The notion of "further existence" is fraught. — creativesoul

I can't see why it is fraught. All I meant by anything having "further existence" is existence beyond merely human experience or perception of the thing in question; what we might think of as some kind of independent existence in other words. So a tree has "further existence" in this sense.

Freud said that psychotics love their delusions as themselves, and that philosophers have that same kind of relationship with their theories. He saw philosophical theories as being kin to internally consistent delusions: the intellect disconnected from its own environment.

That suggests that he saw an embrace of the world as happening only in an irrational context (maybe of the sort that allows a sense of sacredness?).

This loosening would permit some properly basic belief to be existentially dependent upon language, while also having no issue accounting for those that are not.
— creativesoul

OK, so I had said that I think basic beliefs (in order to count as basic) must be pre-linguistically formed and may or may not be articulated. You seem to be saying that some basic beliefs are not pre-linguistically formed. Could you give an example of such a belief? — Janus

Sure, but first...

To be clear regarding that 'loosening' bit, I was just teasing out some different possible meanings(ambiguity) of the notion of "properly basic belief". Different people have different criteria. Different people use the same term to pick out and subsequently refer to remarkably different things.

Oh the banes of philosophy.

:wink:

Plantinga's notion is much different than my own. Sorry if that much has not been clear enough.

Strictly speaking, since there is no such thing as belief at the moment of biological conception, and there is no such thing as disembodied thought, belief and/or cognition, then it only makes sense to say that all belief begins simply and accrues in complexity. It must be that way in order for belief to be amenable to evolutionary progression.

So, with that in the forefront of thought, basic belief would have to be of the first, initial, and/or simplest sort possible while those that are not would have to be of the sort grounded upon some other more basic belief(s). Otherwise there is no difference between grounded and ungrounded belief if both qualify as basic.

However...

Plantinga blurs those lines by claiming that a properly basic belief need not be a groundless, and/or unfounded belief/proposition.

If one's worldview includes a strongly held conviction regarding belief in God, then such a person always has their belief about God in the back of their mind, so to speak. The beliefs about God for some people act as a measuring rod of sorts, constantly and continuously used to help them decide whether or not to believe things that other people say. For example, I've known some of those people to think in ways similar to this...

Since God created everything... any claim to the contrary is wrong/false/not true. This counts as rational/logical thinking, like it or not. And it is exactly this sort of thinking that makes sense of saying that a belief in God is basic.

It's not basic in the sense that I've been arguing, but rather it is basic in the sense of being an operative set of beliefs... firm 'guidelines'... that which is held to be true, and thus the measure of whether other claims are... particularly when other claims contradict one's beliefs about God.

That's a very different sort of basic than I've set out, but it's not so different from some of the other conventional notions throughout history like some mentioned in the paper/book/link.

The notion of "further existence" is fraught.
— creativesoul

I can't see why it is fraught. All I meant by anything having "further existence" is existence beyond merely human experience or perception of the thing in question; what we might think of as some kind of independent existence in other words. So a tree has "further existence" in this sense. — Janus

Talk of "further" and "beyond" makes sense in comparative measures of distance. It's unnecessarily complex in that it needs clarifying by removing the terms from their normal use.

That which exists in it's entirety prior to our discovery is prior to our naming and descriptive practices(language use). A tree exists in it's entirety prior to our attributing the name "tree" to it. As I said, I do not think that we're that far apart. Here there is no need to explain what "further" existence is. Mt Everest. Language-less belief. The moon. Iron. Etc. All sorts of things exist in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices.

Basic belief - on my view - is yet one more of those things.

You're being unnecessarily pedantic and proscriptive regarding what constitutes "normal usage". The terms "further" and "beyond" are often used beyond the context of "comparative measures of distance"; you should know that and it should have been easy enough to work out what I was saying; which simply amounted to drawing a distinction between those things which are generally thought to have independent existence and those which are not.

And you still haven't addressed the more salient question as to whether you can give some examples of basic beliefs which are generated prior to, or independently of, language use.

And also you haven't attempted to address the problem of justification I mentioned.

That suggests that he saw an embrace of the world as happening only in an irrational context (maybe of the sort that allows a sense of sacredness?). — frank

And yet the sense of the sacred is usually found in conjunction with some form of religion and Freud was against religion, believing that it has its genesis in infantile psyches.

And yet the sense of the sacred is usually found in conjunction with some form of religion and Freud was against religion, believing that it has its genesis in infantile psyches. — Janus

I think "Here's a hand" is also usually found in conjunction with some folk ontology (platitudes most people are likely to endorse).

So I read it, and my take is somewhat different, likely just because of my starting point on such things.

To begin, I saw the objective of the article to substantiate the legitimacy of a belief in God, although not to prove the existence of God. That is, the inquiry was whether the epistemological standard a believer in God accepts is substantially similar to the one that the non-believer in God accepts in other matters.

Take, for example, what Plantiga accepts as a foundational belief: "I see a tree." He suggests that one's acceptance of the tree is foundational in that it requires no proof, but it is basic, and he suggests then that a belief in God is as well. According to this, we no more need to justify the tree's existence than we do God's, which would make the argument (in theistic terminology) that our acceptance of the tree's existence is no more or less an act of faith than is our belief in the existence in God.

My initial thought is that I'm not entirely convinced that our belief in the existence of a tree is foundational, at least not for Descartes (although the existence in God was ironically foundational to him, thus providing a basis for him for our knowledge there wasn't an evil genius manipulating our thoughts). "Foundational" therefore does not mean indubitable to Plantiga, nor does it mean fundamentally necessary for comprehension in some Kantian sense. I sense that his view of foundational is a form of pragmatism.

Regardless, Plantiga's question as I take it most generally is whether it is equally rational to accept God's existence as the tree's. The part of Plantiga's analysis not really discussed in this thread, which I took to be the crux of the counterargument against him, is that of the Great Pumpkin. That is, if I can say that God exists as a foundational belief, then why would I not be able to say the same of any absurd non-physical entity, like declaring there is a Great Pumpkin who visits us each Halloween and delivers us pumpkins.

The problem, as I see it, is that we're being asked a question without being provided a basic definition of what we're being asked to believe in. It seems clear that God as Plantiga envisions him is not the Great Pumpkin, so I'm left with the conclusion that the Great Pumpkin God is not a foundational belief, which means I don't know of the existence of the Great Pumpkin God like I do of the existence of trees. So, then, what sort of god would be foundational and just as rational a thing to believe in as a tree?

I think I can conclude that a god who parts seas and sends manna from heaven would be as absurd as one who delivers pumpkins, so that god wouldn't be foundational. If the god I'm being asked to accept as foundational is some nebulous, abstract, unknown entity that might have had a hand in our existence, then I guess that could be foundational, but if it's so ill defined, I'm not sure what the atheist is denying when he denies that existence either. So, should a Christian tell you that his view of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is as foundational as my view of the tree, I think that's nonsense and fails under the Great Pumpkin objection.

The question I don't think is answered adequately is what makes Yahweh (or Zeus or the Sun God or whoever), different from the Great Pumpkin? All of this is to say that I think the Great Pumpkin objection is not adequately responded to. So, to the question, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?," a discussion of "basic" and "foundational" seem to put the cart before the horse if we don't know what God is.

You and I both see the rainbow. The use of the word "rainbow" isn't determined solely by its attachment to a private sensation; it's rather that when someone senses such a presence, it is attributed to the rainbow. — Banno

My friends Anna and Joshua both hear God. The use of the word "god" isn't determined solely by its attachment to a private sensation, it's rather than when someone senses such a presence, it is attributed to God.

You need a finer net.

So, to the question, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?," a discussion of "basic" and "foundational" seem to put the cart before the horse if we don't know what God is. — Hanover

:up:

Freud said... — frank

All sorts of stuff that are now known as "projecting"...

I suppose a direct experience might be something like the following: Standing in front of my oak tree in my back yard, as opposed to looking at the same oak tree in a picture (direct and indirect). Hearing God speak as he stands in front of you (e.g., Jesus and the disciples), or reading his words in the Bible. Although it's not always clear the way many religious people use these words. — Sam26

Would you agree that the distinction between a direct experience of X and an experience of X differ only insofar as direct experience of X is not mediated, whereas experience of X in general is mediated?

I think when someone reads the bible and hears God speaking to them through it, the experience they have is not of the character of God announcing their presence through the interpretation of words; a mediated relationship; it's a borderline aesthetic sense of identity, a tacit "this is divine" that comes from immersion in the words, like a calling or a whisper of purpose. The people who have experienced this readily distinguish it from ordinary functioning of their senses, even if the divinity expresses itself in a usual sensory modality (so no necessary divine sense to have it). It's direct in the sense of finding oneself in an intimate connection with the divine while reading, not by inferring something is divine or being caused to believe that something is divine as a result of what is read.

The answer must be in there being two sorts of basic beliefs - those that are presumed in order for an activity to occur, like keeping the bishop on its own colour in order to play chess; and those that are somehow universally basic... and "here is a hand" is one of those. — Banno

Maybe there are two senses of it.

The particularised one:
(1) A belief B of a person P in a context C is properly basic if and only if P cannot doubt B in C without a performative contradiction necessitated by the doubt.

The universalised one:
(2) A belief B is properly basic if and only if for all contexts C and all people involved in them P; P cannot doubt B in C without a performative contradiction necessitated by the doubt.

The particularised one seems way too weak; basic beliefs look as fungible as normal ones depending on the context and the person; and the universalised one seems way too strong - I can't think of many beliefs that there aren't extenuating circumstances for that would make someone able to reasonably doubt them.

Would you agree that the distinction between a direct experience of X and an experience of X differ only insofar as direct experience of X is not mediated, whereas experience of X in general is mediated? — fdrake

I would agree, but would compare direct with indirect experiences. The best way to examine these kinds of experiences is to examine context driven experiences, or how we use the words in specific cases.

I think when someone reads the bible and hears God speaking to them through it, the experience they have is not of the character of God announcing their presence through the interpretation of words; a mediated relationship; it's a borderline aesthetic sense of identity, a tacit "this is divine" that comes from immersion in the words, like a calling or a whisper of purpose. The people who have experienced this readily distinguish it from ordinary functioning of their senses, even if the divinity expresses itself in a usual sensory modality (so no necessary divine sense to have it). It's direct in the sense of finding oneself in an intimate connection with the divine while reading, not by inferring something is divine or being caused to believe that something is divine as a result of what is read. — fdrake

I generally agree that some people, maybe most view it like you've described. I considered myself a Christian for many years until recently, and believed that many subjective experiences I had were from God. For example, that quiet whisper of God speaking - a kind of divine sense, that some would argue all of us have. I now have many problems with this kind of thinking. I don't outright dismiss it, but I'm very skeptical of most of it, even though I still have a strong spiritual belief system (e.g., my beliefs associated with NDEs).

I would agree, but would compare direct with indirect experiences. The best way to examine these kinds of experiences is to examine context driven experiences, or how we use the words in specific cases. — Sam26

I don't know that there is an everyday use of words that maps neatly onto the distinction between direct and indirect experiences. Whether perceptions of X are mediated through some Y or not is much less important than whether someone "was there to experience it" or not; what makes first hand testimony first hand testimony is that someone was there, not any epistemic account of direct (or indirect) perceptual events.

It looks extremely convoluted to get a good distinction between the two experience types solely out of ordinary use of language. As in, if someone needs glasses to see more than 1 meter away clearly, but with glasses has 20/20 vision, their vision of these distant objects is mediated by the glasses. If no mediation between a perceiver and what they perceive is a pre-requisite for forming basic beliefs regarding what is perceived, then such glasses wearers cannot thereby form basic beliefs using their vision. If no mediation is sufficient, then whereas if they took their glasses off, and reverted to their poor eyesight for distance, they would be in a situation to form basic beliefs about distant objects based on their vision even though they may be unable to see clearly beyond 1 meter away!

I don't know that there is an everyday use of words that maps neatly onto the distinction between direct and indirect experiences. — fdrake

I agree with this, i.e., there is no neat way of mapping this. It's like trying to map out what pornography is, like the Supreme Court said, I know it when I see it (Justice Stewart). I know that seeing that tree in my back yard is about as basic as you can get. The problem is setting out some definition that will fit each case. I don't think that can be done. It's like trying to come up with a definition of game that will fit every use of the word. It can't be done. This is why I say that each use needs looked at on its own merits. Even the words direct and indirect have problems as you pointed out.

This is why in most of my discussions I use the phrase "generally it's the case that." So, there are some general things we can say about basic beliefs. I do think there are nonlinguistic basic beliefs along with linguistic basic beliefs, but this covers a lot of ground.

I do think there are nonlinguistic basic beliefs along with linguistic basic beliefs, but this covers a lot of ground. — Sam26

:wink:

That one's hard(impossible to me) to deny.

The trick, if there is one to be had, is taking proper account of the belief content, what they consist of. Although, I've now come to see - clearly I think - that nonlinguistic belief are not under consideration in the paper, nor have they been throughout the history of epistemology. Rather, the focus... as it ought be for questions of what counts as a knowledge claim... is the claim.

As always, good to see ya Sam!

:smile:

...drawing a distinction between those things which are generally thought to have independent existence and those which are not.

And you still haven't addressed the more salient question as to whether you can give some examples of basic beliefs which are generated prior to, or independently of, language use. — Janus

Well, I've actually already answered these concerns in this very thread. However, I do not wish to continue going on here about my own position and how it applies to Plantinga and his concerns. So, this will be my last post setting these difference out. I do reject the idea of properly basic belief being anything other than the most basic of all kinds of belief... and those are not mediated and/or expressed in language by the creature that actually formed them. That's strictly speaking concerning what counts as "basic". I lean heavily toward ordinary language use on that.

On the other hand, as I've already set out a few different times, there is most certainly a sense of what counts as " basic" that permits and/or allows complex beliefs to count as such. This is because the criterion is all about the certainty one has in such belief as well as the belief itself being basic to a bunch of other ones. Although, again... strictly speaking none of those count as basic in the sense of the very first ones. So...

The entire discussion hinges upon calling complex belief "basic", which is of no real surprise to me, because all of the ones being called so are statements of belief, and statements consist of correlations that include language use. That's already one-step-removed from being basic... strictly speaking, of course!

P.S.

And I expect we would be involved in teasing out what each of us holds as being a criterion for what counts as "independently of language use". If I remember correctly, our positions do not work with/from the same criterion of what counts as such.

I work from existential dependency and/or independency, and that involves the basic elemental constituency of the thing under consideration. I also work from the notion of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our naming and describing it. That's not a clean cut. There's some overlap. Some things are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, us, and language use... but are nonetheless things that exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them and/or our naming and describing them.

That's enough for here. This isn't the place for it. From here I'll tend towards continuing to talk about belief statements as belief... and see how they pan out as properly basic or not, according to the criteria in the link, because that is the aim of the thread.

The answer must be in there being two sorts of basic beliefs - those that are presumed in order for an activity to occur, like keeping the bishop on its own colour in order to play chess; and those that are somehow universally basic... and "here is a hand" is one of those. — Banno

"Here is a hand" is as basic as it gets for talking about hands. So, that also seems to be basic in the same sense as "bishops move diagonally" for playing chess. Both beliefs are needed in order to do something. The one is needed in order to talk about hands(language games), and the other is needed in order to play the game of chess. It's almost as if "Here is a hand" serves as a basic rule... just like "bishops move diagonally". In that sense, it's not two sorts at all, they are both the same in that they are the groundwork(basic rules) for doing something else with language.

:wink:

I generally agree that some people, maybe most view it like you've described. I considered myself a Christian for many years until recently, and believed that many subjective experiences I had were from God. For example, that quiet whisper of God speaking - a kind of divine sense, that some would argue all of us have. I now have many problems with this kind of thinking. I don't outright dismiss it, but I'm very skeptical of most of it, even though I still have a strong spiritual belief system (e.g., my beliefs associated with NDEs). — Sam26

I'm curious as to what happened. Do you no longer hear the sounds which you had attributed to God whispering, or do you still hear the sounds but now believe that they are caused by something other than God?

I'm curious as to what happened. Do you no longer hear the sounds which you had attributed to God whispering, or do you still hear the sounds but now believe that they are caused by something other than God? — Metaphysician Undercover

This discussion would take us far away from the thrust of this thread. Suffice it to say that I don't believe, because I don't think there is sufficient evidence to support many of the Christian beliefs.

By the way, I never heard sounds, it was more like a feeling or intuition.

that nonlinguistic belief are not under consideration in the paper, nor have they been throughout the history of epistemology. — creativesoul

Correct, Plantinga never discusses basic beliefs in terms of nonlinguistic beliefs. Nonlinguistic beliefs wouldn't fall under the category of epistemology.

Hey Creative, how's it going?

Correct, Plantinga never discusses basic beliefs in terms of nonlinguistic beliefs. Nonlinguistic beliefs wouldn't fall under the category of epistemology.

Hey Creative, how's it going? — Sam26

I'm good Sam.

:smile:

I think I'm going to copy and paste a few of the criteria for "basic belief" mentioned in the link. May be interesting to grant them as a means to see where things go...

Argh...

I just cannot do it! I cannot bring myself to keep reading someone talking in terms of 'perceptual beliefs' and 'memory beliefs', when that very language use alone shows clearly that the author has gotten belief itself wrong to begin with.

All beliefs are existentially dependent upon and include physiological sensory perception and memory both. So, there is no stronger ground for concluding that both are irrevocable necessary elemental constituents of all belief. Thus, removing either from the other(to separate the two) is to remove both from the belief itself, and this move renders what's left utterly inadequate, insufficient, incomplete, and just not quite enough to remain a belief.

There is no belief without either. There is no belief without both. All belief is existentially dependent upon both perception and memory. There is no such thing as a perceptual belief as compared to memory beliefs.

Perhaps this would be best put a different way. What counts as a perceptual belief and a memory belief is determined solely by us, we cannot be wrong about it. Those things do not exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. However, if we have knowledge of what all belief consist of; if we have knowledge of what all belief are existentially dependent upon; if we know what we're talking about when we're talking about belief, then we know that Platinga does not.

Sorry. I think I ought exit now.

:worry:

(1) I see a tree,
(2) I had breakfast this morning,
and
(3) That person is angry.

All three of these statements of belief are about what's happened and/or is happening.

Some belief is not.

The first is based upon(is existentially dependent upon) knowing how to use "I see a tree" and all that that entails. The second is based upon(is existentially dependent upon) knowing how to use "I had breakfast this morning" and all that that entails. The third is based upon(is existentially dependent upon) knowing how to use "That person is angry" and all that that entails.

All are based upon prior belief and not just one, but rather a plurality thereof; all of the ones required for language acquisition itself that are themselves propositional in content.

Learning the names of things is as basic as basic gets if we require all belief to have propositional content. None of the three are basic beliefs, even if we rule out non linguistic ones.

I agree with this, i.e., there is no neat way of mapping this. It's like trying to map out what pornography is, like the Supreme Court said, I know it when I see it (Justice Stewart). I know that seeing that tree in my back yard is about as basic as you can get. The problem is setting out some definition that will fit each case. I don't think that can be done. It's like trying to come up with a definition of game that will fit every use of the word. It can't be done. This is why I say that each use needs looked at on its own merits. Even the words direct and indirect have problems as you pointed out. — Sam26

Something that makes me deeply suspicious of this whole endeavour of subordinating conceptual analysis to the analysis of word use is that an idea can be posited and motivated by use and insulated from its problems by claiming that the idea itself is sound, it's just the ambiguities of language that render definitions for concepts more like family resemblances ("X tends to go together with Y in these circumstances") than complete characterisations ("X holds if and only if Y"). This is not to say behavioural indicators regarding a concept are worthless for examining how it works, it's just to say that it's not the whole story - simply because the use of words does not exhaust the domain of analysable phenomena.

Though I guess pursuing that connection would take the thread too far afield.

Learning the names of things is as basic as basic gets if we require all belief to have propositional content. None of the three are basic beliefs, even if we rule out non linguistic ones. — creativesoul

In the earlier parts of this thread I think posters have said what I'm about to reiterate, but then at some point this discussion became more of a linguistic analysis. I'm sure much is to be said about that, but I take the primary focus of the article to be pragmatic, meaning there are certain beliefs we hold to be self-evident and therefore basic and from that we build a world around it. When we see the tree, we certainly can question whether it's a tree and we can doubt all the way down to Descartes' cogito, but as a matter of pragmatics, we don't. We just start with a basic unwashed acceptance of certain things, and the question then becomes whether an acceptance of God is just as reasonable as an acceptance of trees.

For what it's worth, I think not. I think a belief in any meaningful god requires an act of faith that goes far beyond an acceptance that there is actually a real tree out there when you see it. In fact, I think a belief in God requires a suspension of rationality in some regard, and it requires a belief in purpose and meaning that goes far beyond seeing a tree. The foundational elements of most theological systems do not contain such simple statements as "the tree you see is the tree there is." They contain such statements as "The Bible is a sacred text that identifies the will of God and the path to a fulfilled and meaningful life." Surely there is a difference there.

This discussion would take us far away from the thrust of this thread. Suffice it to say that I don't believe, because I don't think there is sufficient evidence to support many of the Christian beliefs.

By the way, I never heard sounds, it was more like a feeling or intuition. — Sam26

I think it is important to the discussion because no one has adequately described whether "basic" beliefs are derived from sensations such as whisperings, or internal feelings and intuitions. It is a significant difference, because people tell us things, and we might believe what they say, and this would be an instance of deriving a belief from a sensation such as a whispering. On the other hand one might derive a belief directly from an internal feeling or an intuition, and this would be something completely different from being told something.

If we conflate these two distinct ways of deriving belief, we are headed for problems. So for instance, you had internal feelings or intuitions, which supported your belief, but you described this as "whisperings", as if an external person was telling you to believe this. Do you see how this description could be very misleading? Where is "the voice" coming from, within, or outside? If it is from within, as you now admit, then it is improper to describe it as a whispering, or voice, it is more like a feeling or intuition.

So, on the subject of a "basic belief", we have still not adequately determined whether such a thing comes from a feeling within, or from someone telling you what to believe. These two are very distinct, and if we conflate the two, and say a basic belief is some type of mixture of these two, or something like that, we will have endless discussions, lost in confusion, never getting anywhere.

All beliefs are existentially dependent upon and include physiological sensory perception and memory both. So, there is no stronger ground for concluding that both are irrevocable necessary elemental constituents of all belief. Thus, removing either from the other(to separate the two) is to remove both from the belief itself, and this move renders what's left utterly inadequate, insufficient, incomplete, and just not quite enough to remain a belief. — creativesoul

There are degrees of dependence. So it does not make sense to say all beliefs require internal elements and external elements and to say that it doesn't make sense to classify them in this way. Since a belief can be principally internally sourced, or principally externally sourced, it does make sense to classify them in this way. This is especially true if we are talking about "basic" beliefs, because we are looking for where the support for the belief comes from.

We have a distinction between theory and practise. Of course all theory contains elements from practise, and all practise contains theoretical elements, but this does not mean that the distinction is useless and bound to mislead us.

Something that makes me deeply suspicious of this whole endeavour of subordinating conceptual analysis to the analysis of word use is that an idea can be posited and motivated by use and insulated from its problems by claiming that the idea itself is sound — fdrake

If analyzing concepts isn't a matter of linguistic analysis, then what is it? Concepts by definition are linguistic, and definitions arise through use. Even when someone discovers something new, and thereby discovers a new concept, it's through use that it becomes a norm of language. It's in a culture of language that correct and incorrect uses become manifest. Furthermore, use isn't the be all and end all of the answer, simply because it takes a huge amount of effort sometimes to untangle correct use from incorrect use. This is clearly seen in Wittgenstein's Investigations, and it's clearly seen in On Certainty, which, I believe, is the actual application of Wittgenstein's thoughts in the PI.

Because something is motivated by use, it doesn't mean the idea is sound (so I agree). We often fail to understand just how complex some of these problems are, even those who think they have a good grasp of Wittgenstein's ideas (and I include myself in this class) often fail (more often than not) in their attempts to explain some of these ideas or concepts.

This is not to say behavioural indicators regarding a concept are worthless for examining how it works, it's just to say that it's not the whole story - simply because the use of words does not exhaust the domain of analysable phenomena. — fdrake

Of course the analysable data goes far beyond just a linguistic analysis. There is a danger in thinking that a linguistic analysis always answers a particular philosophical problem. I tend to use it for two reasons, first, it's where my interests lie, and second, language is the medium used to talk about these problems, especially philosophical problems.

There are degrees of dependence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not existential dependence. A is either existentially dependent upon B or it's not. If A is existentially dependent upon B. and B is existentially dependent upon C, D, and E, then so too is A.

Of these, if any are basic, it would be C, D, and E.