never “erase” the harm they did. It is up to others to make a better world in spite of their evil.

Mike Tyson was convicted of rape. A horrible crime. I believe he can be reformed and redeemed. I don’t know enough about his life to say whether or not he has been, though. — Noah Te Stroete

Hitler was bad, however Ghengis Khan did alot of good. Many of the nations he conquered were known for raping women, murdering people and oppressing the poor. That is a very overly simplistic analysis of Ghengis Khan. The people Temujin conquered were terrible and attrocius people. Perhaps it was evil conquering evil. The poor weren't any worse off under Ghengis Khan. Look up the history of religions originating out of Saudi Arabia and their relationship to rape.

No, the principle of paying off moral debt doesn’t make sense even to start with, and the reason is what I have been trying to convey: There is no correspondence between the original transgression and the presumed reimbursement. — Congau

Yes there is, it corresponds to whatever satisfies as reimbursement. This would be true even if I was talking about the individual, which Im not.

Whatever is paid back, most be paid back in kind, or else it just isn’t real. If you steal a hundred dollars, you can pay back a hundred dollars and at least there is some logical correspondence between crime and compensation. But when paying back in an unconvertible currency so to speak, there’s no way to reach satisfaction. — Congau

Thats just not true, people reach satisfaction over moral transgressions all the time. They do so regardless of this strict mathematical calculation you claim must be present. The currency may seem unconvertible to you but people get by just fine without it.

You seem to imply in your argumentation that you can morally commit any immoral act as long as you pay back somehow, and that it is as if the bad thing you did never happened. No, what was bad remains bad. If you kill someone’s child and later save the world, that child will still be gone. — Congau

Its not that it never happened, or that reality (the child being gone) would change somehow, its about the moral measure of that person. The bad actions are still bad and the good actions still good as you say, but Im not asking whether the bad actions are considered good somehow based on good action. im asking about the balance, about how the good and bad measure against each other.
We dont judge someones moral worth on whether they’ve did 1 good thing or 1 bad thing, we take account of both and weigh them against one another. I dont think thats controversial.