This is a greedy reduction. The use of the word God isn't determined solely by its attachment to a private sensation; it's rather that when someone senses such a presence, it is attributed to God. Just like the word "tree"'s use isn't determined by "I see this tree" when functioning as a basic belief. — fdrake

You and I both see the rainbow. The use of the word "rainbow" isn't determined solely by its attachment to a private sensation; it's rather that when someone senses such a presence, it is attributed to the rainbow.

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "God" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what God is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "God". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a God is only by looking at his God. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "God" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

Yeah that was directed at creativesoul in defense of your side.

It was for you, too.

You can have "propositional content" in your mind without having any words to mean by it. You can have, as I phrase it, an "attitude toward an idea" (a picture in your mind held to be in a certain relation to the world), which is what a proposition is, without yet having words with which to communicate that to someone else. — Pfhorrest

...if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

Seems to me that you and Wittgenstein are not too far apart here. At least, that would be so if you agree that there are uses for language that are not an "attitude toward an idea", a "object and designation".

I think that we should believe in religious tolerance. What's your view? — frank

Sure. Believe what you like

But if you espouse your beliefs in a public forum such as this, don't complain about the critique.


Edit: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7746/my-belief-system

To state what a belief is, you have to put it into a sentence with a subject/predicate form. So whether or not beliefs are propositional, you have to say them in so they sound as if they're propositional.

Propositions are not words. Propositions are the things that words mean. — Pfhorrest

Many others share this view... this use of the term "proposition". This is not the thread to criticize it, but it's wrong on several levels, including but not limited to what belief and meaning are.

I'll say this much...

"Tree" is a word. It refers to trees. Trees are what "trees" means. Trees are not propositions.

To state what a belief is, you have to put it into a sentence with a subject/predicate form. So whether or not beliefs are propositional, you have to say them in so they sound as if they're propositional. — Pneumenon

Yes.

Hence, any belief can be stated; and if it cannot be stated it is not a belief.

To state what a belief is...

Belief does not require being stated.

...any belief can be stated; and if it cannot be stated it is not a belief. — Banno

It only follows that Jack has no beliefs. You and I both know that that's not right.

To state what Mt Everest is, you have to put it into a sentence with a subject/predicate form.

:brow:

Whenever we get into a discussion, this comes up again.

Tedium ensues.

To state what Mt Everest is, you have to put it into a sentence with a subject/predicate form. — creativesoul

My mouth is too small.

It can be said that there is God. It can be said there is no God. Rainbows and Psyche likewise. And allowing for context, there need be no contradiction.
— unenlightened

So while psychology might have something to say here, philosophy remains irrelevant, or silent. — Banno

Psyche and Sophia are equally divine. If you ask the gods whether they believe in god, you are liable to get as biased an answer as if you ask a mortal whether they believe in the self.

Indeed. And...

To state what your mouth is, you have to put it into a sentence with a subject/predicate form...

Therefore your mouth has propositional content and/or form or it's not a mouth.

Whenever we get into a discussion, this comes up again.

Tedium ensues. — Banno

Yes. Philosophy done well is work... and quite often it is of the tedious variety.

Witt's quip is perfectly applicable in situations where some belief of an individual is claimed to be ineffable by the individual. If it cannot be stated by the individual, then it is not a well formed belief of the individual. They cannot know what it is that they're talking about. They know that they do not have a good enough grasp to be able to speak clearly about it. What is known can be stated clearly.

I'm clearly stating that not all belief has propositional content.

All belief consists of correlations. All predication consists of correlation. All statements. All sentences. All naming and descriptive practices. All interjection. All exclamation. All interrogation. Etc.

Our knowledge of this correlational content is the bridge between the ineffable(Jack cannot state his own beliefs) and the effable(we can clearly know and thus state what all belief consists of, including what Jack's belief consists of). Prior to common language use, all belief consists of correlations drawn between different directly perceptible things.

That is what facilitates all language use, creation, and acquisition.

I know, right?

It's kind of fishy. :wink:

My conclusion, is that if you have a belief in God, then it requires a good epistemological justification. It's a cop out to think that such a belief doesn't require such a justification. — Sam26

Epistemological justifications require inter-subjective corroboration. The existence of a tree can easily be so corroborated. Can the existence of God?

Epistemological justifications require inter-subjective corroboration. The existence of a tree can easily be so corroborated. Can the existence of God? — Janus

Can the existence of beauty, of any value, of oases and mirages, of rainbows, of other minds, of one's own mind? Let's eliminate from the discussion anything that cannot be so corroborated; the discussion will be short indeed.

Epistemological justifications require inter-subjective corroboration. — Janus

Explain this statement, I don't follow.

Can the existence of beauty, of any value, of oases and mirages, of rainbows, of other minds, of one's own mind? Let's eliminate from the discussion anything that cannot be so corroborated; the discussion will be short indeed. — unenlightened

Perceptions of beauty, belief in values, perceptions of oases, mirages and rainbows, the ideas of one's own and others' minds all obviously exist, as do ideas of and beliefs in God.

Not everyone will perceive beauty, believe in any particular values or believe in God. Everyone will see oases, mirages and rainbows and trees if the conditions are right.

So what kind of further existence do beauty, values and God have? Would they exist absent human perceptual experience? Is there anything there which would reliably appear to all percipients as beauty, value or God, as there is in the case of oases, mirages, rainbows and trees, in other words?

"Properly basic belief" can be construed in a myriad of ways.

It is a name that is used to talk about a plurality of different things. This thread bears witness. All such constructions are linguistic ones. That is, all our linguistic constructs are existentially dependent upon language use. I think we all agree here. The name "properly basic belief" is itself existentially dependent upon common language use, it is the result thereof. All naming practices are language use.

So,"properly basic belief" is a name of our own arbitrary choosing. Like all naming practices, "properly basic belief" is used as a means to pick individual things out of the world to the exclusion of all others. The name always has a referent. The referent is not always the same. There are different senses(accepted uses) of the name. Some of those pick out that which is existentially dependent upon language. Some do not.

The difference is imperative to our understanding.

If a properly basic belief is not existentially dependent upon language, then it can consist of nothing that is. Statements cannot be properly basic by this criterion. Propositions, propositional form, and propositional content cannot be properly basic by this criterion.

Belief in God is most certainly existentially dependent upon language use. So, if we are to claim that belief in God is properly basic, then properly basic beliefs need not be the first ones, they need not be the basis of all others, they need not be the most basic ones...

Then why call them "properly basic"?

Justifications for beliefs or for what one thinks (about what one perceives, for example) are only relevant in an inter-subjective context.

Such justifications rely upon some form of reliable corroboration. Can there be any reliable inter-subjective corroboration for the existence of God?

Perceptions of beauty, belief in values, perceptions of oases, mirages and rainbows, the ideas of one's own and others' minds all obviously exist, — Janus

Intersubjectively confirmed perceptions? That's a novelty!

Properly basic beliefs can be given linguistic form, but they cannot be dependent on language use. The difficulty then is to explain how the jump is made from pre-linguistic intuition to linguistic formulation. We can say that the linguistic formulations of what might be considered to be "properly basic beliefs" find their foundations in pre-linguistic "seeing". but that is not the same as to say that the former are rationally justified by the latter.

It is obviously reasonable to think that such perceptions exist because their existence is inter-subjectively corroborated in the sense that everyone will agree that such things are experienced. What did you think I meant?

from Plantinga

...so far as I know, no one has developed and articulated any other reason for supposing that belief in God is not properly basic...

If what counts as properly basic belief includes the first ones, the rudimentary ones, the most simple and basic ones, then belief in God quite simply cannot count. That's more conclusion than supposition.

Of course, I reject the targets of Plantinga's criticisms of the classical and other conventional foundationalist criteria for properly basic belief for reasons that are not in line with Platinga, but are in direct line with my critique thereof. I reject his for the same reasons I reject theirs.

Properly basic beliefs can be given linguistic form, but they cannot be dependent on language use. The difficulty then is to explain how the jump is made from pre-linguistic intuition to linguistic formulation. We can say that the linguistic formulations of what might be considered to be "properly basic beliefs" find their foundations in pre-linguistic "seeing". but that is not the same as to say that the former are rationally justified by the latter. — Janus

I wouldn't argue for and/or defend my position like that, but I do not think that we're too far apart in general.

I think the best path here is methodological in that we must first come up with an acceptable and adequate criterion for what counts as "belief". I've done that. Then and only then can we expect to make sense of the further subsequent qualifications of "basic" and "properly basic" as kinds of belief.

Basic belief must be of the simplest variety. Basics always come first. It makes no sense whatsoever to say otherwise. Doing so renders the notions of basic and complex utterly meaningless.

Basic belief must be of the simplest variety/kind. All kinds consist of correlations. Basic correlations would be drawn by a creature capable of drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things; the simplest correlations possible.

Perhaps the criterion could be adjusted - 'loosened up a bit' as it were - so as to be something like... the simplest variety/kind of belief adequate for serving as strong and/or reliable ground for some conclusion(more complex belief) or another. This loosening would permit some properly basic belief to be existentially dependent upon language, while also having no issue accounting for those that are not.

This would add some practical consideration.

So what kind of further existence do beauty, values and God have? Would they exist absent human perceptual experience? Is there anything there which would reliably appear to all percipients as beauty, value or God, as there is in the case of oases, mirages, rainbows and trees, in other words? — Janus

The notion of "further existence" is fraught.

A better question: What do beauty, values, and God consist in and/or of? Are they things that exist in their entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices?

Do those names pick out individual things that exist in their entirety prior to the namesake?

This loosening would permit some properly basic belief to be existentially dependent upon language, while also having no issue accounting for those that are not. — creativesoul

OK, so I had said that I think basic beliefs (in order to count as basic) must be pre-linguistically formed and may or may not be articulated. You seem to be saying that some basic beliefs are not pre-linguistically formed. Could you give an example of such a belief?